Harwell Wells is the I. Herman Stern Professor of Law at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper.
My new paper, Shareholder Meetings and Freedom Rides, is a story about the history of corporate and securities laws that begins in an unlikely place.
In 1947, James Peck and Bayard Rustin, members of the radical pacifist group the Fellowship of Reconciliation and its offshoot the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), were preparing for a civil rights protest they called the Journey of Reconciliation, now remembered as the first Freedom Ride. Inspired by Quaker pacifism, Ghandian nonviolence, and their own experiences as conscientious objectors during World War II, Peck, who was white, and Rustin, who was African-American, would ride with other members of the Fellowship as an interracial group in buses across the upper South. On the ride the group intended to defy rules requiring segregation in transport, in an attempt to force bus lines to follow the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Morgan v Virginia, which held state-mandated segregation in interstate travel unconstitutional. But before they embarked on the Journey of Reconciliation, Peck and Rustin did something else radical: they bought shares in a corporation.
A year later, after their travels in the South had led to terror, death threats, beatings, and in Rustin’s case a term on a chain gang, they brought their activism to a new site of protest, the annual meeting of the corporation of which they were now shareholders, Greyhound Bus Lines, which even after Morgan had as a matter of company policy continued to segregate passengers on its interstate routes. At the meeting Peck and Rustin offered a proposal condemning the company’s policy, and invoked a different body of Federal law, the Federal securities laws, to insist that Greyhound provide all its shareholders the opportunity to vote on their proposal. The law they cited was only a few years old; in 1942 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had adopted a new rule, Rule X14a-7 (now 14a-8), the “Shareholder Proposal Rule,” giving a shareholder under some circumstances the power to make proposals to corporate management and requiring companies to send those proposals to all their shareholders in their annual proxy solicitations—at the company’s expense.
Comment on Climate Disclosure
More from: Nell Minow, ValueEdge Advisors
Nell Minow is Vice Chair of ValueEdge Advisors. This post is based on her comment letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).
The accountability processes of government and business are each ideal for optimizing different policy issues, and we get into trouble when we let one take on the role of the other. What has made the US capital markets the most robust and respected in the world is the combination of market- and government-based structures and especially the comprehensive transparency of our public companies. The nature of capitalism is to maximize profits, and it is up to the government to make sure that happens without externalizing costs onto the public who have no capacity to provide a market-based response. Corporate executives would always prefer less disclosure. Investors would prefer more. Because of the collective choice problem, there is no way for investors to make a market-based demand for more information as effectively and efficiently as having the government set the floor for what must be disclosed.
It is within this context that the questions will always arise about when it is time to add more to the already extensive information that issuers must provide to investors. As the request for comments and Commissioner Lee’s outstanding presentation on materiality suggest, that time has come for ESG. The reason it is the fastest-growing sector of investment vehicles [1] is a reflection of increasing concerns about the inadequacy of GAAP numbers in assessing investment risk. Let me emphasize that; ESG and climate change disclosure concerns are entirely and exclusively financial. That is what makes them a have-to-have, not a nice-to-have.
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