Monthly Archives: August 2023

DEI Initiatives Post-SFFA: Considerations for Boards and Management

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, John F. Savarese, Adam J. Shapiro, Erica E. Bonnett, Noah B. Yavitz, and Carmen X. W. Lu.  Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders? (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaStakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

It is no secret that American corporations face vigorous — and often conflicting — demands concerning diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) initiatives.  Over the past year, DEI initiatives and commitments have come under pressure in the face of macroeconomic headwinds, political scrutiny and legal challenges.  That pressure has only grown following the Supreme Court’s recent decision against affirmative action in SFFA v. Harvard (as discussed in our prior memo), after which Attorneys General from both red and blue states sent conflicting letters to Fortune 100 companies on what the SFFA decision meant for corporate DEI initiatives.

Managing the tension between proponents and opponents of DEI programs and initiatives is particularly complex because of the range of stakeholders involved.  Shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, regulators, stock exchanges and state legislatures are among the groups that have sought to shape the DEI agenda.  And DEI is no longer a domestic issue:  The European Union’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which is expected to affect over 3,000 U.S. companies, includes disclosure standards that require firms to assess and disclose workforce and supplier diversity, equity and inclusion policies, practices and metrics to ensure equal treatment and opportunities for all.

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ChatGPT and Corporate Policies

Baozhong Yang is an Associate Professor of Finance at Georgia State University. This post is based on a recent article by Professor Yang, Manish Jha, Assistant Professor of Finance at Georgia State University; Jialin Qian, PhD Candidate at Georgia State University; and Michael Weber, Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago. 

Understanding corporate policies is central to corporate finance. Investment policies, in particular, are key to corporate growth and aggregate fluctuations, with aggregate investment being the most volatile component of GDP. Neoclassical q-theory suggests that Tobin’s q can serve as a sufficient statistic to describe firms’ investment opportunities and policies (Hayashi, 1982). However,  managerial information is typically not available for all firms, despite the availability and usefulness of information for a subset of firms provided by various surveys, e.g., the Duke University/Federal Reserve CFO Surveys and the Conference Board CEO Surveys.

To address this issue, our paper harnesses the power of ChatGPT, an advanced AI model developed by OpenAI, capable of processing long and complex questions and providing detailed, expert-level responses. Using ChatGPT, we extract firm-level corporate expectations of future investment policies and answer these questions: Can ChatGPT help understand corporate policies? Does the ChatGPT-extracted investment policy provide unique insights beyond existing measures like Tobin’s q or cash flows? How does this information impact asset prices and returns?

Our sample comprises 74,586 conference call transcripts from 3,878 unique companies spanning from 2006 to 2020. These transcripts contain valuable information, including corporate managers’ beliefs and expectations about their firms’ future capital expenditures. Leveraging ChatGPT, we extract quantitative assessments of future increases and decreases in investment, constructing a firm-level ChatGPT Investment Score.

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SEC Adopts Final Rules on Cybersecurity Disclosure

Cydney S. Posner is Special Counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

At an open meeting on Wednesday last week, the SEC voted, three to two, to adopt final rules on cybersecurity disclosure. In his statement at the  open meeting, Commissioner Jaime Lizárraga shared the stunning statistics that, last year, 83% of companies experienced more than one data breach, with an average cost of in the U.S. of $9.44 million; breaches increased 600% over the last decade and total costs across the U.S. economy could run as high as trillions of dollars per year. Given the ubiquity, frequency and complexity of these threats, in March last year, the SEC proposed cybersecurity disclosure rules intended to help shareholders better understand cybersecurity risks and how companies are managing and responding to them.  Although a number of changes to the proposal were made in the final rules in response to objections that the proposal was too prescriptive and could increase companies’ vulnerability to cyberattack, the basic structure remains the same, with requirements for both material incident reporting on Form 8-K and periodic disclosure of material information regarding cybersecurity risk management, strategy and governance. According to SEC Chair Gensler, “[w]hether a company loses a factory in a fire—or millions of files in a cybersecurity incident—it may be material to investors….Currently, many public companies provide cybersecurity disclosure to investors. I think companies and investors alike, however, would benefit if this disclosure were made in a more consistent, comparable, and decision-useful way. Through helping to ensure that companies disclose material cybersecurity information, today’s rules will benefit investors, companies, and the markets connecting them.”

Here are the final rule, the fact sheet and the press release.

Of course, the SEC’s concerns about cybersecurity disclosure are not new. In 2018, the SEC issued long-awaited guidance on cybersecurity disclosure. The guidance addressed disclosure obligations under existing laws and regulations, cybersecurity policies and procedures, disclosure controls and procedures, insider trading prohibitions and Reg FD and selective disclosure prohibitions in the context of cybersecurity.  That guidance built on Corp Fin’s 2011 guidance on this topic (see this Cooley News Brief), adding, in particular, new discussions of policies and insider trading.   While the guidance was adopted unanimously, some of the commissioners were not exactly enthused about it, viewing it as largely repetitive of the 2011 staff guidance—and hardly more compelling. (See this PubCo post.) Moreover, although there were improvements in disclosure following release of the guidance, concern mounted that company disclosures were not consistent, comparable or decision-useful, with “different levels of specificity regarding the cause, scope, impact and materiality of cybersecurity incidents.” In addition, cyber risks had escalated during and after the pandemic with more remote work, together with more widespread reliance on third-party service providers and “rapid monetization of cyberattacks facilitated by ransomware, black markets for stolen data, and crypto-asset technology.”

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IFRS Releases New Global Sustainability Disclosure Standards

David Lopez and Francesca Odell are Partners and Tamrin Ballon is an Associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Lopez, Ms. Odell, Ms. Ballon, and Jorge U. Juantorena. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaDoes Enlightened Shareholder Value add Value (discussed on the Forum here) and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

I. Background

On June 26, 2023, the International Sustainability Standards Board (“ISSB”) issued its inaugural sustainability reporting standards—IFRS S1 General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information (“IFRS S1”) and IFRS S2 Climaterelated Disclosures (“IFRS S2”) (together, the “Standards”). [1]

The ISSB, which was established by the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation in 2021, released the Standards with the express intent of creating a global baseline that would benefit investors and companies and, thus, the international capital markets. [2] [3] The Standards have been viewed as an important step forward in Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) approaches, as the ISSB attempts to bring some order to the ever-changing landscape surrounding sustainability disclosures. The Standards seek to consolidate various existing disclosure frameworks and apply across industries, geographies, and accounting principles.

The Standards have been well-received throughout the international community, garnering the support of oversight and regulatory bodies and several jurisdictions. Notably, the Standards employ a financial materiality standard as opposed to the stricter double materiality standard that has come under scrutiny by anti-ESG proponents and has been proposed in other sustainability disclosure regimes, such as the European Commission’s draft European Sustainability Reporting Standards (“ESRS”). The Standards’ sole focus on financial materiality is likely to further attract international support of the Standards.

The ISSB noted that it developed the Standards within 18 months and followed a transparent and inclusive process, soliciting more than 1,400 responses to its initial proposals. The ISSB’s speed in developing the Standards comes in contrast to the long-awaited and delayed climate rules anticipated from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).

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Index Providers: Whales Behind the Scenes of ETFs

Yu An is an Assistant Professor of Finance at Johns Hopkins University, Matteo Benetton is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of California, Berkeley, and Yang Song is an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Washington. This post is based on their recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst; New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal Theories on Horizontal Shareholding (discussed on the Forum here) and Horizontal Shareholding (discussed on the Forum here) both by Einer Elhauge.

Introduction

Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have experienced remarkable growth in recent years. According to the 2021 Investment Company Institute Fact Book, total assets under management (AUM) in ETFs increased from $992 billion in 2010 to $5.4 trillion by the end of 2020.

By design, the vast majority of ETFs passively replicate the performance of an underlying index, which in most cases is constructed and maintained by a designated index provider. As S&P Dow Jones, the world’s largest index provider, writes on its website, “An index provider is a specialized firm that is dedicated to creating and calculating market indices and licensing its intellectual capital as the basis of passive products.” Thus, most ETFs exhibit a two-tiered organizational structure: (i) an index provider builds and maintains the index that underlies an ETF and charges index licensing fees to an ETF issuer, and (ii) the ETF issuer services ETF investors and charges expense ratios to ETF investors.

Figure 1: Two-tiered organizational structure for SPDR S&P 500 ETF as of December 2020.

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Testimony at the Subcommittee on Capital Markets Hearing: “Reforming the Proxy Process to Safeguard Investor Interests”

Chris Netram is the Managing Vice President of Policy at the National Association of Manufacturers. This post is based on his testimony.

The NAM is the largest manufacturing association in the United States, representing nearly 14,000 manufacturers of all sizes and in every industrial sector. Manufacturers are dedicated to creating products and processes to improve the quality of life for all Americans; every day, innovators throughout our industry pioneer groundbreaking new technologies and celebrate America’s entrepreneurial spirit.

When the manufacturing industry succeeds, America succeeds. Manufacturers employ nearly 13 million Americans from all walks of life, paying $95,990 on average in wages and benefits. Manufacturing’s annualized contribution to the U.S. economy was $2.9 trillion as of the first quarter of 2023; by itself, manufacturing in the U.S. would be the eighth-largest economy in the world. And manufacturers are continuing to invest in growth—monthly construction spending in the industry rose to a record $193.88 billion in May of this year—while performing more than 55% of all private-sector research and development. This growth bolsters U.S. competitiveness on the world stage, especially as China continues to work toward its ambition of becoming the world leader in advanced manufacturing.

Manufacturing is a capital-intensive industry. As such, the industry’s strength depends in large part on companies’ ability to raise the funds necessary for critical investments in equipment, machinery, facilities and R&D. Many manufacturers turn to the public market to access this capital, which supports job-creating projects and robust partnerships with businesses of all sizes, including small and medium-sized businesses, throughout the manufacturing supply chain.

When manufacturers offer their shares to the public, it allows everyday Americans to participate in the industry’s success, largely through passive investments like mutual funds, pension plans and 401(k) accounts. The fiduciary relationship between publicly traded companies and their shareholders lies at the bedrock of America’s world-leading capital markets. Manufacturers’ management teams and boards of directors must act in Main Street investors’ long-term financial best interests, and those investors have the right to hold company leaders accountable via the proxy ballot.

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How Governance Professionals Are Guiding Corporate Disclosure on E&S Topics

Sarah Crowe is ESG and Sustainability Channel Lead and Charles Neidenbach is a Lead ESG Advisor at Nasdaq. This post is based on a publication by Nasdaq ESG Solutions. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto TallaritaFor Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain (discussed on the Forum here) and Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, Roberto Tallarita; and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Increased public scrutiny of corporate action and disclosure on environmental and social topics has generated concern that both leaders and laggards are at risk of unwanted attention.

Amidst the shifting landscape of environmental and social regulations and stakeholder expectations, we gathered input from governance professionals across the Nasdaq network, including corporate secretaries, general counsels, executives, and board members, to identify leading practices informing their approach to ESG and sustainability. They raised corporate sustainability and social responsibility disclosures, as well as the role of ratings in reputation and risk management, as key topics.

Several of the governance professionals we spoke with predict that the days of broad aspirational statements in sustainability and corporate social responsibility reports are waning as risk mitigation further influences the information shared in voluntary disclosures. The resulting approach for many organizations is to disclose the most impactful environmental and social metrics and policies sought by investors and rating organizations, and those most critically aligned with the business strategy and goals.

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Mega Grants: Why Would a Board Approve Nine-Figure CEO Pay?

Brian Tayan is a researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative and David F. Larcker is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting, Emeritus, at Stanford Graduate School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for long-term performance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried.

We recently published a paper on SSRN (“Mega Grants: Why Would A Board Approve Nine-Figure CEO Pay?”) that examines the practice of awarding “mega grants” to CEOs.

Mega grants are large, one-time equity awards with long vesting periods (up to 10 years) granted in lieu of or in addition to annual awards with the intended purpose of providing significant incentive to achieve long-term targets. Mega grants were popular in the late 1990s (having been awarded to the CEOs of Oracle, Walt Disney, IAC/Interactive, and others) but fell out of favor in response to shareholder criticism. A 2005 accounting change that required companies to record the fair value of equity awards in the financial statements further decreased the attractiveness of large-scale option awards.

This trend has reversed in recent years, with executives receiving nine-figure awards once again appearing on annual lists of the highest paid CEOs. The reasons behind this change are unclear. Some see a turning point following the decision of Apple to grant a one-time equity award (with 5- and 10-year vesting provisions) valued at $376 million to CEO Tim Cook in the first year he succeeded Steve Jobs as CEO. The board explained its decision: “In light of Cook’s experience with the company, including his leadership during Jobs’s prior leaves of absence, the board views his retention as CEO as critical to the company’s success and smooth leadership transition.” In subsequent years, the CEOs of other large technology companies succeeding long-time founders—such as those of Microsoft and Alphabet—also received mega grants.

Another turning point occurred in 2018 when the board of Tesla awarded CEO Elon Musk a performance-vested stock-option package valued at up to $56 billion, based on achieving an aggressive series of market capitalization, revenue, and cash flow targets over a 10-year period. Musk already had significant incentive to perform, owning 22 percent of the company (worth $13 billion). Nevertheless, the company’s chairman described the award as a case of “heads you win, tails you don’t lose” with shareholders benefitting from significant share-price appreciation in the event of success and zero payout to Musk otherwise. Musk ultimately achieved many of the performance goals (despite experts describing them as “laughably impossible”), catapulting the company’s valuation above $1 trillion and Musk’s net worth for a time above $200 billion. Subsequent years witnessed a small surge of technology company CEOs (including founder CEOs) receiving nine-figure mega grants, which Bloomberg described as “Elon Musk copycats,” presumably in their hopes of achieving similar outcomes.

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Testimony at the Subcommittee on Capital Markets Hearing: “Reforming the Proxy Process to Safeguard Investor Interests”

Nell Minow is Vice Chair of ValueEdge Advisors. This post is based on her testimony.

I am very grateful for the opportunity to share my thoughts on the proxy process and shareholder resolutions. I welcome your questions and will submit supplemental materials as necessary following this session and the related hearings on ESG and proxy advisors. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to remind my fellow panelists about the essential elements of transparency and accountability that are the foundation of capitalism and the reason the markets of this country are the strongest, the most robust, and the greatest creators of wealth for investors and employees in the world. I am always disappointed to see the lengths corporate insiders and their service providers will go to insulate themselves from minimal transparency and feedback.

I have worked on behalf of shareholders since 1986 in a series of companies co-founded with Robert A.G. Monks and Rick Bennett, starting with Institutional Shareholder Services, all previous companies profitably sold and doing well. I met Bob Monks when I was at OMB and he was on the staff of then-Vice President George H.W. Bush on President Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, where we worked with the late Boyden Gray, who was an exemplar of free market economics.

I would like to state for the record that I have included my firm purely for identification. No one is paying me to be here and neither I nor our clients have any financial interest in any legislation or regulatory activity on these matters. I emphasize this because my experience with those who comment on these issues is that they often disguise their financial interest in the policies being discussed. [1]

The appendices to this testimony include my recent comment to OMB listing some of the Orwellian names of the fake, dark money front groups that are distorting the legislative and regulatory processes on these issues.

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Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Board Action that Has a Disenfranchising Effect on a Stockholder

Gail Weinstein is Senior Counsel, Philip Richter and Michael P. Sternheim are Partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Sternheim, Steven Epstein, Brian T. Mangino, Amber Banks, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Coster v. UIP (June 28, 2023) is the first decision (so far as we know) in which a Delaware court, in the context of a contested board election, has validated a board of directors’ action that had the effect of disenfranchising a stockholder. Notably, the case presented a highly unusual factual setting. In the decision, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the overlapping applicability of the SchnellBlasius and Unocal standards in this context and, combining these doctrines, established a unitary standard for review of board actions that have a disenfranchising effect.

Key Points

  • The new standard appears to be, essentially, a heightened Unocal standard. Under the new standard, a board action that has the effect of disenfranchising a stockholder in the face of a contested director election or stockholder vote touching on board control is permissible if it is a “reasonable and proportionate” response to a threat to the corporation (the Unocal standard), but the court will apply the “special sensitivity” toward stockholder disenfranchisement issues that the Schnell and Blasius doctrines bring. The decision furthers the Delaware courts’ longstanding trend of blending these doctrines, with the effect, clarified in UIP, of essentially relegating Schnell and Blasius to being specific applications of the Unocal standard rather than being standards of review themselves.
  • In our view, there will still be a very high bar to judicial validation of board action that has the effect of disenfranchising a stockholder in the face of a contested director election or stockholder voting touching on board control. The standard of review the Supreme Court articulated in UIP may appear to be less stringent than the Schnell and Blasius standards that have often been applied in this context. However, we believe it likely that the new standard will not significantly change the court’s general approach to or outcome in these cases—first, because the decision just reaffirms the court’s evolution toward a combination of the SchnellBlasius and Unocal doctrines in this context; and, second, because, as the Supreme Court emphasized, the facts in UIP were highly unusual.

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