Yearly Archives: 2017

It Pays to Write Well

Byoung-Hyoun Hwang is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the Cornell SC Johnson College of Business. Hugh Kim is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of South Carolina Darla Moore School of Business. This post is based on an article published in the May 2017 edition of the Journal of Financial Economics authored by Professors Hwang and Kim.

In It Pays to Write Well, published in the May 2017 edition of the Journal of Financial Economics, we examine how the readability of corporate disclosure documents affects investors and stock prices.

Corporate disclosure comes in the form of accounting numbers framed or accompanied by a substantial amount of text. While earlier research has emphasized the informativeness of the accounting numbers, our study is part of a relatively new literature stream that looks at the informativeness of the text and the ease with which the text in corporate disclosure documents can be processed.

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Sections 204 and 205 of Delaware Corporation Law: Effective Tools to Remedy Defective Corporate Acts

Jenness E. Parker is Counsel and Kaitlin E. Maloney is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden publication. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Since they became effective in 2014, Sections 204 and 205 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) have provided mechanisms for a corporation to unilaterally ratify defective corporate acts or seek relief from the Court of Chancery to validate any corporate act under certain circumstances. These provisions filled a perceived gap in the DGCL. Prior to their enactment, a corporation had no tool to fix defective acts or obtain validation of issues causing uncertainty in corporate documents, actions or otherwise. So far, the Court of Chancery has had relatively few opportunities to opine on the use of these statutory provisions.

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Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach is Associate Professor at Ecole Polytechnique Federale and Swiss Finance Institute. Cornelius Schmidt is Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of Finance, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH Bergen) and is an Economist with the European Commission (DG Competition—Chief Economist Team). This post is based on a recent article by Professor Fahlenbrach and Professor Schmidt, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics. The views expressed in this article are personal, and do not necessarily represent those of DG Competition or of the European Commission.

In our article, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, which was recently accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics, we examine whether the increase in passively managed institutional ownership changes the governance of corporations to the detriment of shareholders, or whether index-tracking institutions participate in governance as much as more active institutions. We concentrate on two corporate governance areas which executives may rapidly influence after a change in the balance of power in corporations—the board of directors and their relative power in the organization measured by an accumulation of titles. We also examine whether passive institutional investors use their main governance device, shareholder proposals, more actively. We study announcement returns to mergers and acquisitions to test whether agency costs are higher and whether managers can reap personal gains from empire building after increases in passive ownership.

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Delaware’s Fall: The Arbitration Bylaws Scenario

Lynn M. LoPucki is Security Pacific Bank Distinguished Professor of Law at the UCLA Law School. This post is based on a recent article by Professor LoPucki, forthcoming in Delaware’s Dominance in Corporate Law (Stephen Bainbridge, ed., Cambridge University Press 2018). This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Until recently, Delaware’s dominance in the competition to sell corporation charters was considered so great as to be irreversible. Scholars assumed that if another state were to discover a method to compete effectively, Delaware could simply copy it. But the current threat to Delaware’s dominance comes not from another state, but from arbitration bylaws. Delaware cannot solve the problem by copying because the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from offering secret arbitration.

For Delaware, loss of its cases to arbitration would a crippling blow. Delaware dominates the charter competition by leveraging its unique Chancery Court. Unlike the courts of other states, the Chancery Court is significantly specialized in corporate law, publishes its opinions, has a large body of precedent, tries cases without juries, and has the resources and motivation to provide quick hearings. Other states cannot copy Delaware because they do not incorporate sufficient numbers of companies to generate sufficient litigation to support a court specialized in corporate law, because their governments are not dependent upon, and so not fully supportive of, their efforts to compete for charter sales, and because their constitutions guarantee the right to trial by jury.
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Private M&A Deal Terms: UK vs. US Markets

Charlie Geffen is a partner in the London office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn publication by Mr. Geffen, Matthew H. Hurlock, and Anne MacPherson.

The growth of transatlantic private M&A (including private equity) has led to increasing examples of “two nations divided by a common language.” Although many of the core principles of deal making are the same, there are market and cultural differences in the UK and US that participants should understand. We have seen many hours spent working through these differences and, whilst some are meaningful, others are in reality more “form over substance.”

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Weekly Roundup: May 12–May 18, 2017


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of May 12–May 18, 2017.

















The Promise of Market Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine

Adena Friedman is President and CEO of Nasdaq, Inc. This post is based on a Nasdaq publication by Ms. Friedman.

Robust public markets are the fuel that ignites America’s economic engine and wealth creation. Companies list on U.S. exchanges to access a steady, dependable stream of capital to grow and create jobs, and investors choose our markets because they are the world’s most trusted venues for long-term wealth creation.

Built on the shoulders of entrepreneurs with great ideas, public companies drive innovation, job creation, growth and opportunity across the global economy. A central reason for the success of U.S. capital markets is that American public companies are among the most innovative and transparent in the world. Additionally, the mechanisms that govern our markets ensure opportunity through fair and equal access—providing a solid foundation for the diversity of investing perspectives, participants and strategies represented in our capital markets.

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Looking Behind the Declining Number of Public Companies

Les Brorsen is EY Americas vice-chair for public policy. This post is based on an EY publication by Mr. Brorsen, David Brown, Jeff Grabow, Chris Holmes, and Jackie Kelley.

Public market trends: US companies get bigger, more stable

US listings dropped after the dot-com bubble, but the market has largely stabilized, and US public companies today are much larger than in the past.

During the dot-com peak in 1996, US listings hit a record high of more than 8,000 domestically incorporated companies listed on a US stock exchange with an average market capitalization of $1.8b in today’s dollars. The number of domestic US-listed public companies decreased precipitously through 2003, with almost 2,800 companies lost because of M&A activity and delistings. By 2003, there were 5,295 domestic US-listed companies. The loss of domestic US-listed companies in 1996–2003 represents 74% of the loss from 1996 to date. (See figures 1 and 2). READ MORE »

The Dynamics of Managerial Entrenchment: The Corporate Governance Failure in Anglo-Irish Bank

Joanne Horton is a Professor of Accounting and Finance at the University of Exeter Business School. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Professor Horton; Dr. Gary Abrahams, Practitioner Research Fellow in the Accounting Department at the University of Exeter Business School; and Yuval Millo, Professor of Accounting at the University of Warwick Business School.

What are the dynamics through which corporate boards fail? While the corporate governance literature examines the relations between board composition and financial performance, it pays little attention to how exactly such relations unfold.

We aim to address this question in our recent paper The Dynamics of Managerial Entrenchment: The Corporate Governance Failure in Anglo-Irish Bank by examining one of the Irish banks embroiled in the Irish banking crisis of 2008-9—Anglo Irish Bank (hereafter, Anglo). We study the case of Anglo and examine, using interviews with key individuals involved in the bank, the dynamics on the board and among other managers, paying particular attention to relations between the board and Anglo’s CEO. Our choice to study Anglo was motivated by the fact that Anglo embodied dramatically a corporate failure: a bank that in less than 20 years moved from being a spectacular success, to collapsing, requiring the highest bailout to date from the Irish government.

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Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights

Blair A. Nicholas is a partner and Brandon Marsh is senior counsel at Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP. This post is based on a Bernstein Litowitz publication by Mr. Nicholas and Mr. Marsh. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel (discussed on the Forum here).

Recent developments and uncertainties in the securities markets are drawing institutional investors’ attention back to core principles of corporate governance. As investors strive for yield in this post-Great Recession, low interest rate environment, large technology companies’ valuations climb amid the promises of rapid growth. But at the same time, some of these successful companies are asking investors to give up what most regard as a fundamental right of ownership: the right to vote. Companies in the technology sector and elsewhere are increasingly issuing two classes or even three classes of stock with disparate voting rights in order to give certain executives and founders outsized voting power. By issuing stock with 1/10th the voting power of the executives’ or founders’ stock, or with no voting power at all, these companies create a bulwark for managerial entrenchment. Amid ample evidence that such skewed voting structures lead to reduced returns long run, many public pension funds and other institutional investors are standing up against this trend. But in the current environment of permissive exchange rules allowing for such dual-class or multi-class stock, there is still more that investors can do to protect their fundamental voting rights.

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