Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Lipton. Additional posts by Martin Lipton on short-termism and corporate governance are available here.
In a brilliant must-read article in the May-June 2017 issue of the Harvard Business Review, Joseph L. Bower and Lynn S. Paine show the fallacies of the economic theories and statistical studies that have been used since 1970 to justify shareholder-centric corporate governance, short-termism and activist attacks on corporations. They demonstrate the pernicious effect of the agency theory promoted by Milton Friedman (1970) and Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976), a theory still endorsed today by a majority of academic economists and lawyers who write about and teach corporate governance. The Bower and Paine rejection of hedge fund activism is telling.
Behavioral Implications of the CEO-Employee Pay Ratio
More from: Lynne Dallas
Lynne L. Dallas is Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law. This post is based on Professor Dallas’ recent comment letter submitted to the SEC, available here.
On February 6, 2017 the Securities and Exchange Commission requested comments on further delay in implementing Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act that requires disclosure of CEO-employee pay ratios by public companies. This request should be analyzed in the context of a law that has been on the books almost seven years and has already been the subject of extensive public comments and SEC releases. Moreover, the SEC has granted to public companies considerable flexibility in calculating their ratios. These companies have substantial capabilities with today’s technology to collect and analyze data.
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