Yearly Archives: 2026

2026 Proxy Season Preview

Ariane Marchis-Mouren is a Senior Researcher and Brian Campbell is a Center Leader at The Conference Board. This post is based on a report developed by The Conference Board in partnership with ESGAUGE, Russell Reynolds Associates, and the Rutgers Law School Center for Corporate Law and Governance.

The 2026 proxy season unfolds amid significant shifts in the regulatory, political, and investor landscape, reshaping how shareholder proposals are filed, evaluated, and voted. Following record activity in 2024 and a modest pullback in 2025, companies now face a proxy environment defined less by volume and more by discretion, legal complexity, and evolving investor expectations.

Trusted Insights for What’s Ahead®

  • More shareholder proposals are being resolved off the ballot rather than put to a vote. Negotiation, withdrawal, and omission increasingly shape outcomes, raising the bar for proposals to advance.
  • Procedural changes have materially reshaped the shareholder proposal process. Record no-action activity, the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) retreat from routine staff review, and tighter rules on exempt solicitations place greater responsibility—and risk—on issuers and proponents.
  • Voting outcomes are becoming less predictable as decision-making grows more contextual. Asset managers and proxy advisors continue to rely less on rigid policy frameworks and more on issuer-specific facts, disclosure quality, and demonstrated responsiveness.
  • Proxy disclosure is emerging as a central stewardship tool in a more constrained engagement environment. As informal engagement and procedural guardrails narrow, clear, decision-oriented proxy disclosure plays an increasingly important role in shaping investor understanding and voting behavior.

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Complaint Challenging Restrictions on Shareholder Proposal Rights

Josh Zinner is the CEO of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). This post is based on the text of a complaint filed by the ICCR and As You Sow.

INTRODUCTION

  1. For more than eight decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has safeguarded the right of shareholders in a public company to present a proposal in the company proxy statement regarding significant issues of concern. This right—enshrined in a regulation known as Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)—has long served as a foundational mechanism for shareholder participation in corporate governance and for advancing the Exchange Act’s core goals of investor protection and transparent markets.
  2. Shareholder proposals are a critical mechanism for a company’s shareholders to raise and vote on important issues directly relevant to a company’s long-term performance and risk profile. More broadly, this process reflects a core principle of American capital markets: that investors who supply capital to public companies retain meaningful rights to protect their investment by participating in corporate governance. The transparency and accountability that follow robust shareholder rights are also a key reason that global capital flows to American markets—investors have confidence that U.S. markets provide meaningful mechanisms for disclosure, accountability, and investor protection.
  3. When a company seeks to exclude a qualified shareholder proposal from its proxy materials, it must comply with the procedural framework established by Rule 14a-8. The company must notify both the Commission and the proposal’s proponent and articulate the legal basis for exclusion. This obligation ensures that proponents have an opportunity to respond and that SEC staff can evaluate whether the exclusion is consistent with Rule 14a-8 and longstanding Commission precedent.
  4. In recent months, the SEC has adopted a new policy abandoning the requirements and procedures established by the Commission’s own regulation governing the shareholder proposal process. Rather than hearing from both sides and engaging in the review contemplated by the regulations, SEC staff now categorically issues “no-objection” letters—or effectively blesses exclusions—when companies invoke certain formulaic assertions in their submissions. This approach replaces meaningful regulatory oversight with a new, de facto rubber-stamp process that allows companies to exclude proposals without any analysis by the staff.
  5. This policy was implemented without the notice-and-comment rulemaking that is required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when an agency adopts or effectively alters binding regulatory standards. The APA requires federal agencies to act through transparent procedures; provide reasoned explanations for policy changes, regardless of the language the government uses to characterize them; and to give affected stakeholders an opportunity to comment before altering decades of the operation of existing regulations. The SEC circumvented the procedural safeguards of the APA and effectively changed how Rule 14a-8 operates through informal staff practice rather than through rulemaking.
  6. The result is a process that deprives shareholders of rights established by SEC regulation and decades of Commission precedent. This approach will lead to the exclusion of shareholder proposals that should be included in proxy materials, weakening a core mechanism of shareholder participation in corporate governance. In doing so, it risks undermining investor confidence in the transparency and accountability of U.S. public markets—principles that have long distinguished American capital markets globally. These outcomes are difficult to reconcile with the Commission’s statutory mission to protect investors, maintain fair and orderly markets, and facilitate capital formation.

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The State of US Reincorporations: Post-Proxy Season 2025

Samuel Nolledo is a Senior Analyst, Sarah Wenger is a Lead Analyst, and Aaron Wendt is a Senior Director of Research at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on their Glass Lewis memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Key Takeaways

  • While a widespread “DEXIT” has yet to materialize, state-to-state reincorporations by U.S. public companies remain in the spotlight.
  • Of the 26 reincorporation proposals that went to a vote in the second half of 2025, 16 involved existing companies and 10 involved a SPAC or other business combination.
  • Among existing companies, the most common reasons cited for reincorporating were the jurisdiction’s legal environment (81%), Delaware’s franchise taxes and fees (50%), litigation risk (38%) and business operations (25%).
  • Only 29% of the reincorporations from the 2025 post-season involved significant or controlling shareholders, compared to 55% during the 2025 proxy season.
  • Although average support for reincorporation proposals rose to 86% in the post-season compared to 82% in proxy season, more reincorporation proposals were not approved by shareholders (four, vs. two during proxy season).

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Ten Tactics that Unnecessarily Frustrate Activists and Impact Negotiating Leverage

Christine O’Brien is a Senior Advisor and Lex Suvanto is the CEO at Edelman Smithfield. This post is based on an Edelman Smithfield memorandum by Ms. O’Brien, Mr. Suvanto, and Patrick Ryan.

Boards and management all have the same fear – the ominous news story, 13D filing, or even the first phone call when an activist investor introduces themselves as one of their largest shareholders. What happens next is swift and often sets the tone for the engagement. The Board is notified, advisors are summoned, and a defense plan is assembled. Directors are flooded with counsel from advisors who claim they know the activist best and have seen this situation many times before.

In these moments, it’s easy for Boards to slip into self-preservation mode and engage in standard defensive tactics. However, many of these well-advised tactics may jeopardize trust with the activist and ultimately reduce the company’s negotiating leverage. Rather than establishing the basis for a thoughtful exchange of ideas, some standard defense tactics can inadvertently signal resistance and bad intentions, making it more difficult to maintain a constructive dialogue that could lead to a mutually beneficial outcome.

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2025 Equity Plan Proposals: Continued Robust Shareholder Support

Linda Pappas is a Principal and Tara Tays is a Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.

Key Takeaways

  •  Nearly 25% of Russell 3000 companies submitted an equity plan proposal in 2025. Shareholder support was strong at 88% on average, and less than 1% of proposals failed to receive majority support, consistent with 2023 and 2024 levels
  • It is most common for companies to return to shareholders every 2 to 3 years to seek equity plan approvals
  • While proxy advisor opposition to equity plan proposals typically results in lower shareholder support, the proposal failure rate increases only modestly (to a failure rate of less than 4%)
  • Among the limited number of companies that failed to receive shareholder support over the last two years, approximately half were in the health care (e.g., pharma/biotech) sector
  • Companies can take several steps to improve the likelihood of a successful shareholder vote outcome, including: analyzing share reserve needs, assessing potential dilution, understanding top shareholder voting policies and proxy advisor concerns, and clearly disclosing the shareholder-friendly features of the equity plan

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Engines of External Governance

Mariana Pargendler is the Beneficial Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Elizabeth Pollman is the Perry Golkin Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal.

Who are the pivotal actors and interests shaping corporate governance? Traditional accounts focus on shareholders, directors, and officers, and treat corporate governance as largely an intra-firm issue of power, incentives, and monitoring. Recent scholarship has expanded this view by identifying additional actors and forces, including the diverse constituents of the U.S. “corporate governance machine” (such as proxy advisors, stock exchanges, stock indices, and ratings agencies), as well as international organizations that have propelled “the rise of international corporate law.” Other commonly identified influences include corporate gadflies, the state as a shareholder, and broader political-economic forces such as populism, nationalism, and geopolitics.

These accounts, however, often leave out an important part of the picture: the role of nonprofits in shaping corporate governance. In our Article, Engines of External Governance, we examine how nonprofits have become key drivers of external governance—the ways in which actors outside the firm seek to embed broader objectives into corporate decision-making. Bringing nonprofits into focus sheds critical light on corporate governance developments and their trajectory.

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Texas Corporate Developments: What Officers and Directors Need to Know

Hillary Holmes, Gerry Spedale, and Gregg Costa are Partners at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn memorandum by Ms. Holmes, Mr. Spedale, Mr. Costa, Ronald Mueller, Jack DiSorbo, and Muriel Hague.

Texas is entering a watershed moment in corporate law and market development. Over just the past few months, the state has attracted headline‑making redomestications, launched multiple nationally significant stock exchanges, and expanded the reach and influence of the Texas Business Court. Together, these developments signal more than incremental progress—they reflect Texas’s accelerating rise as a premier jurisdiction for corporate governance, capital formation, and high‑stakes commercial dispute resolution. For officers and directors evaluating strategic opportunities in 2026, understanding Texas’s rapidly evolving corporate landscape has never been more important.

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SEC Adopts Final Rule Requiring Section 16(a) Reporting for Officers and Directors of Foreign Private Issuers

Liz Walsh is of Counsel and Jennifer Zepralka is a Partner at Mayer Brown. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum.

On February 27, 2026, more than two weeks in advance of the deadline, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) adopted final amendments to certain rules and forms under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to reflect the requirements of the Holding Foreign Insiders Accountable Act (the “HFIAA”).  The HFIAA, and the SEC’s related rules, subject officers and directors of foreign private issuers (“FPIs”) to the beneficial ownership reporting requirements of Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act, beginning with an obligation to file an initial statement of beneficial ownership on Form 3 no later than March 18, 2026.  Importantly, the SEC’s rule amendments do not go beyond what was required by the HFIAA, providing needed certainty with respect to the scope of this new obligation for insiders of FPIs.  Subsequently, on March 5, 2026, the SEC published an order granting an exemption from beneficial ownership reporting requirements under Section 16(a) for officers and directors of certain FPIs.  This alert addresses the SEC’s rule amendments and the exemptions therefrom, and provides some potential next steps for FPIs to which the reporting requirements will apply.

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Can Extended Equity Vesting Periods Break the Dominance of Performance-Based Compensation?

Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS-Corporate memorandum by Craig Benedict and Daniel King, Compensation & Governance Advisory at ISS-Corporate.

Performance based awards have long been championed by proxy advisors and investors as the best way to align executive incentives with shareholder outcomes. Performance awards with a three-year performance period have emerged as the dominant performance horizon in the U.S. as a result. Despite this broad market consensus, some investors have begun to show support for simpler equity structures that deemphasize performance in favor of longer time-based equity vesting periods.

Norges Bank, the investment arm of Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, is one of the most prominent proponents of an extended equity vesting period. The bank argues that performance-based equity can be expensive and complex and result in higher overall compensation than non-performance-based plans with an extended equity vesting period.

In this paper, ISS-Corporate examines these two different approaches to CEO compensation across Russell 3000 companies, comparing performance, compensation levels, investor and non-investor perceptions and governance data. READ MORE »

Oversight Failures on Workplace Misconduct Can Support Fiduciary Duty Claims

Kerry E. Berchem and Robert G. Lian, Jr. are Partners at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. This post is based on their Akin Gump memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Overview

In a precedent-setting derivative decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a board of directors’ and senior officers’ failure to respond in good faith to clear red flags of workplace sexual misconduct may give rise to viable breach of fiduciary duty claims under Delaware law. In an opinion penned by Chancellor Kathleen J. McCormick, the court denied motions to dismiss claims against certain directors and officers of eXp World Holdings Inc., ruling that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to support allegations that the company’s fiduciaries had breached their oversight obligations and that the chief executive officer (CEO) had breached his duty of loyalty by concealing information and retaining employees implicated in the alleged misconduct. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System v. Glenn Sanford, et al., C.A. No. 2024-0998-KSM (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 2026).

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