Monthly Archives: June 2022

An Early Look at the 2022 Proxy Season

Hannah Orowitz is Head of ESG, Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director, and Lee Anne Hagel is Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based on a Georgeson memorandum by Ms. Orowitz, Mr. Kumar, Ms. Hagel, and Kilian Moote.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo Strine (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Introduction

An early examination of 2022 proxy season voting statistics yields a number of notable observations:

We have seen several types of proposals that attracted majority support for the first-time this season, including shareholder proposals addressing racial equity and civil rights audits, sexual harassment concerns and gender pay equity.

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Corporate Greenhouse Gas Disclosures

Lynn M. LoPucki is Security Pacific Bank Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA Law School. This post is based on his recent paper, forthcoming in the UC Davis Law Review.

On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed a rule that would make corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reporting mandatory. The rule would require nearly all public companies to report their GHG emissions, even if those emissions were not in themselves material to investors.  In doing so, the SEC has rejected the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) single-materiality approach to climate disclosures in favor of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) double-materiality approach. Under a single-materiality approach, disclosures are designed solely for use by investors; under a double-materiality approach, disclosures are designed for use by investors and other stakeholders—including the public.

Under SASB’s single-materiality approach, companies in most industries are not required to report their scope 1 and scope 2 emissions because—in SASB’s view—those emissions are not large enough to be material to investors. Under the GHG Protocol’s double-materiality approach, companies in all industries are required to report their scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. In adopting the GHG Protocol’s approach, the SEC apparently relied on the first prong of its authority to adopt regulations “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors” (emphasis added). Mandatory reporting to some version of the GHG Protocol now appears inevitable in the United States.

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Impeding a Whistleblower’s Ability to Communicate with the SEC

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

Most likely, what comes to mind when you think about companies’ impeding the ability of a whistleblower to communicate with the SEC are allegations of overly ambitious confidentiality provisions in employment agreements or company policies. Not so in this case. In April, the SEC issued an Order in connection with a settled action charging David Hansen, a co-founder and officer of NS8, Inc., a privately held fraud-detection technology company, with violating the whistleblower protections of the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that, after an NS8 employee raised concerns to Hansen about a possible securities law violation, Hansen took action to limit the employee’s access to the company’s IT systems. The SEC charged that these actions impeded the employee’s ability to communicate with the SEC in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) and imposed a $97,000 civil penalty. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce dissented, contending that the SEC’s Order “does not explain what, precisely, Mr. Hansen did to hinder or obstruct direct communication between the NS8 Employee and the Commission.”

According to the Order, in 2018 and 2019, an employee of NS8 raised concerns internally that the company was overstating the number of its paying customers and other customer data, including falsely inflating customer numbers and monthly revenue “used to formulate external communications—including to potential and existing investors.” In July 2019, the SEC alleged, the employee submitted a tip to the SEC about these concerns, and, in August 2019, he raised these concerns specifically to Hansen. As part of that conversation, the SEC alleged, he warned Hansen that “unless NS8 addressed this inflated customer data, he would reveal his allegations to NS8’s customers, investors, and any other interested parties. [Hansen] suggested that the NS8 employee raise his concerns directly to his supervisor or the CEO.” The employee then allegedly informed his supervisor and repeated his warning. As alleged, after the supervisor informed Hansen of the call with the employee, Hansen left an urgent message with the CEO. Hansen discussed the matter with the CEO, the SEC alleged, and, following that discussion, both he and the CEO “took steps to remove the NS8 Employee’s access to NS8’s IT systems.” According to the Order, the CEO advised Hansen that he had removed the employee’s administrator privileges for one system, while retaining “read-only access ‘so it looks like an error.’” Hansen also allegedly “used NS8’s administrative account to access the NS8 Employee’s company computer [and] then left the NS8 Employee’s computer and password in the CEO’s office.” According to the SEC, the employee’s social media and other accounts were accessed. Subsequently, according to the Order, the CEO fired the employee.

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“Defense Stocks” Highlight Challenges in Navigating Sustainability Taxonomies

Jason Halper is partner, Timbre Shriver is an associate, and Jayshree Balakrishnan is a law clerk at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Ms. Shriver, Mr. Balakrishnan, Ellen Holloman, Sara Bussiere and Elizabeth Moore. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Exit vs. Voice by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

It is hardly news that ESG investing is a significant aspect of the asset management industry. According to Barron’s, $400 billion was invested in U.S. mutual funds and assets that have an ESG orientation in 2021. [1] However, it remains a challenge for issuers, asset managers, regulators and other industry participants to determine whether a particular business, industry, or product promotes or is harmful to ESG considerations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine shines a spotlight on this larger issue due to shifting attitudes about “defense stocks”—e.g., stock in weapons and ammunition manufacturers and other companies in the defense industry. The defense industry does not immediately come to mind when thinking about ESG issues. From an environmental perspective, weapons production has a high carbon footprint. [2] Conservative estimates place national defense at more than 50 percent of governments’ carbon emissions. [3] From a social perspective, defense spending has historically been viewed as contrary to social good and welfare. [4] But in light of recent events, public opinion, even viewed through the ESG lens, has seemed to shift away from the potentially harmful environmental impact of the industry towards the potentially positive social impact it may have in the defense against a harmful geopolitical actor. [5] Analysts suggest that “defense is likely to be increasingly seen as a necessity that facilitates [ESG] as an enterprise, as well as maintaining peace, stability and other social goods.” [6]

The notion that a particular business or product can give rise to tension between the environmental and social aspects of ESG, or raise disputes about whether it is sustainable or socially beneficial at all, is not limited to the defense industry. For instance, in the United States, there have been significant investor complaints and confusion, as well as regulatory scrutiny surrounding the question of what constitutes a “sustainable” company. [7] Just ask Oatly, a Swedish oat milk producer and self-described sustainable company that faced significant backlash and was “cancelled” on social media after it sold a significant equity interest to a high-profile group of investors led by a private equity firm whose portfolio also includes investments in corporations accused of contributing to climate change and other unsustainable practices. [8] Though Oatly applies sustainable practices in its production process, [9] environmental activists, including some shareholders, argued that Oatly was doing more harm than good to overall sustainability by accepting these investments. However, as discussed below, this type of black and white approach does little to help assess whether a particular investment is consistent with ESG principles. Rather, ESG investing requires far more nuanced assessments that take into account, among other things, the managers’ historical statements about its ESG investing approach, the investors’ particular ESG appetite, and taxonomic classifications of the product or business. From the perspective of the private equity firm that invested in Oatly, investment in a sustainable brand could signal that sustainability can be profitable. Likewise, the defense industry illustrates the difficulties in taking a “one-size-fits-all” approach to classifying companies or products as “ESG-compliant” or not. Another example is natural gas, which, under certain circumstances, was classified as green in the EU Taxonomy Regulation (the “EU Green Taxonomy”), raising protests from various quarters about this classification. But in justifying its decision, the European Commission pointed out that “there is a role for natural gas and nuclear as a means to facilitate the transition towards a predominantly renewable-based future.” [10] Thus, while there are any number of examples, the defense industry provides a useful lens through which to examine the challenges for the asset management industry in classifying investments as sustainable or not.

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What is the Law’s Role in a Recession?

Gabriel Rauterberg is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. This post is based on a review essay in the Harvard Law Review.

The last two years have seen astonishing changes to how public institutions manage the economy in the United States and other developed countries. Like so many recent changes, this began in March 2020, when the world faced not only a public health emergency but also one of the most profound shocks to the global economy in the modern era—a shock broader than any other in eighty years. Never before had virtually all of the world’s economies suffered a contraction at the same time. Global output decreased by nearly 3.4% in 2020, the largest contraction since the Second World War. The United States saw the largest recorded demand shock in its history (-32.9%), and the unemployment rate peaked around 15% during 2020.

In response, the United States, European Union, and dozens of other governments embarked on massive campaigns of economic stimulus. Over a year and a half, the United States Congress spent almost $5 trillion across three major fiscal packages. Just the first of those bills, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (or “CARES Act”), at $2.2 trillion, was already twice the size of the Obama Administration’s principal response to the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The European Union likewise engaged in massive fiscal stimulus, also outpacing its response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (“GFC”). For a wide range of nations, this has led to the largest expansion of government spending—and associated fiscal deficits—relative to the economy’s size, since World War II. Indeed, the urgency and scale of the fiscal response to Covid-19 drew analogies to war finance, as opposed to more traditional forms of business cycle management.

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Fortune 500 General Counsel Report

Cynthia Dow leads Russell Reynolds Associates’ Legal, Risk & Compliance Officers capability; Harsonal Sachar leads Knowledge for Russell Reynolds Associates’ Legal, Risk & Compliance Officers and Human Resources Officers capabilities; and Leah Christianson is a member of Russell Reynolds Associates’ Center for Leadership Insight. This post is based on their Russell Reynolds memorandum.

High turnover & an acceleration of seasoned diverse appointments amid an intense business environment

In 2021, 59 Fortune 500 companies appointed new General Counsels. Russell Reynolds Associates wanted to study what differentiates those 59 new hires from past appointees. To do so, RRA captured the route to the top of General Counsels in the Fortune 500 (N=480), including those appointed last year (N=59), with a particular focus on diversity, career trajectory, and key experiences.

In comparison to previously hired Fortune 500 General Counsels, those appointed in 2021 are more likely to:

  1. Be female and ethnically diverse
  2. Be outsiders who are more seasoned in both their industry and the GC role
  3. Have a broader range of experiences

We hope GCs, CHROs, CEOs and boards will use these findings to:

  1. Gain a new appreciation for the pace of change and strides forward for diversity in the GC talent pool
  2. Think more proactively about internal executive development and de-risking succession planning
  3. Be more intentional about an equitable search process that includes top talent from in and outside the organization

1. General Counsels appointed in 2021 are more diverse

59 new General Counsels took the top legal job at Fortune 500 companies in 2021, an increase compared to 2020, which saw 52 General Counsels entering the ranks, and 2019, which saw 49 new appointees.

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When It Comes to Board Diversity, Regulation Helps But Is No “Silver Bullet”

Hannah Geyer is associate director of the chapter network and centers at National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). This post is based on a NACD BoardTalk publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here); Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? by Jesse M. Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and Duty and Diversity by Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

With more attention to diversity in society, boardrooms are no exception. How to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion on boards is no one-size-fits all approach; however, with increasing attention to this issue, regulations in specific states have attempted to push diversity forward. What is next for advancing board diversity, equity, and inclusion is not set in stone, but these are some trends to pay attention to as more regulations may be on the horizon—and boards need to understand all aspects of regulations related to diversity, including their benefits and challenges.

Expect More Regulation

The current state of board diversity regulation is partly dependent on the jurisdiction in which the company resides. At the end of 2021, 12 US states had either enacted or considered diversity legislation, including California, whose AB 979 requiring covered corporations to have at least one director from an underrepresented community by the end of 2021 was overturned by the Los Angeles County Superior Court mere days after the advisory council met. Meanwhile, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) last year approved Nasdaq’s board diversity rule, which requires companies listed on the Nasdaq exchange to publicly disclose board-level diversity statistics and have at least two diverse directors or explain why they do not.

Despite the fate of the California law, it is likely disclosure requirements will become both more common and more stringent given increasing stakeholder expectations around accountability and disclosure. Additionally, investor proxy voting guidelines increasingly account for board diversity. For example, State Street’s guidelines reflect the expectations that boards of all listed companies have at least one female board member and that companies in the S&P 500 disclose, at minimum, the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the board, and have at least one director from an underrepresented community. Should these expectations not be met, State Street may vote against the chair of the nominating committee.

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Decentralized Governance and the Lessons of Corporate Governance

Kevin Schwartz and David Adlerstein are Attorneys at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Schwartz, Mr. Adlerstein, David E. Kirk, and I. Andrew Mun.

While recent gyrations in cryptoasset markets have focused attention on the future contours of stablecoins, market-making, and impending regulation, another feature of the blockchain landscape is also confronting noteworthy challenges. Specifically, a new breed of business organization has emerged that is defined by its rejection of the centralized, traditional governance structures at the heart of our modern corporations. These decentralized blockchain-based organizations are conducting a substantial, growing volume of business activity, and many are encountering a variety of governance challenges. Some of these challenges are novel, but many others strikingly resemble those that corporations have confronted for decades. We believe that governance design for these organizations should heed some of the hard-fought lessons that have helped to form the pillars of modern corporate governance.

Blockchain networks that allow the limitless programming of computer code (such as Ethereum) enable software developers to create business applications that run without the need for further human administration. A prominent example is Uniswap: a decentralized application that enables the trading of cryptocurrencies through an automated market-making function, with more than $1 trillion in trading volume to date. Decentralized trading exchanges like Uniswap are but one flavor of business activity using decentralized blockchain protocols. Among other examples, there are popular decentralized applications for collateralized lending and even more sophisticated financial applications.

Very often, these protocols are controlled not by a central managerial authority or corporate organizational documents, but rather by a diffuse group that governs the protocol by referendum, in accordance with parameters built into the computer code. Blockchain applications governed in this manner are known as Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”). Typically (as in the case of Uniswap), the right to vote in a DAO’s governance is based on ownership of a cryptoasset known as a “governance token,” akin to voting rights in a corporation. There are thousands of DAOs of varying design, from simple single-purpose organizations, to elaborate formats melding governance by DAO tokenholders with traditional corporate forms. DAOs collectively hold billions of dollars of assets and can conduct business at significant scale—for instance, by pooling participants’ capital, by transacting or investing in both cryptoassets and other assets, and by interacting with other blockchain protocols and DAOs, all without centralized management or the involvement of traditional legal entities.

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CEO Pay Proposals Face Growing Investor Disapproval

Subodh Mishra is Global Head of Communications at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on an ISS memorandum by Brian Johnson, Executive Director at ISS Corporate Solutions. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here).

Key Takeaways

  • Investors rejected CEO compensation proposals through Say-on-Pay votes at a record rate in the 2021 proxy season, even though pay remained flat in FY2020
  • Proxies filed through early May indicate a strong increase in CEO pay for FY2021
  • CEO pay proposal support continues to decline in S&P 500 universe

For many companies, 2021 signaled a return to normal business after the COVID-19 pandemic upended the economy and significantly disrupted financial forecasts established at the beginning of 2020. Given the difficulty in meeting financial targets set under short- and long-term incentive plans, CEO pay levels remained essentially flat in FY2020 for both S&P 500 and Russell 3000 (excl. S&P 500) companies. Despite the lack of pay increases, investors rejected compensation proposals in Say-on-Pay votes at a historic rate during the 2021 proxy season, with a record 20 companies in the S&P 500 failing to secure majority support for their proposals.

Based on proxies filed through early May, we have observed a strong increase in CEO pay in FY2021 across the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 (excl. S&P 500) universes. Median Total Summary Compensation Table (SCT) CEO pay for S&P 500 companies is up 9 percent for the year and has increased almost 40 percent in the Russell 3000 (excl. S&P 500). Say-on-Pay votes held as of May 9 indicate that investor support for CEO packages continues to erode at many companies. Median support for Say-on-Pay at S&P 500 companies is on track to decline for an eighth consecutive year. These results suggest a growing disconnect between board determinations of CEO compensation and what shareholders are willing to accept.

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The SEC’s Cyber Disclosures

Shiva Rajgopal is Roy Bernard Kester and T.W. Byrnes Professor of Accounting and Auditing at Columbia Business School, and Alex Sharpe is founder of Sharpe Consulting LLC. This post is based on their recent comment letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

This post is based on a comment letter on the SEC’s cyber disclosures submitted jointly by me, Shiva Rajgopal, and my co-author, Alex Sharpe. I chair both the Cybersecurity and Board Director programs for Columbia Business School, entitled Leading Cybersecurity at Your Organization and Corporate Governance Program: Developing Exceptional Board Leaders respectively. Alex Sharpe is a long-time cybersecurity and business strategy professional with real world operational experience. He has over 30 years of experience working these areas nationally and internationally for both the public and private sectors including the U.S. Intelligence Community and regulators.

To frame our comments, it is useful to summarize what the new SEC rule asks for:

  • The rule requires current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents on Form 8-Ks within four business days;
  • The rule requires periodic disclosures regarding, among other things:
    • A firm’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks;
    • Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures;
    • Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; and
  • The rule asks for updates about previously reported material cybersecurity incidents.

We support the new requirements in principle. However, we believe these requirements do not go far enough in certain areas and can be refined in others. We also believe that the rules need to be expanded to address all three of the Commission’s roles. As written, the proposed changes are highly focused on near term aspects of protecting investors (the first role): (i) protect investors; (ii) maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and (iii) facilitate capital formation.

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