Yearly Archives: 2019

NYS Common Retirement Fund’s Climate Action Plan

Thomas P. DiNapoli is New York State Comptroller. This post is based on a memorandum from the New York State Comptroller Office. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Message from the Comptroller

As Comptroller of New York State and Trustee of the Common Retirement Fund (CRF), I am deeply concerned about the impact of climate change on the Fund’s investments, as well as its impact on the economy as whole. I understand the immense investment risks posed by climate change, but also recognize the significant investment opportunities in the transition to the emerging low carbon economy.

Ensuring strong investment returns for the CRF is fundamental to providing the benefits that our more than one million members, retirees and beneficiaries rely on for retirement security. Our government employers and New York’s taxpayers are also important stakeholders for the CRF. Identifying, assessing and addressing the investment risks and opportunities associated with climate change is integral to ensuring the long-term health of the CRF and the payment of those benefits.

For years, the CRF has used a multi-faceted approach to climate change, employing investment, active stewardship and public policy advocacy strategies. Over the last 10 years, the CRF has:

  • identified and assessed its risks through scenario analysis and carbon footprinting;
  • committed to investing $10 billion in sustainable strategies, including climate solutions;
  • engaged with the largest emitters to reduce risks and assess transition readiness; and
  • advocated at the international, national and state levels for policies to reduce climate-related investment risks and create opportunities for the CRF, and the economy as a whole.

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Get Us There—The Ceres Strategic Plan

Mindy Lubber is CEO and President at Ceres. This post is based on her Ceres memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here).

In 1989, in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, a group of forward-thinking investors and environmentalists, led by pioneer Joan Bavaria, came together to form Ceres. At the time, they were at the forefront of a transformative movement in business. They understood that the most successful companies in the long term will be those that consider their impacts on the environment, employees and communities. They knew then what we say now at Ceres: sustainability is the bottom line.

Today, our research shows that nearly 400 of the 600 largest publicly traded companies in the U.S. have commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 300 actively manage water resources and nearly 300 actively protect employees’ human rights. Companies have begun to embrace sustainability and incorporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks and opportunities into their decision making in ways we couldn’t have dreamed of thirty years ago.

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Investors Bancorp‘s Impact on Long-Term Incentive Plans

Matthew B. Grunert and Scott C. Sanders are partners and Jackie Z. Coleman is an associate at Bracewell LLP. This post is based on their Bracewell memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

The trend of including director-specific limits on the size of annual equity awards to non-employee directors under long-term incentive plans (“LTIPs”) continues to pick up steam, as evidenced by our survey of LTIPs filed this proxy season for shareholder approval. Nearly 75% of LTIPs reviewed now include a director-specific limit on the size of annual non-employee director grants, with a majority of those LTIPs restricting not only the size of annual equity awards, but also capping total annual compensation to non-employee directors.

This trend’s beginnings arose from the 2017 Delaware Supreme Court decision in In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholders Litigation (“Bancorp”). In Bancorp, the court held that a shareholder-approved cap on the aggregate number of shares that could be granted to non-employee directors under the company’s LTIP did not constitute shareholder ratification of the subsequent individual awards granted to non-employee directors of Investors Bancorp. As a result, the court held that the “entire fairness standard” should apply to any review of the size of non-employee director awards, requiring the board to demonstrate that the awards were fair to the company, as opposed to permitting application of the more company-friendly “business judgment rule,” requiring a showing by the plaintiff of corporate waste.

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Exchanging Views on Exchange-Traded Funds

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks at the FSB/IOSCO Joint Workshop on ETFs and Market Liquidity, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Welcome to all of you. We are so delighted to be able to host you at the Securities and Exchange Commission for today’s workshop on exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The discussion today is sure to be fascinating. Aside from my greeting, everything I say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners. [1]

It is graduation season, so if you have time to walk around the city, you might see graduates of our local schools celebrating in their caps and gowns. The big story of this graduation season was the announcement by a wealthy commencement speaker at one college that he would pay off the debt of the entire graduating class to whom he was speaking. [2] His gift is wonderful, but it may become much more difficult to find commencement speakers, as I suspect that there are few who would be able to match such generosity. The reality is that most graduates will not be the beneficiaries of such kindness from a stranger.

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Defined Contribution Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy

Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania Law School; Andrea Hasler is Assistant Research Professor in Financial Literacy at the George Washington University School of Business; and Annamaria Lusardi is the Endowed Chair of Economics and Accountancy at the George Washington University School of Business. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Cornell Law Review.

Retirement saving in the United States has changed dramatically. The classic defined-benefit (DB) plan has largely been replaced by the defined-contribution (DC) plan. With the latter, individual employees’ decisions about how much to save for retirement and how to invest those savings determine the benefits available to them upon retirement.

This system relies on employees to save and invest their money for retirement, decisions that they are poorly equipped to make. A variety of studies document low levels of financial literacy in the general population. People with low financial literacy are susceptible to a number of investment mistakes, including choosing products that do not meet their needs and paying excessive fees. They are also vulnerable to fraud. Moreover, investment decision-making is complicated. The typical 401(k) plan offers participants products that many of them do not understand. Effective retirement savings also requires people to begin saving early, to reallocate their portfolios periodically as they age and, when they retire, to determine how to manage the balance in their accounts to provide income for the rest of their lives.

Although financial illiteracy is a widespread problem, the evolution of workplace pensions exacerbates the problem by imposing responsibility for financial well-being in retirement on a group of people who are particularly ill-suited to the task. We term these people “workplace-only investors,” which we define as people whose only exposure to investment decisions is by virtue of their participation in an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan or equivalent DC plan; they do not have other retirement accounts or financial investments. We view workplace-only investors as forced or involuntary investors in that their participation in the financial markets is a product of their employment and unlikely the result of informed choice. They are a sizeable share of participants in DC pension plans.

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Weekly Roundup: June 7–13, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 7–13, 2019.



French Legislation on Corporate Purpose



A New Era of Extraterritorial SEC Enforcement Actions


Ten Years of Say-on-Pay Data


New DOJ Compliance Program Guidance


Board Diversity by Term Limits?



EVA, Not EBITDA: A Better Measure of Investment Value


CFO Gender and Financial Statement Irregularities




Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion


Precluding Pre-Merger Communications in Post-Merger Dispute

Stakeholder Capitalism for Long-Term Value Creation

Steve W. Klemash is Americas Leader; Jamie C. Smith is Associate Director; and Rani Doyle is Executive Director, all at the EY Center for Board Matters. This post is based on their EY memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here); and The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Boards can strengthen their oversight role by guiding management to focus on the long-term, understand stakeholder objectives and communicate the many ways their companies create value.

Transformation of business, society and governments has accelerated over the last decade. Disruption, especially in business, is an increasing challenge for governments, society and companies to navigate and manage. In this environment, a growing and increasingly diverse group of market participants is supporting greater corporate focus on creating long-term value for multiple stakeholders.

As companies consider why and how to address such considerations, a consensus is emerging about how companies can redefine and communicate corporate value through an expanded lens. There is an ongoing shift from the view that the primary purpose of companies is to enhance and protect value for shareholders (shareholder capitalism) to the view that corporations are better able to deliver long-term value to shareholders when they understand and address the needs of their customers, employees, investors, regulators and other key stakeholders (stakeholder capitalism).

As boards examine these changing dynamics and expectations, they should consider recent market-driven approaches and regulatory views on measuring and communicating corporate value with an expanded and longer-term perspective.

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Should Retail Investors’ Leverage Be Limited?

Rawley Heimer is Assistant Professor at the Boston College Carroll School of Management and Alp Simsek is Rudi Dornbusch Career Development Associate Professor of Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.

Financial markets feature considerable speculative trading that can harm uninformed investors. Consequently, financial market regulators have long grappled with how to prevent investors from making harmful speculative trades, while preserving markets for useful trades. Leverage is a major catalyst for speculative trading. Our article examines the impact of leverage limits on the retail foreign exchange (forex) market. We find that leverage limits result in smaller losses for the most aggressive traders without harming market liquidity. Further, the policy improves belief-neutral welfare and reduces excessive financial intermediation. Our approach can be applied to other markets, and will be a useful framework for regulators as they try to curb speculation without impeding well-functioning markets.

The retail forex market is an ideal venue for our analysis because leverage limits in this market are new (introduced in 2010, compared to e.g. the market for U.S. equities, which has had a leverage limit of 2:1 since 1934). In October 2010, under the authority of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) capped the amount of leverage brokers can provide to U.S. traders at 50:1 on all major currency pairs and 20:1 on others. Meanwhile, European regulators did not impose any leverage limits, and the maximum leverage available almost always exceeded 50:1. These market features—time-series variation in available leverage and a suitable control group of unregulated traders—allow us to use a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the costs and benefits of the leverage-constraint policy.

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Sometimes Silence is Golden: “Dell Compliance” Following Aruba III

Michael Kass is Portfolio Manager at BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings (discussed on the Forum here) and Appraisal After Dell, both by Guhan Subramanian.

The frequently discussed but generally unwritten story underlying the three judicial opinions in Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks involves a dispute between two luminaries of the Delaware Corporate Law—Vice Chancellor Travis Laster and Chief Justice Leo Strine.

The story goes that Vice Chancellor Laster, fuming over his “rebuke” in Dell, a decision not written but generally attributed to the Chief Justice, sought to force acknowledgement of the faults in that decision by adopting an extreme view of its logic and interpreting it reductio ad absurdum for a “result that no litigant would even ask for”. He did so by (i) finding an odious transaction process involving rampant conflicts of interest, negotiating negligence and selective disclosure to be sufficiently reliable to evidence fair value (“FV”) because its record of defects was, in his view, no worse than the one in Dell, while, nevertheless, (ii) ruling that the cleanest measure of FV was the Company’s so-called unaffected stock price (“USP”), a metric that was neither argued by any party at trial nor particularly well suited to the FV measurement objective, given strong evidence of conflicts of interest and the exploitation of material non-public information found in the trial record. Similar to the first holding, on process sufficiency (or what was subsequently coined by Vice Chancellor Glasscock as “Dell Compliance” in AOL), the latter holding on “USP Relevance” was grounded in the Vice Chancellor’s comparison of the factual record of Aruba against those in Dell and DFC, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s heavy deference to observable market measures of value in those cases. Not to be outdone by this deft, “hoisted on your own petard” tactic by the Vice Chancellor, the Chief Justice returned the favor in a manner that only a superior tribunal can—by (a) reversing the Chancery Court on the USP Relevance holding via a scathing criticism of its reductionist argumentation, (b) affirming its Dell Compliance holding with virtually no discussion on the merits of the Chancery Court’s adjudication of that issue, and (c) directing a verdict in reliance on the Dell Compliance holding—notwithstanding obvious conflicts in the trial record on the quantification of deductible synergies that, absent judicial gloss, would have frustrated such implementation. While motives remain opaque, the twin effects of this directed verdict are to establish finality (i.e., ensure there will be no Aruba IV or, more importantly, Aruba V) and, by implication, to set in stone the Vice Chancellor’s findings of fact that implicitly sanction as “reliable” a very, very dirty deal.

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Precluding Pre-Merger Communications in Post-Merger Dispute

John Mark Zeberkiewicz is director and Daniel E. Kaprow is an associate at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. This post is based on a Richards Layton memorandum by Messrs. Zeberkiewicz, Kaprow, Rudolf Koch and Robert Greco, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications (discussed on the Forum here); and M&A Contracts: Purposes, Types, Regulation, and Patterns of Practice, both by John C. Coates, IV.

In Shareholder Representative Services LLC v. RSI Holdco, LLC, C.A. No. 2018-0517-KSJM (Del. Ch. May 29, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a provision in a private-company merger agreement precluding a buyer from using the seller’s privileged emails against the seller in post-closing litigation. Following the guidance from the decision in Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 80 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2013), the RSI Court held that under the terms of the parties’ merger agreement, pre-merger communications between the target company’s owners and representatives and the target company’s counsel could not be used by the buyer in a post-closing dispute.

In September 2016, RSI Holdco, LLC (“Buyer”) acquired Radixx Solutions International, Inc. (“Radixx”). Radixx and its counsel negotiated for a so-called “Great Hill provision” in the merger agreement—i.e., one providing that certain pre-merger privileged communications would not pass to the Buyer at the effective time. In essence, the merger agreement provided that the pre-merger privileged communications between the sellers and company counsel would survive the merger and be assigned to the stockholders’ representative, and prevented the Buyer from using or relying on any such privileged communications. Despite the clear language of the merger agreement, the Buyer sought to use approximately 1,200 pre-merger emails that it had acquired by virtue of the merger in post-closing litigation. Although it acknowledged that the emails were presumably privileged at the time they were made, the Buyer argued that because the sellers did not take steps to excise or segregate the privileged communications from the email servers, the privilege had been waived.

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