Yearly Archives: 2018

Investment Bank Liability for M&A Services

Arthur H. Rosenbloom is Managing Director of Consilium ADR LLC, and Gilbert E. Matthews is Senior Managing Director and Chairman of the Board of Sutter Securities, Inc. This post is based on their recent paper and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Introduction

To err is human but there is often no divine or other forgiveness for investment banks in Delaware litigation when their misconduct rises to the level of aiding and abetting the board’s breach of fiduciary duty to its shareholders. In this article, we consider recent Delaware case law on investment banker liability that has resulted in judgments against bankers and has caused them to make contributions to shareholders when some of these matters settle even when they deny liability.

Delaware has ruled that investment banks are not in privity with the shareholders, their obligations being limited solely to those who engage them. In the 1990 Shoe-Town decision, the Court of Chancery ruled that the investment bank hired by management “owed no fiduciary duty to the shareholders.” [1] The Court distinguished this case from the Wells decision in New York (which had ruled that the investment banks liable to shareholders) “because the investment advisor in that case was hired by a special committee charged solely with determining the fairness of the transaction for the shareholders.” [2] In 1996, the Delaware Superior Court ruled similarly in Stuchen v. Duty Free Int’l, Inc. [1996 WL 33167249 (Del. Super. Apr. 22, 1996) at *12.]

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The Limits of Mutual Fund Obligation to Shareholders

Robert Skinner and Amy Roy are partners at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on their Ropes & Gray memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

In a victory for the mutual fund industry, a federal district court in New York rejected the attempt of fund shareholders to assert a breach of contract claim against the fund for a purported violation of an investment policy contained in part of the fund’s prospectus. In doing so, Judge George B. Daniels of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Edwards v. Sequoia Fund, Inc. [1] declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Northstar Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Investments, [2] holding that the terms of the concentration policy contained in Sequoia Fund, Inc.’s Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) cannot form the basis of a contractual obligation to the Fund’s shareholders. Judge Daniels further ruled that even if shareholders could assert a breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of the Fund’s concentration policy. The court held that a fund does not act contrary to SEC guidance by concentrating in a particular industry where the investments exceed the 25% concentration threshold merely as the result of a passive increase in the share value of fund holdings, as opposed to the acquisition of additional shares.

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Decoding Quant ESG

Mike Chen is Portfolio Manager, George Mussalli is Chief Investment Officer and Head of Equity Research, and Yosef Zweibach is Head of Business Strategy & Investor Relations at PanAgora Asset Management, Inc. This post is based on a PanAgora memorandum by Mr. Chen, Mr. Mussalli, and Mr. Zweibach. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here) and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Interest in ESG investing has exploded in recent years. However, despite increased demand for this type of strategy, asset owners still have many questions regarding ESG and best practices for constructing optimal investment portfolios. These questions include: What exactly is ESG investing? Do I sacrifice alpha if I invest in ESG portfolios? How does quant ESG work and what are the advantages to a quant approach? In this post, PanAgora seeks to answer many of these commonly asked questions. Our main conclusions are as follows:

  • Originally viewed by the investment industry as incompatible with alpha generation, evidence shows that ESG considerations can actually enhance both a portfolio’s economic performance and its ESG profile.
  • ESG considerations capture many of the return and risk drivers not captured through traditional financial metrics, and are relevant for the valuation of today’s corporations.
  • The quantitative investment approach is well-suited to take advantage of the large and growing collection of datasets. Investors would be well served to utilize quantitative methods to evaluate companies’ ESG footprints, as well as for portfolio construction and output measurement.
  • All asset owners should consider ESG portfolios in their investment allocation, whether via integration into their larger portfolio or via the impact approach.

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Glass Lewis’ Shareholder Initiative Guidelines

Courteney Keatinge is Director of Environmental, Social & Governance Research at Glass, Lewis & Co. This post is based on a Glass Lewis memorandum by Ms. Keatinge.

Shareholders are playing an increasingly important role at many companies by engaging in meetings and discussions with the board and management. When this engagement is unsuccessful, shareholders may submit their own proposals at the companies’ annual meetings. While shareholder resolutions are relatively common in some countries like the United States, Japan and Canada, in other markets shareholder proposals are rare. Additionally, securities regulations in nearly all countries define and limit the nature and type of allowable shareholder proposals including submission ownership thresholds. For example, in the United States, shareholders need only own 1% or $2,000 of a company’s shares to submit a proposal for inclusion on a company’s ballot. However, American issuers are able to exclude shareholder proposals for many defined reasons, such as when the proposal relates to a company’s ordinary business operations. In other countries such as Japan, however, shareholder proposals are not bound by such content restrictions. Additionally, whereas in the U.S. and Canada the vast majority of shareholder proposals are precatory (i.e. requesting an action), such proposals are binding in most other countries. Binding votes in the U.S. are most often presented in the form of a bylaw amendment, thereby incorporating the proponent’s “ask” in the company’s governing documents.

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Emerging Practice in Long-Term Plans

Brian Tomlinson is Research Director of the Strategic Investor Initiative at CECP. This post is based on a CECP memorandum by Mr. Tomlinson. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here) and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive Summary

The information asymmetry between corporations and investors is particularly severe regarding long-term strategic plans: existing market infrastructure for disclosure is very short-term focused and underserves sources of long-term value creation. The CEO-delivered long-term plan gives corporations an opportunity to reorient disclosures to the long-term. The Strategic Investor Initiative provides comprehensive guidance to CEOs and their Investor Relations teams on the key components of a long-term plan—set out in our Investor Letter to CEOs.

Through feedback from institutional investors we have identified content elements essential to an effective investor-facing CEO-delivered long-term plan:

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Weekly Roundup: November 2-8, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of November 1–8, 2018.



Clarifying MFW’s ab initio Condition




The DOJ’s New Corporate Monitor Policy


Do Insiders Time Management Buyouts and Freezeouts to Buy Undervalued Targets?



Cyber-Fraud Controls and the SEC




The Duty of Activist Investors in Negotiating Mergers



Are Proxy Advisors Really a Problem?


The Future of the Corporation



Mandating Women on Boards: Evidence from the United States

Mandating Women on Boards: Evidence from the United States

Sunwoo Hwang is a PhD candidate at the University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School; Anil Shivdasani is the Wells Fargo Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School; and Elena Simintzi is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School. This post is based on their recent paper.

On September 30, 2018, California enacted Senate Bill 826 mandating that all publicly-traded companies headquartered in the state to have at least one female director by the end of 2019. The law further requires that by year-end 2021, all firms have at least one female director if the board has four members or fewer, two female directors if the board has five members, and three female directors if the board has six members or more. With the passage of this law, California has become the first state in the United States to mandate female directors on boards of publicly held firms. Not surprisingly, the law has generated substantial debate with proponents praising efforts towards balanced gender representation. Opponents have raised concerns over appointments of less qualified female board members and discrimination against male candidates.

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Synutra—A Practical Application of MFW or a Free Look for Controlling Stockholders?

William Lawlor is partner and Michael Darby is an associate at Dechert LLP. This post is based on their Dechert memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here); Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts by Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan; and The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach by Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian (discussed on the Forum here).

In the recent decision of Flood v. Synutra International, Inc., [1] a divided Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of a challenge to a controlling stockholder’s take-private transaction. The Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Strine held, among other things, [2] that the deferential business judgment review applied to the merger because the controlling stockholder had timely satisfied the dual requirements of Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. [3] (“MFW”) in proposing those requirements in the initial stages of the process but after submitting its initial proposal letter.

The plaintiff challenged the application of MFW on the grounds that the controlling stockholder had failed to satisfy MFW’s “ab initio” requirement that the merger be conditioned on MFW’s dual requirements upfront. The controlling stockholder had submitted an initial written proposal to the target board and attached the proposal as an exhibit to its Schedule 13D filing. That initial proposal did not condition the merger on MFW’s dual requirements, but a follow-up proposal two weeks later did. Nevertheless, in rejecting the plaintiff’s argument for the “brightest of lines”—the initial offer—the Court held that the follow-up proposal was sufficient because the MFW conditions were in place before any “economic horse trading” had begun.

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The Future of the Corporation

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum authored by Mr. Lipton.

A project of the British Academy—“The Future of the Corporation” reached a major milestone on November 1, 2018 with the public discussion of a framework and supporting papers. The project is led by Oxford Prof. Colin Mayer.

In his framework, Prof. Mayer puts forth a radical reinterpretation of the nature of the corporation that focuses on the corporate purpose, its alignment with social purpose, the trustworthiness of companies and the role of corporate culture in promoting purpose and trust. This view of the corporation rejects shareholder primacy—that the sole social purpose of the business corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.

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Are Proxy Advisors Really a Problem?

Frank M. Placenti is partner at Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLC. This post is based on a recent paper by Mr. Placenti that was commissioned by the American Council for Capital Formation.

Proxy advisory firms have been a feature of the corporate landscape for over 30 years. Throughout that time, their influence has increased, as has the controversy surrounding their role.

In Blackrock’s July 2018 report on the Investment Stewardship Ecosystem, [1] the country’s largest asset manager noted that, while it expends significant resources [2] evaluating both management and shareholder proposals, many other investor managers instead rely “heavily” on the recommendations of proxy advisors to determine their votes, and that proxy advisors can have “significant influence over the outcome of both management and shareholder proposals.”

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