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HLS Faculty & Senior Fellows
Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board
- Peter Atkins
- David Bell
- Kerry E. Berchem
- Richard Brand
- Daniel Burch
- Paul Choi
- Jesse Cohn
- Arthur B. Crozier
- Renata J. Ferrari
- Andrew Freedman
- Ray Garcia
- Joseph Hall
- Jason M. Halper William P. Mills
- David Millstone
- Theodore Mirvis
- Philip Richter
- Elina Tetelbaum
- Sebastian Tiller
- Marc Trevino
- Steven J. Williams
Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
2017 Institutional Investor Survey
There is an increased emphasis being placed on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations by the investment community. ESG considerations’ shift into the mainstream is being propelled by regulatory changes and the proliferation of data substantiating that ESG integration can help increase risk-adjusted investment returns. Despite the current political uncertainty around the world, it appears […]
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Posted in Accounting & Disclosure, Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Asset management, Board composition, Board performance, Boards of Directors, Director qualifications, Diversity, Engagement, ESG, Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors, International governance, Mutual funds, Pay for performance, Say on pay, Shareholder activism, Shareholder value, Surveys
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Controlling Systemic Risk Through Corporate Governance
In Policy Brief No. 99—February 2017 of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), I explain how corporate governance could be used to help control systemic risk. Excessive risk taking by systemically important financial firms is widely seen as one of the primary causes of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Most of the post-crisis regulatory […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Banking & Financial Institutions, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Financial Crisis
Tagged Business judgment rule, Capital requirements, Financial crisis, Financial institutions, Liquidity, Management, Moral hazard, Public interest, Risk management, Risk-taking, SIFIs, Systemic risk
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The “Why” Question in Investment Theory
Economics has developed as a science, conveniently forgetting its roots in political philosophy. Unfortunately that “science” is severely dated, and the functioning of the global capital markets has become separated from the real world. A simple thought experiment throws light on the theoretically correct strategies for a rational saver, but leaves us with unsatisfactory answers. […]
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Posted in Accounting & Disclosure, Banking & Financial Institutions, Corporate Social Responsibility, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Accountability, Capital allocation, Capital markets, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, Institutional Investors, International governance, Market efficiency, Shareholder rights, Shareholder value, Stewardship, Sustainability, UK
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Another “Choice” for Bank Regulatory Reform?
[In] November 2016, we noted that the Financial CHOICE Act proposed by Rep. Jeb Hensarling was only the beginning. While many eyes continued to be fixed on the House Financial Services Committee and the much anticipated CHOICE Act 2.0, on Monday, March 13, FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig made a regulatory reform proposal of his […]
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Posted in Banking & Financial Institutions, Financial Regulation, Legislative & Regulatory Developments, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Banks, Capital markets, CHOICE Act, Derivatives, Dodd-Frank Act, Donald Trump, FDIC, FHCs, Financial institutions, Financial reform, Financial regulation, Investment banking, Swaps
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Are Large Banks Valued More Highly?
In Are Large Banks Valued More Highly?, we investigate whether the value of large banks, defined as banks with assets in excess of the Dodd-Frank threshold for enhanced supervision ($50 billion in 2010 constant dollars), increases with the size of their assets, using Tobin’s q and market-to-book as our valuation measures. There is a widely-held […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Banking & Financial Institutions, Empirical Research, Financial Crisis, Financial Regulation
Tagged Bailouts, Banks, Capital requirements, Financial crisis, Financial institutions, Financial regulation, Firm valuation, Incentives, Liquidity, SIFIs, Stress tests, Systemic risk, Too big to fail
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The Americas – 2017 Proxy Season Preview
Proxy season is in full swing in Latin America, and is just beginning to heat up in Canada and the United States, and some early trends are already becoming evident across the Americas. Interestingly, there seems to be a slow but potent convergence of the governance world, composed of so many individual markets, as investor […]
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Posted in Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Corporate Elections & Voting, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications, Securities Regulation
Tagged Boards of Directors, Canada, Executive Compensation, International governance, Proxy access, Proxy season, Securities regulation, Shareholder activism, Shareholder rights, Transparency, Wells Fargo
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Did Say-on-Pay Reduce or “Compress” CEO Pay?
In the Dodd-Frank Act legislation after the 2008 Financial Crisis, the inclusion of shareholder SOP voting was driven by bipartisan Congressional support to “control executive compensation…” at corporations. In 2009, a former SEC chief accountant said, “Executive compensation at this point in time has gotten woefully out of hand… The time to adopt ‘say on […]
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Corporate Elections & Voting, Executive Compensation, Institutional Investors, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Boards of Directors, Dodd-Frank Act, Executive Compensation, Incentives, Institutional Investors, Management, Say on pay, Securities regulation, Shareholder voting
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Does the Market Value Professional Directors?
Professional directors, as often defined by academics and practitioners, are independent directors whose only vocation consists of serving as corporate directors on one or more boards. Such directors hold no other full-time employment. Currently, over 84 percent of corporate boards include at least one professional director. Since the 1970’s academics across disciplines have argued that […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Boards of Directors, Empirical Research
Tagged Agency costs, Agency model, Board composition, Board independence, Boards of Directors, Director qualifications, Firm performance, Form 8-K, Management, Market reaction, Shareholder value
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New York Cybersecurity Regulations for Financial Institutions Enter Into Effect
While the New York Cybersecurity Regulations represent a softening in key respects from the requirements set forth in the initial proposal, the regulations impose minimum standards that exceed existing federal standards and introduce new requirements, including obligations to critically evaluate cybersecurity practices to ensure compliance, maintain detailed documentation demonstrating compliance and report cyber events to […]
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