Yearly Archives: 2022

Policy Insights: Say on Climate

John Galloway is Global Head of Investment Stewardship at Vanguard, Inc. This post is based on a publication by Vanguard Investment Stewardship.

Executive summary

  • At this time, Vanguard does not proactively encourage companies to hold a “Say on Climate” vote given the lack of established standards or widely accepted market norms that govern these votes.
  • When a company chooses to hold a “Say on Climate” vote, Vanguard expects the board to provide clear disclosure of the rationale for the vote, to articulate the oversight mechanisms and implications of the vote, and to produce robust reporting in line with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) framework.
  • Vanguard does not seek to direct company strategy. We view “Say on Climate” votes as a signal on the coherence and comprehensiveness of the reporting and disclosures a company provides to explain its climate plan to the market, rather than an endorsement of, or an expression of lack of confidence in, the plan itself.

Developments in Say on Climate votes

Last year we outlined our approach to evaluating Say on Climate proposals that encouraged companies to disclose climate transition plans.

We have since observed a significant increase in management-proposed climate plans that are put to an advisory shareholder vote, primarily among European and Australian companies. The specific forms and governance mechanisms of these votes remain heterogeneous, as some companies mirror the framework of “Say on Pay” (a vote on the plan every three years, and an annual vote on a progress report) while others opt for “test and learn” or “one and done” approaches. The various choices boards make amid the lack of consensus or convergence of frameworks and standards on these votes creates some confusion and complexities that investors and other stakeholders are working to navigate.

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The Quest for Legitimacy in Corporate Law

Stavros Gadinis is Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law and Christopher Havsay is Climenko Fellow at Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. Candidate at Harvard University in the Government Department. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

The waves of politics, culture, and identity are crashing over corporate headquarters. Disney’s recent criticism of Florida’s “Don’t Say Gay” law resulted in the company losing its tax status with the state following a political backlash. Tech giants like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, have been repeatedly rocked by employee walkouts. Corporations’ social choices are attracting criticism from a wide variety of stakeholders across the ideological spectrum. Progressives denounce corporate initiatives as mere facades aimed to deflect from the lack of desired social, political, and economic progress, illustrated by their familiar “greenwashing” critique of corporate actions on climate change. Meanwhile, conservatives bemoan companies’ newfound enthusiasm for social causes as out-of-bounds for a profit-making entity and castigate managers as mouthpieces of “woke” elites who are imposing their values on an unwilling public.

Rather than simply rebuking corporate choices, these attacks are increasingly focusing on managers’ competence to decide controversial social issues, questioning their accountability and representativeness, and portraying managers’ motivations as suspicious and biased. Critics left and right are united in their perceptions that managers wield seemingly arbitrary powers over their subordinates, control vast economic resources, and influence our wider society in untold ways through political lobbying. Should corporate managers possess such authority to spearhead broad societal change?

This question may sound bewildering to corporate governance specialists, but it is easily recognizable to experts on administrative agencies as a challenge on the legitimacy of managerial authority. It echoes doubts long raised against policymaking by administrative agencies: lack of democratic authorization, concerns about overpowerful rule-setters, unease at the delegation of important policy choices to unaccountable and unrepresentative officials, and opaqueness of decision-making processes. To contend with these fears, administrative law has honed a toolbox of institutional design and policy mechanisms to bolster the legitimacy of agency decision-making by offering substantive and procedural justifications for the exercise of authority. These processes, such as the development of notice-and-comment procedures, increased disclosure and transparency requirements, and agency emphasis on developing policy through predictable rulemaking procedures rather than other ad hoc mechanisms, provide the foundation of why agencies hold such important powers in our democratic society.

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Four Traps Boards Should Avoid

David Brown is managing director of Alvarez & Marsal. This post is based on a NACD BoardTalk publication.

The COVID-19 pandemic required directors to immerse themselves in the weeds of day-to-day decision-making. Small decisions, such as who came into the office and how often, became big decisions as the disruption’s massive shock waves impacted almost every aspect of operations. Now that we find ourselves in a different phase of the pandemic, there seem to be a few disturbing holdover trends from the height of COVID-19 impacting many corporate boards. Here are four of them and what directors can do to maximize their boards’ effectiveness in this time of market turmoil.

1. Too many are involved in the day-to-day operations of the company. Pandemic-related or not, some boards seem to have forgotten their strategic role, inserting themselves into areas squarely owned (and for good reason) by the C-suite. This is especially apparent in cases where an executive retires and takes a seat on the board but can’t leave their former duties alone.

How can you recognize if your board is slipping into management territory? Look for instances of micromanagement, such as board members directly calling on staff to have meetings or to weigh in on issues, or cases where the board sets spending approval bars too low for capital or other expenses. I’ve seen boards require spending approval for as little as $100,000. This added layer of approval will slow speed to value, and, in extreme cases, may disincentivize executives from making smart investments in the business.

The Fix: Hold your executives accountable for decisions about operations and spending. Eliminate non-board meeting communications with them unless there’s a crisis or unexpected event. And then only do so during a called board meeting.

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An Early Look at the 2022 Proxy Season

Hannah Orowitz is Head of ESG, Rajeev Kumar is Senior Managing Director, and Lee Anne Hagel is Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based on a Georgeson memorandum by Ms. Orowitz, Mr. Kumar, Ms. Hagel, and Kilian Moote.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo Strine (discussed on the Forum here); and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Introduction

An early examination of 2022 proxy season voting statistics yields a number of notable observations:

We have seen several types of proposals that attracted majority support for the first-time this season, including shareholder proposals addressing racial equity and civil rights audits, sexual harassment concerns and gender pay equity.

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Corporate Greenhouse Gas Disclosures

Lynn M. LoPucki is Security Pacific Bank Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA Law School. This post is based on his recent paper, forthcoming in the UC Davis Law Review.

On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed a rule that would make corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reporting mandatory. The rule would require nearly all public companies to report their GHG emissions, even if those emissions were not in themselves material to investors.  In doing so, the SEC has rejected the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) single-materiality approach to climate disclosures in favor of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) double-materiality approach. Under a single-materiality approach, disclosures are designed solely for use by investors; under a double-materiality approach, disclosures are designed for use by investors and other stakeholders—including the public.

Under SASB’s single-materiality approach, companies in most industries are not required to report their scope 1 and scope 2 emissions because—in SASB’s view—those emissions are not large enough to be material to investors. Under the GHG Protocol’s double-materiality approach, companies in all industries are required to report their scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. In adopting the GHG Protocol’s approach, the SEC apparently relied on the first prong of its authority to adopt regulations “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors” (emphasis added). Mandatory reporting to some version of the GHG Protocol now appears inevitable in the United States.

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Impeding a Whistleblower’s Ability to Communicate with the SEC

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

Most likely, what comes to mind when you think about companies’ impeding the ability of a whistleblower to communicate with the SEC are allegations of overly ambitious confidentiality provisions in employment agreements or company policies. Not so in this case. In April, the SEC issued an Order in connection with a settled action charging David Hansen, a co-founder and officer of NS8, Inc., a privately held fraud-detection technology company, with violating the whistleblower protections of the Exchange Act. The SEC alleged that, after an NS8 employee raised concerns to Hansen about a possible securities law violation, Hansen took action to limit the employee’s access to the company’s IT systems. The SEC charged that these actions impeded the employee’s ability to communicate with the SEC in violation of Rule 21F-17(a) and imposed a $97,000 civil penalty. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce dissented, contending that the SEC’s Order “does not explain what, precisely, Mr. Hansen did to hinder or obstruct direct communication between the NS8 Employee and the Commission.”

According to the Order, in 2018 and 2019, an employee of NS8 raised concerns internally that the company was overstating the number of its paying customers and other customer data, including falsely inflating customer numbers and monthly revenue “used to formulate external communications—including to potential and existing investors.” In July 2019, the SEC alleged, the employee submitted a tip to the SEC about these concerns, and, in August 2019, he raised these concerns specifically to Hansen. As part of that conversation, the SEC alleged, he warned Hansen that “unless NS8 addressed this inflated customer data, he would reveal his allegations to NS8’s customers, investors, and any other interested parties. [Hansen] suggested that the NS8 employee raise his concerns directly to his supervisor or the CEO.” The employee then allegedly informed his supervisor and repeated his warning. As alleged, after the supervisor informed Hansen of the call with the employee, Hansen left an urgent message with the CEO. Hansen discussed the matter with the CEO, the SEC alleged, and, following that discussion, both he and the CEO “took steps to remove the NS8 Employee’s access to NS8’s IT systems.” According to the Order, the CEO advised Hansen that he had removed the employee’s administrator privileges for one system, while retaining “read-only access ‘so it looks like an error.’” Hansen also allegedly “used NS8’s administrative account to access the NS8 Employee’s company computer [and] then left the NS8 Employee’s computer and password in the CEO’s office.” According to the SEC, the employee’s social media and other accounts were accessed. Subsequently, according to the Order, the CEO fired the employee.

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“Defense Stocks” Highlight Challenges in Navigating Sustainability Taxonomies

Jason Halper is partner, Timbre Shriver is an associate, and Jayshree Balakrishnan is a law clerk at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader memorandum by Mr. Halper, Ms. Shriver, Mr. Balakrishnan, Ellen Holloman, Sara Bussiere and Elizabeth Moore. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here); and Exit vs. Voice by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here).

It is hardly news that ESG investing is a significant aspect of the asset management industry. According to Barron’s, $400 billion was invested in U.S. mutual funds and assets that have an ESG orientation in 2021. [1] However, it remains a challenge for issuers, asset managers, regulators and other industry participants to determine whether a particular business, industry, or product promotes or is harmful to ESG considerations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine shines a spotlight on this larger issue due to shifting attitudes about “defense stocks”—e.g., stock in weapons and ammunition manufacturers and other companies in the defense industry. The defense industry does not immediately come to mind when thinking about ESG issues. From an environmental perspective, weapons production has a high carbon footprint. [2] Conservative estimates place national defense at more than 50 percent of governments’ carbon emissions. [3] From a social perspective, defense spending has historically been viewed as contrary to social good and welfare. [4] But in light of recent events, public opinion, even viewed through the ESG lens, has seemed to shift away from the potentially harmful environmental impact of the industry towards the potentially positive social impact it may have in the defense against a harmful geopolitical actor. [5] Analysts suggest that “defense is likely to be increasingly seen as a necessity that facilitates [ESG] as an enterprise, as well as maintaining peace, stability and other social goods.” [6]

The notion that a particular business or product can give rise to tension between the environmental and social aspects of ESG, or raise disputes about whether it is sustainable or socially beneficial at all, is not limited to the defense industry. For instance, in the United States, there have been significant investor complaints and confusion, as well as regulatory scrutiny surrounding the question of what constitutes a “sustainable” company. [7] Just ask Oatly, a Swedish oat milk producer and self-described sustainable company that faced significant backlash and was “cancelled” on social media after it sold a significant equity interest to a high-profile group of investors led by a private equity firm whose portfolio also includes investments in corporations accused of contributing to climate change and other unsustainable practices. [8] Though Oatly applies sustainable practices in its production process, [9] environmental activists, including some shareholders, argued that Oatly was doing more harm than good to overall sustainability by accepting these investments. However, as discussed below, this type of black and white approach does little to help assess whether a particular investment is consistent with ESG principles. Rather, ESG investing requires far more nuanced assessments that take into account, among other things, the managers’ historical statements about its ESG investing approach, the investors’ particular ESG appetite, and taxonomic classifications of the product or business. From the perspective of the private equity firm that invested in Oatly, investment in a sustainable brand could signal that sustainability can be profitable. Likewise, the defense industry illustrates the difficulties in taking a “one-size-fits-all” approach to classifying companies or products as “ESG-compliant” or not. Another example is natural gas, which, under certain circumstances, was classified as green in the EU Taxonomy Regulation (the “EU Green Taxonomy”), raising protests from various quarters about this classification. But in justifying its decision, the European Commission pointed out that “there is a role for natural gas and nuclear as a means to facilitate the transition towards a predominantly renewable-based future.” [10] Thus, while there are any number of examples, the defense industry provides a useful lens through which to examine the challenges for the asset management industry in classifying investments as sustainable or not.

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What is the Law’s Role in a Recession?

Gabriel Rauterberg is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. This post is based on a review essay in the Harvard Law Review.

The last two years have seen astonishing changes to how public institutions manage the economy in the United States and other developed countries. Like so many recent changes, this began in March 2020, when the world faced not only a public health emergency but also one of the most profound shocks to the global economy in the modern era—a shock broader than any other in eighty years. Never before had virtually all of the world’s economies suffered a contraction at the same time. Global output decreased by nearly 3.4% in 2020, the largest contraction since the Second World War. The United States saw the largest recorded demand shock in its history (-32.9%), and the unemployment rate peaked around 15% during 2020.

In response, the United States, European Union, and dozens of other governments embarked on massive campaigns of economic stimulus. Over a year and a half, the United States Congress spent almost $5 trillion across three major fiscal packages. Just the first of those bills, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (or “CARES Act”), at $2.2 trillion, was already twice the size of the Obama Administration’s principal response to the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The European Union likewise engaged in massive fiscal stimulus, also outpacing its response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (“GFC”). For a wide range of nations, this has led to the largest expansion of government spending—and associated fiscal deficits—relative to the economy’s size, since World War II. Indeed, the urgency and scale of the fiscal response to Covid-19 drew analogies to war finance, as opposed to more traditional forms of business cycle management.

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Fortune 500 General Counsel Report

Cynthia Dow leads Russell Reynolds Associates’ Legal, Risk & Compliance Officers capability; Harsonal Sachar leads Knowledge for Russell Reynolds Associates’ Legal, Risk & Compliance Officers and Human Resources Officers capabilities; and Leah Christianson is a member of Russell Reynolds Associates’ Center for Leadership Insight. This post is based on their Russell Reynolds memorandum.

High turnover & an acceleration of seasoned diverse appointments amid an intense business environment

In 2021, 59 Fortune 500 companies appointed new General Counsels. Russell Reynolds Associates wanted to study what differentiates those 59 new hires from past appointees. To do so, RRA captured the route to the top of General Counsels in the Fortune 500 (N=480), including those appointed last year (N=59), with a particular focus on diversity, career trajectory, and key experiences.

In comparison to previously hired Fortune 500 General Counsels, those appointed in 2021 are more likely to:

  1. Be female and ethnically diverse
  2. Be outsiders who are more seasoned in both their industry and the GC role
  3. Have a broader range of experiences

We hope GCs, CHROs, CEOs and boards will use these findings to:

  1. Gain a new appreciation for the pace of change and strides forward for diversity in the GC talent pool
  2. Think more proactively about internal executive development and de-risking succession planning
  3. Be more intentional about an equitable search process that includes top talent from in and outside the organization

1. General Counsels appointed in 2021 are more diverse

59 new General Counsels took the top legal job at Fortune 500 companies in 2021, an increase compared to 2020, which saw 52 General Counsels entering the ranks, and 2019, which saw 49 new appointees.

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When It Comes to Board Diversity, Regulation Helps But Is No “Silver Bullet”

Hannah Geyer is associate director of the chapter network and centers at National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). This post is based on a NACD BoardTalk publication. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here); Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? by Jesse M. Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and Duty and Diversity by Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

With more attention to diversity in society, boardrooms are no exception. How to advance diversity, equity, and inclusion on boards is no one-size-fits all approach; however, with increasing attention to this issue, regulations in specific states have attempted to push diversity forward. What is next for advancing board diversity, equity, and inclusion is not set in stone, but these are some trends to pay attention to as more regulations may be on the horizon—and boards need to understand all aspects of regulations related to diversity, including their benefits and challenges.

Expect More Regulation

The current state of board diversity regulation is partly dependent on the jurisdiction in which the company resides. At the end of 2021, 12 US states had either enacted or considered diversity legislation, including California, whose AB 979 requiring covered corporations to have at least one director from an underrepresented community by the end of 2021 was overturned by the Los Angeles County Superior Court mere days after the advisory council met. Meanwhile, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) last year approved Nasdaq’s board diversity rule, which requires companies listed on the Nasdaq exchange to publicly disclose board-level diversity statistics and have at least two diverse directors or explain why they do not.

Despite the fate of the California law, it is likely disclosure requirements will become both more common and more stringent given increasing stakeholder expectations around accountability and disclosure. Additionally, investor proxy voting guidelines increasingly account for board diversity. For example, State Street’s guidelines reflect the expectations that boards of all listed companies have at least one female board member and that companies in the S&P 500 disclose, at minimum, the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the board, and have at least one director from an underrepresented community. Should these expectations not be met, State Street may vote against the chair of the nominating committee.

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