Yearly Archives: 2021

New Tactics and ESG Themes Change the Direction of Shareholder Activism

Richard J. Grossman and Neil P. Stronski are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here).

Takeaways

  • Activism is likely to rebound as the business world recovers from COVID-19 disruptions.
  • Some activists are raising permanent capital, giving them new leverage, and activist approaches have become more acceptable to many institutional investors.
  • Even high-performing companies may face pressure on ESG issues.
  • The best defense is a solid relationship with and understanding of your shareholders, coupled with a plan for dealing with activists if they emerge.

Shareholder activism levels decreased in 2020 amid the upheaval and uncertainty brought on by COVID-19. But activists did launch a number of high-profile campaigns and there was an uptick of activism in the second half of the year; and more than 80 CEOs were replaced during activist campaigns.

Today, even well-performing companies may find themselves targets of activist campaigns on environmental and social issues, as new funds have been formed to specialize in these areas. Moreover, established activists have established new types of investment vehicles that could strengthen their hands. Preparing for the possibility of an activist campaign should therefore be on the board agenda at most public companies.

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Underwriters Do Not Use Green Shoe Options to Profit from IPO Stock Pops

Robert Evans is a partner at Locke Lord LLP. This post is in response to a post on the Forum by Professor Patrick M. Corrigan of Notre Dame Law School.

Professor Corrigan offers a new theory about why some IPO stocks pop and others suffer steep drops—underwriters are to blame. His “principal trading theory” maintains that, contrary to accepted wisdom, overallotments and green shoe options in IPOs are used to maximize trading payoffs for underwriters. His theory is wrong. Matt Levine, in his Bloomberg column, Money Stuff, agrees.

As a matter of market practices and because of the SEC’s Regulation M, underwriters must complete their sales, including overallotments, before the IPO stock starts trading in the market. They cannot, for these reasons, hold back and sell more shares at higher prices in the aftermarket.

Establishing a new and vibrant trading market where one never existed is a challenging task. The investors that a company doing an IPO and its underwriters seek as shareholders have lots of competing ways to invest their money. Even in the same industry as the IPO company, there are competitors with established trading markets a track record of being a public reporting company.

Transforming a privately-held venture into a NYSE- or Nasdaq-traded company involves considerable art as well as science. Underwriters are asking the investors to take on some of the risk of that launch into the unknown of public trading. The dynamics of supply and demand for the shares can influence the success or failure of the company’s entering into the public markets.

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Weekly Roundup: February 19-25, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of February 19-25, 2021.


ESG and the Biden Presidency


Perspective from 2020 Conversations with Audit Committee Chairs


Bloomberg Activism Screening Model


The Corporate Governance Machine


Recent Trends in Officer Liability



Activism In Context: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going


Guidance on Enhancing Racial & Ethnic Diversity Disclosures


Robinhood and GameStop: Essential Issues and Next Steps for Regulators and Investors


Board Effectiveness: A Survey of the C-Suite


Crisis-Resilient Boards: Lessons from Vale


Volatile Transitions: Navigating ESG in 2021


Atomic Trading



QualityScore: Methodology Guide


2020: An Overview


Corporate Adolescence: Why Did ‘We’ not Work?

Corporate Adolescence: Why Did ‘We’ not Work?

Donald Langevoort is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and Hillary A. Sale is Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and an Affiliated Faculty Member at Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper.

In academic and public commentary, entrepreneurial finance is usually portrayed as a quintessential American success story, an institutional structure whereby expert venture capitalists with strong reputational incentives channel much-needed equity to deserving entrepreneurs, then subject them to intense monitoring to assure they stay on the path to hoped-for success in the form of an initial public offering or public company acquisition. Yet, in recent years there have been gross embarrassments and allegations of outright criminality, at companies like Uber, Theranos, and the subject of our paper, WeWork. In short, we argue, fiduciary deficits and rent-seeking behaviors abound and the costs are borne not just by the venture capitalists or other investors.

Although we do not quarrel with the historical record of success, we are focused on the changes in the market for start-up capital that may well have contributed to the recent bouts of rent-seeking and extreme. Indeed, our title’s reference to corporate adolescence underscores the ever-lengthening period of time that high-tech start-up companies have before undergoing the so-called rites of passage to public adulthood. We argue that the private privileges allow for a build-up of bad choices and testy behaviors commonly observed in human adolescents, e.g., risk-taking and rule-breaking, thereby embedding in the firm’s habits and culture problems that may later be hard to fix.

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2020: An Overview

Josh Black is Executive Vice President and Editor-in-chief at Insightia. This post is based on an article from The Activist Investing Annual Review 2021.Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

At the peak of proxy season 2020, many activists halted or dialed back campaigns where they feared a sudden change of shareholder perspectives or of irrecoverable value destruction. That led to a sluggish year—a 10% decline in companies publicly subjected to activist demands, a median Total Follower Return of 2%, and about a 16% decline in board seats won worldwide thanks mainly to fewer settlements.

Since then, however, activists have acted ruthlessly to shake up both their own operations and the management of portfolio companies. If 2019 was the year that ended the secular expansion of activist investing, 2020 was a reminder to focus on first principles—subpar valuations due to fixable problems with a quick path to change. All would agree; leadership matters in a pandemic.

Hindsight 2020

Chiding activists for their lack of optimism is easy after the fact. Central bank support leading to a broad market recovery helped put a shine on activist portfolios. The market’s response to stocks in a process of transition has since become exuberant and funds that doubled down on their convictions were rewarded handsomely.

Also unexpected, control slate victories for Starboard Value and Bow Street Capital helped the number of board seats won at contested meetings in the U.S. to the highest level for at least six years. There were shareholder meetings in Europe and Japan that were so unexpectedly close that rematches against weakened incumbents are inevitable. By the fourth quarter, activists had started to think big about ways of demonstrating underperformance and about whole industries that need to adapt, including media, energy, and active fund management.

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QualityScore: Methodology Guide

Sam Osea is Associate Vice President and Sean McPhillips is Senior Associate at ISS ESG, the responsible investment arm of Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on their ISS memorandum.

Overview

ISS ESG Governance QualityScore (GQS) is a data-driven scoring and screening solution designed to help institutional investors monitor portfolio company governance. At both an overall company level and along topical classifications covering Board Structure, Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Audit & Risk Oversight, scores indicate relative governance quality supported by factor-level data. That data, in turn, is critical to the scoring assessment, while historical scores and underlying reasons prompting scoring changes provide greater context and trending analysis to understand a company’s approach to governance over time.

With the continued and growing focus on investor stewardship and engagement, alongside the global convergence of standards and best practices, governance plays an increasingly prominent role in investment decisions. As an extra-financial data screening solution, the Governance QualityScore methodology delivers several key benefits.

Employs robust governance data and attributes. Governance attributes are categorized under four topical categories: Board Structure, Shareholder Rights & Takeover Defenses, Compensation/Remuneration, and Audit & Risk Oversight. Governance QualityScore calls upon a library of more than 230 governance factors across the coverage universe, of which up to 127 are used for any one company (defined by region). Governance QualityScore highlights both potentially shareholder-adverse practices at a company, as well as mitigating factors that help tell a more complete story. The underlying dataset is updated on an ongoing basis as company disclosures are filed, providing the most-timely data available in the marketplace.

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More than 1,200 Empirical Studies Apply the Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)

This post relates to a Program on Corporate Governance study published by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance, available here and discussed on the Forum hereLucian Bebchuk is James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. Alma Cohen is Professor of Empirical Practice, Harvard Law School. Allen Ferrell is Harvey Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School.

In a study issued by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) put forward a corporate governance index – the Entrenchment Index (E-Index). This post provides an update on the considerable influence that the study has had on subsequent research. According to Google Scholar citations data, as of the end of 2020, the study was cited by more than 2,900 research papers; a list of these papers is available here. Furthermore, a review of these research papers has identified more than 1,200 studies that have applied the E-index and used it in their empirical analysis.

A list of 1,260 empirical studies using the E-index in their empirical analysis is available here.

The list of studies applying the E-Index includes empirical studies published in:

  • Leading journals in finance such as The Journal of Finance, The Journal of Financial Economics, and The Review of Financial Studies;
  • Leading journals in economics such as the Journal of Political Economy and the Review of Economics and Statistics;
  • Leading journals in law and economics such as the Journal of Law and Economics and Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; and
  • Leading journals in accounting, such as the Journal of Accounting and EconomicsJournal of Accounting and Public Policy, and The Accounting Review. 

The Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell study was first circulated in 2004 and was published in 2009 in the Review of Financial Studies. The study identified six corporate governance provisions as especially important, demonstrated empirically the significance of these provisions for firm valuation, and put forward an “Entrenchment Index,” the E-Index, based on these six provisions.

The study is available here.

Atomic Trading

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent remarks at the George Washington University Law School Regulating the Digital Economy Conference. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Reni [Saula] for that introduction. It is a pleasure to be with all of you today. I will start with the usual disclaimer that my views are my own and not necessarily those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or my fellow Commissioners. The momentous market events of several weeks ago are relevant to the theme of this year’s conference—regulating the digital economy—and thus motivate my remarks.

The market events to which I am referring are, of course, the Reddit-threaded run-up in the prices of a number of meme stocks, the subsequent run-down in prices, and the many attendant colorful stories. At the top of the non-financial news feed were the market volatility, trading volumes, regular Joe-to-riches stories, hedge fund losses, short squeezes, gamma squeezes, glee at sticking it to the “suits,” anger at trading limitations, a jumble of emotions as stock prices fell from their highs, and debates about the intricacies of market structure. Movies to elucidate these events are on their way. [1]

The Securities and Exchange Commission, along with other regulators and market watchers, is still sorting through the many layers of those events, so I cannot give you a definitive assessment of what took place, let alone whether any significant regulatory changes or enforcement actions will result. Instead, I will offer some musings on the challenges that lie before the Commission as we decide whether and how to react to these events with new or modified regulations and, more generally, as we think about stepping up our game as a regulator of the digital economy.

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Volatile Transitions: Navigating ESG in 2021

Anthony Campagna is Managing Director and Duncan Paterson is Associate Director at ISS ESG, the responsible investment arm of Institutional Shareholder Services. This post is based on their ISS ESG memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

Key Takeaways

  • The forecast recession and “long ascent” of global economic recovery after COVID-19 will require a strong commitment and decisive action from financial markets.
  • While the global economic downturn has been a time of significant stress for all investors, the willingness of international governments to couple stimulus programs with sustainability objectives offers a clear opportunity for responsible investors to play a leading role in the recovery.
  • Regulatory pressure will be a key driver for responsible investment practices in 2021, with significant initiatives in the European Union coming into force, and governments in Asia making strong commitments to Net Zero targets.
  • While the term ESG is broadly accepted in responsible investment markets, the range of issues that responsible investors are called upon to consider daily continues to expand. The topics covered in this paper are framed in three broad conceptual groupings: Planetary Boundaries, Inclusion and Stewardship.
  • ISS ESG has identified 10 of the key global trends that we believe responsible investors will be focusing on through 2021, both in terms of impacts on portfolio risk/returns, and in terms of time spent managing policies and stakeholder relationships.
  • This year we have also prepared a regionally-focused paper for each of the Americas, EMEA, Asia and Australia/New Zealand, highlighting risks about which the local teams in each region are speaking with their own networks.

Overview

As the world seeks to reconcile the impacts of the first, second and subsequent waves of COVID-19, investors and market participants usher in 2021 with equal measures of optimism and consternation. While working with uncertainty has been a modus operandi of the industry since its inception, 2020 tested the resolve of even the most seasoned Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investor: the oft-prophesied Black Swan event collided with already intensifying ecological, economic and socio-political pressures, paralyzing companies, cities and democracies across the world. In this climate, the role of the responsible investor emerges with renewed purpose.

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Crisis-Resilient Boards: Lessons from Vale

Stephen Davis is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Program on Corporate Governance, and Sandra Guerra is a board member of Vale. This post is based on an interview conducted by Dr. Davis with Ms. Guerra.

Ever since the onset of the pandemic, corporate directors, their advisors, and investors have sought to identify board characteristics and practices that might be associated with superior management of epic disruption. Might any of the board features commonly rated by market analysts as governance-positive have helped companies navigate economic challenges posed by COVID? What lessons may be learned to make boards more crisis-resilient? Research is beginning to shed light on answers. But insights meanwhile may be drawn from the recent experience of boards facing comparable catastrophic risk.

One rare, insider perspective on such a case comes from Vale, the Brazil-based global mining giant. On January 25 2019, a tailings dam at the iron ore mine just east of Brumadinho, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, suffered a devastating collapse. The resulting mudflow killed some 270 people, most of them Vale employees and family members. The disaster was, like the pandemic for others, an existential one for the company. Vale confronted sudden, daunting, regulatory, reputational, financial, and operational consequences that threatened the firm’s survival. Executives still face homicide and corruption charges, and this month the company agreed to a USD 7 billion settlement, the largest in Brazil’s history.

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