Yearly Archives: 2018

Review of Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018

Jim Rossman is head of Shareholder Advisory, Chris Couvelier is Director, and Kashyap Shah is an Analyst at Lazard. This post is based on a Lazard publication by Mr. Rossman, Mr. Couvelier, and Mr. Shah, Mary Ann Deignan, Dennis Berman, and Rich Thomas. 

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here);  Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Key Observations on the Activist Environment in 1H 2018

1. New campaigns initiated and capital deployed by activists reached record levels in 1H 2018

  • 1Q 2018 and 2Q 2018 were the two most active quarters ever, resulting in a record 145 new campaigns launched against 136 companies in 1H 2018
    • Elliott’s 17 new campaigns in 1H 2018—nearly three times the level of the next most prolific activist—accounted for ~12% of all activity
  • An all-time high ~$40.1bn of capital was deployed by activists in new campaigns in 1H 2018, representing a ~6% increase over the same period last year
  • The broadening use of activism as a tactic continued, with 104 investors (including 20 “first timers”) launching new campaigns in 1H 2018

READ MORE »

Lorenzo v. SEC: Will the Supreme Court Further Curtail Rule 10b-5?

Roger A. Cooper and Matthew C. Solomon are partners and Leslie N. Silverman is senior counsel at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Cooper, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Silverman.

Last month, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Lorenzo v. SEC, a case where Francis Lorenzo, a registered representative of a broker-dealer, allegedly emailed false and misleading statements to investors that were originally drafted by his boss. After administrative and Commission findings of liability, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit determined that, while Lorenzo was not the “maker” of the statements, he did use them to deceive investors, and thereby violated the so-called scheme liability provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. As described in the petitioner’s motion seeking certiorari, the case presents the question whether, under the Court’s 2011 Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders decision, the scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find liability in connection with false or misleading statements by persons who are not themselves the maker of those statements and, thus, not liable under the false-and-misleading statements provision of Rule 10b-5(b). The answer to this question could have implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or “Commission”) Enforcement Division as well as potentially significant implications for private securities litigants who principally rely on Section 10(b) to bring private causes of action sounding in fraud.

READ MORE »

The Limits of “The Corwin Effect”

Nicholas D. Mozal is an associate at Ross Aronstam & Moritz LLP. This post is based on a Ross Aronstam & Moritz memorandum by Mr. Mozal. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In Morrison v. Berry, [1] the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of M&A litigation under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC. [2] As in Appel v. Berkman, [3] the Supreme Court held that Corwin did not apply because of the target’s failure to disclose all material facts to stockholders. The decision reiterates that Delaware courts will scrutinize disclosures to determine whether Corwin should apply, and Morrison guides boards and their counsel about how to avoid the pitfall of partial disclosures.

Background Facts

The Fresh Market (the “Company”) received an unsolicited offer from Apollo Global Management LLC on October 1, 2015. Apollo stated it had discussed whether Ray Berry, the Company’s founder, board member, and owner of nearly 10% of its shares, would agree to roll his equity in a deal, thus rendering him potentially “interested” in a transaction with Apollo. The board then dutifully created a special committee, hired a banker, and ran a five-month process. At the end of that process the special committee and board recommended a deal with Apollo. The Company released the required Schedule 14D-9, which incorporated Apollo’s Schedule TO. Nearly eighty percent of the Company’s shares tendered into the deal.

READ MORE »

Effects of Executive Pay Levels on Say on Pay

Austin Vanbastelaer and Charles Gray are consultants at Semler Brossy Consulting Group, LLC. This post is based on a Semler Brossy memorandum by Mr. Vanbastelaer, Mr. Gray, Todd Sirras, Kayla Dahlerbruch, and Justin BeckRelated research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

CEO pay gets most of the attention for the Say on Pay vote. It’s less clear how shareholders interpret and evaluate pay levels for the other named executive officers excluding the CEO (“NEOs”) and to what degree these values impact Say on Pay outcomes. We looked at S&P 500 Say on Pay results from the past three years to understand how NEO compensation influences Say on Pay voting and made four key observations:

READ MORE »

Proposed Amendments to Whistleblower Rules

Mark D. Cahn is partner and Joseph Toner is a senior associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. This post is based on a WilmerHale memorandum by Mr. Cahn and Mr. Toner.

In 2011, pursuant to authority granted under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) adopted rules implementing the whistleblower provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Whistleblower Program). The Whistleblower Program allows the Commission to provide monetary rewards to whistleblowers who provide the Commission with information that leads to successful enforcement actions. Over the past seven years, the Commission has trumpeted the successes of its Whistleblower Program—namely, that information provided by whistleblowers has led to almost $1.5 billion in disgorgement and penalties and over $275 million has been paid out in whistleblower “awards.”

At the same time, the Whistleblower Program has come under increasing scrutiny. After years of litigation, the anti-retaliation provisions of the Whistleblower Program were recently struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held unanimously in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers that the Commission had exceeded its authority by extending the protections to whistleblowers who only reported violations internally. [1] The size of some of the most recent awards has also attracted considerable attention. Indeed, while the Commission has ordered almost 50 awards, over 40% of that money was awarded in three very sizeable awards.

READ MORE »

Gender Diversity and Board Quotas

David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz and Ms. McIntosh that originally appeared in the New York Law Journal.

California has made headlines this summer with legislative action toward instituting gender quotas for boards of directors of public companies headquartered in the state. The legislation has passed the state senate; to be enacted, it must be passed by the California state assembly and signed by the governor. In 2013, California became the first state to pass a precatory resolution promoting gender diversity on public company boards, and five other states have since followed suit. The current legislative effort has come under criticism for a variety of reasons, and, while it is not certain to become law, it could be a harbinger of a broader push for public company board gender quotas in the United States. It is worth considering whether quotas in this area would be beneficial or harmful to the larger goals of gender parity and board diversity.

READ MORE »

IPO Governance Survey 2018

Michael Kaplan, Joseph A. Hall, and Sophia Hudson are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Mr. Kaplan, Mr. Hall, Mr. Hudson, Alan Denenberg, Richard Truesdell, and Byron Rooney.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here) by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel and Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, by Lucian Bebchuk.

An initial public offering is a key inflection point for a company, not least because it often triggers the opportunity to review and replace the company’s corporate governance structure. In place of complex contractual shareholder arrangements that are subject only to the constraints of corporate law, upon an IPO, a company adopts a more simplified governance structure that is subject to SEC and stock exchange listing standards. As the burden of obtaining shareholder approval to amend governance arrangements in the future is much higher for a public company, companies planning for an IPO often seek to establish a corporate governance structure which is as flexible as possible.

In the last few years, we have witnessed a sea-change in corporate governance among the largest U.S. public companies, e.g., those in the S&P 500, due largely to pressure imposed through shareholder proposals and proxy voting guidelines. Through increased pressure by shareholder activists and proxy advisory firms, these companies have been forced to abandon governance structures that are perceived to entrench control among a small group of holders and/or management, or which create barriers to more direct shareholder engagement. In recent years some of these same players have also put pressure on IPO companies and enacted policies meant to bring the governance of IPO companies in line with that of more mature public companies.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: July 20-26, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of July 20-26, 2018.

Awaiting Supreme Court Clarification on Fraudulent Scheme Claims





Successful CFIUS Monitorships


Brexit Update: Keeping Track of the Moving Pieces




Corporate Disobedience


The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem


Development in Insider Trading Liability


Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks


Enhancing Director Performance and Impact


SEC Enforcement for Social Media Violation



Analysis and Recommendations on Shareholder Proposal Decision-Making under the SEC No-Action Process

Sanford Lewis is Director at the Shareholder Rights Group. This post is based on a Shareholder Rights Group memorandum by Mr. Lewis, with editorial assistance from Andrew Toritto.

The shareholder proposal process, administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Rule 14a-8, is a pillar of modern corporate governance.

The Shareholder Rights Group is a coalition of investors protecting shareholders’ rights to engage with public companies through shareholder proposals. Our analysis submitted to the SEC on July 2, 2018 concludes that certain changes in SEC practices during the 2018 proxy season raised serious threats to this well-established right. We include recommendations for corrective SEC guidance.

READ MORE »

2018 Proxy Season Review

Marc Treviño is a partner and June Hu is an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Mr. Treviño and Ms. Hu.

The complete publication (available here) summarizes significant developments relating to the 2018 U.S. annual meeting proxy season, including:

Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals

  • Environmental/social/political proposals gain traction. Although shareholders submitted a consistent level of environmental/social/political (“ESP”) proposals as a percentage of all shareholder proposals submitted, there was a significant increase in the percentage withdrawn (for the first time surpassing the percentage going to a vote). This development appears primarily to reflect growing engagement by companies on a number of these issues, particularly anti-discrimination policies. Moreover, those going to a vote recorded a higher average percentage of votes cast in favor (more than 25% for the first time) and, notwithstanding the decline in the number of ESP proposals voted on, there was a marked increase in the number that passed (although still a low number). As in prior years, the vast majority of ESP proposals failed.

READ MORE »

Page 36 of 86
1 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 86