Yearly Archives: 2022

Insider Giving

Nejat Seyhun is the Jerome B. & Eilene M. York Professor of Business Administration and Professor of Finance at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business. This post is based on a recent paper by Mr. Seyhun; Sureyya Burcu Avci, Research Scholar at Sabanci University; Cindy A. Schipani, Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor of Business Administration and Professor of Business Law at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business; and Andrew Verstein, Professor of Law at UCLA. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors by Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here).

Would any of us refuse a gift? We typically do not, unless of course the gift resembles a Trojan Horse. In this blog, we hope to convince you that even if you do not refuse it, you should treat a gift from insiders with upmost care. The problem is that previous studies have shown that corporate insiders earn abnormal returns on not only open market sales and purchases of their firms’ stock, but also on their gifts. Specifically, corporate executives tend to make charitable gifts of their firms’ common stock just prior to a decline in the company’s share prices. If insiders win, who loses? The timing of these gifts is troublesome since the evidence suggests that corporate executives may be defrauding not only their shareholders but also the charities that receive the stock and possibly the taxpayers. If insiders manipulate the information flow in their companies to maximize their benefit, this can potentially hurt the shareholders. Similarly, if insiders’ actions send a wrong signal about corporate governance in their firms, this can also hurt the shareholders. If they donate overvalued stock, the donation will not benefit the charities as much as they claim. Finally, if they unfairly maximize their tax deductions, this can hurt taxpayers. Given the significant policy implications of these findings, we revisit this important issue in an attempt to clarify why insiders are able to time their gifts successfully.

A recent case that illustrates this troublesome development occurred on July 29, 2020 in Kodak stock. After surging 2,757%, a large shareholder and member of Kodak’s board of directors, George Karfunkel donated three million shares of Kodak shares on a day when stock prices fluctuated between $17.50 and $60, (or valued between $50 million and $180 million) to a charitable synagogue in New York state (See, Devine, Curt, CNN Business, “Kodak insider’s stock donation raises new concerns around the company’s government loan“.) Less than one month later, Kodak shares were trading below $6. Had the same donation taken place on August 27, 2020, it would have been worth less than $20 million. This suspicious donation contributed to concerns about unfair business practices at Kodak and jeopardized a large government loan promise to Kodak. In return, these troubling developments have contributed to a precipitous drop in Kodak stock price, thereby severely hurting Kodak shareholders.

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Weekly Roundup: December 31, 2021–January 6, 2022


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of December 31, 2021–January 6, 2022.



SEC’s Focus on Advisory Fees—Implications for Private Fund Managers



Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking the Distinction between Legal and Business Risk in Corporate Law



Board Dialogue on DEI


Why We Should Trust Investors for Promoting Sustainability Goals




Board Responsibility for Artificial Intelligence Oversight





The Mainstreaming of ESG Investing Through Policymaking

The Mainstreaming of ESG Investing Through Policymaking

Thea Utoft Høj Jensen is Managing Director and Garielle Muhlberg is a Consultant at FTI Consulting, Inc. This post is based on their FTI Consulting memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

ESG, Sustainable Finance, Green Investments—some of the biggest buzz words in finance the last years. What used to be a niche topic has now taken centre stage. Investors’ almost insatiable appetite and legislative innovation will keep it there for quite some time to come. Staying on top of local developments is not enough, reading the international trend tea leaves will be the only way for investors to answer; what next?

On the global stage, the EU has positioned itself as the Sustainable Finance frontrunner. Boasting the world’s first ever climate law, an action plan on sustainable finance already in 2018, and its recent unparalleled green bond issuance, the EU green agenda has been travelling at a rate of knots. As seen with other high-profile initiatives, the EU is ‘setting the standard’.

EU data protection and privacy laws (the famous GDPR) are a prime example, where versions have appeared across the continent, with SA’s Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) epitomising this trend.

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Interested Voting

Matteo Gatti is Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).

Despite the ever-growing influence of institutional investors and shareholders generally in corporate governance, interested voting is not fully explored. While corporate law is indisputably attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, such transactions hardly cover all instances in which an interested shareholder may harm the corporation by casting a pivotal vote determining the outcome of a resolution. Especially in this current phase of reconcentration of corporate ownership, a deeper investigation is long due.

In a new paper, Interested Voting, I organically analyze different types of resolutions impacted by interested voting, the most typical interested shareholders, current regimes attempting to tackle the phenomenon, and possible policy fixes in areas not covered by an existing regime.

Taxonomies of interested voting

The paper presents taxonomies of interested voting based on type of shareholder resolution and type of shareholder. On the first front, I look at M&A transactions, director elections, changes to the organizational documents, and non-binding resolutions like shareholder proposals and say-on-pay votes. On the other front, I describe several types of shareholders that can be prone to interested voting. Some, like directors, managers, and controlling shareholders, are the usual suspects. But some other shareholders can be as problematic: significant shareholders, acquirers, parties to a voting agreement, cross-owners, institutional investors, shareholder activists, arbitrageurs, employees, and various types of activists (climate, labor, and political).

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ISS Releases Benchmark Policy Updates for 2022

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

This week, ISS issued its benchmark policy updates for 2022. The policy changes will apply to shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2022. The key changes for U.S. companies relate to say-on-climate proposals, board diversity, board accountability for climate disclosure by high GHG emitters, board accountability for unequal voting rights and shareholder proposals for racial equity audits, as well as the decidedly less buzzy topics of capital stock authorizations and burn rate methodology in compensation plans.

Say on climate. The policy updates distinguish between management proposals and proposals submitted by shareholders. In both cases, proposals will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but the factors taken into account will differ.

ISS indicates that its policy for management proposals represents a codification of the framework it developed last year, adjusted for relevant feedback. For management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan (or variations of same), ISS will take into account a long list of factors, including the completeness and rigor of the plan, the extent to which the company’s climate-related disclosures align with the TCFD recommendations and other market standards; disclosure of the company’s scope 1, 2 and 3 GHG emissions; the completeness and rigor of the company’s short-, medium- and long-term targets for reducing GHG emissions in line with the Paris Agreement; whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based; whether the company has committed to be “net zero” for Scopes 1, 2, and 3 emissions by 2050; whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years; whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance; disclosure regarding how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy; any specific industry decarbonization challenges; and how the company’s commitment, disclosure and performance compare to its industry peers. And that list isn’t even exhaustive.

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Enforcement Again Brings Charges for Failure to Disclose Perks

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.

Failure to disclose executive perks continues to be a flashing target for SEC Enforcement. Just last year, there were two actions against companies for disclosure failures regarding perks—Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. (see this PubCo post) and Argo Group International Holdings, Ltd. (see this PubCo post). And earlier this year, Enforcement brought settled charges against Gulfport Energy Corporation and its former CEO, Michael G. Moore, for failure to disclose some of the perks provided to Moore (see this PubCo post). Now, the SEC has once again filed settled charges against a company, ProPetro Holding Corp., and its co-founder and former CEO, Dale Redman, for failure to properly disclose executive perks—including, once again, personal use of aircraft at the company’s expense—as well as two stock pledges. While the topic is not new, the different types of blunders and slip-ups—which seem to be unique to each case—can be instructive. In this case, the focus was—in addition to absence of a policy regarding personal travel reimbursement, inadequate internal controls around perks and failure to disclose paid personal travel expenses—an inadequate process for completion and review of D&O questionnaires.

As you know, Reg S-K Item 402 requires identification of all perquisites and personal benefits by type, and quantification of any perquisite or personal benefit that exceeds the greater of $25,000 or 10% of total perquisites. Item 403, which provides for inclusion of the beneficial ownership table, requires disclosure of the number of shares beneficially owned that are pledged as security, usually disclosed in a footnote to the table.

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Board Responsibility for Artificial Intelligence Oversight

Robert G. Eccles is Visiting Professor of Management Practice at Oxford University Said Business School, and Miriam Vogel is President and CEO of EqualAI and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is quickly taking over. But not in the robot-coup type of scenario that inspires multimillion dollar box office hits. Rather, AI protects our credit cards from fraudulent activity, helps employers to hire and maintain a remote workforce during a global pandemic, and enables doctors to deliver care to patients thousands of miles away. AI is and will be a powerful tool to advance our lives, economy, and opportunities to thrive, but only if it does not perpetuate and mass produce discrimination and physical harm to individuals—and massive liability to corporations. Board members are in an optimal position to ensure that companies under their purview are prepared to avoid the harms, and litigation risks that AI could invite.

In particular, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations that safeguard against risks and ensure good corporate stewardship provide a natural home and framework to guard against these harms.

As focus on climate change grows through COP26 has made clear, the environment or “E” will be a future headline involving AI, as the outsized carbon footprint of AI inflicts increasing damage to our environment. In the meantime, corporate leadership must immediately turn to the “S,” or societal implications of AI, where harms are pervasive and liability is imminent. On the upside, if we get this right, AI can instead by an ally in addressing these harms and best practices for board “G” or governance. For instance, instead of blindly deploying AI systems that have been built and trained on data sets mostly populated by Caucasian male users, we can enhance user safety by operating transparently and noting when an AI program has been tested and trained on limited populations. Better yet, we can open our aperture and use AI to broaden our consumer base by ensuring that AI products are not just safe but also beneficial to broader swaths of the population. Likewise, AI is often considered a trigger for job loss, but if we are thoughtful and forward thinking, implementing measures like upskilling programs, workers can benefit, along with the companies and ultimately our economy, from providing a broader population to service and support AI deployment.

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Board Oversight: Key Focus Areas for 2022

Holly J. Gregory is partner at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on her Sidley memorandum.

Boards function in a complex and dynamic business setting in which stakeholder expectations and demands for board attention are expanding. The challenges of operating through the COVID-19 pandemic in an uncertain environment continue to be felt as companies anticipate a new post-pandemic normal. Companies face pressure on multiple fronts, including resistance to returning to in-person work in a highly competitive talent market, supply chain bottlenecks and inflation, the potential for a global and national economic slowdown, and increasing risk of cyberattacks, unusual climate events, and regulatory action (including antitrust enforcement and taxation), all in an atmosphere of heightened scrutiny of board oversight.

Ensuring that directors are well-positioned to satisfy their oversight responsibility requires periodic assessment of board agenda priorities and the related structures, processes, and controls that are in place to ensure that the board is well-informed on a timely basis of matters requiring attention. This post summarizes directors’ duty of oversight and highlights issues that are likely to require significant board attention in 2022, including:

  • Strategy and risk.
  • Corporate purpose and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters.
  • Human capital and workforce issues.
  • Shareholder engagement and activism.
  • Crisis management.
  • Board-management relationships and board culture.

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SEC Provides Interpretative Accounting Guidance

John Ellerman and Mike Kesner are partners at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Introduction

From time to time, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provides interpretative accounting guidance, referred to as staff accounting bulletins (SABs), to public companies. On November 24, 2021, the SEC released SAB 120, which addresses the estimation of the fair value of share grants such as stock options, restricted shares, performance awards, and other equity awards when a company issues an equity award just prior to the release of positive non-public information. This type of equity award is referred to in SAB 120 as a “spring-loaded” award. If the award is spring-loaded, the SEC believes the company may need to value the award for accounting and proxy purposes at an amount greater than the reported share price at the date of grant.

It is important to note that the statements of SEC staff in accounting bulletins are not rules or interpretations of the SEC nor are they published as bearing the SEC’s official approval. Such statements represent interpretations and practices followed by the Division of Corporate Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.

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Why We Should Trust Investors for Promoting Sustainability Goals

Wolf-Georg Ringe is Professor of Law & Finance at the University of Hamburg Faculty of Law. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

ESG investing is undoubtedly on the rise. However, many contributors to this Forum and other academic commentators remain skeptical as to the incentives and genuine interests of institutional investors in pursuing sustainability goals. For example, in a recent post, Roberto Tallarita exposes the limits of portfolio primacy and explains why policymakers should revert to traditional legal instruments for furthering such policy objectives. In this spirit, regulators frequently seek to prescribe and regulate how firms may address ESG concerns by formulating conduct standards. For example, the European Union is poised to redefine directors’ duties to include sustainability and climate objectives.

Deviating from this viewpoint, my recent paper, Investor-led Sustainability in Corporate Governance, takes a more optimistic view and makes the case for the empowerment of investors to achieve greater sustainability in capital markets. Put differently, I shift the focus of ESG away from regulatory intervention to instead favor a market-led approach in ESG investments.

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