Yearly Archives: 2021

ISS’ Annual Policy Survey Results

Shaun Bisman is a Principal and Han Wen Zhang is an Analyst at Compensation Advisory Partners LLC. This post is based on their CAP memorandum.

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) released on October 1st the results of its annual Global Benchmark Policy survey and its new climate survey. The surveys are part of ISS’ annual policy development process. ISS will release the final policy updates by the end of the year, to be adopted for shareholder meetings during the 2022 proxy season. This post examines key findings from the 2021 Global Benchmark Policy Survey that foreshadow shareholder expectations in 2022. Overall, the survey results align with recent trends of increased shareholder interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.

Overview of the Survey

The global benchmark policy survey covers a wide array of issues including executive compensation, board meeting practices, and governance provisions. The survey received 409 responses, of which 39% were from investors and investor-affiliated organizations, 60% from companies or corporate-affiliated organizations (“non-investors”), and the remaining 1% from non-profit and academic organizations.

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Speech by Commissioner Peirce on the Future of the SPAC Market

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks before the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law Conference. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, AJ [Harris]. It is a pleasure to be part of the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law conference. I have to start with the standard disclaimer. My views are my own and not necessarily those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

A family I know recently acquired a flock of mail-order chickens to produce free-range eggs. A baker’s dozen—thirteen little chicks—have now grown up into twelve egg-producing hens. The thirteenth is still holding out for an egg-stra egg-laying incentive, I guess. Each of these hens has her own look and personality. My favorite is the chicken who desperately wants to move out of the hen house, which is actually quite a functional dwelling, and into her featherless family’s house. This would-be inside chicken, in an effort to ingratiate herself with her “peeps,” runs up to greet any family member who comes out of the house. She also has a habit of walking up onto the deck and looking longingly through the sliding glass doors when the family is sitting inside at the dining room table. If I were part of the family, I certainly would have caved by now to the hopeful bird pleading with me from the outside, but the family has not been moved by her fowl pleas.

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Speech by Commissioner Roisman on Cybersecurity

Elad L. Roisman is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on his recent remarks before the Los Angeles County Bar Association. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Good afternoon. Thank you for the kind introduction and the opportunity to speak to the Los Angeles County Bar Association today. Before I begin, let me issue the standard disclaimer that the views I share are my own and do not represent those of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) or my fellow Commissioners.

Today I would like to speak with you about cybersecurity, a topic that is becoming increasingly important for companies and regulators as more of our registrants’ operations have moved online. The threats, strategies, and motives of cybercriminals can take many forms. To name just a few, they may be: simple account intrusions that seek to steal assets from an investor’s or customer’s accounts; ransomware attacks that seek to disable business operations in order to extract payments; and even acts of “hacktivism” that disrupt services to make a political point. Cyber events can often be hard to detect, hard to measure quickly, and can involve reporting obligations to multiple government agencies and stakeholders.

The reasons I want to talk about this today are manifold, including to emphasize the challenging position SEC registrants, in particular, face when dealing with cyber threats. I also want to stress that the SEC is only one part of the cyber regulatory landscape, but we have some specific requirements and guidance in place about areas on which to focus. Finally, I will note that I believe there is more that the Commission should contemplate in terms of cyber guidance and/or rules to ensure that companies understand our expectations and investors get the benefit of increased disclosure and protections by companies.

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Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition

Matthew J. Bloomfield is Assistant Professor of Accounting at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; Henry L. Friedman is Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of California Los Angeles Anderson School of Management; and Hwa Young Kim is a Ph.D. Student in Accounting at the University of California Los Angeles Anderson School of Management. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here);The Specter of the Giant Three by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding by Einer Elhauge (discussed on the Forum here); and Horizontal Shareholding by Einer Elhauge (discussed on the Forum here).

Over the last twenty years, the degree of common ownership of large public companies has increased considerably. In 2015, BlackRock Inc. and Vanguard Group were both top-five owners in over half of the publicly listed firms in the U.S. and Canada (Park et al. 2019). Several recent studies have raised concerns that overlapping ownership can lead to anticompetitive product market outcomes (e.g., Azar et al. 2016, Xie and Gerakos 2018). This would happen naturally if managers take actions that are in their shareholders’ best interests and their shareholders seek to maximize the value of their market- or industry-wide portfolio. Some studies have even gone so far as to recommend that antitrust regulators should limit large institutional investors to either holding only a small stake (< 1%) in any industry or holding no more than a single firm per industry (Posner et al. 2017). While the theoretical concern is well-founded, several academics and practitioners have voiced doubts about whether common ownership actually leads to anticompetitive outcomes, largely due to the passive nature of the large common owners and the low plausibility of, for instance, asset managers influencing capital structure, payout policies, board composition, or specific company practices like airline route choices or checking account fees (Hemphill and Kahan 2018, Koch et al. 2021). In short, prior literature does not provide clear evidence of a plausible mechanism through which common ownership could affect product market outcomes in an economically meaningful way.

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The Current State of Human Capital Disclosure

Alison Omens is Chief Strategy Officer, Aleksandra Radeva is Junior Analyst, and Kavya Vaghul is Senior Director of Research at JUST Capital. This post is based on a JUST Capital memorandum by Ms. Omens, Ms. Radeva, Ms. Vaghul, Emily Bonta, Catrina Notari, and Ian Sanders. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Key Findings

To meet growing expectations on human capital disclosure—from investors, workers, regulators, the American public, and other key stakeholders—the country’s 100 largest employers have work to do. Between July and August 2021, JUST Capital analyzed the 100 largest U.S. employers for how they disclose across 28 metrics covering six key human capital themes—Employment and Labor Type, Job Stability, Wages, Compensation, and Benefits, Workforce Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, Occupational Health and Safety, and Training and Education. We wanted to better understand the current state of human capital disclosure across commonly recommended standards and metrics. Overall, the data revealed three key trends:

  1. Disclosure is low across the board, with the disclosure rate below 20% for the majority of metrics.
  2. Most metrics are currently disclosed in Corporate Social Responsibility or Sustainability Reports, which do not require auditing or have standardization requirements.
  3. Metrics that have highest levels of disclosure are most likely to be reported in Annual Reports (10-K filings).

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Racial Equity Audits: A New ESG Initiative

Ron S. Berenblat and Elizabeth R. Gonzalez-Sussman are partners at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on an Olshan memorandum by Mr. Berenblat, Ms. Gonzalez-Sussman, Claudia B. Dubón, Rebecca L. Van Derlaske, Ian A. Engoron, and Sarah R. Matchett. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

I: Introduction

The increasing focus on environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) considerations at public companies, including this year’s highly publicized proxy contest at Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”), has demonstrated the growing importance of understanding ESG and the implications it can have for investors and companies. Among the many ESG developments bubbling to the forefront of the markets in recent years is the desire of investors to see companies address social justice concerns. In particular, shareholders have begun to request that companies conduct racial equity audits (“Racial Equity Audits”), which generally seek an independent, objective and holistic analysis of a company’s policies, practices, products, services and efforts to combat systemic racism in order to end discrimination within or exhibited by the company with respect to its customers, suppliers or other stakeholders. We anticipate greater interest in Racial Equity Audits and similar initiatives in the upcoming proxy season and accordingly believe companies will be pushed to critically and objectively examine their current internal practices and policies relating to equity and inclusion to identify areas in need of improvement.

A. Overview of the ESG Landscape Today

ESG considerations can be broken down into three categories. First—environmental criteria, which considers a company’s actions as a steward of the environment, such as what steps a company is taking to address the depletion of the planet’s resources, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, or the effects of climate change. [1] Second—social criteria, which considers how a company engages with all of its stakeholders (including employees, customers and suppliers) rather than just shareholders, including the treatment and diversity of its employees on the frontline, management and boardroom levels, the effects of a company on the surrounding community, and whether a company is working with suppliers who share similar socially desirable values. [2] Third—corporate governance, which considers how a company governs itself and holds itself accountable taking into account the structure and diversity of a company’s board of directors, the separation between management and the board of directors, executive compensation, equal and fair pay amongst employees, and the extent to which a company or its management or board of directors are undertaking lobbying efforts, making political and charitable donations, or engaging in corruption or bribery. [3]

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Carbon Zero and the Board

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, David M. Silk, and Ram Sachs. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

The pursuit of carbon neutrality has forced challenging board discussions about companies’ medium and long-term strategies. Increasingly, investors, customers and other stakeholders expect companies to set—and meet—carbon reduction goals. Investors, in particular, are pushing for standardized climate and sustainability metrics from companies. Forthcoming SEC rulemaking is likely to mandate such disclosures, including with respect to greenhouse gas emissions. Looking ahead, as climate metrics become widely available, and as carbon reduction commitments become operational requirements, boards will need to proactively communicate how climate change and the transition away from carbon will impact their business outlook and planning. Already, the market has rewarded companies that are well-positioned to transition to a carbon-constrained operating environment, and is starving fossil fuel production projects of necessary capital.

Within this context, directors must now grapple with near-existential questions of whether and how to transition into a low or no-emission future. Some companies may choose to proceed on course, with long-term wind-down and liquidation in mind. More frequently, boards will work with management to assess the conversion of products and operations to more sustainable alternatives. Increasingly, boards are considering whether and how to diversify into new business lines that are more resilient to climate stressors or a changing regulatory environment. All of these decisions lead to a host of disclosure, regulatory and stakeholder concerns.

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Disrupting the Disruptors? The “Going Public Process” in Transition

Aswath Damodaran is Professor of Finance at New York University Stern School of Business. This post is based on his recent paper.

For decades, the process that private companies in the United States have used to get listed on public markets has followed a familiar script, using bankers as intermediaries to price and sell their offerings, primarily to preferred clients. As the number of public offerings has surged in the last few years, there have also been disruptions at three levels.

  • The first is in the types of companies going public, with many firms entering the public markets with large losses and unformed business models. For much of the twentieth century, the prototype for a private company that was going public was that of a small, growing company, with a working business model, making or on the verge of making profits, and a need for capital that exceeded what venture capitalists could offer. The median going-public company has become larger (in terms of revenues, in constant dollar terms) and less profitable; only 20% of firms that went public between 2016 and 2020 were making money, in contrast to the 80% of firms that went public between 1980 and 1990.
  • The second is in process that a private company follows to go public, for the last few decades, has been built around bankers as intermediaries. The traditional IPO process takes too long, costs too much, and leaves both issuing companies and investors dissatisfied, the former because the process takes too long and is too inefficient, and the latter because they feel that only a select few can partake at the offer price. One alternative is direct listings, where the company dispenses with the banking services (setting an offering price and roadshows) and lets the market set the price on the offering date. This process, by reducing the need for banking intermediaries, is less costly but it still takes time and comes with constraints, especially in the context of raising capital from the offering to cover future business needs. A special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) offers a different approach to going public, with an initial listing of an entity that raises public, with the intent of merging with a private business that wants to be in the public markets. The sponsors of the SPAC are the key players in this game, since investors in the entity are dependent upon the sponsors finding a target and negotiating a good deal. While SPACS may be more time efficient, and SPAC sponsors get a little more leeway than conventional IPOs in disclosure and marketing, the sponsor’s substantial slice of capital (20% or higher) is large enough to wipe out any potential timing and pricing benefits in the deal, making them often the only winners in this process.

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Weekly Roundup: October 22–28, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 22–28, 2021.


​U.S. DOL Proposes ESG-Related Updates to the ERISA Investment Duties Regulation



ESG Regulatory Reform


The Stablecoins Debate


SEC Highlighting the Need to Consider Climate Change Disclosures in SEC Filings


Board Readiness for Shareholder Activism


Are Narcissistic CEOs All That Bad?


BlackRock to Permit Some Clients to Vote



Climate in the Boardroom 2021


Climate Stewardship



Taking Corwin Seriously


The New Landscape of Human Capital Metrics


Books and Records Demands


A Test of Stakeholder Governance


Raiders and Activists

Raiders and Activists

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis, and Sabastian V. Niles. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

We have long been advising and defending companies attacked or threatened by raiders and activists seeking to profit by bust-up takeover, greenmail extortion or increase in stock price by financial engineering and excess leverage. Those attacks and pressures have often involved reducing wages and/or firing employees, cutting CAPEX and compromising the long-term outlook, competitiveness and sustainability of the enterprise— all to the detriment of the value of the company and the shareholders who are left holding the bag after the raider/activist has emptied it. We have also long supported and innovated a number of defenses, like the “poison pill,” protective bylaws and charter provisions, amendments to state corporation statutes and federal regulations that address raider/activist proxy fights and give boards of directors the necessary tools to fulfill their duties. In 2016 we worked with the World Economic Forum to advance The New Paradigm for modernizing shareholder engagement, fostering a collaborative framework of partnership between companies, their major investors and stakeholders and creating long-term, sustainable value while advancing corporate purpose and ESG imperatives.

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