Monthly Archives: June 2023

Comment on PCAOB’s Proposed Auditing Standard

Jack T. Ciesielski is an the Investment Manager and founder of R.G. Associates, Inc. and Amy C. McGarrity is Chief Investment Officer and Chief Operating Officer of Colorado PERA. This post is based on their comment letter.

The Members of the Investor Advisory Group (MIAG) appreciate the opportunity to comment upon the
PCAOB’s “Proposed Auditing Standard – General Responsibilities of the Auditor in Conducting an Audit and Proposed Amendments to PCAOB Standards” (Proposal). [1] We agree with PCAOB Chair Erica Y. Williams that “Our capital markets never stop evolving, and PCAOB standards must keep up to keep investors protected. The Proposal would modernize standards that are foundational to audit quality, ensuring they are fit to meet today’s challenges.”

We understand the proposed standard AS 1000, “General Responsibilities of the Auditor in Conducting an Audit,” would entirely replace AS 1001, “Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor,” AS 1005, “Independence,” AS 1010, “Training and Proficiency of the Independent Auditor,” and AS 1015, “Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work.” We commend the Board for undertaking this project to bring the interim auditing standards into the twenty-first century, and approve the combination of the four single standards into one comprehensive standard. Our letter first addresses several major areas in the Proposal that we believe need attention if this is to be a high-quality standard. It then offers our views on the questions provided in the Proposal.

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Congressional Sustainable Investing Caucus

U.S. Representative Sean Casten (IL-06), and U.S. Representative Juan Vargas (CA-52) are members of the House Financial Services Committee. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaHow Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales.

There are $8.4 trillion in U.S. assets under management in funds that prioritize environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors. This represents 13 percent – or 1 in 8 dollars of the total US assets under professional management. Globally, the value of assets engaged in sustainable investing is estimated at $41 trillion. It has grown rapidly and is projected to exceed $53 trillion by 2025, representing more than a third of the $140.5 trillion in projected total assets under management.

Given the rapid growth of this asset class, it is necessary for Congress to better understand and monitor this space so we can ensure robust investor protections while still preserving necessary market access. For that reason, we created the Congressional Sustainable Investment Caucus.

Sustainable investing is not a new concept. For over a decade, U.S. retail and institutional investors have considered ESG factors in their investment decisions.

This approach helps investors secure insight into issues that are important to their capital allocation strategies but are not always fully or consistently disclosed in corporate reporting. These issues include but are not limited to climate change, diversity, and labor rights. Investors believe these issues are material and need to be accounted for when assessing market opportunities and risks.

Recent research suggests some sustainable investment strategies achieve comparable or even better financial returns than conventional investments over the long term. However, the justification for ESG investment is not solely dependent on value. It is no less rational to choose to maximize ESG criteria over expected returns than it is to choose to ‘shop local’ rather than favoring cheaper imported goods. A vibrant, free market does not optimize to a single utility function.

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Insider Trading Disclosure Update: Rulemaking Activity

Matthew E. KaplanBenjamin R. Pederson, and Jonathan R. Tuttle are Partners at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a memorandum by Mr. Kaplan, Mr. Pederson, Mr. Tuttle, Anna MoodyAshley Yoon, and Mark Flinn. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried.

Rulemaking Activity

SEC Adopts New Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plan and Trading-Related Disclosure and Reporting Requirements

On December 14, 2022, the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 10b5-1 under the Exchange Act and new disclosure requirements relating to trading activity of corporate insiders and the trading policies of issuers. The amendments, among other things, add significant new conditions to the availability of Rule 10b5-1’s affirmative defense to insider trading liability, including: (i) a cooling-off period; (ii) a certification as to the absence of possession of no material nonpublic information; (iii) limitations on overlapping and single trade plans; and (iv) a requirement to act in good faith. In addition, the amendments create new disclosure requirements regarding: (i) the adoption, modification and termination of Rule 10b5-1 and other trading arrangements by Section 16 officers; (ii) insider trading policies and procedures of issuers; and (iii) the timing of option awards to named executive officers made in close proximity to the issuer’s release of material nonpublic information. The amendments also augment the reporting obligations under Section 16 of the Exchange Act for transactions made pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangement and gifts. The full text of the final rules is available here.

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‘Not A Thing’: Six Legal Reasons the Federal ‘Debt Ceiling’ is Null & Void

Robert C. Hockett is the Edward Cornell Professor of Law at Cornell University. This post is based on his recent piece.

Writing in outrage for over a decade about the illegality of the putative ‘debt ceiling as I, along with several distinguished colleagues, have been doing, I am not a little relieved to see some of our longstanding arguments gaining traction. I am a little bit troubled, however, by how attention has centered almost solely upon the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The 14th Amendment is, to be sure, one of the grounds upon which the ‘debt ceiling’ must be declared null and void – for reasons even beyond those we’re hearing right now, as I’ll indicate. But there are at least five additional such grounds. It might then be helpful to elaborate them, along with their mutual complementarities, in summary fashion.

My hope in so doing will be to supply responsible members of Congress, our President, and his Treasury Secretary with the fortitude needed to end the present tragicomedy, now ritually repeated with dispiriting regularity any time that a Democrat is in the White House and Republicans hold one or both Chambers of Congress, once and for all.

I’ll proceed as follows: Part 1 provides essential constitutional and federal budgetary background information helpful in understanding the ‘debt ceiling’ and its obsolescence since 1974 if not its invalidity ab initio. Part 2 then elaborates the seven legal bases for treating the ‘debt ceiling’ as the nullity that it is. Part 3 then suggests a strategy for responsible legislators and executives in ignoring the ‘debt ceiling’ going forward, at least until its formal but unnecessary repeal. I then conclude and look forward.

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The Never-Ending Story: CEO Succession Planning

Carey Oven is National Managing Partner and Bob Lamm is Independent Senior Advisor at the Center for Board Effectiveness, Deloitte & Touche LLP. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum.

Deloitte’s Chief Executive Program has engaged in a series of dialogues with current CEOs as well as those who are (or were) considered for CEO roles. The following is a high-level thematic summary of the Program’s work on succession planning, with a focus on how boards might improve their strategy in this area.

It is no secret that the number of areas involving board oversight has increased dramatically, especially in recent years. The role of the corporation in society, workplace strategies, and climate change are just some of the newer topics that boards are expected to address. And of course, this is in addition to the many perennial items of governance like risk management and guiding the company’s long-term strategy.

It may be a truism to say that every topic on the board’s agenda is important. But governance experts generally believe that CEO succession is among the most important director responsibilities. [1] The CEO is usually the most visible and prominent position within a company. [2] When things go well, an effective succession planning strategy can result in a CEO with transformative leadership potential who executes on the company’s long-term vision and adds value for shareholders and other stakeholders. [3] And, just as importantly, business history is littered with cautionary tales of what can happen when the succession process goes awry. [4]

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Drag-Along Provisions and Covenants Not to Sue in the Private Company M&A Context

Amy L. SimmermanDavid J. Berger, and Ryan J. Greecher are Partners at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on a WSGR memorandum by Ms. Simmerman, Mr. Berger, Mr. Greecher, James G. Griffin-Stanco, and Jason B. Schoenberg, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu; Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV; The New Look of Deal Protection (discussed on the Forum here) by Fernan Restrepo, and Guhan Subramanian; and Deals in the Time of Pandemic (discussed on the Forum here) by Guhan Subramanian and Caley Petrucci. 

Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery recently issued a decision addressing whether a covenant not to sue set forth in a stockholders’ agreement is enforceable under Delaware law, with the result that a stockholder would be precluded from challenging a sale of the corporation. [1] Such covenants have become increasingly common among private companies, and the covenant in this case was based on a National Venture Capital Association form.

The court concluded that as a general matter, such covenants not to sue are enforceable under Delaware law, but that the circumstances in an individual case will matter and such covenants cannot protect boards of directors and other defendants from liability for intentionally harmful conduct. In this case, the court determined that because the underlying allegations could support claims for intentional misconduct by the board and a controlling stockholder, the covenant not to sue could not serve as a basis to dismiss the claims.

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Embracing Environmental Justice Initiatives to Advance Corporate Objectives

Tatjana Vujic is Special Counsel, and Arie T. Feltman-Frank and Daniel L. Robertson are Associates at Jenner & Block LLP. This post is based on a Jenner & Block memorandum by Ms. Vujic, Mr. Feltman-Frank, Mr. Robertson, and Steven Siros. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaFor Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain (discussed on the Forum here) and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Earth Week 2023 brought with it two significant environmental justice developments. The week began with New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy announcing the adoption of regulations aimed at reducing pollution in historically overburdened communities and those disproportionately impacted by health and environmental stressors. President Biden then capped the week off by issuing an Executive Order on Revitalizing Our Nation’s Commitment to Environmental Justice for All which further embeds environmental justice initiatives throughout the federal government (read our analysis of that order here). These actions display the heightened emphasis on environmental justice that has led to these and other significant developments at the federal and state levels.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” With increased funding provided by the Inflation Reduction Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the American Rescue Plan Act, federal agencies are investing at unprecedented levels to advance environmental justice.

The Biden administration also developed the Justice40 Initiative, with a goal of ensuring that 40% of the overall benefits of certain federal investments flow to “disadvantaged communities that are marginalized, underserved, and overburdened by pollution.” The Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool geospatially identifies such disadvantaged communities, which include federally recognized Tribes and Alaska Native villages.

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Weekly Roundup: June 2-8, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 2-8, 2023.



Investor Group Launches Plan to Boost Corporate Climate Engagement


SEC Final Share Repurchase Disclosure Rules Less Burdensome Than Expected


The SEC Revolving Door and Comment Letters


Director-Shareholder Engagement: Getting It Right



Fairness Opinions and SPAC Reform


Icahn-Illumina Contest: Board Accountability and the UPC



Do Investors Care About Impact?


Beware of Post-Closing Unjust Enrichment Claims


Beware of Post-Closing Unjust Enrichment Claims

Rory K. Schneider is a Partner and Colin O. Lubelczyk is an Associate at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Schneider, Mr. Lubelczyk, Martha E. McGarry, Andrew J. Noreuil, and Camila Panama and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu; Allocating Risk Through Contract: Evidence from M&A and Policy Implications (discussed on the Forum here) by John C. Coates, IV.

There are several contractual provisions that sellers often use to limit their liability for post-closing claims brought by a buyer in the context of a private company purchase agreement. Reliance disclaimers, non- survival of representations and warranties, exclusive remedy, and no-recourse provisions in their typical forms, however, only go so far in court. Even where there is no explicit carve-out for fraud claims, as a matter of “public policy,” Delaware courts have generally not enforced contract provisions that prevent a buyer from asserting fraud claims against sellers and/or their affiliates for making false representations and warranties or knowing that representations and warranties made by other seller parties were false.

A consequence of this judicial approach is that it has exposed limited partners and selling shareholders to derivative unjust enrichment claims, of which there have been an increasing number of cases over the last several years. These unjust enrichment claims have proven difficult to dismiss at the pleading stage, thereby exposing affiliates to precisely the type of protracted litigation that, in many cases, the contracting parties agreed that seller affiliates should not have to face. In light of this, sellers and their counsel should consider adding contractual language to specifically preclude unjust enrichment claims that are not dependent upon any proof of wrongdoing. The law in Delaware remains unsettled on the extent to which explicit protections against such claims would result in their prompt dismissal, but at the least, their inclusion may make buyers less apt to file the claims in the first place and make courts more willing to reject them.

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Do Investors Care About Impact?

Julian F. Kölbel is Assistant Professor of Sustainable Finance at the University of St. Gallen. This post is based on a recent paper, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, by Professor Kölbel; Florian Heeb, Postdoctoral Associate at the MIT Sloan School of Management; Falko Paetzold, Assistant Professor for Social Finance at EBS University; and Stefan Zeisberger, Associate Professor of Fintech – Experimental Finance at the University of Zurich. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaHow Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; and Does Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita. 

Do investors care about impact? Yes, in the same way, they care about pandas.

Sustainable investing is discussed as a potentially powerful mechanism to address negative externalities by appealing to investors’ prosocial preferences. The sustained growth in sustainable investing funds suggests that prosocial preferences are prevalent among individual investors. By expressing these preferences in their investment decisions, investors might shape the economy and society.

However, a crucial question remains: Do individual investors genuinely care about the impact of their investments, or are they driven by the warm glow associated with choosing a “green” option? The answer to that question is decisive for whether and how the sustainable investing industry has an impact. We provide this answer in our paper «Do Investors Care About Impact?”, recently published in the Review of Financial Studies.

A priori, one might expect two alternative behaviors. The standard view is that investors derive utility from the positive impact of investments and thus pay more for an investment with more impact. This view is embedded in many theoretical models of sustainable investing. However, research on charitable giving suggests that individuals can be surprisingly indifferent to the magnitude of their impact. For example, prior research in psychology has shown that people donate about the same amount to save one or four panda bears. People care a lot about pandas, no doubt. But it is more the emotions about pandas, not the number of pandas, that drive decisions. Our paper finds that investors care about impact as people care about pandas.

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