Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

Building a Better Board Book

We recently published a paper on SSRN, Building a Better Board Book, that evaluates the quality of information presented by management to directors in advance of board meetings. Board members rely on information provided by management to inform their decisions on strategy, capital allocation, performance measurement, and risk management. These materials suffer from three overarching […]

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Where’s the Board? Questions for Equifax

On Tuesday, October 3, 2017, Richard F. Smith the former CEO of Equifax testified before the House Energy And Commerce Committee. In his apology for the exposure from Equifax files of sensitive personal information for nearly 146 million Americans, he indicated that an “individual” in Equifax’s technology department had failed to heed security warnings and […]

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Why Does Fast Loan Growth Predict Poor Performance for Banks?

In our article, Why Does Fast Loan Growth Predict Poor Performance for Banks?, which was recently accepted for publication in the Review of Financial Studies, we show that the common stock of U.S. banks with loan growth in the top quartile of banks significantly underperforms the common stock of banks with loan growth in the […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Banking & Financial Institutions, Bankruptcy & Financial Distress, Mergers & Acquisitions | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Why Does Fast Loan Growth Predict Poor Performance for Banks?

Shareholder-Manager Contracting in Public Companies

Activist investors often want managers to take specific actions, which they accomplish by methods such as installing their own person on the management team or the board or by writing explicit action-based contracts with management. These contracts have received far less research attention in the activist literature even though they are akin to the classical […]

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Index Investing Supports Vibrant Capital Markets

Index investing has profoundly changed the way investors seek returns, manage risk, and build portfolios. For nearly 50 years, index investment vehicles have lowered costs and simplified access to diversified investments for all investors, from sophisticated institutions to individuals. Technology and data have also transformed the range of investments that can be tracked by an […]

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The Governance Implication of a Proposed Yates “Soft Repeal”

In an October 6, 2017 speech, Deputy U.S. Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein offered further hints on the proposed “soft repeal” of the long-controversial “Yates Memorandum” on corporate liability and individual accountability. Mr. Rosenstein had first raised the possibility of a change to Yates in a September 14, 2017 speech to the Heritage Foundation. In […]

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Posted in Boards of Directors, Legislative & Regulatory Developments, Practitioner Publications, Securities Litigation & Enforcement, Securities Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on The Governance Implication of a Proposed Yates “Soft Repeal”

Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies

In our paper Busy Directors: Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies, we examine when having a busy director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. “Busy” directors—individuals who serve on multiple boards—continue to be the subject of debate among academics, practitioners, and policymakers. We develop and test the hypothesis that two […]

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2017 Relative TSR Prevalence and Design of S&P 500 Companies

Over the last several years as compensation committees and executives strive to align pay with shareholder returns, they have increasingly turned to market-based performance measures such as relative total shareholder return (RTSR). Traditionally, RTSR was used primarily by Energy and Utilities companies, largely because these companies’ stock prices tend to be closely correlated, so TSR […]

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Fire Sale Discount: Evidence from the Sale of Minority Equity Stakes

Asset fire sales—namely, the forced sales by distressed sellers at prices lower than what the highest potential bidder could bid if it were not financially constrained as studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1992)—have attracted much attention. They have become important building blocks in much of recent theoretical work in finance and macroeconomics. Empirical evidence on […]

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Protecting Shareholder Ownership and Governance Rights

Various efforts to reform the shareholder proposal process, SEC Rule 14a-8, ask the Securities and Exchange Commission to formally curb the ability of share owners to file proposals. The proposed reforms, including a 2014 petition by a consortium of corporate interest groups and a recent proposal by the US Department of Treasury , take a […]

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