Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Communications Challenges for the Post-Activist Proxy Contest World

The New Normal for Activist Investor Campaigns Over the past several years, the end game for activist investor campaigns has increasingly become a consensual settlement of some sort, rather than a proxy contest to “the death”. In 2016, 45 percent of activist proxy contests ended in a settlement, up from 35 percent in 2012. Looking […]

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Posted in Boards of Directors, Corporate Elections & Voting, Institutional Investors, Practitioner Publications | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Communications Challenges for the Post-Activist Proxy Contest World

Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis

By any measure, corporate directors lead exceptionally busy lives. Many directors hold full-time executive positions, and most serve on the board of at least one other company. Academics and policymakers debate whether directors’ outside professional commitments enhance or detract from their governance abilities. Directors, on one hand, might acquire valuable knowledge and practice by serving […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Banking & Financial Institutions, Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

The Search for a Long-Term Premium

Jaap van Dam, principal director of investment strategy at PGGM, one of the world’s largest asset owners known for its commitment to long-horizon investing, once asked what he called the million-dollar question: “Can we be reasonably certain that we will be rewarded for being a long-horizon investor? Because, if we’re not, then why bother?” A […]

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Balancing the Governance of Financial Institutions

Banking regulation is first and foremost preoccupied with the problem of excessive risk-taking by banks and other leveraged financial institutions, which can lead to bank runs and panics and their resulting high economic costs. In recent decades, regulators have sought to curb bank risk-taking almost exclusively through external “safety and soundness” regulations, emphasizing capital requirements, […]

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Kokesh Raises Questions About Declinations with Disgorgement Under the FCPA Pilot Program

On June 16, 2017, the United States Department of Justice issued a declination letter to Linde North America Inc. and Linde Gas North America LLC (collectively, “Linde”), American subsidiaries of a German multinational chemical company, closing an investigation against Linde for potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). As part of the declination, […]

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Posted in Court Cases, Practitioner Publications, Securities Litigation & Enforcement, Securities Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Kokesh Raises Questions About Declinations with Disgorgement Under the FCPA Pilot Program

SEC Chairman Clayton on His Agenda

SEC Chairman Jay Clayton gave his first public address [on July 12, 2017], with some meaningful remarks directed at public company regulations. The long-term interest of the Main Street Investor (the term is not defined but capitalized in his speech) is the cornerstone of how the SEC will measure whether it is being true to its mission […]

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Posted in Accounting & Disclosure, Legislative & Regulatory Developments, Practitioner Publications, Securities Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on SEC Chairman Clayton on His Agenda

Lighting Our Capital Markets

I am so pleased to be with you today [July 11, 2017]. We all share an interest in ensuring that our markets are healthy. Strong and resilient markets are vital to having a strong and resilient economy. Before I go further, let me pause to say that I am speaking today as an individual Commissioner […]

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Weekly Roundup: July 7–13, 2017

The Law & Brexit XII Posted by Thomas J. Reid, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Friday, July 7, 2017 Tags: Banks, Brexit, Clearing houses, Derivatives, ESMA, EU, Europe, Financial institutions, Financial regulation, International governance, Oversight, Systemic risk, UK How Your Board Can Be Ready for Crisis Posted by Paula Loop, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, on Friday, July 7, 2017 Tags: Board monitoring, Boards of Directors, Cybersecurity, Management, Oversight, Reputation, Risk, Risk management, Risk oversight British Prosecutors Criminally Charge Global Bank […]

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The Long Arm of the MAC

Dealmakers have long recognized the implications of a Material Adverse Effect (MAE/MAC) standard in a merger agreement. As the Delaware court noted in the Hexion case, a buyer asserting an MAC condition “faces a heavy burden when it attempts to invoke a material adverse effect clause in order to avoid its [contractual] obligation.” In a recent […]

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Posted in Accounting & Disclosure, Court Cases, Practitioner Publications, Securities Litigation & Enforcement | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

Inelastic Labor Markets and Directors’ Reputational Incentives

In our recent paper, Inelastic Labor Markets and Directors’ Reputational Incentives, we examine the extent to which independent directors on corporate boards face consequences for their individual performance and how these consequences, in turn, shape directors’ incentives. Prior studies of directors’ incentives largely focus on collective performance measures that are necessarily common to all directors at a given firm (e.g., […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Boards of Directors, Empirical Research, Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Inelastic Labor Markets and Directors’ Reputational Incentives