Yawen Jiao is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of California, Riverside. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Jiao and Ying Duan, Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Alberta.
Mutual funds hold about a quarter to a third of outstanding shares of U.S. companies in the past decade and therefore have the potential to play a pivotal role in corporate governance. In our article, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, we simultaneously consider two governance approaches of mutual funds in the proxy voting setting: First, they can follow the “Wall Street rule” when dissatisfied with firm management, that is, sell their shares and “exit” the firm. This approach is modeled by Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011). Second, they can attempt to directly intervene (“voice”) by voting against firm management, as suggested by theories of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998).