Yearly Archives: 2021

SEC Comments on Climate Change Disclosure

Jina Choi and David M. Lynn are partners at Morrison & Foerster LLP. This post is based on their Morrison & Foerster memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

The Division of Corporation Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission recently published a sample letter to companies providing illustrative comments that the Division of Corporation Finance may issue to companies regarding their climate-related disclosure, or the absence of climate-related disclosure [1] (the “Sample Letter”).

This action is the latest in a series of developments demonstrating the SEC’s focus on climate disclosure by public companies.

  • The SEC continues to focus on and spotlight climate change and ESG-related disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws.
  • The SEC may be working to update its 2010 guidance on climate change disclosure and the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance has sent out letters to public companies providing comments on climate-related disclosure or the lack of such disclosure in SEC reports.
  • The SEC set forth a Sample Letter with illustrative comments regarding Risk Factor and MD&A disclosures.
  • Companies should also consider recent guidance on how climate-related risks may need to be addressed in financial statements.
  • The SEC’s Enforcement Division has set up an ESG Task Force which is focusing on any material gaps or misstatements in companies’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules.

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SEC Enforcement Order Highlights Risks of Data-Based Market Intelligence

Kimberly Zelnick, Doru Gavril, and Christine E. Lyon are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Ms. Zelnick, Mr. Gavril, Mr. Lyon, and Brock Dahl.

Data miners and data aggregators should carefully examine their policies and procedures to avoid the inclusion of material nonpublic information (“MNPI”) in analytical products. Consumers of such analyses should avoid trading activities informed by market intelligence that is knowingly based on MNPI. Last week, the SEC announced a $10 million settlement with market data intelligence company AppAnnie that has broad implications for both producers and consumers of data-based market intelligence. The ruling pushes the enforcement envelope in significant ways, but leaves unanswered many questions that will be critical as the role of big data grows.

Novel Issues Underpin the SEC Settlement

AppAnnie is an app analytics and app market data provider. Founded in 2010, it was premised on a simple model of gathering data: users would download a free, high quality app on their phone (e.g., a VPN app). In turn for the free use of its app, AppAnnie would be allowed to collect the end-user’s data on their use of other apps of interest. Over time, at scale, AppAnnie would amass a large, free, and incredibly valuable dataset of user behavior.

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Board Refreshment and Succession Planning in the New Normal

Rich Fields is leader of the Board Effectiveness Practice; Rusty O’Kelley III is co-leader of Board and CEO Advisory Partners for the Americas; and Laura Sanderson is co-leader of the Board and CEO Advisory Partners for EMEA, at Russell Reynolds Associates. This post is based on their Russell Reynolds memorandum.

Increasingly assertive institutional investors, aggressive hedge fund activists, empowered ESG experts, and powerful proxy advisors are ramping up their demands on public company boards. These and other influential stakeholders are scrutinizing corporate boards to see if they have the right people to succeed—and that they are committed to effective refreshment, board succession, and board evaluation practices. For these reasons, Russell Reynolds is updating its prior advice to directors and boards on how to successful navigate these heightened expectations. Those found wanting are more likely than ever to face meaningful consequences, including losing for support incumbent directors in both contested and uncontested elections.

Part of the reason for this enhanced attention is simple: the work of boards has never been more difficult and important. From the unprecedented challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic volatility, geopolitical instability, and board agendas bursting at the seams with topics new and old, boards and their members are being tested like never before. Many boards have risen to the occasion, providing steady and thoughtful leadership; others have struggled, failing to add (or eroding) value.

Against this backdrop, many boards and leadership teams have taken a step back to evaluate their composition and effectiveness, asking themselves tough questions:

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A Guide for Boards and Companies Facing Ransomware Demands

Antonia M. Apps and Adam Fee are partners and Matthew Laroche is special counsel at Milbank LLP. This post is based on their Milbank memorandum.

On September 21, 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a set of actions designed to counter ransomware, principally by discouraging ransomware payments. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) for the first time designated a virtual currency exchange for facilitating financial transactions for ransomware actors. OFAC also issued an updated advisory about ransomware that, among other things, emphasized that the U.S. government continues to strongly discourage ransomware payments and strongly encourage reporting to and cooperating with government agencies in the event of an attack. [1]

Though the Department of the Treasury’s actions do not prohibit victim companies from paying ransoms, they add another layer of complexity for victim companies deciding whether to pay. Paying a ransom carries short-term and long-term consequences, carries legal and regulatory risk, as highlighted by the Department of the Treasury’s recent actions, and could shape the outlook and reputation of a company for years to come. The decision also is one most companies will have to make. Ransomware groups continue to proliferate, and attacks have become more common, sophisticated, and successful. In addition to the Department of the Treasury, several other law enforcement and regulatory bodies have issued guidance and made public statements discouraging ransomware payments and describing the risks from making them. Among other things, they note that paying the ransom encourages future attacks against the victim company and others, and does not guarantee the restoration of data or the return of stolen data without public disclosure. [2]

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Statement by Chairman Gensler on Rules Regarding Clawbacks of Erroneously Awarded Compensation

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

I support today’s [Oct. 14, 2021] action to re-open comment on the Dodd-Frank Act rule regarding clawbacks of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation. I believe we have an opportunity to strengthen the transparency and quality of corporate financial statements as well as the accountability of corporate executives to their investors.

In today’s economy, corporate executives often are paid based on how the companies that they lead perform: things like revenue and profits of the overall business. Occasionally, however, the numbers the companies reported as the basis of that compensation aren’t accurate. In these cases, companies may have to go back and revise or restate prior financial reporting. As a result, an executive may have been paid for meeting certain milestones that the company didn’t, in fact, hit.

Over the last couple of decades, Congress has decided that executives should pay back that incentive-based compensation. [1] Congress first mandated these clawbacks under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring chief executives and chief financial officers to return incentive-based pay in cases of misconduct from the previous 12 months.

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Delaware Decision Deals with Director Independence

Gail Weinstein is senior counsel, and Steven J. Steinman and Brian T. Mangino are partners at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Steinman, Mr. Mangino, Andrew J. Colosimo, Mark H. Lucas, and Erica Jaffe, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).

BGC Partners, Inc. Derivative Litigation (Sept. 20, 2021) involved a merger between entities that were controlled by the same person, Howard Lutnick, through his control of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. (“Cantor”). Lutnick had a far larger economic interest in the target company, Berkeley Point Financial LLC (“Berkeley Point”), than in the acquiring company, BGC Partners, Inc. (“BGC”). The plaintiffs claimed that he therefore caused BGC to overpay for Berkeley Point (receiving himself 42% of the alleged overpayment, which amounted to $125 million, at the expense of the other BGC stockholders). The transaction was approved by a special committee of BGC’s four outside directors, after months of negotiation with BGC. (BGC’s minority stockholders did not vote on the transaction.) The plaintiffs sued Lutnick, Cantor, and BGC’s directors for breach of fiduciary duties in improperly approving the related-party transaction.

The court found, despite evidence that it characterized as “not overwhelming,” that two of the outside directors may not have been independent of Lutnick. As a result, the court held that: (i) the plaintiffs were excused from not having made a litigation demand on the board to bring the litigation (as demand would have been futile); (ii) the burden of proof under entire fairness review would not shift to the plaintiffs (as the transaction was not approved by a special committee comprised of a majority of independent directors); and (iii) the plaintiffs had validly pled a non-exculpated fiduciary claim against one of the non-independent directors (as that director may have taken actions that furthered Lutnick’s self-interest, violating the duty of loyalty).

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Weekly Roundup: October 8–14, 2021


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 8–14, 2021.


Corporate Liquidity Provision and Share Repurchase Programs


SEC Form 10-K Comments Regarding Climate-Related Disclosures


Data Governance Tips for Companies Following SEC’s In re App Annie


New York Court on the Enforcement of Federal Forum Provision


Questions to Ask Before Forming a New Board Committee


Crisis Management in the Era of “No Normal”


Should SPAC Forecasts be Sacked?


2022 Proxy and Annual Report Season



Banking-Crisis Interventions, 1257-2019


Sustainability Impact in Investor Decision-Making


Just Say No? Shareholder Voting on Securities Class Actions


Speech by Commissioner Roisman on the U.S. Capital Markets


Going Dark: Speech by Commissioner Lee on The Growth of Private Markets and the Impact on Investors and the Economy


Ninth Circuit on Strict Liability for Direct Listings


Special Committee Report


Comment on Climate Change Disclosures

Comment on Climate Change Disclosures

Jessica Ground is Global Head of ESG, and Clara Kang is Counsel at Capital Group. This post is based on their comment letter to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding its proposed framework for climate change-related disclosures by public companies. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

We share the view that has been articulated by various policymakers, academics and other market participants that climate change poses a systemic risk to our financial markets and the broader economy. The potential impacts of climate change on financial markets are broad and far-reaching, including disruptions not only in asset valuations but more generally in the proper functioning of the markets as market participants seek to mitigate physical and transition risks stemming from climate change. As a result, investors increasingly view material climate (and other ESG)-related risks and opportunities as critical drivers of a company’s ability to generate value over the long-term. To that end, there is a strong need for climate-related issuer disclosure that is consistent, comparable and rooted in materiality.

Today, the asset management industry faces a significant data challenge with respect to climate or ESG-related information. As the Investor-as-Owner Subcommittee of the Commission’s Investor Advisory Committee noted in its May 2020 report, issuers take a range of different approaches (or none at all) in providing ESG-related disclosure: of those that do provide disclosure, some publish stand-alone reports while others incorporate disclosure in existing regulatory filings; some disclose information against third-party standards such as those issued by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) while others do not; and still others do not report directly but provide information to third-party data providers. [1] Such data providers employ vastly different methodologies for ESG scoring systems that often result in an issuer being rated favorably for its ESG practices by one data provider but unfavorably by another. In short, while there is a plethora of ESG-related information in the marketplace, the information tends to be subjective, spotty and unreliable, limiting investors’ ability to effectively and efficiently consider material climate or other ESG risks in allocating capital.

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Special Committee Report

Gregory Gooding, William Regner and Jeffrey Rosen are partners at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Mr. Gooding, Mr. Regner, Mr. Rosen, Emily Huang, Maeve O’Connor, and Sue Meng, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani (discussed on the Forum here).

This post surveys corporate transactions announced during the period from January through June 2021 that used special committees to manage conflicts and key Delaware judicial decisions during this period ruling on the effectiveness of such committees. While corporate transactional activity during the first half of 2021 may be remembered more for SPACs, cryptocurrencies and meme stocks, there continued to be a significant number of conflicted transactions and the Delaware courts continued to refine the boundaries of Delaware law involving the use of special committees.

Special Committee Independence: How Close is Too Close

Once a decision has been made to form a special committee, the most important question, and sometimes a fraught one, is which directors are sufficiently independent of the interested stockholder to effectively serve on that committee. Delaware case law is replete with examples of committees whose effectiveness has been challenged because one or more members allegedly lacked independence, in many cases as a result of social or business connections with the interested stockholder. However, a recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision may signal a willingness of the Delaware courts to apply closer scrutiny to such allegations.

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Ninth Circuit on Strict Liability for Direct Listings

Boris Feldman, Sarah Solum and Doru Gavril are partners at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. This post is based on a Freshfields memorandum by Mr. Feldman, Ms. Solum, Mr. Gavril, Drew Liming, and Abigail West.

On September 20, 2021, the Ninth Circuit held that securities sold by third parties and exempt from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws are nevertheless subject to strict liability for the issuer if sold after a direct listing. By affirming a district court’s earlier decision in Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 367 (N.D. Cal. 2020), the Ninth Circuit majority parted ways with the decades-old law of other circuits, the Court’s own precedent, and the historical development of the federal securities regime. The Supreme Court should grant certiorari and reverse.

Section 11 and Slack’s Direct Listing

At issue in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Slack was how Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 applies to shares sold through a direct listing. To balance Section 11’s imposition of strict liability, Congress and the courts have limited the claim to a discrete group of shareholders. Shareholders must establish standing by showing that their shares were traceable to the challenged registration statement. In cases dating back decades, both the Ninth Circuit and other circuit courts have consistently held that the public availability of shares other than those sold pursuant to the challenged registration statement can defeat standing.

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