Yearly Archives: 2023

SEC Spring 2023 Reg-Flex Agenda — Not Much New But Lots Left To Do

Cydney S. Posner is Special Counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

The SEC’s Spring 2023 Reg-Flex Agenda—according to the preamble, compiled as of April 10, 2023, reflecting “only the priorities of the Chair”—has now been posted. Here is the short-term agenda, which shows most Corp Fin agenda items targeted for action by October 2023, potentially making the next four months an especially frenetic period, with only a few proposal-stage items targeted for April 2024.  And here is the long-term (maybe never) agenda. Describing the new agenda, SEC Chair Gary Gensler observed that “[t]echnology, markets, and business models constantly change. Thus, the nature of the SEC’s work must evolve as the markets we oversee evolve. In every generation since President Franklin Roosevelt’s, our Commission has updated its ruleset to meet the challenges of a new hour. Consistent with our legal mandate, guided by economic analysis, and informed by public comment, this agenda reflects the latest step in that long tradition.”

The short-term agenda includes a half dozen or so potential proposals that were on the Fall 2022 agenda, but didn’t quite make it out of the starting gate, such as plans for disclosure regarding corporate board diversity and human capital. Similarly, issues related to the private markets are still awaiting proposals.  The question of why and how to address the decline in the number of public companies has, in the recent past, been a point of contention among the commissioners: is excessive regulation of public companies a deterrent to going public or has deregulation of the private markets juiced their appeal, but sacrificed investor protection in the bargain? That debate may play out in the coming months with two new proposals targeted for October this year: a plan to amend the definition of “holders of record” and a proposal to amend Reg D, including updates to the accredited investor definition.  And the behemoth proposal regarding climate change disclosure—identified on the last agenda as targeted for final action but not considered for adoption on the schedule as planned—reappears on the current calendar with a later target date. Will that new target be met? Notably, political spending disclosure is, once again, not identified on the agenda. That’s because Section 633 of the Appropriations Act once again prohibits the SEC from using any of the funds appropriated “to finalize, issue, or implement any rule, regulation, or order regarding the disclosure of  political contributions, contributions to tax exempt organizations, or dues paid to trade associations.”

READ MORE »

Delaware Rulings Underscore the Importance of Preserving Documents

Gregory P. Ranzini and TJ Rivera are Associates at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Document discovery plays an essential role in litigation. Litigants and courts rely on documentary exhibits, along with witness testimony about such exhibits, to create a trial record. As a result, courts expect that parties will take reasonable steps to preserve documents. When they fail to do so, heated disputes over spoliation can arise. In some egregious cases, these spoliation fights can grow to overshadow the substantive issues in the case, or even influence or dictate the outcome.

Two recent Delaware opinions address the types of sanctions that are potentially available under Delaware law for spoliation of evidence, and when they will be imposed.

  • In Harris v. Harris, the Court of Chancery for the first time imposed an adverse inference at the motion to dismiss stage and held that it could do so without treating the inference as a formal discovery sanction under Rule 37.
  • In BDO USA, LLP v. EverGlade Global, Inc., Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick of the Delaware Court of Chancery, sitting by designation as a Delaware Superior Court judge, granted default judgment as a discovery sanction under a theory of respondeat superior.

These cases serve as reminders for Delaware litigants and practitioners alike that document discovery is not just a formality to observe on the way to the “real” litigation. Rather, the courts take discovery conduct seriously and will not hesitate to grant relief when the interests of justice so require.

READ MORE »

High Bar for Challenge of Business Decisions by an Independent Board

Gail Weinstein is Senior Counsel, and Philip Richter, and Steven Epstein are Partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Mr. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, Brian T. Mangino, Andrew J. Colosimo and  Randi Lally and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

In City of Coral Springs Police Officers’ Pension Plan v. Jack Dorsey, Block, Inc., et al (May 9, 2023), the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a lawsuit against the directors of Block, Inc. (a tech company, originally called Square, Inc., led by former Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey) challenging Block’s $237.3 million acquisition in 2021 of an 86.23% stake in TIDAL, a music streaming company 27% owned by Shawn Carter (who is professionally known as Jay-Z). The court dismissed the case after finding that the plaintiffs did not establish that the independent directors of Block acted with bad faith (and that, therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish demand futility).

Key Points

  • The decision serves as a reminder of the very high bar for a finding that an independent board acted in bad faith. Even in the context of a decision to approve what was “by all accounts, a terrible deal” following a minimal and flawed process, an independent and disinterested board will not have liability unless it acted in bad faith. This decision indicates that, generally, the court will not find bad faith unless the board essentially did almost nothing to evaluate the transaction before approving it. In this case, where the directors received a presentation about the transaction, had three short meetings, and asked management questions, they had not acted in bad faith, the court found—even though, apparently, the answers to the questions they asked all strongly indicated that the deal should not be done.
  • The court continues its trend in recent years of criticizing a flawed process even when reaching a holding for the defendants. This is another case in which, although the court held that the director defendants had no liability, the court’s recitation of the background facts and other commentary made clear the court’s view that Dorsey may have been motivated by his friendship with Carter and that the directors had not done a good job and had made what was obviously a “terrible business decision.”

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: June 23-29, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 23-29, 2023.

Commentary: Our Proxy Advice is Apolitical


Nine Mistakes To Avoid When Transitioning CEOs


Ruling Provides Roadmap For Navigating Transactions With Fiduciary on Both Sides


Dynamic CEO-Board Cultural Proximity


Demonstrating Pay and Performance Alignment


Side Letter Governance


The Activism Vulnerability Report



2023 AGM Early Season Review




The Rise of International ESG Disclosure Standards

David A. Cifrino is Counsel at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on his MWE memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.; and Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (discussed on the Forum here) by Mark J. Roe.

New regulations expected to be adopted in 2023 will result in exponential growth in the amount of environmental, social and governance (ESG), i.e., sustainability, data generated by reporting companies and available to investors.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is expected to adopt final rules requiring detailed disclosure by companies of climate-related risks and opportunities by the end of 2023. The newly-formed International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) is expected to adopt two reporting standards in June: one on climate-related risks, and a second on other sustainability related information. Regardless of how much harmonisation there will be between these and other ESG disclosure standards, it is clear that mandatory, standardised sustainability reporting by corporations will increase significantly worldwide over the next few years.

The Data Driven and Rapidly Consolidating Global ESG Investing Ecosystem

The demand for enhanced ESG disclosure is intense. Globally, overall ESG investing is massive, having grown as much as tenfold in the last decade. Morningstar, Inc. estimated that total assets in ESG designated funds totaled more than US$3.9 trillion at the end of September 2021. The evolution in ESG investing has been accompanied by exponential growth in the amount and types of data available for ESG investors to consider. The number of public companies publishing corporate sustainability reports grew from less than 20 in the early 1990s to more than 10,000 companies today, and about 90% of the Fortune Global 500 have set carbon emission targets, up from 30% in 2009.

The world’s largest asset manager, Blackrock, Inc., noted in a comment letter to the US Department of Labor regarding pension fund regulation that, as ESG data has become more accessible, the firm has developed a better understanding of financially relevant ESG information, and ESG funds that incorporate financially relevant ESG data have become more common. BlackRock stated that its systems for ESG analysis have access to more than 2,000 categories of ESG metrics from various ESG data providers. The firm concluded that, because of the greater volume of ESG-related disclosures by companies and third party ESG vendors, together with advancements in technology, “the use of ESG data to seek enhanced investment returns and/or mitigate investment risks has become more sophisticated.”

READ MORE »

The Bipartisan SEC Whistleblower Reform Bill: Building on Success

Allison Herren Lee is Of Counsel at Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto LLP. This post is based on her Kohn, Kohn, & Colapinto piece.

The SEC’s whistleblower program has been a resounding success – a point that has been echoed by SEC Chairs and Commissioners from both sides of the aisle. Indeed, whistleblowers have helped to take over $1.5 billion out of the pockets of fraudsters and put it back into the hands of their victims.  The program has garnered over $6.3 billion in sanctions and, importantly, awarded over $1.5 billion to the courageous women and men who helped bring misconduct to light.

It is this very success that highlights the wisdom, and anti-corruption benefits, of continually working to improve and build upon the promise of this impressive record. Fortunately, a bipartisan group of Senators agree and have put forth the SEC Whistleblower Reform Act of 2023.  Introduced by Senators Grassley (R-IA) and Warren (D-MA) on March 15, and cosponsored by Senators Collins (R-ME), Warnock (D-GA) and Cortez Masto (D-NV), this legislation is designed to make some important improvements to the SEC’s existing program.

Most notably, the legislation would address the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers which stripped workers of protection from retaliation when they have reported corporate misconduct internally but not externally to the SEC. In addition, it would reinforce important safeguards to prevent companies from using policies or practices designed to muzzle whistleblowers.

READ MORE »

2023 AGM Early Season Review

Amanda Buthe is a Director, Rajeev Kumar is a Senior Managing Director and Kilian Moote is a Managing Director at Georgeson LLC. This post is based on a Georgeson memorandum by Ms. Buthe, Mr. Kumar, Mr. Moote, Daniel Chang, Brigid Rosati, and Michael Maiolo. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

The 2023 Annual General Meeting (AGM) season has been a record-breaking for ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) shareholder proposal submissions. As of May 15, there have been 951 ESG proposals submitted, surpassing 941 submissions in the previous year.

Despite the increased number of ESG proposals, overall support for ESG initiatives has declined in the past two years, with the number of proposals receiving majority support decreased significantly. Only 24 proposals received majority support up until May 12 compared to 48 within the same timeframe in 2022.

Investors have shown a decreasing level of support for ESG proposals as they become more specific and focused on the impact of environmental, societal and political issues, including board and workforce diversity, political spending and reproductive rights.

Anti-ESG on the rise

Anti-ESG proposal submissions accounted for 10% of all ESG proposals: double the proportion last year. Despite the increase in the number of anti-ESG proposals, average support for them has nonetheless declined from 9.2% in 2022 to 6.2% in 2023.

Among the various anti-ESG proposal categories, those focused on social topics have seen a significant increase: a 46% rise in submissions (67 in 2023 to-date compared to 46 in 2022). None of these proposals have passed.

So far in 2023, proponents have filed 27 anti-ESG proposals related to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) issues, a number that has grown each year.

READ MORE »

Control Expropriation via Rights Offers

Leeor Ofer is a fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, and is an S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. This post is based on her recent paper, forthcoming in the American Business Law Journal. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried and Holger Spamann.

Rights offers are a relatively common capital raising method. In a rights offer, the company’s existing shareholders are given the opportunity to purchase newly-issued shares in proportion to the amount of shares they already own (pro-rata) for a specific subscription price per-share. Typically, rights offers are conducted at a discount to the underlying share’s trading price.

Given that rights offers allow all shareholders to participate in the issuance in proportion to their existing shareholdings and under the same terms, the traditional view had once been that rights offers are fair to all shareholders. Previous scholarly work has shown, however, that rights offers cannot fully protect outsiders from insider expropriation. Specifically, corporate insiders can sell themselves cheap stock – a scenario coined as “cheap stock tunneling” – even when the issuance is conducted as a rights offer. First, when some shareholders are limited in their ability to participate in attractive rights offers, say for lack of sufficient funds, the formal right to participate does little to protect such shareholders. Second, Fried and Spamann have recently shown that corporate insiders can capitalize on their informational advantage to engage in cheap stock tunneling via rights offers. Namely, corporate insiders can intentionally set the subscription price within a “zone of uncertainty” – a price range for which outsiders cannot tell for sure whether the price is too high or too low. When the subscription price is set within this range, outsiders who participate risk purchasing overpriced stock, while outsiders who refrain from participating risk cheap-stock tunneling. To balance these two risks, outsiders exercise only part of their subscription rights, and some cheap-stock tunneling is facilitated.

READ MORE »

The Activism Vulnerability Report

Jason Frankl and Brian G. Kushner are Senior Managing Directors at FTI Consulting. This post is based on their FTI Consulting memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Frankl and Kushner Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Introduction and Market Update

With summer just around the corner, FTI Consulting’s Activism and M&A Solutions team welcomes readers to our June 2023 Activism Vulnerability Report that highlights the findings from our Activism Vulnerability Screener for 1Q23 and discusses notable trends and themes observed in the world of shareholder activism during the 2023 proxy season.

Following the consecutive collapses of Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”) and Signature Bank in March, other regional banks have been under pressure. Despite the U.S. Federal Reserve’s (“Fed”) efforts to prop up the banking sector, the high-profile failures coming in such close proximity undoubtedly contributed to depositors withdrawing more than $100 billion from First Republic Bank (“First Republic”) during 1Q23. This news, coupled with First Republic having a high percentage of uninsured deposits, triggered a run on the bank, causing a liquidity crisis that the bank could not quell. [1] On May 1, regulators seized First Republic, which had reported $232.9 billion in total assets on March 31, making it the largest U.S. bank failure since the 2008 financial crisis; JPMorgan Chase later agreed to buy the majority of its assets. [2]  In the weeks following the First Republic Bank collapse, PacWest Bancorp, with shares down 66.2% year-to-date and deposits likewise hemorrhaging since SVB’s loss disclosure on March 8, announced it was exploring a potential sale. [3] [4]

The U.S. government’s battle over the debt ceiling, though resolved in early June, destabilized markets in May when it appeared lawmakers might not come to a resolution. [5]  Despite the instability, investors were granted some breathing room in May as inflation continued to recede from its June 2022 peak. [6]  The Fed issued its tenth consecutive interest rate hike in May, and although recent positive macroeconomic data has left the option open to future rate increases later this summer, analysts are expecting the Fed to pause tightening for at least one meeting to determine if additional rate hikes are warranted. [7] A pause may be more beneficial to investors than a direct rate cut would be; the S&P 500 has historically climbed 16.9% on average in the 12 months following a rate pause compared to a 1.0% drop in the 12 months following a rate cut. [8]  At this point, market participants seem to believe the Fed will pause this month, but could resume rate tightening as early as July. However, additional rate hikes may carry consequences of their own, as the ever-present threat of a recession exposes risks to equity investors, just when it seemed the market was moving past a potential banking crisis. [9]

With share prices of financial institutions under pressure, shareholder activists began circling the sector. Campaigns focused on financial institutions doubled in 1Q23 relative to the same period last year. The Telecom, Media & Technology (“TMT”) and the Industrials sectors were also a focus for activists during the quarter.

READ MORE »

Side Letter Governance

Elisabeth de Fontenay is a Professor of Law at Duke University, and Yaron Nili is a Professor of Law and the Smith-Rowe Faculty Fellow in Business Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School. This post is based on their article, forthcoming in the Washington University Law Review.

It is no exaggeration to say that over its roughly forty-year history, private equity has revolutionized both corporate finance and corporate governance.  When it first arose in the 1980s, the private equity buyout represented an entirely novel approach to owning, managing, and financing companies, and its effects on both corporate behavior and the financial markets have been profound.  Today, private equity is one of the major global asset classes, and it has attracted a truly staggering amount of capital over a relatively short period of time. It has been the driver behind major changes to, and innovations in, financial contracting.  Staffed with some of the most sophisticated financiers in the world and advised by the most elite law firms, private equity sponsors innovate at a furious pace in their mergers and acquisitions (M&A), financing, fund formation, and other contracts, and are relentless in advancing their interests in the financial markets.  Understanding how private equity funds themselves are structured and incentivized is therefore crucial for understanding how the private equity industry behaves and affects global finance.

In a leveraged buyout, a private equity fund acquires a company using a high proportion of debt (“leverage”), then seeks to optimize the company’s operations, governance and strategy before eventually exiting the investment through a sale or public offering (“buyout”).  Yet private equity buyout funds are distinct not only in their investment strategy—buying and selling whole companies—but also in the formation of the funds themselves. The sponsor that sets up and manages the buyout fund enters into a long-term agreement with investors that governs the relationship among them.  This agreement, formally a limited partnership agreement (or LPA), typically bestows on all investors in the fund the same rights and obligations. Over time, however, this simple and uniform structure has become far more complex: sponsors routinely enter into separate agreements (or “side letters”) with some or all of their investors, under which each investor in question is granted a tailored set of additional rights. Depending on the fund, the terms of any given side letter need not be disclosed to the other fund investors.

READ MORE »

Page 34 of 65
1 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 65