Yearly Archives: 2021

Optimizing The World’s Leading Corporate Law: A 20-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead

Lawrence A. Hamermesh is Executive Director of the Institute for Law and Economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and Emeritus Professor at Widener University Delaware Law School. Jack B. Jacobs is Senior Counsel at Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP, and former Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery. Leo E. Strine, Jr. is the Michael L. Wachter Distinguished Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Senior Fellow, Harvard Program on Corporate Governance; of counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; and former Chief Justice and Chancellor, the State of Delaware. This post is based on their paper forthcoming in The Business Lawyer, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In our article, Optimizing The World’s Leading Corporate Law: A 20-Year Retrospective and Look Ahead, we look back at a 2001 article (Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law) in which two of us, with important input from the other, argued that in addressing issues like hostile takeovers, assertive institutional investors, leveraged buyouts, and contested ballot questions, the Delaware courts had done exemplary work but on occasion crafted standards of review that unduly encouraged litigation and did not appropriately credit intra-corporate procedures designed to ensure fairness. Function Over Form suggested ways to make those standards more predictable, encourage procedures that better protected stockholders, and discourage meritless litigation, by restoring business judgment rule protection for transactions approved by independent directors, the disinterested stockholders, or both.

Our current paper examines how Delaware law responded to the prior article’s recommendations, concluding that the Delaware judiciary has addressed most of them constructively, thereby creating incentives to use procedures that promote the fair treatment of stockholders and discourage meritless litigation. The continued excellence and diligence of the Delaware judiciary is one of Delaware corporate law’s core strengths.

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M&A/PE Update

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel and Philip Richter and Steven J. Steinman are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Steinman, Randi Lally, Roy Tannenbaum, and Maxwell Yim, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Court Finds No “Material Adverse Effect” from Drastic Reduction in Medicare Reimbursement Rate for Company’s Sole Product—Bardy v. Hill-Rom

In Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. v. Hill-Rom, Inc. (July 9, 2021), the Delaware Court of Chancery found that a more than 50% reduction in the Medicare reimbursement rate payable for the target company’s sole product did not constitute a “Material Adverse Effect” (MAE) under the parties’ merger agreement, primarily because it did not have “durational significance.” Although the target’s revenues dramatically declined due to the rate decrease, the court emphasized that the company had continued to grow.

Background. After performing extensive due diligence, Hill-Rom, Inc. agreed to acquire Bardy Diagnostics, Inc. for $350 million plus additional compensation through an earnout based on 2021 and 2022 revenue. Hill-Rom believed that Bardy had significant growth potential, but did not expect that Bardy would be profitable for several years. Bardy’s sole product was a medical patch used to detect heart problems; and its largest source of revenue was Medicare reimbursements for the patch. The Medicare reimbursement rate for the patch was set by a private entity authorized by Medicare to fulfill this function. For almost a decade, the rate had been about $365 per patch. In late January 2021, two weeks after the merger agreement was signed, the rate was reduced by about 86%.

Hill-Rom claimed that Bardy had suffered an MAE as a result of the rate reduction and refused to close. Bardy brought suit seeking specific performance of the agreement and damages for Hill-Rom’s failure to close. By April 2021, the reimbursement rate for the patch was increased to $133 (about three times the January rate, but still less than half the historic rate). Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III held that Bardy had not suffered an MAE. The court ordered Hill-Rom to close and awarded damages to Bardy in the form of prejudgment interest on the deal price.

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Weekly Roundup: November 5-11, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 5-11, 2021.

Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading “Arms Race”


Remarks by Chair Gensler at the Securities Enforcement Forum


SEC Modernizes Filing Fee Rules


Corporate Board Practices in the Russell 3000, S&P 500, and S&P Mid-Cap 400


Comments at SEC Speaks Signal Significant Policy Changes


BlackRock’s Recent Move Could Benefit Shareholder Activists in Election Contests


SEC Staff Limits Exclusion of “Social Policy” Shareholder Proposals


Mandatory Corporate Carbon Disclosures and the Path to Net Zero



SPAC Sweeps


Pay, Productivity and Management


New DOL Proposal on ESG Investing and Fiduciary Exercise of Shareholder Rights


Investor Behavior in the 2021 Proxy Season


What Is CEO Overconfidence? Evidence from Executive Assessments


ESG Governance: Board and Management Roles & Responsibilities


ISS Proposes Benchmark Voting Policy Changes for the 2022 Proxy Season


Statement by Commissioner Crenshaw on DeFi Risks, Regulations, and Opportunities


Remarks by Chair Gensler At the Institutional Limited Partners Association Summit

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent remarks at the Institutional Limited Partners Association Summit. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you. As is customary, I will note that I am not speaking on behalf of the Commission or SEC staff.

Today, I’d like to talk about private funds, and the importance of certain of these funds—in particular, private equity and hedge funds—to our capital markets.

Why do these funds matter?

First, they matter because they’re large, and they’re growing in size, complexity, and number. Altogether, U.S. private funds have gross assets under management of $17 trillion with net assets of $11.5 trillion. [1] The sheer size and transaction activities of these funds represent a critical portion of our overall capital markets.

Hedge funds have gross assets of at least $8.8 trillion and net assets valued at about $4.7 trillion. Private equity funds gross assets of $4.7 trillion and net assets of $4.2 trillion. [2]

More than those figures, though, these funds matter because of what, or who, stands on either side of them.

The funds pool the money of other people: the limited partners. Many of these limited partners may be in the audience today.

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Statement by Commissioner Crenshaw on DeFi Risks, Regulations, and Opportunities

Caroline A. Crenshaw is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of  Commissioner Crenshaw, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Whether in the news, social media, popular entertainment, and increasingly in people’s portfolios, crypto is now part of the vernacular. [1] But what that term actually encompasses is broad and amorphous and includes everything from tokens, to non-fungible tokens, to Dexes to Decentralized Finance or DeFI. For those readers not already familiar with DeFi, unsurprisingly, definitions also vary. In general, though, it is an effort to replicate functions of our traditional finance systems through the use of blockchain-based smart contracts that are composable, interoperable, and open source. [2] Much of DeFi activity takes place on the Ethereum blockchain, but any blockchain that supports certain types of scripting or coding can be used to develop DeFi applications and platforms.

DeFi presents a panoply of opportunities. However, it also poses important risks and challenges for regulators, investors, and the financial markets. While the potential for profits attracts attention, sometimes overwhelming attention, there is also confusion, often significant, regarding important aspects of this emerging market. Social media questions like “who in the U.S. regulates the DeFi market?” and “Why are regulators involved at all?” abound. These are crucial questions, and the answers are important to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. This article attempts to provide a short background on the current regulatory landscape for DeFi, the role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and highlights two important hurdles that the community should address. [3]

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ISS Proposes Benchmark Voting Policy Changes for the 2022 Proxy Season

Trevor S. Norwitz and Sabastian V. Niles are partners and Justin C. Nowell is an associate at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell memorandum by Mr. Norwitz, Mr. Niles, Mr. Nowell, and Ram Sachs.

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recently released its proposed voting policy changes for the 2022 proxy season and has invited comments from issuers, shareholders and other market participants. The proposed changes focus on climate, board diversity and uneven voting rights in multi-class share structures. Final voting policies are expected to be released shortly following the end of the comment period on November 16, 2021, and final policies would generally apply to shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2022. The proposed changes follow the release of ISS’s 2021 Global Benchmark Policy Survey and its inaugural 2021 Global Policy Survey on climate. The surveys’ findings had led to expectations of more significant policy revisions for the U.S. market that reached environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance metrics in executive compensation, racial equity audits and virtual-only meetings, among other topics.

Notable takeaways from the proposed changes for the U.S. market include:

Climate

In line with prior efforts to elevate risk oversight of environmental and social issues, and ISS’s survey results, the proposed policies heighten board accountability for climate risk and performance, and provide new criteria for assessing “say-on-climate” proposals, whether management or shareholder- sponsored.

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ESG Governance: Board and Management Roles & Responsibilities

Jurgita Ashley is Partner and Co-chair of the ESG Collaborative at Thompson Hine LLP, and Randi Val Morrison is Senior Vice President at the Society for Corporate Governance. This post is based on their Thompson Hine/Society for Corporate Governance memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

I. Introduction

As with other matters, the role of the board of directors regarding environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues is that of oversight. ESG encompasses a broad set of issues, ranging from human capital and compensation issues, to climate change, deforestation, and water and waste management, to supply chain management. Some of these issues are interrelated, and many are continually evolving.

There is no consensus on the key topics and issues encompassed within each of the “E,” “S,” or “G” categories (in fact, it may be easier to try to identify issues that are NOT encompassed within one or more of those categories). Investors’ and other stakeholders’ views differ widely—and are

changing regularly—with regard to which topics and issues are most important for corporate disclosure and investment purposes. Additionally, the importance of ESG issues may vary significantly depending upon company specifics, including industry, size, geographic scope, business operations, and business model (e.g., franchised vs. not).

As a result of the breadth of issues potentially encompassed within the term “ESG,” company-specific variations, the lack of investor consensus on preferences and priorities, and the continually evolving nature of this area, determining how to effect board oversight of ESG issues and how to develop and implement an effective ESG governance structure can be a challenge. At the same time, ESG issues are discussed in boardrooms with increasing frequency, [1] and many companies are considering enhanced board oversight of, and management responsibility for, business-relevant ESG issues. [2]

This post discusses various approaches to board oversight of ESG issues (Part II) and management implementation of ESG strategy (Part III), accompanied by relevant benchmarking information. [3]

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What Is CEO Overconfidence? Evidence from Executive Assessments

Steven N. Kaplan is the Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business; Morten Sorensen is Associate Professor of Finance at Dartmouth University Tuck School of Business; and Anastasia Zakolyukina is Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.

“Unskilled and unaware of it.”

— Kruger and Dunning (1999)

Overconfidence is prevalent among corporate executives, and a number of academic studies have blamed overconfidence for distorting executives’ investment and merger decisions. Traditionally, these studies have measured overconfidence using executives’ personal option holdings, using the so-called Longholder measure that was introduced in a seminal study by Ulrike Malemendier and Geoffrey Tate. However, no direct link has been drawn between overconfidence as a psychological trait and the option-based Longholder measure. The findings thus could be confounding overconfidence with other personality traits correlated with but different from overconfidence. It is also possible that the executives’ option holdings are rational, for example capturing a response to governance constraints on executive compensation or private information, rather than reflecting overconfidence.

A challenge for research is then benchmarking extant measures of overconfidence against executive traits. Data on executive traits are hard to find. Our paper leverages uniquely rich data on personality assessments for more than 2,600 candidates for management positions from a consulting firm that specializes in assessing top management candidates ghSMART. Using these assessments, we examine which traits are behind the Longholder measure of overconfidence.

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Investor Behavior in the 2021 Proxy Season

Dan Konigsburg is Global Corporate Governance Leader, Sharon Thorne is Deloitte Global Board Chair, and Stephen Cahill is Vice Chairman, Deloitte LLP. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum.

Introduction

Today, a climate of dynamic, shifting expectations among investors is changing the corporate landscape. Investors are stepping up their engagement and raising their voices through policy and voting as they seek to influence corporate policies, mindsets and activities.

In doing so, investors risk confusing companies with a wide range of voices: those looked at as part of this research have adopted their own unique fashion, have issued policies and guidelines that diverge significantly from each other. This depends to some degree on the profile of the institutional investor, their geographic location, and the laws and regulations applicable to them.

Inconsistencies in policy and emphasis across the vast landscape of the institutional investor community can make the already difficult work of the board in overseeing strategy, operations, compensation, and much else, including reporting to owners, rather more challenging.

This disparate landscape can become even more challenging when you consider the discrepancies between investors’ voting guidelines—how they say they intend to vote—and the actual voting outcomes.

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New DOL Proposal on ESG Investing and Fiduciary Exercise of Shareholder Rights

Mary Alcock is counsel, Michael Albano is partner, and Francesca Crooks is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on their Cleary memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

On October 14, 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) issued a proposed rule (the “Proposed Rule”) clarifying whether investments made by fiduciaries of plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) may take into account environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) concerns in selecting investments and investment courses of action, as well as fiduciary duties in exercising shareholder rights. [1] The Proposed Rule aligns more closely with recent trends toward ESG-oriented investing and seeks to reduce any chilling effects introduced by the Trump administration’s regulatory and non-regulatory guidance on fiduciary duty-compliant ESG investing.

The DOL’s Proposal

As stated in its press release, the DOL’s aim is to “bolster the resilience of worker’s retirement savings and pensions by removing the artificial impediments—and chilling effect on environmental, social and governance investments—caused by the prior administration’s rules.” [2] The Proposed Rule would supplant the Trump administration’s two final rules on ERISA fiduciary duties, “Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments” and “Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting Shareholder Rights” (the “Current Rules”) [3] and follows the DOL’s March 2021 announcement that, until publication of further guidance, the Biden administration would decline to pursue enforcement against any plan fiduciary for failure to comply with the Current Rules. [4] The Proposed Rule would amend the Current Rules and revert to stances taken in earlier non-regulatory guidance espoused by previous Democratic presidential administrations, [5] as summarized below.

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