Monthly Archives: October 2021

Statement by Chairman Gensler on Rules Regarding Clawbacks of Erroneously Awarded Compensation

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

I support today’s [Oct. 14, 2021] action to re-open comment on the Dodd-Frank Act rule regarding clawbacks of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation. I believe we have an opportunity to strengthen the transparency and quality of corporate financial statements as well as the accountability of corporate executives to their investors.

In today’s economy, corporate executives often are paid based on how the companies that they lead perform: things like revenue and profits of the overall business. Occasionally, however, the numbers the companies reported as the basis of that compensation aren’t accurate. In these cases, companies may have to go back and revise or restate prior financial reporting. As a result, an executive may have been paid for meeting certain milestones that the company didn’t, in fact, hit.

Over the last couple of decades, Congress has decided that executives should pay back that incentive-based compensation. [1] Congress first mandated these clawbacks under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring chief executives and chief financial officers to return incentive-based pay in cases of misconduct from the previous 12 months.

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Delaware Decision Deals with Director Independence

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel, and Steven J. Steinman and Brian T. Mangino are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Steinman, Mr. Mangino, Andrew J. Colosimo, Mark H. Lucas, and Erica Jaffe, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).

BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litigation (Sept. 20, 2021) involved a merger between entities that were controlled by the same person, Howard Lutnick, through his control of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. (“Cantor”). Lutnick had a far larger economic interest in the target company, Berkeley Point Financial LLC (“Berkeley Point”), than in the acquiring company, BGC Partners, Inc. (“BGC”). The plaintiffs claimed that he therefore caused BGC to overpay for Berkeley Point (receiving himself 42% of the alleged overpayment, which amounted to $125 million, at the expense of the other BGC stockholders). The transaction was approved by a special committee of BGC’s four outside directors, after months of negotiation with BGC. (BGC’s minority stockholders did not vote on the transaction.) The plaintiffs sued Lutnick, Cantor, and BGC’s directors for breach of fiduciary duties in improperly approving the related-party transaction.

The court found, despite evidence that it characterized as “not overwhelming,” that two of the outside directors may not have been independent of Lutnick. As a result, the court held that: (i) the plaintiffs were excused from not having made a litigation demand on the board to bring the litigation (as demand would have been futile); (ii) the burden of proof under entire fairness review would not shift to the plaintiffs (as the transaction was not approved by a special committee comprised of a majority of independent directors); and (iii) the plaintiffs had validly pled a non-exculpated fiduciary claim against one of the non-independent directors (as that director may have taken actions that furthered Lutnick’s self-interest, violating the duty of loyalty).

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Weekly Roundup: October 8–14, 2021


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 8–14, 2021.


Corporate Liquidity Provision and Share Repurchase Programs


SEC Form 10-K Comments Regarding Climate-Related Disclosures


Data Governance Tips for Companies Following SEC’s In re App Annie


New York Court on the Enforcement of Federal Forum Provision


Questions to Ask Before Forming a New Board Committee


Crisis Management in the Era of “No Normal”


Should SPAC Forecasts be Sacked?


2022 Proxy and Annual Report Season



Banking-Crisis Interventions, 1257-2019


Sustainability Impact in Investor Decision-Making


Just Say No? Shareholder Voting on Securities Class Actions


Speech by Commissioner Roisman on the U.S. Capital Markets


Going Dark: Speech by Commissioner Lee on The Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy


Ninth Circuit on Strict Liability for Direct Listings


Special Committee Report


Comment on Climate Change Disclosures

Comment on Climate Change Disclosures

Jessica Ground is Global Head of ESG, and Clara Kang is Counsel at Capital Group. This post is based on their comment letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding its proposed framework for climate change-related disclosures by public companies. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

We share the view that has been articulated by various policymakers, academics and other market participants that climate change poses a systemic risk to our financial markets and the broader economy. The potential impacts of climate change on financial markets are broad and far-reaching, including disruptions not only in asset valuations but more generally in the proper functioning of the markets as market participants seek to mitigate physical and transition risks stemming from climate change. As a result, investors increasingly view material climate (and other ESG)-related risks and opportunities as critical drivers of a company’s ability to generate value over the long-term. To that end, there is a strong need for climate-related issuer disclosure that is consistent, comparable and rooted in materiality.

Today, the asset management industry faces a significant data challenge with respect to climate or ESG-related information. As the Investor-as-Owner Subcommittee of the Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee noted in its May 2020 report, issuers take a range of different approaches (or none at all) in providing ESG-related disclosure: of those that do provide disclosure, some publish stand-alone reports while others incorporate disclosure in existing regulatory filings; some disclose information against third-party standards such as those issued by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) while others do not; and still others do not report directly but provide information to third-party data providers. [1] Such data providers employ vastly different methodologies for ESG scoring systems that often result in an issuer being rated favorably for its ESG practices by one data provider but unfavorably by another. In short, while there is a plethora of ESG-related information in the marketplace, the information tends to be subjective, spotty and unreliable, limiting investors’ ability to effectively and efficiently consider material climate or other ESG risks in allocating capital.

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Special Committee Report

Gregory Gooding, William Regner and Jeffrey Rosen are partners at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Mr. Gooding, Mr. Regner, Mr. Rosen, Emily Huang, Maeve O’Connor, and Sue Meng, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).

This post surveys corporate transactions announced during the period from January through June 2021 that used special committees to manage conflicts and key Delaware judicial decisions during this period ruling on the effectiveness of such committees. While corporate transactional activity during the first half of 2021 may be remembered more for SPACs, cryptocurrencies and meme stocks, there continued to be a significant number of conflicted transactions and the Delaware courts continued to refine the boundaries of Delaware law involving the use of special committees.

Special Committee Independence: How Close is Too Close

Once a decision has been made to form a special committee, the most important question, and sometimes a fraught one, is which directors are sufficiently independent of the interested stockholder to effectively serve on that committee. Delaware case law is replete with examples of committees whose effectiveness has been challenged because one or more members allegedly lacked independence, in many cases as a result of social or business connections with the interested stockholder. However, a recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision may signal a willingness of the Delaware courts to apply closer scrutiny to such allegations.

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Ninth Circuit on Strict Liability for Direct Listings

Boris Feldman, Sarah Solum and Doru Gavril are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Mr. Feldman, Ms. Solum, Mr. Gavril, Drew Liming, and Abigail West.

On September 20, 2021, the Ninth Circuit held that securities sold by third parties and exempt from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws are nevertheless subject to strict liability for the issuer if sold after a direct listing. By affirming a district court’s earlier decision in Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 367 (N.D. Cal. 2020), the Ninth Circuit majority parted ways with the decades-old law of other circuits, the Court’s own precedent, and the historical development of the federal securities regime. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

Section 11 and Slack’s Direct Listing

At issue in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Slack was how Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 applies to shares sold through a direct listing. To balance Section 11’s imposition of strict liability, Congress and the courts have limited the claim to a discrete group of shareholders. Shareholders must establish standing by showing that their shares were traceable to the challenged registration statement. In cases dating back decades, both the Ninth Circuit and other circuit courts have consistently held that the public availability of shares other than those sold pursuant to the challenged registration statement can defeat standing.

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Going Dark: Speech by Commissioner Lee on The Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy

Allison Herren Lee is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2021. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Lee, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Perhaps the single most significant development in securities markets in the new millennium has been the explosive growth of private markets. We’ve become all too familiar with the statistics: more capital has been raised in these markets than in public markets each year for over a decade [1] with no signs of a change in the trend. The increasing inflows into these markets have also significantly increased the overall portion of our equities markets and our economy that is non-transparent to investors, markets, policymakers, and the public. [2]

The vast amount of capital in these markets, attributable in part to policy choices made by the Commission over the past few decades, has also created a new, but no longer rare or mythical, kind of business known as Unicorns—private companies with valuations of $1 billion or more. So christened in 2013 when their existence and number was more fittingly associated with fairy tales, they have since grown dramatically in both number and, importantly, in size, reaching dizzying valuations nearing and even exceeding $100 billion. [3] In today’s markets, companies can and do stay private far longer than ever before, despite the fact that they often dwarf their public counterparts in size and influence.

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Speech by Commissioner Roisman on the U.S. Capital Markets

Elad L. Roisman is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on his recent remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2021. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Good morning. To open, I have to note that my remarks are my own and do not reflect the views of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.

I. Introduction

The last 18 months have been unprecedented and while we have all had to make changes and adapt I have found that the purpose of my job has been consistent. I have been going to the office throughout the pandemic and every morning, when I walk into my office, the first thing I see is a slightly faded piece of computer paper on the wall that reads “it’s a privilege.” I printed it over a decade ago and I have carried it to every job I have had since. It has never been more true of any job than it is of the job I have now: it is truly a privilege and an honor to serve on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Today, I want to focus my remarks on one aspect of this great responsibility: preserving and expanding opportunities for businesses in our economy to raise capital and for investors to share in their success.

There is little disagreement that the U.S. capital markets remain the envy of the world. Their depth, liquidity, and transparency are unmatched. Their remarkable quality is not merely a point of pride; it fundamentally affects how our economy runs, and therefore how our people, and people all over the world, are able to live their lives. These are the markets I have the privilege of overseeing.

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Just Say No? Shareholder Voting on Securities Class Actions

Albert H. Choi is Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law at the University of Michigan; Stephen J. Choi is Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University; and Adam C. Pritchard is Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law at the University of Michigan. This post is based on their recent paper.

When a publicly-traded company releases misleading information that distorts the price of the company’s stock, investors who purchase at the inflated price suffer harm from the misleading information when it is corrected. Under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors may bring a private cause of action against corporations and their officers who make materially misleading statements on which the investors rely when buying or selling a security.

Litigation can benefit investors by deterring managers from committing fraud. Discouraging fraud can improve market efficiency and various corporate governance mechanisms that rely on accurate securities prices. In an individual lawsuit, however, while the deterrence benefit accrues to all investors, the plaintiffs must bear the entire cost of the lawsuit. The class action mechanism provides a collective solution to the disincentives discouraging investors from bringing a securities fraud suit. In a class action, a collectivizing agent, the class representative, represents the interests of the class. Individual class members do not need to expend their own resources to obtain a recovery. Indeed, they do not even need to pay attention to the litigation until a settlement or a judgment is reached. All they need to do is submit a claim form once the litigation is concluded.

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Sustainability Impact in Investor Decision-Making

David Rouch and Juliane Hilf are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on their Freshfields memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

In A Legal Framework for Impact: Sustainability Impact in Investor Decision-making, published by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP in July for the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, the UN PRI and the Generation Foundation, we look at the adoption of positive sustainability outcomes as goals of institutional investment management and how far the law supports it.

The issue

The goal most associated with institutional investment management is earning a financial return. But earning money is obviously not the only goal we have for our lives or for our world. It exists alongside broader goals concerning the quality of the social and natural environment we inhabit, or at least its sustainability.

There may have been a time when it was possible to approach the goal of earning a financial return largely in isolation from the others. In reality, however, financial and economic systems are part of wider social and natural ecosystems, the health of which is vital to broader goals. Financial and economic systems can help these ecosystems flourish. However, they also depend upon and can adversely affect them. They can both strengthen and undermine the systems on which they rely.

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