Monthly Archives: April 2014

Segregation of Initial Margin Posted in Connection with Uncleared Swaps

Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Saturday, April 19, 2014

Broker-dealers, CFTC, Collateral, Derivatives, Dodd-Frank Act, Financial regulation, ISDA, Securities regulation, Swaps, Swaps entities
More from: Isabel Dische, Leigh Fraser, Molly Moore, Ropes & Gray

The following post comes to us from Leigh R. Fraser, partner and co-head of the hedge funds group at Ropes & Gray LLP, and is based on a Ropes & Gray publication by Ms. Fraser, Isabel K.R. Dische, and Molly Moore.

Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Rules 23.702 and 23.703 thereunder (together, the “Rules”), swap dealers are required to notify their counterparties that they have the right to require segregation with a third-party custodian of any initial margin (also known as “independent amounts”) posted to the swap dealer in connection with uncleared swaps. As a result of these new rules, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) recently published a form of notification and a set of frequently asked questions regarding these rules. All buy-side entities that trade in uncleared swaps with swap dealers (including buy-side entities that already post their margin with a third-party custodian, such as registered investment companies, and buy-side entities that do not post initial margin) should receive a copy of the notification from their swap dealer counterparties in the coming weeks or months and should plan to respond promptly to the notification in order to avoid any trading disruptions.

The Robust Use of Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets

Posted by Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on

Friday, April 18, 2014

Corporate fraud, Insider trading, Investor protection, Misconduct, SEC, SEC enforcement, SEC investigations, Securities enforcement, Securities fraud, Securities regulation
More from: Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chair White’s remarks to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) 2014 Compliance & Legal Society Annual Seminar; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

I have participated in this event for many years and have always considered this conference to be all about the compliance and legal issues that are most important to the integrity of our securities markets. Now, as Chair of the SEC, I would like to thank you for the work you do day in and day out to protect investors and keep our markets robust and safe.

In about a week, I will have completed my first year at the SEC. It has been quite a year. We have made very good progress in accomplishing the initial goals I set to achieve significant traction on our rulemaking agenda arising from the Dodd Frank and JOBS Acts, intensify our review of the structure of our equity markets, and enhance our already strong enforcement program.

Equity Overvaluation and Short Selling

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Friday, April 18, 2014

Credit supply, Equity capital, Short sales, Stock mispricing, Stock performance
More from: Charles Lee, Craig Nichols, Messod Beneish

The following post comes to us from Messod Daniel Beneish, Professor of Accounting at Indiana University, Bloomington; Charles M. Lee, Professor of Accounting at Stanford University; and Craig Nichols, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Syracuse University.

In our paper, In Short Supply: Equity Overvaluation and Short Selling, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use detailed equity lending data to examine the role of constraints on equity prices. We find that constrained stocks underperform, the short interest ratio (SIR) has a nonlinear association with constraints, constrained stocks have negative returns regardless of short interest ratio, high short interest yet unconstrained stocks do not underperform, yet low short interest unconstrained stocks outperform. Moreover, we show that limited supply is a key feature distinguishing constrained and unconstrained stocks, and that among constrained stocks, those with the lowest supply have the strongest negative returns. Our findings confirm that supply varies across firms (in contrast to SIR, which assumes supply is 100 percent of outstanding shares for all stocks) and short supply in the equity lending market has implications for the informational efficiency of equity prices.

Executive Compensation Under Dodd-Frank: an Update

Posted by Joseph Bachelder, McCarter & English, LLP, on

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Compensation committees, Compensation disclosure, Dodd-Frank Act, Executive Compensation, Pay for performance, Say on frequency, Say on pay, SEC, SEC rulemaking, Securities regulation
More from: Andy Tsang, Joseph Bachelder, McCarter & English

Joseph Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder, with assistance from Andy Tsang, which first appeared in the New York Law Journal.

The Dodd-Frank law took effect July 21, 2010. [1] Subtitle E of Title IX of Dodd-Frank addresses “Accountability and Executive Compensation” (§§951-957). Since the enactment of the act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has adopted final rules as to two of the provisions, proposed rules as to two others and has not yet proposed (but has announced it will be proposing) rules as to another three provisions. This post summarizes the current status of regulation projects under Dodd-Frank Sections 951 through 957.

Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger

Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Thursday, April 17, 2014

Accountability, Berkshire Hathaway, Compliance & ethics, Corporate culture, General governance, Management
More from: Brian Tayan, David Larcker

The following post comes to us from David Larcker, Professor of Accounting at Stanford University, and Brian Tayan of the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Berkshire Hathaway Vice Chairman Charlie Munger is well known as the partner of CEO Warren Buffett and also for his advocacy of “multi-disciplinary thinking”—the application of fundamental concepts from across various academic disciplines to solve complex real-world problems. One problem that Munger has addressed over the years is the optimal system of corporate governance. How should an organization be structured to encourage ethical behavior among organizational participants and motivate decision-making in the best interest of shareholders? His solution is unconventional by the standards of governance today and somewhat at odds with regulatory guidelines. However, the insights that Munger provides represent a contrast to current “best practices” and suggest the potential for alternative solutions to improve corporate performance and executive behavior. In our paper, Corporate Governance According to Charles T. Munger, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine this solution in greater detail.

By the Numbers: Venture-Backed IPOs in 2013

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Boards of Directors, General governance, IPOs, JOBS Act, Surveys, Venture capital firms
More from: Gunderson Dettmer, Meaghan Nelson, Richard Blake

The following post comes to us from Richard C. Blake, partner at Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villeneuve Franklin & Hachigian, LLP, and is based on a Gunderson Dettmer report by Mr. Blake and Meaghan S. Nelson.

2013 was the strongest year for venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) in almost a decade: 82 deals (the most since 2007) generated aggregate proceeds of over $11.2 billion, an average offering amount of $137.2 million. At least one venture-backed company went public each month in 2013, and the pace of IPOs has accelerated in the first three months of 2014.

Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Wednesday, April 16, 2014

Hedge funds, Institutional Investors, Institutional voting, Proxy advisors, Say on pay, Shareholder activism, Shareholder voting
More from: Paul Edelman, Randall Thomas, Robert Thompson

The following post comes to us from Paul H. Edelman and Randall S. Thomas, Professor of Law and Mathematics and Professor of Law and Business, respectively, at Vanderbilt University, and Robert Thompson, Professor of Business Law at the Georgetown University Law Center.

Shareholder voting, once given up for dead as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance, has come roaring back as a key part of American corporate governance. Where once voting was limited to uncontested annual election of directors, it is now common to see short slate proxy contests, board declassification proposals, and “Say on Pay” votes occurring at public companies. The surge in the importance of shareholder voting has caused increased conflict between shareholders and directors, a tension well-illustrated in recent high profile voting fights in takeovers (e.g. Dell) and in the growing role for Say on Pay votes. Yet, despite the obvious importance of shareholder voting, none of the existing corporate law theories coherently justify it.

Beyond Efficiency in Securities Regulation

Posted by June Rhee, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Tuesday, April 15, 2014

Algorithmic trading, Disclosure, Information environment, Market efficiency, Reliance, Securities regulation
More from: Yesha Yadav

The following post comes to us from Yesha Yadav of Vanderbilt Law School.

In my paper, Beyond Efficiency in Securities Regulation, recently made available on SSRN, I argue that the emergence of algorithmic trading calls into question the foundation underpinning today’s securities laws: the understanding that securities prices reflect all available information in the market. Securities regulation has long looked to the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) for theoretical validation to ground its most central tenets like mandatory disclosure, the Fraud-on-the-Market presumption in Rule 10b-5 litigation, as well as the architecture of today’s system of interconnected exchanges. It is easy to understand why. Laws that make markets more informative should also make them better at communicating with investors and in allocating capital across the economy. In this paper, I suggest that this connection between informational and allocative efficiencies can no longer be so readily assumed in the age of algorithmic trading. In other words, even as algorithmic trading pushes markets to achieve ever-greater levels of informational efficiency, able to process vast swathes of data in milliseconds, understanding what this information means for the purposes of capital allocation seems ever more uncertain. Recognizing that notions of informational efficiency are growing disconnected from the market’s ability to also interpret what this information signifies for capital allocation, this paper proposes a thoroughgoing rethinking about the centrality of efficiency economics in regulatory design.

European Commission Proposes to Moderate Short-termism and Reduce Activist Attacks

Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on

Monday, April 14, 2014

Disclosure, EU, Europe, European Commission, Institutional Investors, International governance, Long-Term value, Proxy advisors, Shareholder activism, Short-termism
More from: Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton.

Two articles (among several) in a comprehensive proposal to revise EU corporate governance would have a significant beneficial impact if they were to be adopted in the United States. In large measure they mirror recommendations by Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., in two essays: Can We do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Columbia Law Review 449 (Mar. 2014) and One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term? 66 Business Lawyer 1 (Nov. 2010).

US Intermediate Holding Company: Structuring and Regulatory Considerations for Foreign Banks

Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on

Monday, April 14, 2014

Banks, Dodd-Frank Act, Financial institutions, Financial regulation, Foreign banks
More from: Andrew Fei, Luigi De Ghenghi, Davis Polk

The following post comes to us from Luigi L. De Ghenghi and Andrew S. Fei, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including diagrams, tables, and flowcharts, is available here.

The Federal Reserve’s Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards (“EPS”) final rule requires a foreign banking organization with $50 billion or more in U.S. non-branch/agency assets (“Foreign Bank”) to place virtually all of its U.S. subsidiaries underneath a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company (“IHC”). The IHC will be subject to U.S. Basel III, capital planning, Dodd-Frank stress testing, liquidity, risk management requirements and other U.S. EPS on a consolidated basis.

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