Yearly Archives: 2019

Stakeholder Governance—Issues and Answers

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, and William Savitt is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell memorandum.

The Business Roundtable’s recent call for a commitment to long-term sustainable economic value creation has prompted a vigorous debate about the optimal corporate governance model for achieving that goal.

Certain familiar arguments have reappeared in reaction to the Business Roundtable’s important statement rejecting shareholder primacy and embracing stakeholder governance. Various law firms and commentators insist that such innovation in corporate governance is constrained by an imperative to maximize shareholder value—the ideology that a corporation can have no purpose other than profit maximization for shareholder gain. Others assert that the path to effective governance reform lies with prescriptive regulation, presumptively by the federal government.

We disagree, and propose an alternative: The New Paradigm. Our approach reimagines corporate governance as a cooperative exercise among a corporation’s shareholders, directors, managers, employees, business partners, and the communities in which the corporation operates. The New Paradigm promotes transparency and engagement to ensure fair treatment of all stakeholders. It also aims to curtail, if not eliminate, short-termism and to combat activist pressure for financial engineering focused on short-term gain. Our approach thus addresses the fundamental criticism of corporations today—that their preoccupation with maximizing short-term shareholder gain has failed to generate economic growth and security for the rest of society—while avoiding the substantial risks of heavy-handed regulatory intervention.

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The New Stock Market: Law, Economics, and Policy

Merritt B. Fox is the Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law at Columbia Law School; Lawrence R. Glosten is the S. Sloan Colt Professor of Banking and International Finance at Columbia Business School; and Gabriel Rauterberg is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. This post is based on the introduction to their recent book The New Stock Market: Law, Economics, and Policy.

Markets for trading financial instruments are a central feature of modern finance and play a crucial role in the larger economy. The U.S. stock market, where public equities are traded, is a global symbol of commerce and trade. Its total valuation is about $25 trillion—almost double the total assets held by the commercial banking system. It serves as a principal vehicle for the direct and indirect investment of public savings, and represents roughly half of the value of the dollar savings of individual Americans. Its functioning is also critical to the process by which changes of control in major companies take place. The prices in the stock market incorporate enormous amounts of information and serve as important guides to decision making throughout the economy. Yet, despite their prominence, the stock market, and financial trading markets more broadly, remain deeply puzzling and complicated. The central institutions of the stock market are a series of trading venues—twelve stock exchanges, over thirty active alternative trading systems, and other forms of off-exchange trade—whose operational details and governing regulatory scheme are extremely complex. The stock market’s central economic dynamics, particularly the adverse selection dynamics created by informed traders, mark it off by degree, if not kind, from the ordinary markets of the real economy. And its controversies are both perennial and new. Insider trading, manipulation, and short-selling remain attention-grabbing, while newer participants and institutions, such as high-frequency traders and dark pools also generate discussion and debate.

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Investment Management: Compliance Developments & Calendar for Private Fund Advisers

Jason M. Daniel is a partner and Jenny M. Walters is a senior practice attorney at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. This post is based on a Akin Gump memorandum by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Walters, Nnedi Ifudu NwekeSophie Donnithorne-TaitEzra Zahabi, and Michelle Reed.

While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought several enforcement actions in 2018-19, the most significant new developments were published interpretations and alerts. Other agencies, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), also provided new guidance and brought significant enforcement actions.

Fiduciary Interpretation

In June of 2019, the SEC adopted a new interpretation (the “Fiduciary Interpretation”) defining fiduciary duties for investment advisers as consisting of a duty of loyalty and a duty of care, requiring investment advisers to provide advice that is in the best interests of the relevant client without putting the adviser’s interests ahead of the client’s. The Fiduciary Interpretation specifically defines the duty of loyalty, requires precise disclosure regarding conflicts and establishes a duty of care. For private fund and institutional clients, the Fiduciary Interpretation acknowledges a difference between retail and institutional clients.

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Weekly Roundup: October 18–24, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 18–24, 2019.


2019 Mid-Year Shareholder Activism Report


Conducting a Token Offering Under Regulation A





The Consequences to Directors of Deploying Poison Pills






CFIUS Modernization





The Corrosion Critique of Benefit Corporations


CII Letter to the SEC—Proxy Advisor Regulation

Ken Bertsch is Executive Director at the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). This post is based on a comment letter that CII submitted to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

October 15, 2019

The Honorable Jay Clayton, Chairman
The Honorable Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Commissioner
The Honorable Allison Herren Lee, Commissioner
The Honorable Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner
The Honorable Elad L. Roisman, Commissioner

c/o Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Re: File No. 4-725 Proxy Advisor Regulation

Dear Commissioners:

The Council of Institutional Investors and the undersigned coalition of investors writes to express concern that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or the “SEC”) has embarked on a series of actions that we believe may reduce investor participation in the corporate governance voting process, and is likely to undermine investor protection, upend efficiency in the critical arena of corporate governance and impair capital formation by diminishing corporate managerial accountability. We refer specifically to:

  • Proxy Advisor Interpretation and Guidance. The Commission’s August 21, 2019, Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules to Proxy Voting Advice and Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers (collectively, the “Proxy Advisor Interpretation and Guidance”); and
  • Proxy Advisor Rulemaking. The prospect of proposed rule amendments to address proxy advisors’ reliance on the proxy solicitation exemptions in Rule 14a-2(b), which is listed in the current Commission Regulatory Flex Agenda (“Proxy Advisor Rulemaking”).

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The Corrosion Critique of Benefit Corporations

Brett McDonnell is the Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. This post is based on his recent paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Benefit corporation statutes have emerged as the leading new statutory alternative to enable and encourage social enterprises, businesses which seek both to generate financial returns for their investors while also pursuing social missions. Some persons who strongly support social enterprises have criticized benefit corporation statutes, arguing that they create a mistaken impression that companies organized under ordinary corporation statutes cannot consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders except insofar as doing so benefits shareholders in the long run. This corrosive effect on the understanding of most corporations may impede the adoption of socially responsible behavior. I call this common criticism of benefit corporation statutes the “corrosion critique.”

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Outlaws of the Roundtable? Adopting a Long-term Value Bylaw

Neil Whoriskey is partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Cleary Gottlieb memorandum by Mr. Whoriskey. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here) and The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here).

The CEOs of 150 major US public companies recently pledged to act for all of their “stakeholders”—customers, employees, suppliers, communities and yes, even stockholders. [1] Much commentary ensued. But before we get too excited about whether these CEOs are grasping the mantle of government to act on behalf of the citizenry and other people who aren’t paying them, there is the prior question of whether, as a matter of Delaware law, they can.

Under Delaware law, directors owe a fundamental duty of loyalty—the question is, to whom? There has been some academic debate over the years as to whether this duty is owed exclusively to stockholders or is also owed to other stakeholders of the corporation, but the weight of decided Delaware law comes down firmly on the side of stockholders. [2] The Delaware Supreme Court ruled 30 years ago that the interests of other stakeholders may be considered only if “there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.” [3] The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court echoed this view: “[T]he object of the corporation is to produce profits for the stockholders. . . [T]he social beliefs of the manager, no more than their own financial interests, cannot be their end in managing the corporation.” [4] In other words, the duty of loyalty requires that the corporation be run for the benefit of stockholders—a predictable result, as the Chief Justice points out, in a governance system that in all its particulars is based on the “relationship between corporate managers and stockholders. . . where only stockholders get to vote and only stockholders get to sue to enforce directors’ fiduciary duties.” [5]

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Examining Corporate Priorities: The Impact of Stock Buybacks on Workers, Communities and Investors

Jesse Fried is the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post is based on his recent testimony before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here) and Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay, by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Chairwoman Maloney, Ranking Member Huizenga, and members of the Subcommittee: I thank you for inviting me to testify. Stock buybacks are an important and increasingly controversial feature of our capital markets. I am honored to have been asked to participate in this hearing.

I was asked for comment on the role of buybacks in the economy and their regulation, including: (1) whether the cash distributed via buybacks could instead be better used for other purposes, such as investing more in R&D; (2) the appropriate level of transparency surrounding buybacks; and (3) executives’ conflicts of interest in buybacks related to their stock-based compensation.

I was also asked for comment on the following pieces of legislation: (1) H.R.         , Stock Buyback Reform and Worker Dividend Act of 2019; (2) H.R.         : Stock Buyback Disclosure Improvement Act of 2019; (3) H.R. 3355, Reward Work Act; and (4) H.R.         , To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers to disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission the details of any repurchase plan for an equity security, and to prohibit such a repurchase unless it is approved by the Commission (hereinafter, “SEC Approval Act”).

In this statement, I share my background and credentials and then, in five Parts, offer my views on buybacks and my general reactions on the provisions in these pieces of legislation, some of which currently are in discussion-draft form.

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A Review of ISS Proposed 2020 Policy Changes

Lisa Stimmell is a partner and Courtney Mathes is a practice support lawyer at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. This post is based on their WSGR memorandum.

On October 7, 2019, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) released its Proposed Benchmark Policy Changes for 2020, reflecting 17 proposed new policies or policy changes, three of which are applicable to U.S. issuers. ISS is soliciting feedback from governance stakeholders on its proposed benchmark voting policies through 5:00 p.m., ET, on October 18, 2019.

The following is a summary of the three proposed policy changes to the ISS United States Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Recommendations.

Problematic Governance Structure—Newly Public Companies.

Under its current voting policy, ISS generally recommends a vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s initial public offering, the company or the board (a) adopted bylaw or charter provisions materially adverse to shareholder rights, or (b) implemented a multi-class capital structure having unequal voting rights. In addition, ISS provides a list of factors that it will consider in determining whether to recommend a vote against or withhold from the pre-IPO directors including, among others, the level of impairment of shareholders’ rights, the disclosed rationale, the ability to change the governance structure (e.g., limitations on shareholders’ right to amend the bylaws or charter, or supermajority vote requirements), and the ability of shareholders to hold directors accountable through annual director elections, or whether the company has a classified board structure. [1]

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CFIUS Modernization

Eric J. Kadel, Jr. and Christopher L. Mann are partners and Kathryn E. Collard is an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. This post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell memorandum by Mr. Kaddel, Mr. Mann, Ms. Collard, John Evangelakos, Benjamin R. Weber, and Dharak V. Bhavsar.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has issued proposed regulations to implement CFIUS reforms enacted under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”). Certain provisions of FIRRMA went into effect immediately upon its adoption in August 2018, but many of the provisions of the legislation require regulations to be prescribed by CFIUS before becoming effective.

The proposed rules, which would implement most of the provisions of FIRRMA that have not already gone into effect, have been issued in two separate proposals, both of which are covered in this memorandum:

  • TID Businesses. The first set of regulations would replace the existing CFIUS regulations codified at part 800 of title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and among other things would implement the provisions of the FIRRMA legislation pertaining to certain non-control but non-passive investments in critical technology, critical infrastructure and sensitive personal data businesses (so-called “TID” businesses).
  • Real Estate. The second set of regulations, to be codified at a new part 802 of title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, would implement the expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction under FIRRMA to certain real estate transactions.

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