Monthly Archives: August 2023

Special Committee Report

Gregory V. Gooding and Maeve O’Connor are Partners and Caitlin Gibson is a Counsel at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Mr. Gooding, Ms. O’Connor, Ms. Gibson, Andrew Bab, Bill Regner, and Matthew Ryan, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

This  post surveys corporate transactions announced during the first half of 2023 that used special committees to manage conflicts and key Delaware judicial decisions during this period ruling on issues relating to the use of special committees.

Who Controls and When?

Delaware courts have held that transactions between a controlled company and its controller are subject to the test of entire fairness—Delaware’s most exacting standard of review—due to the inherent risk of minority stockholder abuse presented by such transactions. In structuring a transaction between a Delaware company and a significant stockholder—or a transaction in which a significant stockholder has interests that differ from those of other stockholders—the first step is to determine whether that significant stockholder controls the company, either generally or with respect to the specific transaction being considered.

In some cases, the answer is clear. A stockholder owning more than 50% of a company’s voting power controls that company. In the case of a public company, ownership of somewhat less than 50% can result in control given the practical reality that less than 100% of the shares will be present at any stockholder meeting, with the result that the near majority stockholder will be able to elect the entire board. But the controller status of a stockholder owning a significant, but meaningfully less than majority, equity interest occupies a more uncertain status. While Delaware courts have found control potentially to exist at levels well below 50% ownership, proving control in those circumstances requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the alleged controller has actually dominated the company’s conduct, either generally or with respect to the particular transaction being challenged. The existence of such control is a “highly contextualized” question, depending not only on share ownership but also on a variety of other factors, [1] none of which alone may be sufficient to prove control. Rather, “[a] finding of control . . . typically results when a confluence of multiple sources combines in a fact-specific manner to produce a particular result,” [2] as illustrated by the examples below.

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Mitigating Litigation Risk When Incorporating DEI Goals Into Executive Incentive Programs

JT Ho and Mike Delikat are Partners, and Bobby Bee is a Practice Support Counsel at Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on an Orrick memorandum by Mr. Ho, Mr. Delikat, Mr. Bee, and John Giansello. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

On June 29, 2023, the Supreme Court found Harvard and UNC’s admissions policies, which considered race and ethnicity as factors in admissions, to be unlawful under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While this ruling does not directly impact corporate DEI programs due to existing legal prohibitions on considering race in employment decisions, this case may embolden more applicants, employees, government officials like state Attorneys General and conservative activist groups to bring “reverse discrimination” claims and shareholder demands and proposals, a trend that already is on the rise.

Executive compensation programs that include DEI performance as a metric have already been and may continue to be a source of such claims and attacks. Many executive compensation programs in recent years have incorporated DEI metrics due to institutional investor demands. Such goals are often tied to increasing the number of women or diverse employees by a certain percentage, especially in higher-paid roles or retaining a certain percentage of such groups of employees, and have become more formulaic and rigorous over the years due to investor scrutiny.

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SEC’s New Rules on Use of Data Analytics by Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers

Hardy Callcott, Jay Baris, and Laurie Kleiman are Partners at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Mr. Callcott, Mr. Baris, Ms. Kleiman, Jamie Brigagliano, Benson Cohen and Ranah Esmaili.

On July 26, 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) proposed new rules for broker-dealers (Proposed Rule 15(1)-2) and investment advisers (Proposed Rule 211(h)(2)-4) on the use of predictive data analytics (PDA) and PDA-like technologies in any interactions with investors. [1] However, as discussed below, the scope of a “covered technology” subject to the rules is much broader than what most observers would consider to constitute predictive data analytics. The proposal would require that anytime a broker-dealer or investment adviser uses a “covered technology” in connection with engaging or communicating with an investor (including exercising investment discretion on behalf of an investor), the broker-dealer or investment adviser must evaluate that technology for conflicts of interest and eliminate or neutralize those conflicts of interest. The proposed rules would apply even if the interaction with the investor does not rise to the level of a “recommendation.”

“Covered technology” is defined extraordinarily broadly to include any “analytical, technological, or computational function, algorithm, model, correlation matrix, or similar method or process that optimizes for, predicts, guides, forecasts, or directs investment-related behaviors or outcomes.” The Proposing Release makes clear that “PDA-like” technology is intended to include all technologies such as algorithmic trading, artificial intelligence, machine learning, natural language processing, chatbots, and digital engagement processes if they are used in communicating with investors or managing investments. [2]

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CalSTRS Escalates Efforts to Hold Global Companies Accountable for Not Adequately Disclosing Climate Change Risks

Rebecca Forée is Media Relations Manager, and Aeisha Mastagni is Portfolio Manager within the Sustainable Investment & Stewardship Strategies Unit at the California State Retirement System (CalSTRS). This post is based on their CalSTRS memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock (discussed on the Forum here) by Leo E. Strine, Jr; and Exit vs. Voice (discussed on the Forum here) by Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver Hart, and Luigi Zingales.

WEST SACRAMENTO, Calif. (August 10, 2023) – For the 2023 proxy season, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)—the world’s largest educator-only pension fund with more than $315 billion in assets—stepped up its efforts to hold companies around the globe accountable for failing to address climate change risks: CalSTRS voted against the boards of directors at a record 2,035 global companies because they did not provide necessary climate risk disclosures.

In 2021, CalSTRS made a pledge to achieve a net zero investment portfolio by 2050, or sooner. The steps CalSTRS takes to achieve net zero carbon emissions are rooted in its mission to provide California’s public school teachers with a secure financial future. As a part of this mission, CalSTRS will continue to hold the companies in its global portfolio accountable for addressing sustainable business practices and providing minimum climate risk disclosures to investors.

“We voted against boards that didn’t meet the most basic disclosure expectations,” explains Aeisha Mastagni, a portfolio manager on CalSTRS’ Sustainable Investment and Stewardship Strategies team. “These public disclosures are an important step toward reaching net zero because companies cannot be held accountable for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions without them.”

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Weekly Roundup: August 18-24, 2023


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 18-24, 2023.

Unveiling the Business Risk: Why Board and Executive Engagement in DE&I Matters


Pressure on DEI Initiatives Continues to Mount


From cyber strategy to Implementation: what CEOs and boards need to Know


Shareholder Rights: Assessing the Threat Environment


Midyear Observations on the 2023 board agenda


Director Compensation: Increases Are Back Among the Largest US Companies


The SEC’s Money Market Fund Reforms


Inside the IFRS S1 and S2 Sustainability Disclosure Standards


2023 S&P 500 New Director and Diversity Snapshot


EU Adopts Long-Awaited Mandatory ESG Reporting Standards


Voting Rationales


More Women Take CEO Jobs But Parity Still Decades Away


Employee Bankruptcy Trauma


Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Private Fund Advisers


Statement by Chair Gensler on Private Fund Advisers


Statement by Chair Gensler on Private Fund Advisers

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Today, the Commission is considering final rules related to private fund advisers. I am pleased to support this adoption because, by enhancing advisers’ transparency and integrity, we will help promote greater competition and thereby efficiency in this important part of the markets.

Private funds and their advisers play a significant role for investors and issuers. They play an important role in nearly every sector of the capital markets. On one side are the funds’ investors, such as retirement plans or endowments. Standing behind those entities are millions of investors like municipal workers, teachers, firefighters, professors, students, and more. On the other side are issuers raising capital from private funds, ranging from startups to late-stage companies.

After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress understood the important role that private funds and advisers play. In the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Congress effectively required most private fund advisers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Congress also gave the Commission specific new authorities under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to prohibit or restrict advisers’ sales practices, conflicts, and compensation schemes. [1] This built upon our existing authorities to regulate advisers with respect to their books and records as well as with respect to fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices, among others. [2]

In addition, Congress mandated in 1996 that, in our rulemaking, the Commission must consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation in addition to investor protection and the public interest.

Importantly, Congress did not cabin either of these provisions—the Dodd-Frank reforms or the 1996 requirements to consider efficiency, competition, and capital formation—only to retail investors. Thus, consistent with our mission and Congressional mandate, we advance today’s rules on behalf of all investors—big or small, institutional or retail, sophisticated or not.

First, the rules will increase transparency and comparability in funds’ quarterly statements to investors. This will apply to advisers’ fees (such as management fees, performance fees, and portfolio investment fees), expenses, and performance metrics.

Second, the rules will bring greater transparency to investors regarding preferential treatment, often arranged through side letters. Under the rules, advisers will be able to continue to offer side letters to fund investors, but only if the material economic terms of those agreements are disclosed in advance and all other terms subsequently are disclosed to all investors in that fund. With regard to preferential treatment for redemptions and portfolio holdings information, if such preferential treatment would have a material negative effect on other investors, advisers will be able to offer such terms if also offered to all investors in that fund.

Third, the rules will prohibit an adviser from charging to the fund fees and expenses related to investigations that result in a court or government authority sanctioning the adviser for violating the Advisers Act. Such activity is contrary to public interest and investor protection. Further, the rule will restrict a limited number of other named activities (such as an adviser borrowing from a fund they advise) by prohibiting them unless the adviser provides disclosure, and, in some cases, receives investor consent.

Fourth, the rules will require advisers to obtain a fairness or valuation opinion when the adviser directs a fund to sell assets to another fund that the adviser also advises. This will help address potential conflicts of interest that may emerge when an adviser may profit at the expense of one fund’s investors because the adviser is advising funds on both sides of a transaction.

Fifth, to benefit market integrity, the rules will require an annual audit of private funds conducted consistent with audits under the existing Advisers Act custody rule.

Finally, today’s adoption includes amendments regarding books and records to help ensure compliance for all advisers.

In finalizing today’s rule, we benefitted from public feedback on our proposal.

First, for example, as detailed in the release, the final rule was revised from the proposal to allow for more flexibility to offer preferential treatment through side letters so long as they’re disclosed and in some cases the preferential treatment is offered to all investors. Second, the prohibition on reimbursement for examination costs was revised to be permitted as long as it’s disclosed. Third, certain activities that would have been prohibited under the proposal are now being permitted in the adopting release so long as the adviser gets consent from investors in that fund. For example, reimbursement for investigation costs would be allowed other than those that result in sanctions for violations of the Advisers Act. Fourth, in addressing comments on our proposal, the adopting release no longer prohibits advisers from seeking indemnification for negligence. [3]

Further, in response to commenters, the final release includes a legacy provision with regard to preferential treatment and restricted activities. This legacy provision provides that advisers would not need to renegotiate limited partnership agreements even if such agreements otherwise would have been covered by the preferential treatment and restricted activity provisions.

Lastly, the annual audit requirement can be satisfied using requirements consistent with the current custody rule, rather than through a new set of requirements as proposed. Given this, earlier today, the Commission reopened for public comment our February 2023 safeguarding proposal.

Today’s final rules will promote private fund advisers’ efficiency, competition, integrity, and transparency. That benefits investors, issuers, and the markets alike.

I’d like to thank the members of the SEC staff who worked on these final rules, including:

  • William Birdthistle, Sarah ten Siethoff, Melissa Harke, Adele Murray, Marc Mehrespand, Tom Strumpf, Tim Dulaney, Trevor Tatum, Shane Cox, Robert Holowka, and Neema Nassiri in the Division of Investment Management;
  • Meridith Mitchell, Natalie Shioji, Jeff Berger, Robert Bagnall, and Amy Scully in the Office of the General Counsel;
  • Jessica Wachter, Ross Askanazi, Alexander Schiller, Charles Woodworth, Justin Vitanza, Lauren Moore, Michael Davis, Kevin Polzien, Daniel James Chapman, and Ralph Bien-Aime in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis;
  • Brandon Figg and Rolaine Bancroft from the Division of Corporation Finance;
  • Christopher Mulligan and Daniel Faigus in the Division of Examinations;
  • Kimberly Frederick and Nikolay Vydashenko in the Division of Enforcement;
  • Paul Munter, Natasha Guinan, Diana Stoltzfus, Jonathan Wiggins, Anita Doutt, Gaurav Hiranandani, Shehzad Niazi, Steven Kenney, Erin Nelson, and Taylor Pross in the Office of the Chief Accountant; and
  • Paul Gumagay, Kathleen Hutchinson, and Morgan Macdonald in the Office of International Affairs.

Endnotes

1Section 913(g)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 211(h) to the Advisers Act.(go back)

2See, e.g., Advisers Act sections 206 and 204.(go back)

3The adopting release states the SEC’s existing view that seeking indemnification for an adviser breaching its federal fiduciary duty operates as a waiver and is invalid under the Advisers Act.(go back)

Statement by Commissioner Uyeda on Private Fund Advisers

Mark T. Uyeda is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Uyeda, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you, Chair Gensler. In the Commission’s ongoing fight against crypto assets, it argued in Terraform that “[w]hen distinguishing between classes of investors, courts construe the federal securities laws’ provisions to provide more—not less—protection to retail investors.” [1] Today, the Commission seeks to impose rules for private funds – which are generally available only for sophisticated investors – that are far more burdensome and restrictive than those products for retail investors. This inconsistency is only one reason why these final rules are arbitrary and capricious.

The Commission relies on questionable statutory authority, fails to consider the aggregate impact of the multitude of rules promulgated since 2022 affecting investment advisers, and dismisses warnings that it will have a disparate impact on smaller advisers, including those that are minority- and women-owned.

When the Commission adopted rules implementing Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, [2] it explained that “[private fund advisers] will be subject to the same registration requirements, regulatory oversight, and other requirements that apply to other SEC-registered investment advisers.” [3] These other requirements prohibit investment advisers to pooled vehicles from engaging in fraudulent conduct, [4] impose safekeeping requirements on investment advisers that have custody of client assets, [5] and regulate how investment advisers market their services. [6] Moreover, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) establishes a fiduciary standard enforceable by the statute’s antifraud provisions. [7]

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Employee Bankruptcy Trauma

Jared A. Ellias is the Scott C. Collins Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent paper.

Congress gave distressed companies a powerful set of tools to deal with financial distress, namely Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  But these tools are thought to come with a cost in the form of damages sustained by the business, which we commonly refer to as the “indirect costs of bankruptcy.”  For example, bankruptcy filings are thought to hurt the relationship between a firm and its workforce.  When Hertz filed for Chapter 11 in 2020, it warned that, for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding, “our employees will face considerable distraction and uncertainty and we may experience increased levels of employee attrition.”  In other words, the design of bankruptcy law, with its highly public federal court hearings, creates a trade-off: firms may benefit from accessing the tools that Congress provided to resolve financial distress, but at the cost of, among other things, reducing the firm’s ability to retain, motivate and attract a value-maximizing workforce.  As a result of this fear, among other fears of business damage, companies often delay and avoid filing for bankruptcy due to concerns that it would damage the business even if the tools of bankruptcy law might be helpful in resolving financial distress.

In my new working paper, “Employee Bankruptcy Trauma,” I study new sources of data – social media data – to learn more about how employees react to the decision of their employers to file for Chapter 11.  There are reasons to be skeptical of the prevailing narrative that workers respond negatively to a bankruptcy filing.  After all, Chapter 11 firms are nearly always suffering from financial distress prior to any bankruptcy filing, and the experience of employees may not change after a court filing.  Indeed, the employee experience could very well improve as employers obtain the powers of a Chapter 11 debtor, such as borrowing new money and paying bonuses. Moreover, there are reasons to be suspicious that firms like Hertz might opportunistically deploy the specter of mass employee departure to pressure bankruptcy judges into agreeing to quick bankruptcy cases, and as such, less judicial oversight.

My approach is to look for evidence of employee responses to Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in social media data, which offer initial, albeit imperfect, insights.  I build a new dataset that combines two social media data sources – online employee reviews and employee work history from social media profiles – to learn more about how employees react to their employer’s Chapter 11 filing.  I use a combination of manual coding, machine learning and statistical analyses to look for evidence supporting the prevailing view that bankruptcy filings damage the firm.

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More Women Take CEO Jobs But Parity Still Decades Away

Laura Sanderson Co-leads the Board and CEO Advisory Partners in Europe and Luke Meynell Co-leads the Board & CEO Advisory Partners in the UK at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on their Russell Reynolds memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite (discussed on the Forum here) by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss; Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (discussed on the Forum here) by Jesse M. Fried; and Duty and Diversity (discussed on the Forum here) by Chris Brummer and Leo E. Strine, Jr.

When we analyzed the 1,822 companies listed on the world’s leading stock indices, we found a total of 106 CEOs left their positions in the first half of 2023. This is just two fewer than we saw in the first half of 2022, which was a record year for CEO turnover.

This high level of departures should be creating an opportunity to accelerate progress on gender parity among CEOs. This year, 13% of those taking a CEO role have been women, up from 2.4% for the first half of 2018.

But the picture varies significantly around the world:

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Voting Rationales

Roni Michaely is a Professor of Finance and Entrepreneurship at The University of Hong Kong, Silvina Rubio is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Bristol, and Irene Yi is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Toronto. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, Scott Hirst; Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy (discussed on the Forum here) and The Specter of the Giant Three (discussed on the Forum here) both by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst.

Voting is a central part of corporate governance, giving shareholders the power to shape a company’s future. With institutional investors holding more than 70% of publicly traded companies’ shares in the US, the success of governance hinges on institutional investors responsibly using their voting power. But what drives institutional investors’ voting decisions? While existing literature has shed some light on the factors influencing institutional investors’ voting decisions, the specific reasons behind each vote often remain elusive. Researchers typically infer these reasons from observable information such as voting patterns and the characteristics of companies, sponsors, proposals, or institutional investors. However, without an explicit rationale accompanying each vote, it is challenging to uncover the reasons that guide their voting decisions.

In our study titled Voting Rationales, we study why institutional investors vote the way they vote on director elections and the impact on firm’s actions, by examining a novel dataset containing 611,389 institutional investors’ voting rationales. Voting rationales are vote-specific, voluntarily disclosed, and have the potential to reveal valuable information beyond what is contained in votes alone. Examples include “A vote AGAINST incumbent Nominating Committee member William (Bill) Larsson is warranted for lack of diversity on the board” or “Adopted or renewed poison pill w/o shareholder approval in past year.” While voluntary, disclosing voting rationales is encouraged by the United Nations (UN) Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), and we find that it has become increasingly popular in recent years. During the 2021 proxy season, 5.4% of all votes and 15.3% of votes against directors had a rationale. In our sample, spanning from 2014 to 2021 proxy seasons, 83% of proposals on director elections and 90% of meetings have at least one rationale. Our data cover a broad range of meetings, providing insight into institutional investors’ concerns when casting their shares.

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