Monthly Archives: July 2016

AML Monitoring: New York Regulator Gets Prescriptive

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Sean Joyce, Joseph Nocera, Jeff Lavine, Didier Lavion, and Armen Meyer.

The New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) issued its final rule on June 30, 2016 requiring either senior officers or the board of directors to certify the effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) transaction monitoring and filtering programs. [1] The rule (Part 504 of the NYDFS Superintendent’s Regulations) is a response to weaknesses in transaction monitoring and watch list filtering programs that the NYDFS identified during routine examinations and subsequent investigations over the past several years.

The final rule differs in several critical ways from an earlier version of the rule NYDFS proposed in December of last year. Most notably, the final rule gives financial institutions the option of having a senior officer or the board certify the efficacy of their transaction monitoring and filtering programs; whereas, the proposed rule only allowed senior compliance officers to do so. Also, in light of industry feedback provided during the comment period, the NYDFS softened the tenor of the certification itself by removing the provision stipulating potential “criminal penalties” for incorrect or falsified certification filings.

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Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance

The Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance were developed, and are posted on behalf of, a group of executives leading prominent public corporations and investors in the U.S. The Open Letter and key facts about the principles are also available here and here.

The following is a series of corporate governance principles for public companies, their boards of directors and their shareholders. These principles are intended to provide a basic framework for sound, long-term-oriented governance. But given the differences among our many public companies—including their size, their products and services, their history and their leadership—not every principle (or every part of every principle) will work for every company, and not every principle will be applied in the same fashion by all companies.

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Bail-in and Market Stabilization

Wolf-Georg Ringe is Professor of International Commercial Law at Copenhagen Business School and at the University of Oxford. This post is based on recent paper authored by Professor Ringe.

The concept of “bailing in” a distressed bank’s creditors to avoid a taxpayer-financed public rescue is commonly accepted as one of the most significant regulatory achievements in the post-crisis efforts to end the problem of “Too Big To Fail”. Yet behind the political slogan, surprising uncertainties remain as to the precise regulatory objective of bail-in, as well as its trigger and the requirements for applying bail-in powers. Further, broad scepticism is voiced as to decisiveness of regulators to make use of their bail-in powers. In short, serious doubts persist as to the credibility of the concept, in particular relating to the fear that regulators may shy away from taking bail-in action in the decisive moment of rescue operations. Regulatory frameworks are ambivalent about the precise trigger requirements and substantial conditions for applying it. At the bottom of this vagueness is a surprising uncertainty about the policy purpose of bail-in.

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Weekly Roundup: July 15–July 21, 2016


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 15–July 21, 2016.




Does Dodd-Frank Affect OTC Transaction Costs and Liquidity?













Pay-for-Performance Update for the S&P 1500: 2015 Pay Outcomes

Shui Yu is a senior executive compensation analyst at Willis Towers Watson. This post is based on a Willis Towers Watson publication by Ms. Yu, Chris Kozlowski, and Steve Kline, originally published on Willis Towers Watson’s Executive Pay Matters blog and reprinted here with permission. © Willis Towers Watson 2016. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes: Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Financial and stock performance throughout the S&P 1500 deteriorated in 2015 as summarized in Figure 1. (For a more detailed analysis, see Year-end 2015 pay-for-performance update for the S&P 1500: Incremental improvement for 2016?Executive Pay Matters, April 21, 2016.) Our review of proxy statement disclosures that were filed this spring reveals the impact those results had on CEO pay, namely, for the bonus payouts and “compensation actually paid” under long-term incentive plans.

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Berkshire’s Blemishes: Lessons for Buffett’s Successors, Peers, and Policy

Lawrence A. Cunningham is the Henry St. George Tucker III Research Professor of Law at George Washington University. This post is based on a recent paper by Professor Cunningham.

While people routinely laud the value of Warren Buffett’s unique governance of Berkshire Hathaway, I have tallied the costs, highlighting lessons for Buffett’s successors, Berkshire’s peers, and public policy.

The most visible—and measurable—costs of the Berkshire model appear in capital allocation, principally acquisitions and investments. Buffett relies on himself in making these decisions, without board or executive input or oversight. While most such decisions have succeeded, many spectacularly so, some bloopers have appeared. The costs of error from such self-reliance could readily be mitigated by broader distribution of decision-making power.

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Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism

Rui Albuquerque is Associate Professor of Finance at Boston College Carroll School of Management. This post is based on a recent paper authored by Professor Albuquerque; Zicheng Lei, Lecturer in Finance and Accounting at the University of Surrey; Jörg Rocholl, President and Professor at the European School of Management and Technology; and Chendi Zhang, Associate Professor of Finance at Warwick Business School. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending and Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson (discussed on the Forum here and here).

There is increasing evidence that state public pension funds preferentially direct their investments towards local corporations, creating a bias which cannot be justified by subsequent returns. In our paper, Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism, we investigate the political activism of firms and how it is influenced by the presence of state public pension fund ownership. The paper shows that state-level political connections appear to be an important mechanism of political activism by corporations with state public pension fund ownership.

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Yet Another Congressional Proposed Corporate Reform: Proxy Advisory Firms in the Crosshairs

Ed Batts is partner and co-head of the M&A and Private Equity groups at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on an Orrick publication.

Over the past six months, U.S. legislators have engaged in an unusual burst of energy to introduce three separate bills regulating various areas affecting U.S. public company corporate governance:

  • The Cybersecurity Disclosure Act of 2015 would require disclosure of whether public company boards contained a cyber-security “expert” or, if not, why not. The bill, introduced by Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Susan Collins (R-ME), appears stranded in the Senate’s Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee.
  • The Brokaw Act would shorten the trigger grace period for filing a Schedule 13D after acquiring 5% or more of an issuer’s stock from ten to two days. It also would require disclosure of any party who “coordinated” with the filer, targeting activist “wolf packs.” This bill, sponsored by Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR), is sitting with the same Senate committee and may become subject to political season vagaries, particularly as supporters including Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. However, ironically, it may find bipartisan support as the current ten day Schedule 13D filing period is viewed as archaic by many corporate issuers. At the very least, this proposed legislation has worried activist investor firms enough to band together in an unprecedented lobbying effort.
  • Last—but certainly not least—Congressmen Sean Duffy (R-WI) and John Carney (D-DE) introduced in the House Financial Services Committee the Proxy Advisory Reform Act of 2016, which appears to have the most impetus for movement through the labyrinth of legislative crafting.

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The Delaware Courts’ Increasingly Laissez Faire Approach To Directorial Oversight

Miles D. Schreiner is an attorney at Monteverde & Associates PC. This post is largely based on a recent memo by Mr. Schreiner. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In a wave of recent cases, judges in Delaware, the state that has pioneered the nation’s corporate laws but holds less than one-third of one percent of the U.S. population, have issued opinions that dramatically curtail the rights of millions of shareholders across the country. For decades, legal scholars have opined that Delaware’s corporate-friendly laws attract droves of corporations with no actual ties to the state to incorporate there, to the detriment of investors. Several recent opinions regarding the effect of so-called shareholder “ratification” further solidify their argument that shareholders’ rights have hit rock-bottom under the stewardship of the Delaware courts, and that the time has come for legislative intervention, including federal regulation of directors’ fiduciary obligations.

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The Management of Political Risk

Campbell R. Harvey is Professor of Finance at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. This post is largely based on a recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of International Business Studies, by Professor Harvey; Erasmo Giambona, the Michael Falcone Chair in Real Estate at the Whitman School of Management at Syracuse University; and John R. Graham, Professor of Finance at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. The complete article, including appendix, figures, and tables, is available here.

We explore a long standing prediction in the international business literature that managers’ subjective perceptions of political risk—not just the level of risk—are important for how firms manage political risk. The importance attributed to political risk by corporate executives has increased over the last 15 years and our results show that political risk is now considered more important than commodity (input) risk. Our analysis suggests that nearly 50% of firms avoid (not simply reduce) foreign direct investment because of political risk. Using a unique survey‐based psychometric evaluation of manager risk aversion, we show that firms with risk averse executives are more likely to avoid investment in politically risky countries—a key implication of behavioral models. This relation is economically stronger when agency problems are more likely to be severe: for example, when executives are less aligned with shareholder value maximization, and when executives are younger (and therefore might put their personal career’ concerns in front of shareholders’ interests). While numerous studies have shown that political risk affects foreign direct investment using objective measures of such risk (electoral uncertainty, conflicts, etc.), our study documents that executives’ subjective perceptions of political risk are also important for political risk management.

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