Yearly Archives: 2021

The SEC’s Clear Reminder About the Need for Quality Cybersecurity Disclosures

Paul Ferrillo is partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP; Bob Zukis is Adjunct Professor of Management and Organization at the USC Marshall School of Business; and Christophe Veltsos is a Professor at Minnesota State University.

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) very recent settled enforcement action against First American Financial Corporation (“FAF”), with an agreed-upon cease and desist order and a monetary penalty of almost $500,000 reaffirmed what we have been preaching —when it comes to the cybersecurity disclosures of public companies, the SEC is watching closely for compliance both under applicable disclosure law (the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and under its 2018 Cybersecurity Guidance, which was issued in the wake of two noteworthy breaches, Yahoo and Equifax.

More directive cyber risk disclosure requirements are likely coming from the SEC this fall. And while cyber risk disclosure isn’t a “get out of jail free” card in the event of litigation, timely and accurate disclosure can significantly reduce a company’s exposure to litigation risk.

That the SEC was already “watching” in regard to cyber risk disclosure should be no surprise to registrants as the SEC first issued cybersecurity guidance in 2011. While no disclosure requirements at that time explicitly referred to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, the SEC’s 2011 Guidance clarified that companies may nevertheless be obliged to disclose “timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment decision.” The SEC subsequently issued its 2018 Guidance to summarize the guidelines concerning cybersecurity disclosure requirements, to reinforce and expand upon the 2011 Guidance, and to address three topics not previously addressed: (1) the significance of cybersecurity risk management procedures and policies, (2) board oversight of cybersecurity, and (3) insider trading restrictions concerning cybersecurity.

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Continued Scrutiny of SPACs and Media Statements

Martin Bell, Stephen Blake, and Brooke Cucinella are partners at Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Bell, Mr. Blake, Ms. Cucinella, Joshua Levine, Marc Berger, and Kathryn Wheelock.

On July 29, 2021, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the SEC announced parallel charges against Trevor Milton, founder, former CEO and executive chairman, and largest shareholder of Nikola Corporation, an electric- and hydrogen-powered vehicle and energy company. The U.S. Attorney’s Office charged Milton with securities and wire fraud in a criminal indictment. The SEC charged Milton with securities fraud based on the same claims. These charges against Milton are notable for three reasons. First, they reflect the SEC’s ongoing focus on the SPAC market and de-SPAC mergers, highlighted most recently in the announcement of charges earlier this month involving a proposed merger between SPAC Stable Road Acquisition Company and Momentus, Inc. Second, they contain the Southern District of New York’s first allegations that touch upon the SPAC market. Third, the charges are a reminder that statements made on social or traditional media require as much care as statements made in formal SEC filings.

Nikola Corporation, the company Milton founded, developed electric and hydrogen cars as well as energy storage systems and infrastructure. As alleged in the U.S. Attorney’s Office and SEC’s charging instruments, Milton helped Nikola raise more than $1 billion in private offerings and go public through a business combination involving a SPAC in 2020. Both before and after Nikola’s initial public offering, Milton is alleged to have engaged in a scheme to defraud and mislead investors about Nikola’s development of products and technology by making false statements about the company and its products on both social and traditional media platforms, including investor conference calls and in-person media events. Milton’s statements included, among others, allegedly inaccurate boasts that Nikola had seen “early success” in creating a “fully-functioning” semi-truck prototype when Milton knew that the prototype was inoperable, and exaggeration about the volume and binding nature of Nikola’s contracts with purchasers of certain vehicles.

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Shell to Appeal Court Ruling in Netherlands Climate Case

Sam Eastwood is partner, Nadine Pieper is an associate, and Armineh Gharibian is senior associate at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Eastwood, Ms. Pieper, Ms. Gharibian, and Johannes Weichbrodt. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

In a recent Blog Post on May 28, 2021, we discussed a landmark court ruling issued by the Hague District Court in May 2021, [1] requiring Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) to reduce the CO₂ emissions of the Shell group by net 45% in 2030, compared to 2019 levels. In a statement on July 21, 2021, Shell confirmed that it will appeal against this decision. In the meantime—and pending any final determination—Shell remain bound by the earlier court ruling.

In this post, we highlight key aspects of the Hague District Court’s decision and Shell’s recent decision to appeal.

The Hague District Court’s Decision

The case against Shell, the top holding company of the Shell group, was brought by several NGOs, led by Milieudefensie, and around 17,000 individual claimants. Shell establishes the general policy of the group and reports on the greenhouse gas emissions of the various Shell companies.

The claimants alleged that Shell has an obligation, derived from the unwritten standard of care pursuant to Book 6, Section 162 Dutch Civil Code, to contribute to the prevention of dangerous climate change through the corporate policy it determines for the Shell group.

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Surging M&A Megadeals Top Records In Q2

Darragh Byrne, Marc Petitier, and Guy Potel are partners at White & Case LLP. This post is based on their White & Case memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? by John C. Coates, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu (discussed on the Forum here); and The New Look of Deal Protection by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here).

The second quarter of 2021 saw the announcement of megadeals (deals worth US$5 billion or more) totaling US$734.4 billion in value—more than in any other quarter on Mergermarket record (since 2006). Megadeal volume hit 45, the third-highest number in any quarter on record.

Activity at the top end was dominated by the US, with 25 megadeal transactions worth US$358.6 billion in Q2 targeting US-based companies. The largest of these was Discovery Inc.’s acquisition of Warner Media for US$96.2 billion, a ride on the bandwagon where traditional media players like Discovery and Warner seek to build scale—and a robust back catalog—to take on streaming mainstays like Netflix and Amazon Prime.

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A New Variation in SEC Insider Trading Enforcement

John F. Savarese and Wayne M. Carlin are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Earlier this week, the SEC filed a complaint in the Northern District of California alleging insider-trading charges that may signal a more aggressive approach to enforcement under the agency’s new leadership. In SEC v. Panuwat, the SEC charged a corporate executive who learned about an impending acquisition of his employer and then traded in the securities of an unrelated company in the same industry that he anticipated would materially increase in price when his employer’s acquisition was publicly announced.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that Mathew Panuwat was a business development executive at Medivation, Inc., a mid-cap oncology-focused biopharmaceutical company. In the course of his employment, Panuwat learned from Medivation’s CEO that the company expected to be acquired by a major pharmaceutical company within a few days, at a premium to the then-market price. Panuwat did not trade in Medivation securities. Rather, within minutes of hearing from the CEO, Panuwat purchased out-of-the-money call options in Incyte Corporation, another mid-cap oncology-focused biopharmaceutical company that he believed would increase in value when the Medivation acquisition was announced.

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The Difference Between Purpose and Sustainability (aka ESG)

Robert G. Eccles is Visiting Professor of Management Practice; Colin Mayer is the Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies; and Judith Stroehle is Senior Research Fellow at University of Oxford Saïd Business School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate purpose and sustainability (often referred to by the acronym of ESG for environmental, social, and governance) are now part of the mainstream lexicon in the corporate and investment communities. The two terms are often used interchangeably as synonyms. This is wrong. Purpose and sustainability are related but different ideas. Purpose comes first. Sustainability can either contribute to it or can detract from it.

As one of us (Mayer) has written, the purpose of a company “is to produce profitable solutions to problems of people and planet,” while at the same time “not profiting from producing problems for people or planet”—a failure in sustainability. Companies that are making investments in sustainability while failing to produce profitable solutions to people and planet are also failing in purpose. Companies that are profitable while degrading the environment and society are focused on profits, not purpose. Danone is an example of the former and ExxonMobil is an example of the latter.

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Weekly Roundup: August 13–19, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 13–19, 2021.

Court of Chancery Decision Provides Guidance for Drafting MAE Clauses


2021 Proxy Season Trends: Executive Compensation


Don’t Wait to Prepare for an Emergency Succession


DOJ Indicts Founder of Nikola for Allegedly Defrauding Retail SPAC Investors



Business Groups: Panics, Runs, Organ Banks and Zombie Firms



What Boards Need to Know Before, During, and After an Acquisition



Board Diversity Deliberations


Effective Disclosure Controls Concerning Cybersecurity Breaches and Risks


CEO Tenure and Firm Value



SEC Adopts Nasdaq Rules on Board Diversity



Building on Common Ground to Advance Sustainable Capitalism

Building on Common Ground to Advance Sustainable Capitalism

Colin Mayer is Co-Chair of the Enacting Purpose Initiative (EPI) and Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies at University of Oxford Saïd Business School; Amelia Miazad is North American Chair of EPI and Founding Director and Senior Research Fellow of the Business in Society Institute at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law; and Rupert Younger is Chair of EPI and Director of the Oxford University Centre for Corporate Reputation at University of Oxford Saïd Business School. This post is based on their EPI report.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Introduction

There is a growing consensus in the global business and investment community that sustainable and inclusive capitalism is vital to society, the environment, and the economy. This paradigm shift is propelling corporate purpose to the top of the agenda for directors and investors.

The first report from the Enacting Purpose Initiative, Enacting Purpose Within the Modern Corporation, A Framework for Boards of Directors, was published in August 2020. This report builds upon that foundation by setting out how directors can work with their investors to leverage corporate purpose to address societal issues and sustain long-term value creation.

This report’s recommendations were informed by extensive dialogue with over 35 board members in the Director Steering Group and over 30 global investors and asset owners and managers in the Investor Steering Group. We remain encouraged by the common ground between investors and directors regarding the value of corporate purpose. This report lays out that common ground in order to produce actionable insights for directors seeking to deepen their collaboration with investors on corporate purpose.

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Public Entrepreneurial Finance around the Globe

Abhishek Dev is a PhD candidate in Finance at the Yale School of Management. This post is based on a recent paper by Mr. Dev; Jessica Bai, PhD candidate in Economics at Harvard University; Shai Bernstein, Associate Professor at Harvard Business School; and Josh Lerner, Jacob H. Schiff Professor of Investment Banking at Harvard Business School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Carrots & Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, by Jesse Fried and Brian Broughman (discussed on the Forum here).

In recent decades, governments around the world have been increasingly interested in boosting innovation and the “knowledge economy,” as opposed to the manufacturing sectors that were the traditional focus of industrial policies. One manifestation of this trend has been through public efforts to boost financing for early-stage ventures. Given the important role played by the venture capital firms in driving innovation and economic dynamism in the US, policy makers are highly interested in making the venture sector more robust.

Young high-growth businesses, however, face substantial information problems, and their financing requires significant expertise. The skillful allocation of capital to such companies may consequentially be difficult for public officials. First, substantial uncertainty and informational asymmetries surround the selection of new ventures, leading private investors to frequently make decisions based on soft information. Decision-making based on such imperfect information may be difficult for officials in bureaucracies to duplicate. Moreover, unlike virtually all government employees, private financiers’ compensation is strongly tied to the success of their investments. This approach improves investors’ incentives to devote substantial effort and make tough decisions (e.g., shut down an investment despite the pressures associated with career concerns and other agency problems).

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SEC Adopts Nasdaq Rules on Board Diversity

David A. Bell is partner, Ron C. Llewellyn is counsel, and Julia Forbess is partner at Fenwick & West LLP. This post is based on a Fenwick memorandum by Mr. Bell, Mr. Llewellyn, Ms. Forbess, and Janiece Jenkins. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here).

On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure, described in our prior Client Alert. The new rules will require a Nasdaq-listed company to have at least two diverse directors (including at least one woman and at least one member of an underrepresented community) or the company will have to explain why it has failed to do so. Subject companies will also be required to disclose board diversity on an annual basis in a prescribed tabular format. The SEC also approved the implementation of a board recruiting service portal that will allow certain Nasdaq-listed companies to access a network of diverse candidates.

Background

Nasdaq filed a proposal for the new rules with the SEC on December 1, 2020, and subsequently amended the proposal on February 26, 2021, to, among other things, require companies with five or fewer board members to: have (or explain the absence of) one diverse board member, allow newly listed companies additional time to achieve compliance and provide a grace period to regain compliance for companies that fall out of compliance due to a board vacancy. The final rules as adopted are the same as the amended rules as proposed by Nasdaq.

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