Yearly Archives: 2021

Shareholder Meetings and Freedom Rides: The Story of Peck v. Greyhound

Harwell Wells is the I. Herman Stern Professor of Law at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper.

My new paper, Shareholder Meetings and Freedom Rides, is a story about the history of corporate and securities laws that begins in an unlikely place.

In 1947, James Peck and Bayard Rustin, members of the radical pacifist group the Fellowship of Reconciliation and its offshoot the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), were preparing for a civil rights protest they called the Journey of Reconciliation, now remembered as the first Freedom Ride. Inspired by Quaker pacifism, Ghandian nonviolence, and their own experiences as conscientious objectors during World War II, Peck, who was white, and Rustin, who was African-American, would ride with other members of the Fellowship as an interracial group in buses across the upper South. On the ride the group intended to defy rules requiring segregation in transport, in an attempt to force bus lines to follow the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Morgan v Virginia, which held state-mandated segregation in interstate travel unconstitutional. But before they embarked on the Journey of Reconciliation, Peck and Rustin did something else radical: they bought shares in a corporation.

A year later, after their travels in the South had led to terror, death threats, beatings, and in Rustin’s case a term on a chain gang, they brought their activism to a new site of protest, the annual meeting of the corporation of which they were now shareholders, Greyhound Bus Lines, which even after Morgan had as a matter of company policy continued to segregate passengers on its interstate routes. At the meeting Peck and Rustin offered a proposal condemning the company’s policy, and invoked a different body of Federal law, the Federal securities laws, to insist that Greyhound provide all its shareholders the opportunity to vote on their proposal. The law they cited was only a few years old; in 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had adopted a new rule, Rule X14a-7 (now 14a-8), the “Shareholder Proposal Rule,” giving a shareholder under some circumstances the power to make proposals to corporate management and requiring companies to send those proposals to all their shareholders in their annual proxy solicitations—at the company’s expense.

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SEC Brings SPAC Enforcement Action and Signals More to Come

Adam Brenneman, Rahul Mukhi, and Jared Gerber are partners at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary memorandum by Mr. Brenneman, Mr. Mukhi, Mr. Gerber, Nick Grabar, JD Colavecchio, and Julian Cardona.

On July 13, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced a major enforcement action related to a proposed merger between a special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”) and a privately held target company (“Target”). This followed numerous warnings by the SEC staff over several months of enhanced scrutiny of such transactions under the federal securities laws. [1] The respondents, except for the Target’s CEO, settled the action by collectively agreeing to civil penalties of approximately $8 million and to certain equitable relief described below. [2]

Background of the Allegations

The SPAC, Stable Road Acquisition Company, raised $172.5 million in an IPO in November 2019 and considered a number of possible merger targets before entering into a merger agreement with the Target, Momentus, in October 2020. In connection with the merger (or “de-SPAC”) transaction, the SPAC engaged in a private placement of shares (referred to as a “PIPE transaction”), securing investor commitments in an aggregate amount of $175 million.

The SPAC filed with the SEC a registration statement with respect to the merger in November 2020. In late January 2021, the SEC issued a subpoena to the SPAC, and around the same time the Target’s CEO resigned from his position. The announcement of a settlement in July 2021 represents an unusually fast resolution of the matter, presumably reflecting urgency for both the SPAC, which is still seeking to complete its de-SPAC transaction before it is required to return its capital to shareholders, [3] and the SEC, which presumably intended to convey an important message to SPACs and their sponsors.

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Weekly Roundup: July 30-August 5, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 30-August 5, 2021.

The Small, Young Company Board



Trust: A Critical Asset



SEC Returns Spotlight to Cybersecurity Disclosure Enforcement



Rethinking Securities Law


Quarterly Review of Shareholder Activism


SEC Focuses Enforcement Efforts on SPAC Transactions


Litigation Risk and Debt Contracting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment


Comment on Climate Disclosure


Delaware M&A Update


Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy


2021 Say on Pay Changes


Managing CEO Transitions Just Got Harder


Locating Stablecoins within the Regulatory Perimeter


2021 Proxy Season Review

Shirley Westcott is a Senior Vice President at Alliance Advisors LLC. This post is based on her Alliance Advisors memorandum.

Overview

The year-long pandemic and economic lock-downs that denoted 2020 gave way to a dynamic 2021 annual meeting season as investors wielded their proxy votes to express their views on an array of environmental, social and governance proposals issues, executive compensation plans and corporate board quality and effectiveness.

Environmental and social (E&S) resolutions drew some eye-popping support levels, including over a dozen on diversity, climate change and political spending that scored over 80% (see Table 1). A total of 34 E&S proposals have received majority support to date— surpassing last year’s record 21—and included six that were unopposed by the boards. Some newly emergent resolutions on racial audits, access to COVID-19 medicines and say-on-climate (SOC) advisory votes also did remarkably well for their first year, reaching vote averages in the 30% range.

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Locating Stablecoins within the Regulatory Perimeter

Howell E. Jackson is the James S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Morgan Ricks is Professor of Law and Enterprise Scholar at Vanderbilt University Law School.

Stablecoins are suddenly very much front and center in the minds of policy makers. Last month, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen assembled the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to explore this increasingly important form of cryptocurrency, and, in a subsequent press release, the Department indicated that in coming months the PWG will release a report exploring how stablecoins fit into our current regulatory framework along with recommendations for addressing any regulatory gaps. [1]

In analyzing stablecoins, one of the first challenges facing the Treasury Department staff will be to determine where, if at all, stablecoins fit within our current regulatory framework. Do these instruments fall within existing regulatory perimeters, making them already subject to some established system of financial regulation? Or is new legislation required to deal with stablecoins? To a considerable degree, early forms of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have escaped primary oversight from financial regulators and Congress has so far failed to expand our regulatory perimeters to reach these first-generation cryptocurrencies in a coherent manner.

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Managing CEO Transitions Just Got Harder

Robert Stark is co-lead of CEO Succession Services in North America at Spencer Stuart; Dan-Meng Chen is a core member of CEO Succession and Leadership Advisory Services at Spencer Stuart; and Woomi Yun is Senior Vice President of Financial Communications at Edelman. This post is based on a Spencer Stuart/Edelman memorandum by Mr. Stark, Mr. Chen, Ms. Yun, Lex Suvanto, Global Managing Director of Financial Communications at Edelman; Mustafa Riffat, Executive Vice President of Financial Communications at Edelman; and Ben Machtiger, Chief Marketing & Communications Officer at Spencer Stuart.

Managing CEO succession has always been one of the most critical responsibilities that boards shoulder. With daunting stakes, they must carefully orchestrate everything, from articulating what they need in their future CEO, evaluating candidates, to managing a range of delicate dynamics.

As if those challenges were not enough, multiple societal forces have converged to make the role of CEOs far more complex than ever – with implications for both the attributes of future CEOs and how boards manage the succession process. The seeds of some of these forces were planted some time ago, but their combination is now effecting profound changes. We now live in a vastly more transparent and viral world. The shift to “stakeholder capitalism” – significantly augmented in 2020 by the Covid-19 pandemic and social unrest – has dramatically expanded expectations on corporations to respond to issues beyond core business matters. In fact, the 2021 Edelman Trust Barometer reveals that public trust in societal institutions is at historic lows; business, in contrast, is perceived as more ethical and competent. Against this backdrop, the pressure is on CEOs to step in and fill the void that governments and other entities have created.

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2021 Say on Pay Changes

Todd Sirras is Managing Director, Justin Beck is Consultant, and Austin Vanbastelaer is Senior Consultant at Semler Brossy LLP. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Sirras, Mr. Beck, Mr. Vanbastelaer, Alexandria AgeeSarah Hartman, and Kyle McCarthy. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Emerging themes from this year’s Say on Pay and proxy voting season suggests a fundamental shift in shareholder and proxy advisor perspectives on compensation. The primary themes of the 2021 proxy season include:

  1. S&P 500 companies have received more scrutiny and lower vote results.
    The S&P 500 failure rate is 3.7% compared to 2.8% for the Russell 3000, even though the ISS “Against” recommendation rate is lower for the S&P 500 (10.2%) than the Russell 3000 (11.0%). Last year the difference was minimal.
  2. Shareholders have been highly critical of special awards and long-term incentive adjustments.
    Shareholders and proxy advisors maintain that special awards should be granted infrequently and to specific executives, with rigorous performance conditions and not be additive to regular annual pay. S&P 500 companies that made positive adjustments to payouts or in-flight PSUs had a nearly 10 percentage point higher failure rate.
  3. Environmental and social proposals received greater support, especially involving matters on EEO, diversity and inclusion, and climate impact.
    The percent of social and environmental proposals that received above 50% support is 18% and 40%, respectively, which is significantly higher than the 9% and 16% rates at this time last year.

Proxy advisors and several institutional investors released guidelines at the onset of Covid-19 to set expectations on how they would evaluate various Covid-related compensation plan adjustments. Most guidance homed in on acceptable adjustments to add discretion in short-term plans, while advising against long-term plan adjustments. Shareholders and proxy advisors held many companies accountable to these communicated guidelines; however, the rules were more rigidly applied to larger cap companies. Elevated scrutiny of the largest companies raises a discussion about how shareholders have evaluated Covid-19 actions in relation to potential long-term compensation changes.

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Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy

Raymond Fisman is Slater Family Professor in Behavioral Economics at Boston University. This post is based on a recent paper, forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, by Mr. Fisman; Marianne Bertrand, Chris P. Dialynas Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business; Matilde Bombardini, Professor at the University of British Columbia Vancouver School of Economics; Brad Hackinen, Assistant Professor in Business, Economics and Public Policy at the University of Western Ontario Ivey Business School; and Francesco Trebbi, Professor of Business and Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley Haas School of Business. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Public officials face an inherent tension in getting feedback on proposed rules and regulations—the best-informed parties are also very likely those with an interest in seeking particular outcomes. If you’re interested in, say, the costs and benefits of green energy requirements, utility companies could surely provide expert advice on the costs and benefits of such rules. The very same experts, however, might be tempted to minimize the benefits and overstate the costs, in an effort to minimize the regulatory burden imposed on their businesses. Relative to private companies, non-profits and research institutions may be seen as more impartial or even adversarial to corporate perspectives. If regulators hear the same message from, say, both utility companies and non-profits like Greenpeace or Earthjustice, they might give more weight to their suggestions.

This captures, in theory, the process by which regulators in the U.S. elicit feedback from the public on proposed rules, and adjust final regulations in response to a slate of public comments from wide-ranging sources. This feedback, submitted by any interested party—for-profits, non-profits, lawmakers, and individuals—can be weighed by rule makers taking into account both the expertise and potential bias of the commenter.

In our paper, forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, we show how financial ties between companies and non-profits—possibly unbeknownst to regulators—can subvert this process of information acquisition and lead to regulations that favor the interests of companies rather than the general public. Non-profits receive donations from corporations or their foundations, and lend their support to companies’ regulatory agendas in return.

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Delaware M&A Update

Jeffrey D. Marell, Krishna Veeraraghavan and Jaren Janghorbani are partners at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on their Paul, Weiss memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Minority Shareholder’s Vote Required by Pre-Disclosure Voting Agreement Did Not Count for Corwin Purposes

In In re Pattern Energy Group Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a class action challenging the sale of Pattern Energy to Canada Pension Plan Investment Board due to allegations that the special committee and certain officers involved in the sale process improperly favored Canada Pension due to the preference of Riverstone Holdings LLC, a private equity fund that formed Pattern Energy and controlled its upstream supplier. The court, in an opinion by Vice Chancellor Zurn, held that the approval of the transaction by a majority of the minority stockholders did not cleanse the transaction under Corwin because such approval was partly based on the vote of a large holder of preferred shares that was contractually bound, pre-disclosure, to vote in accordance with the board’s recommendation, and therefore its vote was not fully informed for purposes of Corwin. For the opinion, click here.

Delaware Court of Chancery Holds 35% Shareholder Not a Controller

In In re GGP, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a class action challenging the acquisition of GGP by Brookfield Property Partners, L.P. Brookfield, who had rescued GGP from bankruptcy, held approximately 35% of GGP’s stock. In addition to its right to designate three members to the GGP board for so long as it owned 20% of GGP’s stock, Brookfield had a standstill agreement with GGP that entitled Brookfield to vote its shares, up to 10% of the outstanding shares of GGP, for or against any non-Brookfield nominee to the GGP board. The standstill also required that transactions between GGP and Brookfield be approved by a majority of the minority GGP stockholders, and provided that GGP would not waive certain provisions of the standstill for other large stockholders unless it granted a similar waiver to Brookfield. The plaintiff challenged the acquisition by Brookfield, arguing that Brookfield was a controller owing fiduciary duties to the minority GGP stockholders and therefore the transaction was subject to entire fairness review. The court, in an opinion by Vice Chancellor Slights, held that Brookfield did not exercise control over GGP, in part because the contractual standstill arrangements with GGP decreased the influence that Brookfield had over the company. Nor did Brookfield exercise control over the merger, as the special committee that negotiated and approved the merger was independent from Brookfield. Moreover, the court concluded that the merger was approved by an informed and uncoerced stockholder vote, and therefore the transaction was cleansed under Corwin. For the opinion, click here.

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Comment on Climate Disclosure

Nell Minow is Vice Chair of ValueEdge Advisors. This post is based on her comment letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

The accountability processes of government and business are each ideal for optimizing different policy issues, and we get into trouble when we let one take on the role of the other. What has made the US capital markets the most robust and respected in the world is the combination of market- and government-based structures and especially the comprehensive transparency of our public companies. The nature of capitalism is to maximize profits, and it is up to the government to make sure that happens without externalizing costs onto the public who have no capacity to provide a market-based response. Corporate executives would always prefer less disclosure. Investors would prefer more. Because of the collective choice problem, there is no way for investors to make a market-based demand for more information as effectively and efficiently as having the government set the floor for what must be disclosed.

It is within this context that the questions will always arise about when it is time to add more to the already extensive information that issuers must provide to investors. As the request for comments and Commissioner Lee’s outstanding presentation on materiality suggest, that time has come for ESG. The reason it is the fastest-growing sector of investment vehicles [1] is a reflection of increasing concerns about the inadequacy of GAAP numbers in assessing investment risk. Let me emphasize that; ESG and climate change disclosure concerns are entirely and exclusively financial. That is what makes them a have-to-have, not a nice-to-have.

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