Matteo Gatti is Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).
Despite the ever-growing influence of institutional investors and shareholders generally in corporate governance, interested voting is not fully explored. While corporate law is indisputably attentive to transactions with a controlling shareholder, such transactions hardly cover all instances in which an interested shareholder may harm the corporation by casting a pivotal vote determining the outcome of a resolution. Especially in this current phase of reconcentration of corporate ownership, a deeper investigation is long due.
In a new paper, Interested Voting, I organically analyze different types of resolutions impacted by interested voting, the most typical interested shareholders, current regimes attempting to tackle the phenomenon, and possible policy fixes in areas not covered by an existing regime.
Taxonomies of interested voting
The paper presents taxonomies of interested voting based on type of shareholder resolution and type of shareholder. On the first front, I look at M&A transactions, director elections, changes to the organizational documents, and non-binding resolutions like shareholder proposals and say-on-pay votes. On the other front, I describe several types of shareholders that can be prone to interested voting. Some, like directors, managers, and controlling shareholders, are the usual suspects. But some other shareholders can be as problematic: significant shareholders, acquirers, parties to a voting agreement, cross-owners, institutional investors, shareholder activists, arbitrageurs, employees, and various types of activists (climate, labor, and political).