Monthly Archives: January 2021

Primary Direct Listings: A Hybrid Approach to a Traditional IPO Alternative

Anna T. Pinedo and Brian Hirshberg are partners and Carlos Juarez is a manager at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum.

Shortly before the end of his tenure as Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Chair Jay Clayton presided over the SEC as it considered and approved the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) proposed rule change modifying the NYSE’s rules in order to permit, as described below, primary issuances in connection with a direct listing of a class of the issuer’s equity securities on the exchange. As summarized in the timeline, the SEC’s consideration of the NYSE’s proposed rule change and the proposed rule change includes a number of twists and turns.

NYSE Proposal Approval Timeline

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Delaware Supreme Court Affirms AmerisourceBergen Ruling that Company Must Produce Documents

Lori Marks-Esterman, Steve Wolosky, and Andrew Freedman are partners at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on their Olshan memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Last month, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an important decision regarding stockholders’ rights to review the books and records of Delaware corporations. In AmerisourceBergen Corporation v. Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement Fund and Teamsters Local 443 Health Services & Insurance Plan, No. 60, 2020 (Del. 10, 2020), the Delaware Supreme Court, on an interlocutory appeal from the Delaware Court of Chancery, upheld the Court of Chancery’s memorandum opinion holding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a proper purpose for conducting an inspection of AmerisourceBergen’s books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“Section 220”), and directing the production of the company’s books and records. The Delaware Supreme Court decision contained three critical rulings: (i) when a Section 220 inspection demand states a proper investigatory purpose, the Section 220 demand need not identify the particular course of action the stockholder will take if the books and records confirm the suspicion of wrongdoing; (ii) a stockholder seeking a Section 220 inspection is not required to establish that the wrongdoing being investigated is actionable; and (iii) the Court of Chancery’s allowance of a post-trial deposition to identify what types of records exist was not reversible error.

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Proposed SEC Rule 144 Amendments

Jeff Karpf and Michael Dayan are partners and Marc Rotter is senior attorney at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary memorandum by Mr. Karpf, Mr. Dayan, Mr. Rotter, Adam Fleisher and Les Silverman.

On December 22, 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) published proposed amendments to Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). [1] Rule 144 is a safe harbor allowing for public resales of securities without registration under the Securities Act. [2] It includes two separate sets of requirements—one applicable to “control securities” and one applicable to “restricted securities”—both of which the SEC proposed to amend. Although the proposed change to the tacking provisions applicable in certain limited circumstances to restricted securities may appear to be the only substantive change being proposed, we believe the proposed amendments to the reporting requirements applicable to control securities, while largely technical in nature, would have the more significant practical effect of increasing the amount and timeliness of disclosure regarding sales by affiliates of foreign private issuers.

Proposed Changes to the Requirements Applicable to Control Securities

Whether a security is a “control security” depends on the investor’s relationship with the issuer—whether the investor is an “affiliate” [3]—and not how the securities were acquired. Investors holding “control securities” can rely on Rule 144 only if the issuer meets certain public information requirements, the resale complies with strict manner of sale and volume requirements and (unless the resale fits under certain de minimis thresholds) the investor files a Form 144 with the SEC. In the Proposing Release, the SEC proposed three significant changes to Form 144 filing requirements:

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New LBO Practices May Be Warranted Based on the Nine West Decision

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel, and Philip Richter and Brad Eric Scheler are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Scheler, Steven Epstein, Warren S. de Wied, and Gary L. Kaplan.

Business headlines have warned of a potential “chilling effect on buyouts” as a result of the decision recently issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re: Nine West LBO Securities Litigation (Dec. 4, 2020). Contrary to the views of some other commentators on the decision, we do not believe that the decision is likely to chill leveraged buyout activity, to upend how LBOs have been conducted, or to significantly increase the potential of liability for target company directors selling the company in an LBO. In our view, the decision is not intended to change the basic ground rules relating to LBOs, but, rather, as discussed below, the court’s result principally reflects the unusual aspects of this case.

Nine West involved the acquisition, in an LBO, of The Jones Group, Inc. (“Jones” or the “Company”) (a publicly traded fashion retail company) by an affiliate of private equity firm Sycamore Partners Management, L.P. Four years after the LBO closed, Jones (then renamed Nine West Holdings, Inc.) filed for bankruptcy. In a prior Bankruptcy Court proceeding, the court held that the LBO was not a fraudulent conveyance under the federal bankruptcy laws (because it fit within a statutory safe harbor for payments made through a financial institution). In this most recent decision, however, the court held, at the pleading stage, that the former Jones directors (none of whom, according to the court, had engaged in self-dealing or were affiliated with the buyer) may have breached their fiduciary duty to the Company by not having sufficiently evaluated whether the LBO “would lead to insolvency” post-closing. As a result, the court rejected dismissal of the claims brought by the bankruptcy trustees against the former Jones directors.

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Coordinated Engagements

Oğuzhan Karakaş is Senior Lecturer in Finance at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School; Elroy Dimson is Research Director of Finance at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School; and Xi Li is Associate Professor of Accounting at the London School of Economics. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

In our recent paper, Coordinated Engagements, we study the nature of and outcomes from coordinated engagements by a prominent international network of long-term shareholders cooperating to influence firms on environmental and social (E&S) issues. We examine the targeting and engagement strategy, success rates and financial outcomes of institutional investors who have coordinated their engagements through the Collaboration Platform provided by the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). Founded in 2006 and supported by the United Nations (the UN), PRI has become the leading network and the largest initiative worldwide for investors with a commitment to responsible ownership and long-term, sustainable returns.

Our dataset is granular and comprehensive, including 31 PRI engagement projects initiated between 2007 and 2015. Each project is originated and coordinated by PRI but is carried out by a group of investment organizations, including investment managers, asset owners, and service providers. A project involves dialogues with numerous targets—on average, with 53 public firms across the globe. Each target in a project may be engaged by a different group of owners, managers and service providers. On average, a group comprises 26 organizations (2 domestic and 24 foreign) whom we refer to collectively as ‘investors’.

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Weekly Roundup: January 15-20, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 15-20, 2021.

CEO Succession Practices in the Russell 3000 and S&P 500


The Rise of Growth Equity—Connecting PE and VC


Financing Year in Review: From Crisis to Comeback


Climate Activism: Status Check and Opportunities for Public Companies






2020 Securities Related Settlements Exceed $5.8 Billion


Directors Using Their Employer’s Email Account




SEC Resource Extraction Payments Final Rule


Why ESG Can No Longer Be a PR Exercise


The Party Structure of Mutual Funds


FTC Seeks Information Regarding Companies’ Data Collection, Use, and Advertising Practices



Racial Diversity and Investment

Racial Diversity and Investment

Colin Melvin is founder and managing director of Arkadiko Partners Ltd. and former Global Head of Stewardship at Hermes Investment Management. This post is based on his Arkadiko memorandum.

Racial diversity—iniquity and interdependence

Whilst gender diversity has been a growing priority for several years, investors have not approached racial diversity with similar enthusiasm and urgency. In the UK, the Parker Review and Baroness McGregor-Smith’s recommendations urged public policy makers and private organisations to focus on increasing ethnic minority representations on boards in FTSE 100 companies [1] and publishing ethnicity pay gap figures. [2] However, little progress has been made. The topic of racial diversity in the investment industry was recently raised in an open letter in the UK from a group called Black Women in Asset Management, challenging the industry to move beyond statements on solidarity and anti-racism. [3] The extensive Black Lives Matter protests, catalysed by the killing of George Floyd, have highlighted our interdependence in the midst of a global health crisis and the urgent need for action. It is time to ask what institutional investors can do to address the increasingly evident racial iniquities and their inconsistency with commitments to responsibility in business and investment.

Unequal opportunities

Institutional investors face a significant cultural challenge in addressing the problems of racism, unequal opportunities and an associated lack of racial diversity in their industry. It is no longer sufficient that they simply declare what they expect of investee companies in respect to diversity. They need to act upon this and embrace diversity within their own investing institutions or asset management businesses. They have an opportunity to draw parallels between the power of diversification in their investments and diversification in their hiring and management of talent, as adding significant value in both contexts. Investment teams with diverse backgrounds contribute with a larger variety of perspectives, which will ultimately increase the quality of investment decision-making.

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Performing Equity: Why Court of Chancery Transcript Rulings Are Law

Joel Friedlander is partner at Friedlander & Gorris, P.A. This post is based on his recent paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Lawyers practicing in the Delaware Court of Chancery or advising Delaware corporations about Delaware corporate law read, inquire about, cite, and disseminate transcript rulings, which are also known as bench rulings. To the practitioner, they are an indispensable tool. They influence our behavior and those of our adversaries. They help predict future litigation outcomes. In that Holmesian sense, they constitute law: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”

In the Delaware Court of Chancery, leadership applications, expedition motions, scheduling disputes, discovery motions, settlement hearings, and fee applications are regularly adjudicated orally or by entry of short minute orders. Merits rulings, such as motions to dismiss, preliminary injunction applications, advancement of legal fees, and summary judgment motions may also be adjudicated orally. A large corpus of unpublished rulings address all aspects of corporate law litigation.

Court of Chancery practitioners have long collected for future reference transcript rulings, letter opinions, orders, and other unpublished decisions. It was not until the 1990s that unpublished memorandum opinions and letter opinions became widely available on Lexis. Upon the publication a generation ago of a treatise on Delaware Court of Chancery practice, a book review attested to the treatise’s utility in light of practitioners’ prior need to collect unpublished rulings.

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FTC Seeks Information Regarding Companies’ Data Collection, Use, and Advertising Practices

Roberto J. Gonzalez and Jeannie S. Rhee are partners Steven C. Herzog is counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul, Weiss memorandum by Mr. Gonzalez, Ms. Rhee, Mr. Herzog, Carly Lagrotteria, Julie L. Rooney, and Cole A. Rabinowitz.

On December 14, 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced that it was issuing orders under section 6(b) of the FTC Act to nine social media and video streaming companies. The orders require the companies to produce a sweeping amount of information on each company’s worldwide customer base, how the companies collect, use, and present personal information, their advertising and user engagement practices, and how their practices affect children and teens. The nine companies—Amazon.com, Inc., ByteDance Ltd., Discord Inc., Facebook, Inc., Reddit, Inc., Snap Inc., Twitter, Inc., WhatsApp Inc., and YouTube LLC—were given a 45-day deadline to respond. The FTC voted 4-1 to issue the orders, with Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips filing a dissenting statement.

Background

Section 6(b) authorizes the FTC to conduct broad-based studies–or “special reports”–about certain aspects of a company’s business or industry sector. The FTC can conduct these studies even without a law enforcement purpose. The FTC seldom relies on section 6(b) to issue orders, but its reliance is not unprecedented. For example, the FTC has issued such orders in the context of requiring alcoholic beverages advertisers to provide data about their past marketing practices. In February 2020, the FTC issued section 6(b) orders to a similar set of tech companies (including Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft) seeking information related to their prior acquisitions.

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The Party Structure of Mutual Funds

Ryan Bubb and Emiliano Catan are Professors of Law at New York University School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); and The Specter of the Giant Three by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

To understand corporate governance in the United States, one must understand the voting behavior of mutual funds. In our paper The Party Structure of Mutual Funds, we develop the first systematic account of the structure of mutual fund preferences over corporate governance. We focus on two basic questions. First, what are the main ways in which mutual funds differ in their corporate governance preferences, as reflected in how they vote? Second, given that variation in voting behavior, what are the characteristic “types” of mutual funds in terms of their corporate governance philosophies?

To answer these questions, we use a comprehensive sample of mutual funds’ votes on 181,951 proposals from 5,774 portfolio companies by 4,656 mutual funds, covering the years 2010-2015. We apply a set of unsupervised machine learning techniques to the data to distill the key patterns in how mutual funds vote.  First, we apply a type of principal components analysis to summarize each mutual funds’ voting behavior in terms of their location in a two-dimensional “preference space.” Figure 1 below plots funds’ locations. Each dot represents a mutual fund, and we also mark with triangles the average location of the funds advised by each of a set of prominent advisors.

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