Yearly Archives: 2020

SEC Increases Rule 14a-8 Thresholds

Eleazer Klein is a partner and Daniel A. Goldstein and David M. Rothenberg are associates at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on their SRZ memorandum.

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) has adopted amendments to the proxy rules to increase the threshold requirements for shareholders to access a company’s proxy materials. These new rules will make it more difficult for certain shareholders seeking to submit shareholder proposals for inclusion at a company’s special or annual meeting of shareholders.

Previously, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided that for a shareholder to submit a proposal for inclusion in a company’s proxy materials, the shareholder must have continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year by the date the proposal is submitted. Under the new rules, such test is replaced with the following three alternative thresholds that will require a shareholder to demonstrate continuous ownership of at least:

  1. $2,000 of the company’s securities for at least three years;
  2. $15,000 of the company’s securities for at least two years; or
  3. $25,000 of the company’s securities for at least one year.

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Short-Termism Revisited

Matt Orsagh is a director, Jim Allen is head of Americas capital markets policy, and Kurt Schacht is managing director of the Standards and Financial Market Integrity division at CFA Institute. This post is based on their CFA report. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Improving fundamental analysis by considering agency problems

Since at least the 1980s, economists have discussed agency problems: when agents such as managers at a company act in their own interest rather than in the interests of their principals, the shareholders. CFA Institute is interested in learning how to address agency problems through better fundamental analysis that measures the costs of these problems (agency costs) and incentivizing managers to pursue an approach that is more fully aligned with the interests of their principals.

CFA Institute first focused on including agency problems in fundamental analysis in 2005 when the issue of “short-termism” was identified. Since that time, other opportunities to improve fundamental analysis have been identified, with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues coming to the fore most recently.

2005–2006: Short-termism identified and recommendations issued

In 2005, according to a survey of more than 400 financial executives, 80% of the respondents indicated that they would decrease discretionary spending on such areas as research and development, advertising, maintenance, and hiring to meet short-term earnings targets and more than 50% said they would delay new projects, even if it meant making sacrifices in value creation. [1] This admission that managers were willing to sacrifice long-term investment in favor of short-term gain was alarming.

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Board Diversity: No Longer Optional

Richa Joshi is an ESG Data Analyst at Truvalue Labs. This post is based on her Truvalue memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here).

Research finds correlation between board diversity and company’s financial performance

Several studies have established that there is a correlation between diversity and companies’ financial performance. In 2018, McKinsey’s report stated: “Diverse companies are 33% more likely to have greater financial returns than their less-diverse industry peers.” In another study, BCG reported that companies with above-average diversity at the management level generate 19% higher innovation revenues than companies with below-average diversity.

New laws and institutional investors put pressure on companies

In September 2018, California became the first U.S. state to pass a law like Senate Bill 826, mandating all public companies with executive offices in the state to have at least one woman on their boards by December 2019. Following the announcement, California companies added 68 new women on their boards, the highest among the 26 U.S. states analyzed by 2020 Women on Boards. Other U.S. states such as Massachusetts, Washington and others are following California’s lead on diversity (details on page 6). Along with the new laws, companies face pressure from institutional investors like Blackrock and State Street to improve the board diversity.

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Reclaiming “Value” in the True Purpose of the Corporation

Martin Lipton is a founding partner specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, and Kevin S. Schwartz is a partner Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here);  For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

As corporate boards have increasingly embraced broad stakeholder governance and sustainable value creation in confronting today’s urgent environmental and social challenges, some critics have sown confusion by claiming that stakeholder governance stands at odds with a duty to promote shareholder value. Remarkably, some now even argue that those directors who view their fiduciary duty as owed to the corporation—to grow its value over the long-term using their business judgment, based on regular engagement with shareholders—run afoul of Delaware law’s purportedly exclusive solicitude for shareholder value, triggering loss of the business judgment rule’s protection. Delaware law says nothing of the sort, and directors must not let such warnings deter their full commitment to sustainable long-term growth, innovation, and corporate social responsibility.

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New Law Requires Diversity on Boards of California-Based Companies

David A. Bell and Dawn Belt are partners and Jennifer J. Hitchcock is an associate at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on their Fenwick memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here).

In a move that continues California’s push for increased diversity on corporate boards, Governor Gavin Newsom on September 30, 2020 signed into law a bill that requires publicly held companies headquartered in the state to include board members from underrepresented communities. The action follows passage of a similar law in 2018 mandating that public companies headquartered in the state have at least one woman on their boards of directors by the end of 2019 (SB 826), with further future increases required depending on board size.

The law significantly expands on the diversity categories included in the legislation as originally proposed (see our prior coverage of the draft legislation here).

Companies that do not comply with the new law, AB 979, will face similar penalties as those noncompliant with SB 826, the gender diversity law: fines in the six figures, in addition to ramifications to their brand and reputation. As with SB 826, the new law contains some open questions and ambiguities that may affect implementation.

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Market Forces Already Address ESG Issues and the Issues Raised by Stakeholder Capitalism

Eugene F. Fama is the Robert R. McCormick Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on his article, originally published in ProMarket. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

Stakeholders versus Shareholders

There is currently much discussion of stakeholder capitalism, the proposition that firms should be run in the interests of all their stakeholders, including workers, and various types of securityholders, and not just shareholders.

My theme is that contract structures—the contracts negotiated among a firm’s stakeholders—address stakeholder interests. Contract structures are an important ingredient in the survival of firms. In a competitive environment, firms have incentives to negotiate contracts that allow them to deliver the products demanded by customers at the lowest cost. This survival competition benefits consumers, and with freely negotiated contracts, it benefits stakeholders.

I focus on internal stakeholders. A firm’s suppliers might be included among its stakeholders, but supplier interests are covered by suppliers. A firm’s customers might be included among its stakeholders, but in a competitive environment, satisfying customers is a first-order survival consideration for firms. If the firm is a monopsonist or a monopolist, however, these conclusions might change.

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2020 Proxy Season Review

Benjamin Colton and Robert Walker are Global Co-Heads of Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on their SSgA memorandum.

This post covers our Stewardship Engagement Guidance to companies in response to COVID-19, the integration of R-Factor™ into our Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, the enhancement of our Proxy Voting Guidelines on board quality and composition, the impact of our Fearless Girl Campaign following its third anniversary, the launch of our new Stewardship Platform to enhance operational efficiency and reporting, Q1 2020 engagement highlights, and regulatory submissions.

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Weekly Roundup: October 2–8, 2020


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 2–8, 2020.

SASB’s Proposed Revisions to Its Conceptual Framework and Rules of Procedure


Stockholder Claims Dismissed Even After Corwin Defense Fails


SEC Amends Disclosure Requirements for Business Sections, Legal Proceedings and Risk Factors


Promoting Consistency in Corporate Sustainability Reporting


Audit Committee Reporting to Shareholders




2020 Aggregate Share-Based Compensation


Maintaining Investor Trust: Independent Oversight in the System of Quality Control


On the SEC’s 2010 Enforcement Cooperation Program



Board Practices Quarterly: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion


The Department of Justice as a Gatekeeper in Whistleblower-Initiated Corporate Fraud Enforcement: Drivers and Consequences



CFTC Identifies Climate-Related Financial Risks and Urges Action


Shadow Trading


Reforming CEO Pay to Grow the Pie for Wider Society

Alex Edmans is professor of finance at London Business School. This post is based on his recently published book Grow the Pie. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive pay is a topic that has captured nearly everyone’s attention—and anger. While most company decisions, such as appointing a new CEO, changing its strategy, and selling a division, typically only make the business pages of a newspaper, executive pay frequently makes headlines. And while politicians used to run for election promising to reform healthcare and education, now they also promise to reform pay. In the 2016 US Presidential election, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton didn’t agree on much, but one of the few things they did agree on was that pay was too high. In the same year, Theresa May launched her ultimately successful campaign to become UK Prime Minister with a speech that promised to curb executive pay.

It’s easy to see why executive pay is so controversial. The sheer numbers suggest that it’s out of touch with reality. In the US, the average S&P 500 CEO earned $14.8 million in 2019, 264 times the average worker—compared to a ratio of only 42 in 1980. It seems that almost all the fruits of economic growth have gone to investors and executives, with workers gaining very little. How can it be fair for a CEO to earn in 1.5 days what an ordinary citizen earns in a whole year? This explains many citizens’ views that current capitalism benefits only the elites, and the strength of the calls for reform.

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Shadow Trading

Mihir N. Mehta is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross School of Business; David Reeb is Professor of Finance at the National University of Singapore; and Wanli Zhao is Professor of Finance at the Renmin University of China. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in The Accounting Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

We examine whether corporate insiders attempt to circumvent insider trading restrictions by facilitating trading in competitors and supply chain partners, an activity we label Shadow Trading.

To identify situations in which insiders could use their private information to facilitate shadow trading, we use corporate announcements. We focus on announcements that are likely to represent the release of private information held by a firm’s insiders such as earnings announcements, M&A transaction announcements, and announcements about new products. Using multiple proxies of informed trading from the literature to measure shadow trading, we document that immediately before one of these corporate news announcements by a focal firm, competitors and supply chain partners display increased informed trading levels in their stocks. In particular, the magnitude of informed trading is linked to the magnitude of the information shocks. Each news event appears to represent a significant opportunity for profitable trading—a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average profit from a single shadow trading event ranges from about $140,000 to over $650,000.

We also consider that there are alternate and less-nefarious explanations for their findings. For instance, shadow trading may reflect trading activity by sophisticated investors, who use proprietary and legal methods to acquire private information, or reflect unobserved market structure characteristics. To examine these possibilities, we conduct analyses using two distinct events that change insiders’ incentives to engage in shadow trading but are unlikely to affect alternative explanations.
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