Monthly Archives: October 2020

Market Forces Already Address ESG Issues and the Issues Raised by Stakeholder Capitalism

Eugene F. Fama is the Robert R. McCormick Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on his article, originally published in ProMarket. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

Stakeholders versus Shareholders

There is currently much discussion of stakeholder capitalism, the proposition that firms should be run in the interests of all their stakeholders, including workers, and various types of securityholders, and not just shareholders.

My theme is that contract structures—the contracts negotiated among a firm’s stakeholders—address stakeholder interests. Contract structures are an important ingredient in the survival of firms. In a competitive environment, firms have incentives to negotiate contracts that allow them to deliver the products demanded by customers at the lowest cost. This survival competition benefits consumers, and with freely negotiated contracts, it benefits stakeholders.

I focus on internal stakeholders. A firm’s suppliers might be included among its stakeholders, but supplier interests are covered by suppliers. A firm’s customers might be included among its stakeholders, but in a competitive environment, satisfying customers is a first-order survival consideration for firms. If the firm is a monopsonist or a monopolist, however, these conclusions might change.

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2020 Proxy Season Review

Benjamin Colton and Robert Walker are Global Co-Heads of Asset Stewardship at State Street Global Advisors. This post is based on their SSgA memorandum.

This post covers our Stewardship Engagement Guidance to companies in response to COVID-19, the integration of R-Factor™ into our Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, the enhancement of our Proxy Voting Guidelines on board quality and composition, the impact of our Fearless Girl Campaign following its third anniversary, the launch of our new Stewardship Platform to enhance operational efficiency and reporting, Q1 2020 engagement highlights, and regulatory submissions.

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Weekly Roundup: October 2–8, 2020


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 2–8, 2020.

SASB’s Proposed Revisions to Its Conceptual Framework and Rules of Procedure


Stockholder Claims Dismissed Even After Corwin Defense Fails


SEC Amends Disclosure Requirements for Business Sections, Legal Proceedings and Risk Factors


Promoting Consistency in Corporate Sustainability Reporting


Audit Committee Reporting to Shareholders




2020 Aggregate Share-Based Compensation


Maintaining Investor Trust: Independent Oversight in the System of Quality Control


On the SEC’s 2010 Enforcement Cooperation Program



Board Practices Quarterly: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion


The Department of Justice as a Gatekeeper in Whistleblower-Initiated Corporate Fraud Enforcement: Drivers and Consequences



CFTC Identifies Climate-Related Financial Risks and Urges Action


Shadow Trading


Reforming CEO Pay to Grow the Pie for Wider Society

Alex Edmans is professor of finance at London Business School. This post is based on his recently published book Grow the Pie. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive pay is a topic that has captured nearly everyone’s attention—and anger. While most company decisions, such as appointing a new CEO, changing its strategy, and selling a division, typically only make the business pages of a newspaper, executive pay frequently makes headlines. And while politicians used to run for election promising to reform healthcare and education, now they also promise to reform pay. In the 2016 US Presidential election, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton didn’t agree on much, but one of the few things they did agree on was that pay was too high. In the same year, Theresa May launched her ultimately successful campaign to become UK Prime Minister with a speech that promised to curb executive pay.

It’s easy to see why executive pay is so controversial. The sheer numbers suggest that it’s out of touch with reality. In the US, the average S&P 500 CEO earned $14.8 million in 2019, 264 times the average worker—compared to a ratio of only 42 in 1980. It seems that almost all the fruits of economic growth have gone to investors and executives, with workers gaining very little. How can it be fair for a CEO to earn in 1.5 days what an ordinary citizen earns in a whole year? This explains many citizens’ views that current capitalism benefits only the elites, and the strength of the calls for reform.

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Shadow Trading

Mihir N. Mehta is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross School of Business; David Reeb is Professor of Finance at the National University of Singapore; and Wanli Zhao is Professor of Finance at the Renmin University of China. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in The Accounting Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

We examine whether corporate insiders attempt to circumvent insider trading restrictions by facilitating trading in competitors and supply chain partners, an activity we label Shadow Trading.

To identify situations in which insiders could use their private information to facilitate shadow trading, we use corporate announcements. We focus on announcements that are likely to represent the release of private information held by a firm’s insiders such as earnings announcements, M&A transaction announcements, and announcements about new products. Using multiple proxies of informed trading from the literature to measure shadow trading, we document that immediately before one of these corporate news announcements by a focal firm, competitors and supply chain partners display increased informed trading levels in their stocks. In particular, the magnitude of informed trading is linked to the magnitude of the information shocks. Each news event appears to represent a significant opportunity for profitable trading—a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average profit from a single shadow trading event ranges from about $140,000 to over $650,000.

We also consider that there are alternate and less-nefarious explanations for their findings. For instance, shadow trading may reflect trading activity by sophisticated investors, who use proprietary and legal methods to acquire private information, or reflect unobserved market structure characteristics. To examine these possibilities, we conduct analyses using two distinct events that change insiders’ incentives to engage in shadow trading but are unlikely to affect alternative explanations.
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CFTC Identifies Climate-Related Financial Risks and Urges Action

Betty Moy Huber is Counsel and Michael Comstock and Alexandra Munson are associates at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum

On September 9, 2020, the Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission published a report, Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System, describing the links between climate change and the U.S. financial system. The Report was largely the product of efforts from its sponsor, CFTC Commissioner Rostin Benham, but was prepared with input from the Subcommittee, comprised of over 30 stakeholders, including banks; investment firms and advisors; oil and gas companies; and public interest and non-profit organizations.

The Report makes two key arguments. First, climate change poses major risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system and its institutions. Second, U.S. financial regulators must move swiftly to understand, measure and address those risks. To that end, the Report makes 53 recommendations for federal and state regulators, legislators, and financial and business leaders to manage climate change and mitigate its impacts.

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Some Thoughts on the Business Roundtable’s Statement of Corporate Purpose

John F. Cogan is the Leonard and Shirley Ely Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. This post was authored by Mr. Cogan; George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution; Michael J. Boskin, the Tully M. Friedman Professor of Economics and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution; and John B. Taylor, the Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum here).

From time to time in the last 150 years, a socialist impulse has taken hold among a significant segment of the U.S. population. This impulse was a primary driver behind the 1880s populists’ movement and among progressives in the 1910s. It was dominant ideology among socialists in the 1930s and among young radicals and intellectuals in the 1960s. Today, there is a similar collectivist sentiment running through America. Although most Americans do not favor government control over the means of production, a significant portion of the population appears to prefer that government, rather than the private sector, be given primary control over the U.S. economy or important parts of it. In a recent poll, 44% favored government control over health care, 35% favored government control over wages of workers, and 33% favored economy-wide government controls.

Today, as in the past, the collectivist sentiment is fueled by resentment against a system that they see as having treated them unfairly, distrust of public and private institutions, and a utopian belief that human nature can be changed to make the world a better place. The American left has developed a strong anti-business sentiment and progressive politicians are calling for extensive regulation of business activities, confiscatory taxes on the wealthy, and a general redistribution of income.

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The Department of Justice as a Gatekeeper in Whistleblower-Initiated Corporate Fraud Enforcement: Drivers and Consequences

Jonas Heese is Assistant Professor of Business Administration in the Accounting & Management Unit at Harvard Business School; Ranjani Krishnan is the Ernest W. & Robert W. Schaberg Endowed Chair in Accounting at Michigan State University; and Hari Ramasubramanian is a Doctoral Student at Michigan State University. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Economics.

Regulatory agencies in the United States rely on the assistance of whistleblowers to detect corporate fraud. The Department of Justice (DOJ) acts as a gatekeeper, evaluating whistleblower allegations to separate legitimate from frivolous cases. Despite its pivotal role in corporate fraud enforcement, there is sparse evidence on how the DOJ exercises its gatekeeping authority. Also, little research examines the consequences of DOJ oversight in such whistleblower cases. In our paper, we examine the DOJ’s gatekeeping role in the context of whistleblowing lawsuits against firms that are alleged to have defrauded the government.

Public and Private Enforcement

A growing debate around fraud enforcement involves the efficacy of public versus private enforcement mechanisms. At one end of the spectrum is a total private enforcement mechanism where whistleblowers provide fraud control with minimal participation from public agencies. At the other end of the spectrum is a public enforcement mechanism that vests all oversight with agencies. In the middle of the continuum is a mixed regime of a private-public partnership, such as whistleblower-initiated lawsuits under the False Claims Act (FCA) against firms that defraud the U.S. government. These mixed regimes have become prevalent in a range of contexts including securities regulations. Our study sheds light on the debate regarding the efficacy of public versus private enforcement mechanisms.

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Board Practices Quarterly: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

Natalie Cooper is Senior Manager and Robert Lamm is an independent senior advisor, both at the Center for Board Effectiveness, Deloitte LLP; and Randi Val Morrison is Vice President, Reporting & Member Support at the Society for Corporate Governance. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here).

The landmark events of 2020 surrounding systemic racism and racial equality have led many companies and their boards to consider their practices related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). For some, the events present an opportunity to reevaluate and enhance current practices; for others, they may prompt the exploration and implementation of actions and practices to advance DEI, within and outside of their organizations, for the first time.

This post explores some ways in which companies and boards have responded to these recent events and other management- and board-focused practices pertaining to DEI. It presents findings based on an August 2020 survey of members, representing more than 200 companies, of the Society for Corporate Governance. We would expect the findings to evolve over time, particularly as they pertain not only to corporate governance, but also to a societal matter, where calls for action and change appear to be ongoing and growing.

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Proposed Rules Relating to the Reporting Threshold for Institutional Investment Managers

Andrew R. Brownstein and David A. Katz are partners and Oluwatomi O. Williams is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a comment letter of Wachtell, Lipton to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Additional contributors to the law firm’s comment letter included Theodore N. MirvisDavid M. Silk, and Sabastian V. Niles. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

On July 10, 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) proposed an amendment to Form 13F that would increase the reporting threshold from $100 million to $3.5 billion (the “Proposed Amendment”). We respectfully submit this letter in response to the solicitation by the Commission for comments on the Proposed Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, we believe that the Proposed Amendment would decrease market transparency, increase the potential for covert activist behavior and market manipulation, reduce the ability of U.S. public companies to engage with investors in a meaningful and efficient manner, and deprive investors, companies and the Commission itself of valuable, decision-useful information. The justification advanced by the Commission for the Proposed Amendment—purported savings of $15,000—$30,000 annually by the “smaller” institutions that would no longer be subject to filing requirements under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Section 13(f)”)—underestimates the market influence of such institutions, likely overestimates the potential savings to those institutions, ignores other costs of the Proposed Amendment and in any event is insufficient to justify the adverse effects of the Proposed Amendment. The Proposed Amendment cuts the information currently available from Form 13Fs by 90%, rendering investors, regulators and the American public blind to important developments affecting the future of major American companies on whom our nation depends for job creation and overall prosperity.

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