Rick Horvath and Eric Siegel are Partners, and Molly Wang is an Associate at Dechert LLP. This post is based on their Dechert memorandum and is part of the Delaware Law Series and the Controlling Shareholder Series; links to other posts in the Delaware Law Series are available here; links to other posts in the Controlling Shareholder Series are available here.
Key Takeaways
- In 2025, sweeping amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) were adopted, including a new Section 144 safe harbor for conflicted transactions and a heightened presumption of director disinterestedness.
- The Court of Chancery recently applied this presumption of director disinterestedness to a derivative complaint outside of the Section 144 safe harbor, and made clear that bare allegations of director compensation, overlapping board service, business relationships, and minority co-investments in professional sports teams will not suffice to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness.
- While addressed in the context of a derivative complaint, the Court’s analysis provides helpful guidance and, if applied in future cases, would remove much of the uncertainty related to conflicted transactions.

