Yearly Archives: 2017

Takeovers and (Excess) CEO Compensation

Isabel Feito-Ruiz is Assistant Professor in Corporate Finance at University of Leon (Spain); and Luc Renneboog is Professor of Corporate Finance at Tilburg University. This post is based on their recent paperRelated research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here).

An executive compensation contract, especially when it comprises equity-based remuneration, ought to align the managerial objectives with those of shareholders. In our paper Takeovers and (Excess) CEO Compensation, we study if a CEO’s equity-based compensation—especially when it seems excessive—affects the choice and expected value generation in takeovers announced by European firms.

According to the optimal contracting theory, equity-based compensation of top executives may be effective in shaping long-term corporate investment policies and encourage managers to make decisions that do not hurt the return required by shareholders. Giving shareholder-oriented incentives to top management leads to better takeover decisions (this is at least what the market seems to believe). Managers pay lower premiums for target firms in takeovers and undertake more risky investments when they receive high levels of equity-compensation. Therefore, stock option-based compensation motivate managers to take on projects that maximize shareholders’ value (even in the absence of active ownership).

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: October 27–November 2, 2017


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 27–November 2, 2017.


Coordinating Compliance Incentives



Not All TSR Incentive Plans are Created Equal


A Mechanism for LIBOR



SEC Enforcement Against Initial Coin Offering



Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance


Creatures of Contract: A Half-Truth About LLCs


Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws





An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees: Evidence of Management Bias and the Effect of Legal Standards


The Art of Drafting Milestones for an Earn-Out



The Continuing Support for Dual-Class Stock by Companies and Investors

David J. Berger, Katharine Martin and Amy Simmerman are partners at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on a WSGR publication by Ms. Martin and Ms. Simmerman. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel (discussed on the Forum here).

The reported demise of dual-class stock appears to be, to paraphrase Mark Twain, “greatly exaggerated.” The end of dual-class stock was predicted following the decisions this summer by the major indices, including FTSE Russell (who operates the Russell 3000 index) and S&P Dow Jones (who manages the Dow Jones 500 index) to ban most companies that went public with multi-class stock. The decisions by the indices came at the behest of numerous institutional investors, especially passive funds, who argued that only companies with a single class of stock should be included in the most prominent indexes. The decisions by the major indexes led many market observers to conclude that companies going public would no longer adopt multi-class stock since it created the risk that these companies would be excluded from the indexes.

READ MORE »

The “Do’s” and “Dont’s” for Say on Pay

Carol Bowie is Senior Advisor at Teneo Governance. This post is based on a Teneo publication by Ms. Bowie.

Advisory votes on compensation are more than half a decade old in the U.S., and the trends are clear:

  • The vast majority of companies provide for annual votes.
  • “Pay for performance” assessments underlie most investor voting.
  • Each year the overall support level averages more than 90 percent, while about only about 2 percent of companies fail to receive majority support for their pay programs.
  • Another 5 to 10 percent pass with what is deemed mediocre backing – below 70 or 80 percent support per proxy advisor policies (ISS and Glass Lewis, respectively) and in the eyes of many investors. This result triggers expectation that the compensation committee will demonstrate a substantive level of responsiveness to the relatively low vote.
  • Increasingly important, low support for say on pay can be a red flag to activist investors who closely monitor shareholder dissatisfaction at potential targets.

READ MORE »

The Art of Drafting Milestones for an Earn-Out

Barbara Borden and Jamie Leigh are partners and Mutya Harsch is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley publication by Ms. Borden, Ms. Leigh, Ms. Harsch, Rama Padmanabhan, Al Browne and Steve Tonsfeldt, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Former stockholders of SARcode Bioscience were recently denied a claim that they were entitled to be paid $425 million in milestone payments under a merger agreement. The decision provides an anecdotal lesson in drafting milestones and suggests that the more technically prescribed milestones may be more difficult to meet, even though the development of the drug is ultimately successful.

In Fortis Advisors v. Shire, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted Shire’s motion to dismiss a complaint filed by the stockholder representative of the former stockholders of SARcode Bioscience seeking the payment of two milestones totaling $425 million. The first milestone related to the outcome of a Phase 2 clinical trial of the drug in development to treat dry eye disease. It required the occurrence of an “achievement date,” which the merger agreement defined as the receipt of audited final tables, figures and listings from an OPUS-2 Study demonstrating that both components of the co-primary efficacy endpoints of the study, as specified in an attached OPUS-2 Study Protocol, was achieved. The definition also required that a specified safety standard (not relevant to the dispute) was also achieved. At the time of the acquisition, the Phase 2 clinical trial was ongoing. The second milestone was payable upon receipt of regulatory approval for the drug, contingent on the occurrence of the achievement date milestone.

READ MORE »

An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees: Evidence of Management Bias and the Effect of Legal Standards

C.N.V. Krishnan is Professor of Banking and Finance at Case Western Reserve University Weatherhead School of Management; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at University of California Berkeley School of Law; and Randall S. Thomas is John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business at Vanderbilt Law School. This post is based on their recent paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Special litigation committees (SLCs) are controversial. They are supposed to dispassionately consider the merits of derivative litigation brought by shareholders against the company and some of its officers/directors, but they are composed of board members from the same company/board that is being sued. As a result, some shareholders and academics complain that these SLCs always seek to dismiss the shareholders’ cases and operate solely to protect directors from liability.

In An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees: Evidence of Management Bias and the Effect of Legal Standards, we empirically test the effectiveness and use of SLCs, the recommendations that they make in their reports, and how legal rules on the judicial review of those report affect case outcomes. We do so using a hand collected final sample of 384 publicly available SLC events spanning the 26-year period Jan 1, 1990 through Dec 31, 2015. In our analysis we find consistent evidence of pro-management SLC bias. We also find that the law and judicial oversight matters. In cases litigated in Delaware, or in courts applying Delaware law to matters involving Delaware companies, the courts tend to exercise their own business judgment and be less deferential to SLCs, while cases in certain states with more deferential legal standards governing court scrutiny of SLCs are more likely to favor management interests.

READ MORE »

House Bill 4015 and the Proposed Regulation of Proxy Advisors

Dimitri Zagoroff is a Senior Proxy Research Analyst at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on a Glass Lewis publication by Mr. Zagoroff.

Regulation of proxy advisors is back on the U.S. legislative agenda. If enacted, the proposed rules could create delays to the delivery and threats to the independence of proxy research, with investors footing the bill.

Introduced October 11, House Bill 4015 is mostly a resubmission of last year’s HR 5311—mostly. The proposed compliance regime is unchanged. Proxy advisors would be required to register with the SEC, meet extensive disclosure requirements relating to methodologies and conflicts of interest, and hire an ombudsperson to handle complaints. However, HR 4015 includes additional detail on how the bill’s thorniest provision would work in practice: allowing companies to vet proxy advisor’s recommendations, including access to analysts, before they are released to investors. The new bill would give companies three days to review draft analysis and submit a response to the proxy advisor’s ombudsperson; if they are “unable to resolve such complaints prior to voting” (whether to the ombudsperson’s satisfaction or the company’s remains unclear), the company would be given space to set out their case within the proxy report distributed to investors.

READ MORE »

EU Financial Market Benchmark Regulation and US Impact

Martin Liebi is a Director and Alexandra Balmer is a Consultant at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Liebi and Ms. Balmer.

The new EU Benchmarks Regulation (BMR) was published in June 2016 and most rules will apply as of 1 January 2018. The BMR introduces new compliance requirements for benchmark administrators, contributors, and users, with regard to interest rate, foreign exchange, security, commodity, and other benchmarks used in financial transactions. The BMR was enacted in response to public pressure resulting from the aftermath of the LIBOR scandals and follows the recommendations of the IOSCO and ESMA EBA Principles. Like many EU financial services regulations does also the BMR have an extraterritorial reach and apply to US based benchmark providers and contributors. This post will give an overview about how US based financial market participants will be affected by the BMR.

READ MORE »

Insights from PwC’s 2017 Annual Corporate Directors Survey

Paula Loop is Leader of the Governance Insights Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a publication from the PwC Governance Insights Center.

Against the backdrop of a new administration in Washington and growing social divisiveness, US public company directors are faced with great expectations from investors and the public. Perhaps now more than ever, public companies are being asked to take the lead in addressing some of society’s most difficult problems. From seeking action on climate change to advancing diversity, stakeholder expectations are increasing and many companies are responding.

In part, this responsiveness is driven by changes in who owns public companies today. Institutional investors now own 70% of US public company stock, much of which is held in index funds. [1] Many of these passive investors believe that seeking improvements in corporate governance is one of the only levers they have to improve company performance. And these shareholders are exerting their influence with management teams and the board through their governance policies, direct engagement and proxy voting.

READ MORE »

Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws

Albert H. Choi is Professor and Albert C. BeVier Research Professor of Law at University of Virginia Law School; Geeyoung Min is Adjunct Assistant Professor and Postdoctoral Fellow in Corporate Law and Governance at Columbia Law School. This post is based on their recent paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power and Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, both by Lucian Bebchuk; and Frozen Charters by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Over the past decade or so, courts have been willing to apply the “contractarian” theory to the organizational documents of corporations: charters (certificates or articles of incorporation) and bylaws. The notion that the charters and bylaws can be thought of as “contracts”—between a corporation and its shareholders and among the shareholders—dates back to the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling and the idea that the corporate organization can be viewed as a “nexus of contracts.” What is new and controversial, however, is the fact that the courts have been willing to apply these ideas to cases where the directors unilaterally have amended bylaws without shareholders’ express ex post approval. With respect to corporate charters, state statutes require an express shareholder approval and do not allow either the directors or the shareholders to unilaterally modify the charter. For bylaws, however, while preserving the right of unilateral modification for the shareholders, corporate statutes allow directors to unilaterally amend the bylaws, either as a matter of default or when the shareholders grant such power through a provision in the charter. While the precise scope of this authority remains somewhat uncertain, recent cases have meaningfully expanded the directors’ freedom.

READ MORE »

Page 15 of 83
1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 83