Yearly Archives: 2017

Uncapping Executive Pay

Michael Doran is Roy L. & Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Professor of Law at University of Virginia School of Law. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

This article sets out the case for repealing the $1 million tax cap on executive pay. In 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code as an aggressive effort to limit what companies pay their executives. Section 162(m) caps at $1 million the corporate deduction for annual compensation paid to senior managers. This limitation, proponents argued, would rein in manager pay, push companies to link executive compensation to corporate and individual performance, restore balance between the pay of executives and the pay of rank-and-file workers, or, if nothing else, impose a significant penalty on companies that lavish high levels of performance-insensitive compensation on their senior managers. More than two decades on, Section 162(m) has proven a spectacular policy failure.

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February 24, 2017–March 2, 2017


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 24, 2017–March 2, 2017.
















The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs

Rosanna Landis Weaver is a Program Manager at As You Sow. This post is based on a report from As You Sow. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here) and Executive Compensation in Controlled Companies by Kobi Kastiel (discussed on the Forum here).

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According to the Economic Policy Institute,

“CEO pay grew an astounding 943% over the past 37 years, greatly outpacing the growth in the cost of living, the productivity of the economy, and the stock market, disproving the claim that the growth in CEO pay reflects the ‘performance’ of the company, the value of its stock, or the ability of the CEO to do anything but disproportionately raise the amount of his pay.”

For the past two years, we have highlighted the 100 most overpaid CEOs of S&P 500 companies, and the votes of large shareholders, including mutual funds and pension funds on their pay packages.

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The Bylaw Puzzle in Delaware Corporate Law

David A. Skeel, Jr. is S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School. This post is based on his recent article, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In less than a decade, Delaware’s legislature has overruled its courts and reshaped Delaware corporate law twice, with proxy access bylaws in 2009 and with shareholder litigation bylaws in 2015. Not since 1986, when Delaware lawmakers overruled Smith v. Van Gorkom by authorizing charter provisions protecting directors from duty of care liability, had Delaware’s legislature overruled its courts in such dramatic fashion. Yet the Delaware legislature has now stepped in twice, and it has done so in a particularly puzzling way: with proxy access, Delaware’s legislature authorized the use of bylaws or charter provisions that Delaware’s courts had banned; while with shareholder litigation, it banned bylaws or charter provisions that the courts had authorized.

What in the world is going on?

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Considerations for U.S. Public Companies Acquiring Non-U.S. Companies

Jennifer V. Audeh is a partner and Corey Brown is an associate at Foley Hoag LLP. This post is based on a Foley Hoag publication by Ms. Audeh and Mr. Brown.

When it is time to sell a company, there are a number of financial and legal steps a business should consider to ready itself for a merger or acquisition. When the potential buyer is a U.S. public company, that list may get longer. The following are some common issues that arise in the context of a U.S. public company acquisition of a non-U.S. company. Being familiar with, and prepared for, the pressure points facing a U.S. public company will make for a smoother acquisition process for both sides.

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The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation

Steven Davidoff Solomon is a Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Professor Davidoff Solomon; Matthew D. Cain, Financial Economist at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Jill E. Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Economics; and Randall S. Thomas, John S. Beasley II Professor of Law & Business at Vanderbilt University Law School. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, we analyze the changes to the merger litigation market in the wake of the Trulia decision which limited attorneys’ fees in disclosure-only settlements. We find that overall levels of merger litigation have declined in the past year, suggesting that Delaware’s effort to reduce frivolous litigation has been at least partially successful. In 2014, 91% of all completed deals were challenged in at least one lawsuit. That number declined to 89% in 2015 and 73% in 2016.

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Section 16(B)—If at First You Don’t Succeed…

Phillip Goldstein is the co-founder of Bulldog Investors.

If an officer, a director or a large (10% or more) shareholder of a public corporation realizes a profit from buying and selling stock within a six-month period, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”) authorizes the corporation to recover from such statutory insider any so-called “short swing” profits. If the corporation fails to act, Section 16(b) authorizes any of its security holders to sue the statutory insider on its behalf to recover the profits from those trades. (In practice, anyone can qualify to sue the statutory by purchasing a single share of stock after the short swing trading has occurred.) And, because Section 16(b) is a strict liability statute, there is no need to allege the existence, let alone misuse, of inside information at the time of any trade and no equitable defenses are permitted. In their treatise on securities regulation, [1] Professors Jennings and Marsh concluded: “Judging solely from the facts stated in the opinions in the decided cases, the function of Section 16(b) would appear to be to impose unjust liability upon entirely innocent persons.”

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Is a “Target Range” Right for your Incentive Plan?

Lane T. Ringlee is a Managing Partner at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on a Pay Governance publication by Mr. Ringlee, Chris Brindisi, and Peter Ringlee.

As shareholders of U.S. public companies demand more accountability for performance, Boards are under increased pressure to continue to strengthen the P4P linkage of their incentive compensation plans. In a 2013 survey of Compensation Committee members co-sponsored by the NYSE, Conference Board, and Pay Governance, [1] the top 3 “challenges” that Committees stated they were facing involved incentive pay and performance goal setting. Specific challenges noted in the survey included:

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2017: Where Things Stand—Appraisal, Business Judgment Rule and Disclosure

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel and Philip Richter is a partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank publication by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Steven EpsteinWarren S. de WiedChristopher Ewan, and Brian T. Mangino. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

As has been widely discussed over the past two years, the Delaware courts have moved toward substantially greater deference to board and stockholder decisions in M&A transactions. Other than in the case of transactions with controllers, there is significantly less risk today than in the past that a challenge (particularly post-closing) to a board decision to engage in a transaction will be successful; there is a far greater likelihood that litigation challenging a transaction will be dismissed at an early stage of litigation; and when there has been a pre-signing market check, there is considerably less risk that an appraisal award issued to dissenting shareholders will exceed the merger price.

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2017 Investor Corporate Governance Report

Viraj Patel is Head of Operations at CMi2i Proxy. This post is based on a CMi2i publication by Mr. Patel, Tony Quinn, and Mark Simms.

In our 2017 Annual Corporate Governance Survey, we asked Institutional Investors who collectively represent over $5 Trillion of Assets under Management a series of questions relating to one theme: what do they believe will be the key Corporate Governance areas of focus for 2017 and beyond?

In keeping with Surveys from previous years, investors expect to see increased levels of engagement with issuers (“Listed Companies”)—with a clear majority of respondents (69%) now stating that they intend to step up the amount of engagement they undertake in 2017. Institutions are being encouraged to monitor the issuers in which they invest more closely. Pressure for this originates from three areas: their own clients, evolving best practice and increasing regulatory obligations in the form of stewardship codes.

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