Yearly Archives: 2017

Social Media and Proxy Contests

Andrew M. FreedmanSteve Wolosky, and Ron S. Berenblat are partners at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on an Olshan publication by Mr. Freedman, Mr. Wolosky, Mr. Berenblat, and Kenneth Mantel. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and Dancing with the Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here).

As shareholder activists fine-tune their communications strategies for the upcoming proxy season, we expect that many will view social media as an increasingly important means of getting their message out to shareholders. Although a number of prominent investors have used certain forms of social media for years (e.g., Carl Icahn’s use of Twitter), we have only recently seen investors begin to engage with multiple social media platforms as part of a comprehensive digital and social media strategy for their campaigns. Noted examples include Elliott Management’s successful campaign at Arconic and Pershing Square’s ongoing election contest at Automatic Data Processing.

This post lays out the important legal issues and other information that investors should consider when evaluating whether and how to use social media in their upcoming campaigns.

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New House Bills on Securities Offerings

Joseph A. HallSophia Hudson, and Michael Kaplan are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk publication by Mr. Hall, Ms. Hudson, Mr. Kaplan, Bruce K. DallasDerek Dostal, and Richard D. Truesdell, Jr..

Bills Would Expand Testing the Waters, Codify Confidential Submission of Draft Registration Statements and Modify Accredited Investor Definition

On November 1, the House passed two bills designed to encourage capital formation by extending JOBS Act testing-the-waters provisions to all companies, codifying the SEC’s earlier expansion of confidential submission of draft registration statements by a non-emerging growth company for its IPO and during the one-year period after going public, and modifying the definition of an accredited investor to make more individuals eligible to participate in private placements. The bills were passed on a bipartisan basis and echo proposals that were part of the Financial Choice Act passed by the House in June 2017 and the Treasury Department’s recent regulatory reform report on capital markets. We expect the bills would likely be passed and signed into law if they reach the Senate floor for a vote.

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Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers

Vasiliki Athanasakou is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the London School of Economics; Daniel Ferreira is Professor of Finance at the London School of Economics; and Lisa Goh is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Hang Seng Management College. This post is based on their recent paper.

In our paper, Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers, we look at changes in stock option granting behavior towards CEOs. We find that, on average, the number of stock option grants to CEOs changes over time, and that such changes can be predicted by CEO corporate investment decisions; CEOs of firms that have very high or very low levels of investment subsequently receive fewer stock options.

We focus on the number of stock options granted to CEOs. We know relatively little about how the number of options granted changes over time, and how this varies across firms, even though regulators and investors often focus their attention on the number of stock options granted. For example, under current NYSE listing requirements, companies need only to obtain shareholder approval for the total number of options to be granted, and not for the value of these options. Consistent with this focus, patterns in option pay, such as the rigidity of annual stock option grants, and the high correlation of CEO pay with stock market indices (Shue and Townsend 2017), suggest that boards also think of option compensation in terms of numbers of options granted. It is natural for boards to focus on the number of options granted, as this is the main item over which they can actually exercise control. Nevertheless, academic research mainly focuses on the dollar value of stock option grants. Our paper examines option-granting behavior using the number of options granted as the main outcome variable. Do boards grant the same number of options to CEOs each year, or do they revise their granting behavior? What factors drive changes in stock option grants?

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Weekly Roundup: November 3–9, 2017


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 3–9, 2017.

Takeovers and (Excess) CEO Compensation



New PCAOB Auditor Reporting Standard Analysis


The Impact of Executive Pay Decisions




Getting Along with BlackRock


Impediments to Books and Records Demands


Do Women CEOs Face Greater Shareholder Activism Compared to Male CEOs? A Role Congruity Perspective


Tax Reform and Executive Compensation




Program Hiring Post-Graduate Academic Fellows


Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends




Governance and Transparency at the Commission and in Our Markets

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent remarks at the PLI 49th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

My remarks will focus on governance and transparency. These issues are, of course, related. Among its many benefits, transparency facilitates effective governance. My first topic will be transparency with respect to the operations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”). Then I will turn to transparency in our securities markets—or said another way, how we can reduce opacity and, thereby, enhance our efforts to deter, mitigate, and eliminate fraud.

Commission Governance—The SEC’s Agenda

Rulemaking is a key function of the Commission. And, when we are setting the rules for the securities markets, there are many rules we, the SEC, must follow. The most well-known is the Administrative Procedure Act, or the APA. Another statute—a transparency-oriented one—is the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the RFA. The goal of the RFA is to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of businesses. That objective—in two words, regulatory proportionality—rings true with me. Under the RFA, federal agencies must “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review.” The agenda then distinguishes between rulemakings to be accomplished in the near-term—one-year—and the long-term—more than a year.

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Voting Rights and Index Inclusion

This post is based on a publication from BlackRock, Inc. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel (discussed on the Forum here).

BlackRock is a strong advocate for equal voting rights for all shareholders. However, we disagree with index providers’ recent decisions to exclude certain companies from broad market indices due to governance concerns. Those decisions could limit our index-based clients’ access to the investable universe of public companies and deprive them of opportunities for returns.

Policymakers, not index providers, should set equity investing and corporate governance standards. BlackRock supports the creation of regulatory regimes that increase financial market transparency, protect investors, and facilitate responsible growth of capital markets.

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Analysis of ISS Policy Application Survey

Lyuba Goltser is a partner and Reid Powell is an associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. This post is based on a Weil publication by Ms. Goltser and Mr. Powell.

[On October 19, 2017], ISS released the results of its Policy Application Survey. This follows the release of its Governance Principles Survey in late September. The Governance Principles Survey is high-level and covers “one share, one vote,” board gender diversity, cross-market company share issuances and repurchases, the use of virtual meetings, and pay ratio disclosures. The more in-depth Policy Application Survey drills down into key issues by market and region as well as by topic, such as responsible investment, takeover defenses, and compensation. The Policy Application Survey results provide views of investors and non-investors and the results of these surveys often are a precursor of changes to ISS’ voting policies. [1]

ISS is expected to publish draft 2018 policy updates and open a comment period in late October and release its final policy updates in mid-November. Key takeaways from the Governance Principles Survey are available here. Takeaways of the Policy Application Survey applicable to U.S. public companies are as follows:

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Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends

Janis Berzins is Associate Professor of Finance; Øyvind Bøhren is Professor of Finance and Founding director of the Centre for Corporate Governance Research, and Bogdan Stacescu is Associate Professor of Finance at BI Norwegian Business School. This post is based on their recent article.

This article, which is forthcoming in the Review of Finance, studies empirically how the controlling shareholder uses the firm’s dividend policy to manage the relationship with other shareholders. There are two alternative views. The opportunistic hypothesis recognizes that the controlling shareholder may feel tempted to capture private benefits at the other shareholders’ expense. For instance, the controlling shareholder may make the firm trade at unfair prices with another firm he owns, hire family members at excessive salaries, and use the firm’s resources to build personal prestige. Such actions can reduce the firm’s ability to pay dividends.

The competing view is the conflict-reducing hypothesis, where the controlling shareholder uses dividends to mitigate conflicts and build reputation for being fair. This strategy may increase the access to new equity and reduce the cost of capital. Hence, dividends will be lower the more serious the potential shareholder conflict under the opportunistic hypothesis, but not under the conflict-reducing hypothesis. Our paper investigates which of these two very different governance strategies firms use in practice.

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Program Hiring Post-Graduate Academic Fellows

The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance is pleased to announce the availability of positions of Post-Graduate Academic Fellows in the areas of corporate governance and law and finance. Qualified candidates who are interested in working with the Program as Post-Graduate Academic Fellows may apply at any time and the start date is flexible.

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The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty

Gregory H. Shill is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. This post is based on an article recently published in the UCLA Law Review and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Servants of Two Masters? The Feigned Hysteria Over Activist-Paid Directors, by Yaron Nili (discussed on the Forum here).

Traditionally, activist hedge funds identify a company ripe for improvement, acquire a toehold position in the company’s stock, and then launch a campaign to convince shareholders to dump incumbent directors in favor of candidates nominated by the fund. In recent years, some funds have begun experimenting with a variation on this practice by offering incentive pay in the form of bonuses to directors they nominate, over and above the compensation all directors receive from the company for their service on the board. These bonuses, known as “golden leashes,” have further polarized the debate over shareholder activism and short-termism. I examine the phenomenon more critically in a recent article, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, recently published in the UCLA Law Review.

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