Yearly Archives: 2021

Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation

David I. Walker is Professor of Law and Maurice Poch Faculty Research Scholar at Boston University School of Law. This post is based on his recent paper, forthcoming in the Florida Tax Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to forfeit previously received compensation under certain circumstances, most notably after a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive compensation was predicated. Clawback provisions are on the rise. Limited clawbacks were mandated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Dodd-Frank legislation, enacted in 2010, mandated a much more comprehensive no-fault clawback regime, and the SEC is in the process of finalizing rules to implement the Dodd-Frank clawback. Meanwhile, the fraction of S&P 1500 companies proactively adopting clawback provisions more expansive than those mandated by SOX has increased from less than 1% in 2004 to 62% in 2013.

This paper focuses on the federal income tax consequences of clawbacks, specifically on the tax treatment of repayments by executives in cases in which the compensation repaid has been included in taxable income in a prior year. This is surprisingly under-explored terrain, particularly given that individual taxes can consume as much as 50% of executive compensation.

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Weekly Roundup: February 12-18, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 12-18, 2021.

Spencer Stuart S&P MidCap 400 Board Report


A New Whistleblower Environment Emerges


Retaining the C-Suite After CEO Turnover


Stakeholder Capitalism: From Balance Sheet to Value Sheet


BlackRock’s 2021 CEO Letter


CFO Signals


2021 Proxy Season: Executive Compensation Considerations



Advisers by Another Name


r/BlackRockAnnualLetter: Climate Change and ESG in the Age of Reddit


COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance


A Conversation with Bill Ackman


Supreme Court Relies on “Bridgegate” Case to Vacate Second Circuit Decision


Troubling Signs from Recent M&A Case Law



Risk Factor Disclosures for the Recovery Era



Executive Compensation in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Julian Hamud is Senior Director of Executive Compensation Research at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on his Glass Lewis memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried; and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not changed Glass Lewis’ approach to executive pay. We start from each company’s specific circumstances, evaluating compensation programs through the lens of pay and performance alignment, and the extent to which companies have been able to tie any program changes to this alignment going forward. It’s a pragmatic, contextual approach that applies in good times and bad.

However, the landscape for issuers and investors has shifted markedly. The many uncertainties faced by companies and their shareholders highlight the need for effective pay programs. Strong linkages between pay and performance remain crucial despite market-wide disruptions, and demonstrating this alignment to shareholders is all the more important. Moreover, the scope of topics to be considered in relation to executive pay is widening, with E&S issues drawing exponentially increased focus in 2020, and human capital management becoming particularly relevant during a time of global economic downturn.

Further, issuers would do well to consider that the pandemic has made executive pay a more salient issue for many investors. All companies, especially those seeking special support from governments or executing significant employment cuts, should consider the reputational risk associated with poor pay decisions, particularly quantum payouts. Even those companies who have managed to perform well during this time may face additional challenges in justifying high executive payouts to their shareholders.

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Corporate Transparency Act: What Companies Need to Know

Carl A. Valenstein is partner and Jose T. Robles, Jr. is an associate at Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP. This post is based on their Morgan Lewis memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr., (discussed on the Forum here); and The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark by Lucian Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr., James David Nelson, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

While the Corporate Transparency Act largely applies to foreign-owned shell companies, domestic companies should carefully read the definition of “reporting company” to ensure they fall within one of the exceptions to the definition. Reporting companies should be mindful of the various penalties associated with noncompliance or providing inaccurate or misleading information to FinCEN.

What is the Corporate Transparency Act?

Congress recently passed the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. The purpose of the CTA is to “better enable critical national security, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to counter money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activity” by creating a national registry of beneficial ownership information for “reporting companies.” The CTA largely applies to foreign-owned shell companies and is set to take effect no later than January 1, 2022—upon the promulgation of regulations by the secretary of the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury).

Who is Required to Report Beneficial Ownership Information?

Under the CTA, a “reporting company” must report certain beneficial ownership information to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) within the Treasury. A “reporting company” is defined as any corporation, limited liability company, or similar entity that is (1) created by filing a formation document with a secretary of state or similar office; or (2) formed under the law of a foreign country and registered to do business in the United States.

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Risk Factor Disclosures for the Recovery Era

Valerie Ford Jacob, Doru Gavril, and Sarah Solum are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Ms. Jacob, Mr. Gavril, Ms. Solum, and Drew Liming.

It’s early 2021. With a new year comes a new Form 10-K. Among other things, your outside counsel is (hopefully) asking you to review and update your disclosures about risks related to COVID-19. That’s good advice, of course. We are still in the midst of a pandemic on a scale previously unseen in the modern era. No one knows how much longer its impact and uncertainties will persist. But this is also time to look at your COVID-19 risks through a new lens: consider whether your filings should also include risk disclosures about the post-pandemic recovery period. [1]

Not all companies were affected the same way by the pandemic. Most public companies experienced the same macroeconomic instability, workforce disruption, and distribution/supply chain upheaval and uncertainty. Beginning last spring, companies and their outside counsel scrambled to describe ever-changing risks regarding contagion, working from home, shifting consumption patterns, various shortages, and evolving government safety mandates. Soon, a new set of risk disclosures emerged, with their own lexicon of pandemic-related terms.

For a number of companies, though, the pandemic shifted consumer and competitive behaviors to create growth, both in demand from existing customers or in the number of new customers. This growth was accompanied by very positive financial or operational results. Several industries that grew during the pandemic should consider risk disclosures tailored for the “recovery era”: social media, home entertainment, video communications, collaboration tools, delivery services, online payments, e-commerce, to name a few.

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Shareholderism Versus Stakeholderism—A Misconceived Contradiction: A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita

Colin Mayer is the Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies at University of Oxford Saïd Business School. This post is based on his recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here);  For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

There has recently been growing interest in stakeholder governance. The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (BT) (discussed on the Forum here) is a thoughtful and carefully constructed critique of the subject. In a nutshell, BT’s critique is that “stakeholderism”—the idea of promoting the interests of the stakeholders of a firm (its customers, employees, suppliers, societies, and the environment)—is either just enlightened “shareholderism”, augmenting the value of shareholders’ investments, or it requires directors of companies to make near-impossible trade-offs. In the first case, stakeholderism as enlightened shareholderism, stakeholder governance is regarded as just good business that creates greater financial value for shareholders as well as benefits for stakeholders. By supporting their stakeholders, companies establish more loyal customers, engaged employees, reliable suppliers and sustainable environments. These generate greater revenues and lower costs for companies and therefore more profits as well as benefits for stakeholders. In this case, BT suggest that stakeholderism is no different from traditional shareholder governance.

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Troubling Signs from Recent M&A Case Law

Ethan Klingsberg is partner and Victor Ma is an associate at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Have we forgotten the lessons of the Delaware cases that arose from the heyday of big-ticket LBOs by private equity preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2008? And to the extent we have, who is bearing the cost, how are plaintiffs uncovering these recent deviations from best practices, and what is to be done?

In these cases from the mid-2000s, courts consistently viewed LBOs as transactions marred by the conflicts of target company executives. Notwithstanding the presence of supermajority independent boards at the target companies, the courts regularly denied motions to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims in connection with LBOs. The focus was the absence of safeguards to neutralize the interests of these executives in working for the financial sponsor buyer after the closing and in having access thereafter to, as one case from that era described it, “a second bite at the apple” when the private equity firm would inevitably flip or IPO the company. [1]

A number of useful protocols grew out of these cases from the 2000s. [2] But the 2000s are now a long time ago and a new generation of gatekeepers (lawyers, bankers, and independent directors, not to mention private equity professionals and their friends in senior management of target companies) for whom those cases may be distant memories at best, are now in prominent roles. In the second half of 2020, two of the most important M&A cases involved alleged missteps that adherence to the protocols arising from the 2000s would have prevented.

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Supreme Court Relies on “Bridgegate” Case to Vacate Second Circuit Decision

Greg Andres, Angela Burgess, and Paul Nathanson are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Mr. Andres, Ms. Burgess, Mr. Nathanson, Neil MacBride, Martine Beamon and Kenneth Wainstein.

On January 11, 2021, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s controversial decision in United States v. Blaszczak, which held that proof of a benefit to the tipper is not a required element for criminal insider trading claims brought under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Although the Supreme Court ordered reconsideration on other grounds— whether certain government information may be considered “property” for the purpose of a scheme to defraud—the impact on the insider trading decision may be the more significant consequence. 

The Second Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Blaszczak

As we discussed in a past client memorandum, in 2019 the Second Circuit in United States v. Blaszczak expanded insider trading liability by affirming the convictions of four individuals of wire fraud, securities fraud, and conversion charges under Title 18. The government charged the defendants—a government employee, a consultant, and two hedge fund analysts—with violating both Title 15 and Title 18 of the U.S. Code. The jury acquitted the defendants under Title 15, which is the traditional basis to charge insider trading, but convicted on certain Title 18 counts. [1] On appeal, one of the defendants’ arguments was that the District Court wrongly instructed the jury that an element that applied under Title 15 did not apply under Title 18: that the tipper disclosed information for a “personal benefit” that was known to the recipients of the tip.

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A Conversation with Bill Ackman

Stephen Fraidin is a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a conversation between Mr. Fraidin and Mr. William Ackman, Founder and CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management, in a keynote session at the Cadwalader Fifth Annual Finance Forum. Their discussion covered the current state of the financial markets, the resurgence of SPACs, and more.

STEPHEN FRAIDIN (SF): It’s always a pleasure to have an opportunity to have a conversation with Bill Ackman. Bill, I’d like to start with a personal question: at what point in your life did you realize or decide that what you wanted to do was become a professional investor?

BILL ACKMAN (BA): Actually when I went to work for my dad after college. He ran a firm that arranged financing for real estate developers and owners. It’s a service business, and after being in that business for six months or a year, it seemed like the real estate developer investors were having more fun than the service providers. So, I didn’t want to be a service provider—I wanted to be on the other side of the table. I was also contemplating whether to go to business school, which I thought would be a good way to transition from service provider to investor. I didn’t know much about investing, so I asked my dad: who do you know that’s a good investor? My dad mentioned a guy named Leonard Marx. I don’t know if you remember the name, but Leonard Marx was a very successful real estate investor and also a very successful stock market investor. And I happened to meet him, and he recommended I read a book called The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham, which is kind of a value investing classic. I read the book, and it’s a bit like Jean-Paul Sartre’s essays on existentialism: you either read it and say “OK, I believe, I’m interested,” or it doesn’t appeal to you. I was intrigued, and from that moment on I became passionate about investing. I went to business school, and then from there I decided I wanted to start my own firm.

SF: Great. So Bill, I would say that we’re right now in a time of significant instability, both market instability and social instability. We’ve got the changeover of U.S. presidential administration. We’ve got the pandemic. We’ve got extraordinarily low interest rates. We’ve got, I think, a recession. How does all of this affect you as an investor? How do you see that instability playing out?

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COVID-19 and Comparative Corporate Governance

Martin Gelter is Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law; and Julia M. Puaschunder is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at Columbia University, and a faculty member at The New School of Public Engagement and affiliate of its Department of Economics. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Corporation Law. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

COVID-19 accounts for a once-in-a-lifetime external economic shock coming down on world society. When the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 emerged in December 2019, the general public in much of the world, let alone business leadership, was not yet particularly concerned. A year into the outbreak of the pandemic, over two million individuals have died directly from the pandemic, which has sickened over hundred million counted people but also affected all of us in the way we live, interact and perform in markets. Country governments have taken harsh measures to combat the disease, including lockdowns that have caused unprecedented disruptions to work life and to the economy.

Not surprisingly, corporate governance is at a critical juncture. Firms have struggled to adapt to lockdowns with severe and drastic effects on their performance. Restrictions have caused GDP drops estimated to likely become 50 times larger than those experienced during the 2008 world financial recession. Unemployment levels increased worse than during the Great Depression, already now also exhibiting worse inequality.

Our paper speculates whether COVID-19 will have a lasting effect on corporate governance around the world. How will large corporations be run and controlled differently? Will the interaction between firms and their shareholders and other stakeholders change due to a different balance of powers between interest and the political environment?

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