Monthly Archives: December 2021

Weekly Roundup: November 26-December 2, 2021

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 26-December 2, 2021.

2021 Board Effectiveness: A Survey of the C-Suite


Sustainability and Investing Lessons Learned in the Pandemic Era



SEC Staff Issues New Shareholder Proposal Guidance


Death by Committee? An Analysis of Corporate Board (Sub-) Committees


Recent Shareholder Activism Trends



Important Earnout/Milestone Drafting Points Arising from Recent Pacira and Shire Decisions


The Limits of Portfolio Primacy


Recent Delaware Derivative Stockholder Litigation Developments


Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey 2021


Dodge v. Ford: What Happened and Why?


Risks to Those Who Facilitate Ransomware Payments



ESG Continues to Find its Way into Incentive Compensation Plans

ESG Continues to Find its Way into Incentive Compensation Plans

Matthew Behrens and Annie Anderson are associates at Shearman & Sterling LLP. This post is part of the 19th Annual Corporate Governance Survey publication prepared by Shearman & Sterling LLP, by Mr. Behrens, Ms. Anderson, Richard Alsop, Doreen Lilienfeld, Gillian Moldowan, and Lona Nallengara. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Although COVID-19 and its impact on business operations brought its own challenges to issuers’ incentive compensation programs, a review of 2020 proxies showed no slowdown in the incorporation of ESG metrics into plan design. Traditional incentive compensation metrics, namely quantitative shareholder return and financial and operational metrics, still dominate but, increasingly, qualitative “social” factors, such as diversity and pay equity, are playing a meaningful role in executives’ take-home incentive pay. In the Top 100 Companies, 15 have announced in their 2020 CD&As that incentive compensation for 2021 will include new ESG metrics. The move toward ESG metrics is both a response to stakeholder pressures and a growing recognition that these factors are important to long-term shareholder value.

This post discusses the forces leading companies to adopt ESG metrics, analyzes how those companies are incorporating ESG metrics into their incentive compensation programs and discusses the challenges of establishing meaningful metrics.

READ MORE »

SPAC Mergers, IPOs, and the PSLRA’s Safe Harbor: Unpacking Claims of Regulatory Arbitrage

Amanda M. Rose is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School and Professor of Management at Vanderbilt University Owen Graduate School of Management. This post is based on her recent paper.

Merging with a SPAC has become a viable alternative to a traditional IPO as way for private companies to go public. Regulators are concerned. Fueling this concern are recent empirical studies (see here and here) showing outstanding average returns earned by SPAC IPO investors who redeem their shares or sell them on the secondary market after a deSPAC transaction is announced, and very poor average returns for SPAC investors who do not redeem or who purchase shares on the secondary market after the announcement (collectively, “deSPAC period investors”). The former group consists overwhelmingly of institutional investors, including a collection of repeat-player hedge funds referred to as the “SPAC mafia,” whereas as the latter group skews retail. These studies suggest that deSPAC period investors are systematically overvaluing SPAC shares, with the SPAC mafia and other institutional investors the primary winners and retail investors the primary losers. There are many possible reasons why deSPAC period investors may be overvaluing SPAC shares, and the SEC and Congress are considering a variety of fixes. In SPAC Mergers, IPOs, and the PSLRA’s Safe Harbor: Unpacking Claims of Regulatory Arbitrage, I focus on one possibility that has garnered significant attention: the public availability of management forecasts.

While commentators often assert that public disclosure of management forecasts is not allowed in traditional IPOs, but is allowed in deSPAC mergers, that is not technically correct. After filing a registration statement, companies doing an IPO may publicly release management forecasts, but they uniformly choose not to. This is because communications in connection with IPOs are excluded from the safe harbor for forward-looking statements contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), a provision that makes it harder for investors to win a lawsuit brought under the federal securities laws alleging that forward-looking statements were misleading. When SPACs share their target’s growth projections with investors, by contrast, those projections do enjoy the safe harbor’s protection.

READ MORE »

Risks to Those Who Facilitate Ransomware Payments

Antonia M. Apps and Adam Fee are partners and Matthew Laroche is special counsel at Milbank LLP. This post is based on their Milbank memorandum.

On November 8, 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced that it had designated virtual currency exchange Chatex, and three companies that provided support to Chatex, for facilitating financial transactions for ransomware groups. In the same release, OFAC announced the designation of two individuals, Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Yevgeniy Polyanin, who also were separately charged by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for deploying REvil ransomware to attack businesses and government entities in the United States. Vasinskyi is allegedly responsible for the July 2021 ransomware attack against the software company Kaseya, which infected more than 1,000 businesses and 40,000 computers worldwide.

We previously wrote in the post linked here about OFAC’s September 2021 actions designed to counter ransomware, principally by discouraging ransomware payments, and recommended guidelines for companies considering whether or not to pay the ransom. Below we describe the latest steps taken by OFAC and DOJ to counter ransomware and how it reinforces the risk to companies that facilitate making ransomware payments.

I. The Kaseya Attack and Latest Enforcement Actions

On July 2, 2021, Kaseya’s Incident Response team learned of a potential cyberattack affecting its VSA software. In response, Kaseya immediately shut down its servers and began warning customers. While Kaseya estimated that only about 40 of its more than 36,000 customers were victimized, more than 30 of those victim customers were service providers, which, in turn, infected their customers. Security analysts believe that those responsible for the attack leveraged multiple vulnerabilities in the VSA software to push a fake update to software users, which automatically delivered the ransomware. By design, the VSA software has administrator rights down to the client systems, meaning that an infected service provider likely automatically infected their clients’ systems. The attack was catastrophic to many of those infected. One of the publicly identified victims—Swedish grocery chain Coop—for a time had to close down more than 800 stores because the attack had crippled payment terminals.

READ MORE »

Dodge v. Ford: What Happened and Why?

Mark J. Roe is David Berg Professor of Business Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent paper. Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition, by Mark J. Roe (discussed on the Forum here).

Dodge v. Ford is one corporate law’s iconic decisions, regularly taught in law school and regularly cited as one of corporate law’s core shareholder primacy decisions. Ford Motor slashed its dividend in 1916 and minority stockholders—the Dodge brothers—successfully sued Ford Motor Company for a big dividend payout. Ford had justified skipping the dividend because he sought to do well for employees and America’s car buyers, with corporate profits a secondary motivation. The court largely rejected Ford’s justifications for holding back the dividend.

Ford’s slashing of the dividend is frequently attributed to his seeking to squeeze out the Dodge brothers from the company and to squelch the Dodges own start-up car company by turning off the dividend spigot. But, several transactional aspects undercut the squeeze-out motivation as being the sole, or even central, motivation: at the start of the dispute, the Dodge brothers offered to sell their stock to Ford for a price not much more than Ford eventually paid them; Ford could have conducted the litigation in a way more likely to make the squeeze-out succeed; and Ford Motor’s underlying expenses that led to the dividend cut were several multiples of Ford’s savings from Dodge brothers’ original sellout offer.

READ MORE »

Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey 2021

Richard Alsop, Doreen Lilienfield, and Gillian Moldowan are partners at Shearman & Sterling LLP. This post is part of the 19th Annual Corporate Governance Survey publication prepared by Shearman & Sterling LLP, by Mr. Alsop, Ms. Lilienfield, Ms. Moldowan, Lona Nallengara, and Kristina Trauger. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

The Survey

The Survey consists of a review of key governance characteristics of the Top 100 Companies, including a review of key ESG matters.

Board Size and Leadership

The average size of the board of the Top 100 Companies has decreased from 12.5 directors in 2015 to 11.6 directors in 2020, and 39 of the Top 100 Companies have split the CEO and board chair positions.

READ MORE »

Recent Delaware Derivative Stockholder Litigation Developments

Stephen Blake, Jonathan Youngwood, and Craig Waldman are partners at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Blake, Mr. Youngwood, Mr. Waldman, Peter Kazanoff, Linton Mann and Michael Garvey, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

This post reviews two recent Delaware Supreme Court opinions that reexamine the standards governing the ability of stockholders to pursue derivative claims in the name of the company against corporate directors and officers, as well as several recent decisions from the Delaware Chancery Court that continue to explore the contours of “Caremark claims” brought against corporate boards for failure of the duty of oversight in connection with negative corporate events.

In Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. v. Rosson, 2021 WL 4260639 (Del. Sept. 20, 2021), the Delaware Supreme Court overruled the concept of “dual” claims established by Gentile v. Rossettei.e., situations where there could be both direct claims litigable by stockholders and derivative claims subject to control of the company’s board, and in UFCW Union & Participating Food Industry Employers Tri-State Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, 2021 WL 4344361 (Del. Sept. 23, 2021), the Supreme Court articulated a refined test for the pleading of “demand futility”— typically the threshold test before a shareholder can take control of a derivative claim.

The Delaware Court of Chancery has also recently issued several opinions concerning claims that boards failed to oversee company operations under standard established by In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Caremark claims”). While oversight liability under Caremark is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,” these recent developments show that while the theory presents obstacles they are not insurmountable. This area has been closely watched since the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019), which allowed a Caremark claim to proceed against Blue Bell Creameries’ board related to a listeria outbreak resulting in three customer deaths. In Firemen’s Retirement System of St. Louis v. Sorenson, 2021 WL 4593777 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021), Vice Chancellor Lori Will dismissed a derivative case related to a cybersecurity breach of hotel customer data, holding that none of the current board members faced a substantial likelihood of liability for a non-exculpated claim. By contrast, in In re The Boeing Co. Derivative Litigation, 2021 WL 4059934 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021), Vice Chancellor Morgan Zurn denied motions to dismiss a derivative claim concerning Boeing’s directors’ oversight duties brought in the wake of two fatal plane crashes, finding that plaintiffs pled a substantial likelihood of liability for both failure to establish a reporting system for airplane safety and ignoring red flags related to airplane safety.

READ MORE »

Page 7 of 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7