Yearly Archives: 2021

ESG Scrutiny From the SEC’s Division of Examinations

Michael Osnato, Michael Wolitzer, and Meaghan Kelly are partners at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Osnato, Mr. Wolitzer, Ms. Kelly, David Blass, Allison Bernbach, and Carolyn Houston. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

In the run up to the 2020 presidential election, we had predicted that a Biden administration would usher in an era of heightened SEC scrutiny. We also anticipated that ESG (environmental, social and governance) and SRI (socially responsible investing) would become a priority for the SEC’s Division of Examinations (the “Exam Division”). For more on this priority shift, see Simpson Thacher, The SEC Under New Management—Outlook for 2021 and Beyond.

Proposed Legislation and Regulatory Scrutiny. One way this shift has manifested is in proposed legislation. Last month, the Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2021 was introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Sean Casten. The Act would direct the SEC to promulgate rules requiring public companies to disclose additional information about their greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuel assets, and how climate change would affect their valuation. There has also been an increase in regulatory attention in this area. In March 2021, the SEC released a request for public comment on climate change disclosures. Also in March 2021, the SEC announced the creation of a Climate and ESG Task Force in the Division of Enforcement, with the stated initial focus on identifying material misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules, as well as to analyze disclosure and compliance issues relating to advisers’ ESG strategies. In its announcement, the Task Force solicited tips and whistleblower complaints related to ESG. And earlier this month, SEC Chair Gary Gensler told the House of Representatives Financial Services Committee that he expected the SEC to propose new rules on corporate climate risk disclosures in the second half of 2021. Additionally, the Exam Division’s April 9, 2021 Risk Alert highlights deficiencies, internal control weaknesses and effective practices identified during recent examinations of investment advisers, registered investment companies and private funds related to ESG investing. For more on this Risk Alert, see our prior post on the Forum.

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Proposed EU Directive on ESG Reporting Would Impact US Companies

Sander de Boer is Senior Manager at KPMG in the Netherlands, and Julie Santoro is Partner at KPMG in the U.S. This post is based on a KPMG by Mr. de Boer, Ms. Santoro, Wim Bartels, Matthew Chapman, Maura Hodge, and Mark Vaessen. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

A new EU proposal would significantly expand the scope of ESG reporting by companies operating in Europe.

Applicability

Proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD)

EU-listed companies, and other companies operating in the EU that are ‘large’ (see definition below).

Fast facts, impacts, actions

The following are key points about the proposed CSRD, which would amend an existing EU Directive and take effect in 2023. US companies with operations in the EU should take care to understand the effect of the proposed disclosures and related assurance requirements.

  • Extended coverage. The current rules scope in ‘large’ public interest entities. The amendments would extend coverage to all ‘large’ (see new definition below) companies and all companies (other than micro-companies) with securities listed on EU-regulated markets; a three-year deferral would apply to small and medium-sized listed companies. These changes would extend the scope from under 12,000 to nearly 50,000 companies.
  • Extended ESG reporting For companies reporting on ESG matters for the first time, the disclosures would be extensive, covering the environmental, social and governance categories of ESG. For companies already in the scope of the current rules (Non-Financial Reporting Directive), new disclosures would include information that is material for stakeholders other than investors, as well as disclosures about social, human and intellectual capital.
  • New assurance The CSRD would introduce mandatory limited assurance over the ESG reporting (including the processes followed in preparing it). The scope may be extended to full assurance after three years.

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Do Firms With Specialized M&A Staff Make Better Acquisitions?

Sinan Gokkaya is associate professor of finance at Ohio University College of Business; Xi Liu is assistant professor of finance at Miami University; and René M. Stulz is the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at the Fisher College of Business at The Ohio State University. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? by John C. Coates, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu (discussed on the Forum here); and The New Look of Deal Protection by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here).

Despite the importance of mergers and acquisitions (or just acquisitions for simplicity) for corporations and for the reallocation of capital within the economy, there is still considerable debate on whether firms create value for shareholders with these investments and why so many acquisitions appear to be unsuccessful. In an attempt to understand the drivers of acquisition performance, an enormous finance literature has focused on acquirer and target characteristics, on the incentives and characteristics of CEOs and directors, the nature of the deals, and so on. However, this literature has not penetrated inside the black box of the firm’s internal decision-making process for acquisitions, most likely because of difficulty in measuring organizational structure and skills pertaining to acquisitions. In our paper titled “Do firms with specialized M&A staff make better acquisitions?”, we open this black box by manually constructing a novel and comprehensive sample of US public firms employing specialized M&A staff from 2000 to 2017 and provide the first in-depth investigation of the impact of specialized M&A staff on acquisition outcomes.

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House Releases Draft Legislation Eliminating SPAC Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements

Ran Ben-Tzur and Jay Pomerantz are partners at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on their Fenwick memorandum.

The rise of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) as a popular alternative structure for taking a company public in the past year has caused increased regulatory scrutiny surrounding the SPAC structure. On May 24, 2021, the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services will hold a hearing regarding SPACs, direct listings, public offerings and investor protections associated with these offerings. In advance of the hearing, the committee released draft legislation amending the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to specifically exclude all SPACs from the safe harbor for forward-looking statements. If passed, this amendment would create increased potential liability for inaccuracies in forward-looking statements for companies looking to go public through a SPAC.

Previous SEC Statement

In April 2021, by John Coates, Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), issued a public statement questioning whether projections, a key component of the disclosures made in connection with taking a company public through the SPAC structure, are covered by the safe harbor under the federal securities laws for forward-looking statements. For more information on the Coates statement, including its implications for companies looking to go public through a SPAC, please see our previous alert, SEC’s New Guidance on Liability Risks Likens SPACs to IPOs.

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Institutional Investor Survey 2021

Kiran Vasantham is Director of Investor Engagement, Jana Jevcakova is Managing Director of Corporate Governance APAC, and Mandy Offel is Manager of Corporate Governance at Morrow Sodali. This post is based on a Morrow Sodali memorandum by Mr. Vasantham, Ms. Jevcakova, Ms. Offel, and Patrick Wightman. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here); Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); and The Specter of the Giant Three by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive Summary

We are delighted to publish Morrow Sodali’s sixth annual Institutional Investor Survey (IIS), which canvasses the views and opinions of more than a quarter of the world’s assets under management [1] at a globally significant point in time.

Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) impacts at listed public companies have been propelled to the forefront of investors’ minds as they assess the management of risks and opportunities, operational resilience, and shareholder value creation through a period of unprecedented market uncertainty and turbulence.

As is widely reported, the trend of capital inflows into ESG-oriented investing has exploded reaching a record high of USD 1.65 trillion in 4Q2020, up almost 29% from the third quarter. [2] The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the acceleration of ESG investing. Importantly, the pace of investment in sustainable funds is expected to continue to increase in the race towards a net zero carbon economy by 2050.

For this reason and following a global health crisis, the interest and appetite of investors, especially asset owners, to hold boards and companies accountable for their performance against “nonfinancial” ESG criteria is set to match, and in some cases exceed, performance against traditional financial measures.

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Speech by Commissioner Roisman on Addressing Inevitable Costs of a New ESG Disclosure Regime

Elad L. Roisman is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on his recent remarks at the Corporate Board Member ESG Board Forum. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Putting the Electric Cart before the Horse: [1] Addressing Inevitable Costs of a New ESG Disclosure Regime

I. Introduction

Thank you to Dan [Bigman] and the Corporate Board Member for inviting me to participate in today’s ESG Board Forum. Of course, the views I express here are my own and do not necessarily represent those of my fellow Commissioners.

As the topic of this event indicates, ESG is on everyone’s mind this year. There have been several calls for the SEC to require public issuers to include granular disclosure on ESG topics in their SEC filings. As you have probably heard me say before, [2] I have reservations about the SEC issuing prescriptive, line-item disclosure requirements in this space, particularly in the areas typically designated as environmental (“E”) or social (“S”) disclosure, although I know people’s categorization of ESG information can vary. [3] As someone recently put it to me, the reason that there is not standardized “E” data from companies yet is that standardization is very hard to do. Investors and fund managers have an insatiable desire for columns in spreadsheets, but some of the data that has been requested is inherently imprecise, relies on underlying assumptions that continually evolve, and can be reasonably calculated in different ways. And ultimately, unless this information can meaningfully inform an investment decision, it is at best not useful and at worst misleading.

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Commissioner Peirce and Commissioner Roisman’s Response to Chair Gensler’s and the Division of Corporation Finance’s Statements Regarding the Application of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice

Hester M. Peirce and Elad L. Roisman are Commissioners at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on their recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today [June 1, 2021], Chair Gensler announced that he has directed the SEC staff to consider whether to recommend that the Commission revisit its recent regulatory actions taken with respect to proxy voting advice businesses and its longstanding interpretation of proxy solicitation. [1] Additionally, the staff announced that it will not recommend an enforcement action against a proxy voting advice business that fails to comply with the Commission’s existing requirements for proxy voting advice. [2]

As background, last July, the Commission adopted requirements that proxy voting advice businesses, in order to rely on exemptions from the information and filing requirements of the proxy rules, must: (1) provide clients with tailored and comprehensive disclosure about their conflicts of interest; and (2) establish policies and procedures designed to ensure companies that are the subject of their voting advice are able to see and respond to such advice in a timely manner. [3] The Commission also underscored its view that proxy voting advice generally constitutes a solicitation under the proxy rules, so the failure to disclose material information about proxy voting advice may constitute a potential violation of the antifraud provision of the proxy rules. [4]

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Recent Claims SPAC Board Structures are a “Conflict-Laden” Invitation to Fiduciary Misconduct

Frank M. Placenti is senior partner at Squire Patton Boggs LLP. This post is based on his Squire Patton Boggs memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Without a doubt, the trendiest transactions on Wall Street during 2020 and the first half of 2021 were the formation of special purpose acquisition corporations (SPACs) and the follow-on mergers (known as “De-SPAC” transactions) that enable private companies to achieve public company status without the rigors, risks and expenses associated with traditional IPOs.

Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ reported that there were 294 SPACs formed in 2020, up from 51 in the prior year, and more than double the number of SPACs formed in the prior three years. Equally impressive was the long list of prominent individuals associated with SPACs. Their credentials (or at least notoriety) conferred an aura of respectability upon this asset class which it had not previously enjoyed.

The sheer volume of recent SPAC transactions, coupled with the impressive pedigrees of some SPAC sponsors, suggest that they have made real progress toward overcoming the taint associated with their ancestors—the much-maligned reverse shell mergers of the early 2000’s and discredited “blank check” public companies of the 1980’s—and have moved more into the mainstream of the U.S. capital markets.

Yet, amidst this swelling acceptance, a recently-filed Delaware class action complaint contends that the typical SPAC governance structure is so “conflict-laden” that it “practically invites fiduciary misconduct.”

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Weekly Roundup: May 28–June 3, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 28–June 3, 2021.

SEC Regulation of ESG Disclosures


Getting Schooled: The Role of Universities in Attracting Immigrant Entrepreneurs


Shareholder Activism and ESG: What Comes Next, and How to Prepare




Carbon, Caremark, and Corporate Governance



Corwin Doctrine Remains Powerful Antidote to Post-Closing Stockholder Deal Litigation


Surviving the Fintech Disruption


Lazard’s Q1 2021 13F Filings Report


Silicon Valley Venture Capital Survey – First Quarter 2021


Determinants of Insider Trading Windows


ESG Matters II




Statement by SEC Chair Gensler on the Application of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

In September 2019, the Commission issued an interpretation and guidance addressing the application of the proxy rules to proxy voting advice businesses. [1] Last July, the Commission adopted amendments to Rules 14a-1(l), 14a-2(b), and 14a-9 concerning proxy voting advice. [2]

I am now directing the staff to consider whether to recommend further regulatory action regarding proxy voting advice. In particular, the staff should consider whether to recommend that the Commission revisit its 2020 codification of the definition of solicitation as encompassing proxy voting advice, the 2019 Interpretation and Guidance regarding that definition, and the conditions on exemptions from the information and filing requirements in the 2020 Rule Amendments, among other matters.

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