Monthly Archives: August 2021

SEC Steps Back from Two 2020 Amendments to the Whistleblower Rules

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum.

The SEC’s whistleblower program provides for awards in amounts between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in an SEC action based on the whistleblower’s original information. The program, which has been in place for more than ten years, is widely acknowledged to have been a resounding success. In September 2020, the SEC adopted a number of amendments to the whistleblower rules, some of which were quite controversial. In early August, SEC Chair Gary Gensler issued a statement indicating that he had directed the SEC staff to revisit the whistleblower rules, in particular, two of the amendments that had been adopted in 2020. (See this PubCo post.) Gensler observed that concerns have been raised, including by whistleblowers as well as by Commissioners Allison Herren Lee and Caroline Crenshaw, that those amendments “could discourage whistleblowers from coming forward.” Now, the SEC has issued a policy statement advising how the SEC will proceed in the interim while changes to those rules are under consideration. Commissioners Hester Peirce and Elad Roisman were none too pleased with the SEC’s action here, questioning whether it might be part of a troubling pattern of unwinding actions taken by the last Administration. They made their views known in this statement.

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The Board’s Role in Sustainable Leadership

Laura Sanderson co-leads the Board and CEO Advisory Partners in Europe; PJ Neal leads the Center for Leadership Insight; and Emily Meneer leads the Social Impact and Education sector Knowledge Management team at Russell Reynolds Associates LLP. This post is based on a Russell Reynolds memorandum by Ms. Sanderson, Mr. Neal, Ms. Meneer, and Jemi Crookes. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Sustainability—both social and environmental—has quickly risen to the top of corporate agendas in recent years. This is in part because of the growing evidence that sustainable practices result in improved financial performance, and in part due to pressure from investors, employees, and the public for companies to articulate the role they play in addressing societal challenges. As one director recently told us, sustainability “has never been a higher priority for the board than it is today.”

In 2020, Russell Reynolds Associates published a study in partnership with the United Nations Global Compact examining the attributes that make executive leaders effective at driving sustainability outcomes. In this post, we study the issue from the board’s perspective, looking at how corporate directors engage with the challenges and opportunities related to sustainability, how they structure and operate the board to oversee related activities, and ultimately, how they enable sustainable in the enterprise.

 

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Obfuscation in Mutual Funds

Chloe L. Xie is Assistant Professor of Accounting at MIT Sloan School of Management. This post is based on a recent paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, by Ms. Xie; Ed deHaan, Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Washington Foster School of Business; Yang Song, Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Washington Foster School of Business; and Christina Zhu, Assistant Professor of Accounting at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the forum here); and The Specter of the Giant Three by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Over 9,000 mutual funds, holding $21.3 trillion in assets, were traded on U.S. exchanges during 2019. Mutual funds hold 32% of the total U.S. equity market value and comprise 58% of retirement savings (Investment Company Institute 2020). Despite the popularity of mutual funds, many studies find that they underperform and that retail investors consistently make poor choices when selecting funds. For example, retail investors could have saved $358M in 2017 alone by switching from high-fee to low-fee versions of S&P 500 mutual funds with nearly identical pre-expense returns. Investor advocates argue that poor mutual fund choices are due in part to complex financial disclosures and fee structures that make it difficult to compare funds. In a paper forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, we investigate whether mutual funds create unnecessarily complex disclosures and fee structures to obfuscate high fees.

Academic theory suggests high-fee index funds create unnecessarily complex disclosures and fee structures so that investors find it difficult to learn from disclosures and make informed decisions (Carlin 2009). But a challenge in investigating this question is controlling for variation in non-discretionary complexity caused by differences across funds.

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The SEC’s Clear Reminder About the Need for Quality Cybersecurity Disclosures

Paul Ferrillo is partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP; Bob Zukis is Adjunct Professor of Management and Organization at the USC Marshall School of Business; and Christophe Veltsos is a Professor at Minnesota State University.

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) very recent settled enforcement action against First American Financial Corporation (“FAF”), with an agreed-upon cease and desist order and a monetary penalty of almost $500,000 reaffirmed what we have been preaching —when it comes to the cybersecurity disclosures of public companies, the SEC is watching closely for compliance both under applicable disclosure law (the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and under its 2018 Cybersecurity Guidance, which was issued in the wake of two noteworthy breaches, Yahoo and Equifax.

More directive cyber risk disclosure requirements are likely coming from the SEC this fall. And while cyber risk disclosure isn’t a “get out of jail free” card in the event of litigation, timely and accurate disclosure can significantly reduce a company’s exposure to litigation risk.

That the SEC was already “watching” in regard to cyber risk disclosure should be no surprise to registrants as the SEC first issued cybersecurity guidance in 2011. While no disclosure requirements at that time explicitly referred to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, the SEC’s 2011 Guidance clarified that companies may nevertheless be obliged to disclose “timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment decision.” The SEC subsequently issued its 2018 Guidance to summarize the guidelines concerning cybersecurity disclosure requirements, to reinforce and expand upon the 2011 Guidance, and to address three topics not previously addressed: (1) the significance of cybersecurity risk management procedures and policies, (2) board oversight of cybersecurity, and (3) insider trading restrictions concerning cybersecurity.

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Continued Scrutiny of SPACs and Media Statements

Martin Bell, Stephen Blake, and Brooke Cucinella are partners at Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Bell, Mr. Blake, Ms. Cucinella, Joshua Levine, Marc Berger, and Kathryn Wheelock.

On July 29, 2021, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the SEC announced parallel charges against Trevor Milton, founder, former CEO and executive chairman, and largest shareholder of Nikola Corporation, an electric- and hydrogen-powered vehicle and energy company. The U.S. Attorney’s Office charged Milton with securities and wire fraud in a criminal indictment. The SEC charged Milton with securities fraud based on the same claims. These charges against Milton are notable for three reasons. First, they reflect the SEC’s ongoing focus on the SPAC market and de-SPAC mergers, highlighted most recently in the announcement of charges earlier this month involving a proposed merger between SPAC Stable Road Acquisition Company and Momentus, Inc. Second, they contain the Southern District of New York’s first allegations that touch upon the SPAC market. Third, the charges are a reminder that statements made on social or traditional media require as much care as statements made in formal SEC filings.

Nikola Corporation, the company Milton founded, developed electric and hydrogen cars as well as energy storage systems and infrastructure. As alleged in the U.S. Attorney’s Office and SEC’s charging instruments, Milton helped Nikola raise more than $1 billion in private offerings and go public through a business combination involving a SPAC in 2020. Both before and after Nikola’s initial public offering, Milton is alleged to have engaged in a scheme to defraud and mislead investors about Nikola’s development of products and technology by making false statements about the company and its products on both social and traditional media platforms, including investor conference calls and in-person media events. Milton’s statements included, among others, allegedly inaccurate boasts that Nikola had seen “early success” in creating a “fully-functioning” semi-truck prototype when Milton knew that the prototype was inoperable, and exaggeration about the volume and binding nature of Nikola’s contracts with purchasers of certain vehicles.

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Shell to Appeal Court Ruling in Netherlands Climate Case

Sam Eastwood is partner, Nadine Pieper is an associate, and Armineh Gharibian is senior associate at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown memorandum by Mr. Eastwood, Ms. Pieper, Ms. Gharibian, and Johannes Weichbrodt. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum here); and Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum here).

In a recent Blog Post on May 28, 2021, we discussed a landmark court ruling issued by the Hague District Court in May 2021, [1] requiring Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) to reduce the CO₂ emissions of the Shell group by net 45% in 2030, compared to 2019 levels. In a statement on July 21, 2021, Shell confirmed that it will appeal against this decision. In the meantime—and pending any final determination—Shell remain bound by the earlier court ruling.

In this post, we highlight key aspects of the Hague District Court’s decision and Shell’s recent decision to appeal.

The Hague District Court’s Decision

The case against Shell, the top holding company of the Shell group, was brought by several NGOs, led by Milieudefensie, and around 17,000 individual claimants. Shell establishes the general policy of the group and reports on the greenhouse gas emissions of the various Shell companies.

The claimants alleged that Shell has an obligation, derived from the unwritten standard of care pursuant to Book 6, Section 162 Dutch Civil Code, to contribute to the prevention of dangerous climate change through the corporate policy it determines for the Shell group.

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Surging M&A Megadeals Top Records In Q2

Darragh Byrne, Marc Petitier, and Guy Potel are partners at White & Case LLP. This post is based on their White & Case memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Are M&A Contract Clauses Value Relevant to Target and Bidder Shareholders? by John C. Coates, Darius Palia, and Ge Wu (discussed on the Forum here); and The New Look of Deal Protection by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here).

The second quarter of 2021 saw the announcement of megadeals (deals worth US$5 billion or more) totaling US$734.4 billion in value—more than in any other quarter on Mergermarket record (since 2006). Megadeal volume hit 45, the third-highest number in any quarter on record.

Activity at the top end was dominated by the US, with 25 megadeal transactions worth US$358.6 billion in Q2 targeting US-based companies. The largest of these was Discovery Inc.’s acquisition of Warner Media for US$96.2 billion, a ride on the bandwagon where traditional media players like Discovery and Warner seek to build scale—and a robust back catalog—to take on streaming mainstays like Netflix and Amazon Prime.

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A New Variation in SEC Insider Trading Enforcement

John F. Savarese and Wayne M. Carlin are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading Via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Earlier this week, the SEC filed a complaint in the Northern District of California alleging insider-trading charges that may signal a more aggressive approach to enforcement under the agency’s new leadership. In SEC v. Panuwat, the SEC charged a corporate executive who learned about an impending acquisition of his employer and then traded in the securities of an unrelated company in the same industry that he anticipated would materially increase in price when his employer’s acquisition was publicly announced.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that Mathew Panuwat was a business development executive at Medivation, Inc., a mid-cap oncology-focused biopharmaceutical company. In the course of his employment, Panuwat learned from Medivation’s CEO that the company expected to be acquired by a major pharmaceutical company within a few days, at a premium to the then-market price. Panuwat did not trade in Medivation securities. Rather, within minutes of hearing from the CEO, Panuwat purchased out-of-the-money call options in Incyte Corporation, another mid-cap oncology-focused biopharmaceutical company that he believed would increase in value when the Medivation acquisition was announced.

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The Difference Between Purpose and Sustainability (aka ESG)

Robert G. Eccles is Visiting Professor of Management Practice; Colin Mayer is the Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies; and Judith Stroehle is Senior Research Fellow at University of Oxford Saïd Business School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate purpose and sustainability (often referred to by the acronym of ESG for environmental, social, and governance) are now part of the mainstream lexicon in the corporate and investment communities. The two terms are often used interchangeably as synonyms. This is wrong. Purpose and sustainability are related but different ideas. Purpose comes first. Sustainability can either contribute to it or can detract from it.

As one of us (Mayer) has written, the purpose of a company “is to produce profitable solutions to problems of people and planet,” while at the same time “not profiting from producing problems for people or planet”—a failure in sustainability. Companies that are making investments in sustainability while failing to produce profitable solutions to people and planet are also failing in purpose. Companies that are profitable while degrading the environment and society are focused on profits, not purpose. Danone is an example of the former and ExxonMobil is an example of the latter.

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Weekly Roundup: August 13–19, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 13–19, 2021.

Court of Chancery Decision Provides Guidance for Drafting MAE Clauses


2021 Proxy Season Trends: Executive Compensation


Don’t Wait to Prepare for an Emergency Succession


DOJ Indicts Founder of Nikola for Allegedly Defrauding Retail SPAC Investors



Business Groups: Panics, Runs, Organ Banks and Zombie Firms



What Boards Need to Know Before, During, and After an Acquisition



Board Diversity Deliberations


Effective Disclosure Controls Concerning Cybersecurity Breaches and Risks


CEO Tenure and Firm Value



SEC Adopts Nasdaq Rules on Board Diversity



Building on Common Ground to Advance Sustainable Capitalism

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