Monthly Archives: August 2023

Spotlight on Recent M&A Delaware Decisions

Barbara Borden and Sarah Lightdale are Partners at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Borden, Ms. Lightdale, Brian French and Jenna Miller, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The mergers & acquisitions market may wax and wane, but one thing in M&A is consistent from year to year: The Delaware courts issue opinions that impact M&A dealmaking. And this year is certainly no exception – Delaware courts continue to have plenty to say about M&A. While certainly not exhaustive (we were serious – the courts have been busy!), in this post we have summarized key takeaways from recent cases.

No Corwin for post-closing claims for injunctive relief

In In re Edgio, Inc. Stockholders Litigation(Del. Ch.; 5/23), the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a ruling regarding an unsettled question of Delaware corporate law – whether an uncoerced and fully informed vote of disinterested stockholders may ratify and defeat a post-closing claim seeking to enjoin certain governance measures and alleged entrenchment devices for the combined company negotiated as part of a transaction. The short answer: no. The longer answer: The court concluded that such a vote, often called “Corwin cleansing,” does not apply to post-closing claims for injunctive relief.

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CEO Tenure Rates

Joyce Chen is an Associate Editor at Equilar. This post is based on a Equilar memorandum by Ms. Chen and Carol Jerotich.

Chief executive officer (CEO) tenure rates have experienced a significant decline in the past decade. A recent study conducted by Equilar—featured in Barron’s annual Top CEOs issue—has brought the change to light, uncovering a substantial shift in both the median and average tenures of S&P 500 CEOs.

Specifically, the median tenure among the S&P 500 companies has decreased 20% from six years in 2013 to 4.8 years in 2022. Although the average tenure also decreased during this period, the decline was comparatively modest. In 2013, average CEO tenure stood at 7.6 years, and by 2022, it had dropped slightly to 7.2 years. While this represents a 5.3% drop, the contrast between the median and average tenure is worth noting.

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Weekly Roundup: July 28-August 3, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 28-August 3, 2023.

Board Diversity Census on Fortune 500 Boards



Reviewing Board Action Interfering With Director Elections or Stockholder Voting Rights in Control


Stockholder Barred from Inspecting Books and Records Related to Board’s ESG-Related Decision



ESG Mid-Year Review: Key Trends in 2023 Thus Far


Supplemental Disclosures to Be “Plainly Material” to Justify Mootness Fee Awards


Climate Change as Unjust Enrichment


Do Activists Beat the Market?



​ESG Mid-Year Review: Expectations for the Remainder of 2023


Congressional Republicans Continue Attack on 2022 ESG Rule


Why Do Investors Vote Against Corporate Directors?


Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2023 Proxy Season


Why Do Investors Vote Against Corporate Directors?

Reena Aggarwal is the Robert E. McDonough Professor of Finance and Director, Georgetown Center for Financial Markets and Policy, Sandeep Dahiya is the Akkaway Professor of Entrepreneurship, and Umit Yilmaz is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Georgetown University.This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Universal Proxies (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst.

Voting against management-nominated directors is an important mechanism for institutional investors to convey their dissatisfaction with a wide array of corporate policies and performance. Our study shows that the role of directors has evolved into a more complex one over the years. Nowadays, investors hold individual directors accountable for new and emerging issues, such as board diversity and climate change, which have gained significant attention compared to the past.

In this evolving landscape, our research offers valuable insights into how institutional investors voice their discontent regarding a firm’s policies on these novel, broader issues. We examine the voting outcomes for uncontested director elections at public firms within the Russell 3000 Index from 2013 to 2021. Our findings indicate that while environment and social issues, in general, are not related to voting outcome, governance plays a crucial role. However, within the broader environmental category, we find that the climate change component is significantly associated with voting outcome stemming from issues related to carbon emissions, product carbon footprint, financing environmental impact, and climate change vulnerability. Climate change has emerged as a concern for investors, attracting attention from institutional investors due to its material impact on firm performance and valuation, especially in industries like fossil fuel extraction. Notably, in 2021, activist investor Engine No. 1 succeeded in pushing for new directors on ExxonMobil’s board to reduce its carbon footprint, garnering support from major institutional investors like BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard. Similarly, in 2022, CalPers voted against 95 directors at 26 companies due to climate-related concerns. However, none of the social subcategories (e.g., human capital and product liabilities) are linked to voting outcomes.

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Congressional Republicans Continue Attack on 2022 ESG Rule

Joshua A. Lichtenstein and Michael R. Littenberg are Partners and Jonathan M. Reinstein is an Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on a Ropes & Gray memorandum by Mr. Lichtenstein, Mr. Littenberg, Mr. Reinstein, Reagan Haas and Alexa Voskerichian. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaHow Much Do Investors Care about Social Responsibility? (discussed on the Forum here) by Scott Hirst, Kobi Kastiel, and Tamar Kricheli-Katz; Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee (discussed on the Forum here) by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff; and Exit vs. Voice (discussed on the Forum here) by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales.

It has been almost five months since the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) adopted a rule clarifying that environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors may be considered just like any other relevant factor as part of the risk-return analysis in choosing investments for retirement plans like 401(k) plans (the so-called 2022 ESG Rule) took effect. The 2022 ESG Rule reversed the ESG investing rule adopted under the Trump administration, which received a large volume of negative feedback during the rulemaking process from a diverse array of commentators. The 2022 ESG Rule has received widespread support form the same community for its return to the DOL’s historic neutral posture on specific investment considerations and the elimination of confusing and costly extra requirements under the Trump administration’s rule. Despite this support from affected institutions, the 2022 ESG Rule continues to be in the crosshairs of Congressional Republicans who have repeatedly sought to invalidate it through resolutions pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA), the latest of which was the subject of the first veto of President Biden’s administration in March.

As reiterated multiple times during the hearings the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability convened on ESG this spring (see our alerts here and here), Republican lawmakers assert that the 2022 ESG Rule constitutes a mandate on fiduciaries to use ESG characteristics in evaluating and selecting investments, thereby prioritizing collateral policy objectives over the financial interests of participants and beneficiaries. These assertions have been made notwithstanding the neutral language of the rule and the express requirement that participants’ best interests be put first in all investment decisions. Following unsuccessful bids to rescind the 2022 ESG Rule through the CRA process, Republican members of Congress have returned to other tactics they have tried in the past, including recently proposing amendments to ERISA (H.R. 4237) that would require an exclusive focus on material financial factors. Additionally, Congressional Republicans have proposed broad ESG restrictions on the federal Thrift Savings Plan (the largest defined contribution plan in the world) that are similar to those restrictions playing out in the states.

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​ESG Mid-Year Review: Expectations for the Remainder of 2023

Marc S. Gerber, Greg Norman, and Simon Toms are Partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden memorandum by Mr. Gerber, Mr. Norman, Mr. Toms, Boris Bershteyn, Tansy Woan and Kathryn Gamble.

ISSB Financial Reporting Standards

  • The International Sustainability Standards Board issued its inaugural financial reporting standards at the end of June.
  • These standards will be effective from January 2024 and are intended to assist in standardizing ESG data.

A wide range of market participants have worked together to respond to the demand for increasing ESG data and clear standards. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), formed by the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS), issued its inaugural financial reporting standards, IFRS S1 and IFRS S2, on June 26, 2023. At the London Stock Exchange Group plc’s launch event for the standards, the exchange’s CEO Julia Hoggett hailed this as a “landmark day for the global economy.”

S1 is the “core baseline” of sustainability reporting and is designed to apply globally to corporates in all sectors to better unify disclosures on factors such as waste and emissions. It sets out how companies can integrate reporting and links sustainability with financial information. S2 details more specific topics such as climate mitigation and adaptation, and will build on existing disclosure frameworks.

ISSB Chair Emmanuel Faber stated that the standards are intended to cut through the “alphabet soup” that has hampered companies in the past few years, reiterating that the standards are not a suite of ESG metrics or disclosures but “a comprehensive language which is deemed to be consistent, verifiable and therefore decision-useful” for market participants.

Both S1 and S2 will be effective from January 2024 and corporate reports should align with the standards beginning FY 2025.

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How Directors Can Optimize Shareholder Engagement in 2023

Kris Pederson is Leader at the EY Americas Center for Board Matters. This post is based on her NACD piece.

In today’s proxy landscape, investor engagement is increasingly key to understanding and addressing shareholder voting outcomes and potential areas of vulnerability that activists could exploit. Investor voting decisions have become more nuanced, universal proxy rules have raised the stakes for getting engagement right, and ongoing economic and market uncertainty put the company’s governance and strategy under additional scrutiny.

Board oversight of and, when appropriate, participation in engagement discussions can enhance the success of these efforts. Notably, 93 percent of Fortune 100 companies disclosed information regarding their shareholder engagement programs in this year’s proxy statements, up from 83 percent in 2020, according to proxy disclosure data based on the 69 companies on the 2022 Fortune 100 list that filed proxies as of May 25. Furthermore, 67 percent disclosed that select board members (most often the lead independent director or compensation committee chair) directly participate in those discussions as appropriate, up from 51 percent in 2020.

As management teams get ready for the remainder of the summer and fall engagement seasons, boards should consider practices for making engagement successful, including offering select directors for discussions with investors as appropriate.

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Do Activists Beat the Market?

Mary Ann Deignan is Head of Capital Markets Advisory, and Rich Thomas and Kathryn Night are Managing Directors in the Capital Markets Advisory group at Lazard. This post is based on a Lazard memorandum by Ms. Deignan, Mr. Thomas, Ms. Night, Leah Friedman and Pavan Surabhi. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); Dancing with Activists by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System (discussed on the Forum here) by Frankl and Kushner Leo E. Strine, Jr.

A review of five-and-a-half years of shareholder activism campaign data reveals important (but often overlooked) observations about this increasingly popular investment approach, used broadly by hedge funds and other investors to influence how U.S. corporations are managed. Specifically, since 2018, the market has reacted positively to new activist situations, with attractive short-term share price outperformance, but relatively few activists have been able to sustain market-beating performance throughout the first year following a campaign launch. In other words, not all activists are the alpha generators that they are made to seem, and the majority do not deliver on their campaign promises of outperformance beyond an immediate “pop.”

Our empirical review included campaigns waged between 2018 and H1 2023 at U.S. companies with market capitalizations greater than $500 million at the time of campaign announcement. We measured total shareholder return (TSR) versus the S&P 500 over one week and one year as proxies for short term and long-term excess return generation. We split the activists into different groups, and then compared performance across institutions with different investing or behavioral profiles. The groups are: Leading Activist Hedge Funds, Other Activist Hedge Funds, ESG-Focused Activists, Long Only Institutions and Episodic Activists (i.e., individuals, private equity funds, family offices).

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Climate Change as Unjust Enrichment

Maytal Gilboa is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law at Bar-Ilhan University, Yotam Kaplan is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law at Bar-Ilhan University, and Roee Sarel is Junior Professor of Private Law and Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal.

The climate crisis represents a stark clash between short-term and long-term interests. Governments prioritize short-term economic growth over long-term climate stability, and are hesitant to comply with their international obligations, which involve costly short-term concessions. Powerful industry lobbyists push for policies that guarantees immense short-term profits, at the expense of future generations. Regulatory mechanisms and international law treaties seem unable to provide effective legal responses to the crisis.

Climate litigation, operating through the court system, aims to fill the gaps left by national and international regulation. Unfortunately, litigation has so far also proven largely ineffective. Currently, climate litigation is primarily based on tort principles, which necessitate a clear showing of harm, attributed to a specific injurer under a “but-for” test for causation. This formulation puts plaintiffs at a structural disadvantage when it comes to climate litigation. The harms of climate change entail unique features: most of them will only materialize in the medium-to-far future, they are highly dispersed, non-monetary by nature, and difficult to attribute to specific actors. Identifying, quantifying, and proving such harms in courts is near-impossible, and claims are systematically rejected by courts. Additionally, tort liability is typically available only following some “wrong” by the defendant. In the context of the climate crisis, polluters who contribute significantly to global warming may not necessarily be committing a wrong, i.e., breaching any identifiable legal duty. Even those who strictly adhere to all legal requirements and regulatory standards, and therefore commit no apparent “wrong,” still contribute to global warming. Thus, the focus of tort law on wrongdoing fails to fully capture the nature of the problem.

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