Monthly Archives: July 2019

Uber vs. Lyft: Who’s at the Wheel?

Ric Marshall is Executive Director of ESG Research at MSCI Inc. This post is based on his MSCI memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here), and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel, and the keynote presentation on The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures.

Two companies, one highly disruptive business model, multiple big challenges looming. Few IPOs in recent memory have attracted more attention—or disappointed more decisively, initially—than the IPOs of ride-sharing groups Uber and Lyft. At the end of June 7, 2019, two months following its IPO, Lyft’s share price traded at 17.7% below its IPO price, while Uber’s ended that same day 1.9% lower. Could ESG considerations have played into investors’ thinking?

Both companies demonstrate striking similarities. Not only do they compete directly with each other, both are investing in autonomous vehicles. Both have large off-the-books workforces as their drivers are classified as independent contractors rather than employees. And both must protect their passengers—both physically and digitally given the amount of personal data they possess. All of these are major issues that have the potential to threaten their business models in the face of regulatory change or consumer backlash.

But one area where their paths have differed markedly, which might have an outsize importance to investors: their listed ownership structure, more specifically around the key question of ownership control alignment, or ownership control skew. [1] Why does this matter? In Uber’s case, investors’ level of influence over the company is commensurate with how many shares they own, while in Lyft’s, investors have virtually no influence, regardless of how many shares they own.

READ MORE »

2019 Midyear M&A Trends

Stephen F. Arcano, Christopher M. Barlow, and Allison R. Schneirov are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

Although the U.S. M&A market has remained relatively strong by historical standards so far in 2019, activity has softened compared to the higher levels in 2017 and 2018, continuing a trend that began in the second half of last year. The pace of overall deal count in the U.S. has decreased from the past two years, with the U.S. having its slowest first quarter by deal count in five years, according to figures from Mergermarket. However, overall deal value in the U.S. remained high in the first quarter of 2019 at $414 billion, falling just below 2018’s first-quarter record high of $415 billion and representing over half of global deal volume. Seven “megadeals” (i.e., deals valued at $10 billion or more) have been announced in the U.S. in the first quarter, one more than in the first quarter of 2018.

Like much of the rest of the world, the U.S. continues to confront economic and political uncertainty, and dealmakers have taken different approaches in response. For instance, although some dealmakers have been restrained, others—including in the biopharmaceutical and financial services industries—have remained active. While the three largest U.S. deals of 2019 thus far have been between strategics, financial sponsors also have been active in the first half of this year.

Selected 2019 Midyear Trends

Regulatory Developments

The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which in August 2018 expanded the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), is already impacting U.S. M&A activity. Notably, interim regulations released by CFIUS in October 2018 have added to the chilling effect on Chinese investments in the U.S., particularly in the technology sector. At the same time, escalating trade tensions with China have led to concerns that Chinese authorities may take stricter stances on approving transactions involving U.S. firms, although this situation remains fluid.

READ MORE »

Weekly Roundup: June 28-July 3, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of June 28-July 3, 2019.



Spotlight on Boards



Post-Cyan Ruling on Discovery Stay


Irrelevance of Governance Structures


SEC Rules and Guidance for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers



How Boards Govern Disruptive Technology—Key Findings from a Director Survey


SEC Staff Guidance on Shareholder Proposals: A Murky Path Forward


Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital


Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure 2019 Status Report


Glass Lewis, ISS, and ESG



SEC Proposal on Pro Forma Synergy Disclosures


Statement Regarding Offers of Settlement

Statement Regarding Offers of Settlement

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

When the Securities and Exchange Commission is considering filing (or has filed) an action alleging violations of the federal securities laws, it often is in the public interest to pursue a timely, reasonable and consensual resolution of the matter. The Commission has long recognized that an appropriately-crafted settlement can be preferable to pursuing a litigated resolution, particularly when the settlement is agreed early in the process and the Commission obtains relief that is commensurate with what it would reasonably expect to achieve in litigation. In plain language, the sooner harmed investors are compensated, the offending conduct is remediated, and appropriate penalties are imposed, the better.

I have been considering the factors that affect settlement negotiations and settlement agreements with an eye toward enhancing outcomes for investors and most effectively utilizing our resources. [1] This statement discusses my views on some of those factors and specifically addresses the Commission’s approach to settlement offers that are accompanied by contemporaneous requests for Commission waivers from automatic statutory disqualifications and other collateral consequences.

READ MORE »

SEC Proposal on Pro Forma Synergy Disclosures

David A. Katz, Trevor Norwitz and Victor Goldfeld, are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.

The SEC recently proposed amendments to its financial disclosure requirements relating to business acquisitions and dispositions. In general, the proposals reflect a welcome comprehensive review and update, balancing the need for providing relevant information to investors with the costs and burdens of disclosure requirements. Among other things, the proposed amendments would:

  • revise the “significance” tests used to determine whether and which financial statements of a target business need to be filed by the registrant, including by (1) using market capitalization rather than total assets for the denominator in the “investment” test (notably, this may increase the number of transactions that meet the test because it is based on equity rather than enterprise value) and (2) adding a new revenue component to the “income” test;
  • eliminate the need to include financial statements for certain periods required under the current rules; and
  • raise the significance threshold for dispositions from 10% to 20%, matching the current significance threshold for acquisitions.

READ MORE »

Solving Banking’s “Too Big to Manage” Problem

Jeremy Kress is Assistant Professor of Business Law at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan. This post is based on his recent article, forthcoming in the Minnesota Law Review.

One of the enduring ironies of the 2008 financial crisis is that nearly everyone now dislikes big banks, but no one can agree what to do about them. Policymakers as diverse as Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, John McCain, Newt Gingrich, and even President Donald Trump, have called for shrinking the largest financial firms.  In fact, both the Democratic and Republican parties endorsed breaking up the banks in their policy platforms for the 2016 election.

This apparent consensus in favor of breaking up the banks stems, in large part, from a perception that some U.S. financial institutions are “too big to manage” (TBTM). A financial institution is TBTM if its size prevents executives, board members, and shareholders from effectively overseeing the firm, leading to excessive risk taking and misconduct. Officials from both the Obama and Trump Administrations have cited the TBTM problem as a catalyst for the 2008 financial crisis. On this view, many of the largest U.S. financial companies collapsed because management was unable to monitor the firms’ risk profiles.

READ MORE »

Glass Lewis, ISS, and ESG

David Bixby is managing director and Paul Hudson is principal at Pearl Meyer & Partners, LLC. This post is based on a Pearl Meyer memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

With some help from leading investor groups like Black Rock and T. Rowe Price, environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues, once the sole purview of specialist investors and activist groups, are increasingly working their way into the mainstream for corporate America. For some boards, conversations about ESG are nothing new. For many directors, however, the increased emphasis on the subject creates some consternation, in part because it’s not always clear what issues properly fall under the ESG umbrella. E, S, and G can mean different things to different people—not to mention the fact that some subjects span multiple categories. How do boards know what it is that they need to know? Where should boards be directing their attention?

A natural starting place for directors is to examine the guidelines published by the leading proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis. While not to be held up as a definitive prescription for good governance practices, the stances adopted by both advisors can provide a window into how investors who look to these organizations for guidance are thinking about the subject.

READ MORE »

Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure 2019 Status Report

Stacy Coleman is Managing Director at Promontory Financial Group and Mara Childress is Director of Public Policy at Bloomberg LP. This post is based on their Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) report. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here) and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

Executive Summary

In June 2017, The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (Task Force or TCFD) released its final recommendations (2017 report), which provide a framework for companies and other organizations to develop more effective climate-related financial disclosures through their existing reporting processes. [1] In its 2017 report, the Task Force emphasized the importance of transparency in pricing risk—including risk related to climate change—to support informed, efficient capital-allocation decisions. [2] The large-scale and complex nature of climate change makes it uniquely challenging, especially in the context of economic decision making.

Furthermore, many companies incorrectly view the implications of climate change to be relevant only in the long term and, therefore, not necessarily relevant to decisions made today. Those views, however, have begun to change. [3]

READ MORE »

Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital

Joel F. Houston is the Eugene F. Brigham Chair in Finance at the Warrington College of Business at the University of Florida; Chen Lin is the Stelux Professor in Finance at The University of Hong Kong; and Wensi Xie is Assistant Professor at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics.

Do the legal environment and the level of shareholder protection meaningfully influence the cost of capital? To shed some light on this issue, our recent article Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital (which is forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics) explores how changes in shareholders’ rights affect their required risk premium, which in turn generates important influences on both corporate valuations and the overall depth of financial markets. Intuitively, when outside shareholders invest in jurisdictions with stronger investor protections, they recognize that insiders are less likely to divert firm resources for their own private benefits. Shareholders factoring this lower risk of expropriation into their valuation model are therefore willing to pay more for firms’ equity, which in turn enables firms to obtain external financing with better terms.

Specifically, we focus on shareholders litigation rights, which entitle them to make legal claims against corporate management. To isolate the effects of shareholder litigation rights, we employ a quasi-natural experiment where we examine the impact of staggered state-level changes in universal demand (UD) laws on firms’ cost of capital. Since the late 1980s, 23 states in the U.S. have adopted these universal demand laws. The adoption of UD laws has significantly weakened shareholders’ litigation rights by raising procedural hurdles to pursue derivative lawsuits. (Davis 2008; Erickson 2010). When a firm’s management breaches its fiduciary duties by causing injuries to the firm, individual shareholders are entitled to bring a derivative suit against the manager to remedy wrongdoing on behalf of the corporation. The universal demand laws, however, impose a “universal demand requirement” to every derivative lawsuit, meaning that the plaintiff shareholder must first make a demand on the board of directors to take corrective actions before proceeding with litigation. This requirement places a significant obstacle to derivative suits because directors are usually the defendants in these suits and hence almost always refuse to proceed with litigation. Moreover, the shareholder can no longer circumvent the demand procedure by arguing demand futility on the grounds that directors have a conflict of interest. Using information on companies’ derivative lawsuits collected from their SEC 10-K filings, we confirm that the occurrence of derivative litigations drops materially following the passage of UD laws. In this regard, UD laws weaken shareholder litigation rights by making it more difficult for shareholders to seek remedies and enforce fiduciary duties through derivative suits.

READ MORE »

SEC Staff Guidance on Shareholder Proposals: A Murky Path Forward

Marc Gerber is partner, Hagen Ganem is counsel and Ryan Adams is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum.

In November 2017, the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (Staff) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued guidance concerning companies’ ability to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy statements under the “ordinary business” and “relevance” grounds of Rule 14a-8. In particular, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (SLB 14I) invited companies to include in their no-action requests their board’s analysis of the significance of a proposal under these exclusions, emphasizing that a well-developed discussion of that analysis would assist the Staff in its review of these requests. Virtually every company that went down this path, however, was unsuccessful, and after the 2018 proxy season many questioned the utility of providing a board analysis.

Perhaps due to this skepticism, heading into the 2019 proxy season the Staff released guidance in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14J (SLB 14J) that, among other things, reiterated its view that a board analysis could be helpful in analyzing no-action requests and provided a nonexclusive list of items that might be included in a “well-developed discussion.” In addition, SLB 14J provided guidance concerning the micromanagement prong of the ordinary business exclusion and on proposals relating to senior executive compensation. While this guidance led to an increase in successful micromanagement arguments, it also created confusion for companies seeking to exclude proposals touching on senior executive compensation.

READ MORE »

Page 8 of 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9