Recent research featured in the Wall Street Journal article, “Best Paid CEOs Run some of the Worst-Performing Companies,” questions basic design premises of the public company CEO compensation model in the US. Specifically, the research [“study”] argues that delivering large equity grants—above the median of companies in the study—to CEOs is not an effective way to motivate long-term shareholder value creation (e.g., total shareholder returns). We believe this study is based upon an incorrect premise of executive motivation and an improper measurement of CEO pay.
Pay Governance, and others, have found a strong alignment between CEO pay and total shareholder returns (TSR) when pay is correctly measured using realizable or realized pay methods. This is contrary to the primary finding of the study, which is based on the accounting value of equity awards, and not the value realizable or realized after performance and vesting conditions are applied. It is well known among shareholders, their proxy advisors, directors, academics and corporate executives that stock grants [including performance shares, stock options, and RSUs] are highly motivational to executives overall.
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