Yearly Archives: 2019

Analysis of IAC Recommendations to Improve U.S. Proxy System

Steve Wolosky, Andrew Freedman, and Ron Berenblat are partners at Olshan Frome Wolosky LLP. This post is based on their Olshan memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Universal Proxies by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

On September 5, 2019, the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (“IAC”) issued a written statement (the “Statement”) to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) making recommendations on steps the SEC should take to reform the “complex and multifaceted” U.S. proxy system. By way of background, the IAC is a committee of academics, investors, market participants and corporate and investor advocates established under the Dodd-Frank Act to advise the SEC on various regulatory priorities and to promote greater investor confidence and integrity in the securities markets. The Statement is actually a lightly modified version of a statement prepared in August by an IAC subcommittee consisting of an impressive cast of members, including a Director of CalPERS and the former General Counsel of Vanguard. The Statement was issued in response to consensus that widespread problems with the current “byzantine” proxy system relating to the accuracy, transparency, timeliness and cost-effectiveness of vote counts must be addressed in order to instill investor confidence in the system. These concerns were most recently brought front and center at the November 2018 SEC roundtable on “proxy plumbing.”

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Taking Significant Steps to Modernize Our Regulatory Framework

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

[On September 26, 2019], the Commission announced three important rulemakings.

  • Modernizing the Approval Framework for ETFs. We adopted a new rule that (1) sets forth a clear and consistent framework that will allow exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) meeting certain standardized conditions to come to market without obtaining an individualized exemptive order, and (2) amends certain forms to enhance disclosures for investors.
  • Expanding “Testing-the-Waters” Communications to All Issuers. We adopted a new rule that will extend to all issuers the flexibility provided by the JOBS Act to communicate with institutional investors about potential IPOs and other registered offerings to better gauge market interest.
  • Enhancing Regulation in the OTC Markets. We proposed amendments to rules governing the publication of quotations for over-the-counter (“OTC”) securities designed to better protect investors from fraud and manipulation, while at the same time facilitating more efficient OTC trading in certain well-capitalized issuers.

These rulemakings share common themes. They modernize decades-old regulations, taking account of our experience, advances in communications technology and changes in the operation of our markets. Importantly, these common sense actions better align our regulations with the preferences and investor protection interests of our long-term Main Street investors, while also facilitating capital formation. I thank my fellow Commissioners and our dedicated staff for the effort, expertise and insight they brought to these important rulemakings.

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The Long Term, The Short Term, and The Strategic Term

David A. Katz is partner and Laura A. McIntosh is consulting attorney at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on an article first published in the New York Law Journal. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here) and Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here).

After many years, this past summer the Business Roundtable updated its principles of corporate governance with a new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation. In the accompanying press release, the Business Roundtable emphasized the larger societal role of corporations in America: “If companies fail to recognize that the success of our system is dependent on inclusive long-term growth, many will raise legitimate questions about the role of large employers in our society.” Superseding the decades-long period during which the Business Roundtable supported the view that “corporations exist principally to serve their shareholders,” the revised statement of purpose is oriented toward “the long-term interests” of “all of our stakeholders.”

The Business Roundtable thus joins other prominent voices in corporate America that are now disavowing long-held views of shareholder primacy. The Business Roundtable press release identifies the two sources of this trend. The first is a perceived disconnect between the short-term interests of “shareholders” and the long-term interests of “stakeholders,” a group that, writ large, could encompass all of American society. The second is a desire to stave off government intervention that could impose an overly burdensome stakeholder- centric model of corporate governance through legislation: “If companies fail to recognize that the success of our system is dependent on inclusive long-term growth, many will raise legitimate questions about the role of large employers in our society.”

The short-term/long-term, shareholder/stakeholder debate is likely to become more intense, and more political, in the near future. As the landscape of corporate governance shifts around them, companies should seek firm ground on a foundation of business success by creating and implementing a strategic plan over a time horizon that will maximize both growth and profitability. With a well- developed, well-articulated, and well-executed strategy, a chief executive can generate productivity and value, and a successful enterprise will have correspondingly wide latitude from investors and regulators alike to engage in responsible corporate stewardship in the manner, and over the timeframe, that is best suited to the corporation.

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Weekly Roundup: September 20-26, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 20-26, 2019.


Stakeholder Governance—Some Legal Points


Are Early Stage Investors Biased Against Women?


Statement on Volcker Rule Amendments


Trading and Arbitrage in Cryptocurrency Markets



Reg FD Enforcement Action


Investor Stewardship Reporting and Engagement





The Fearless Boardroom


Sustainability in Corporate Law



2019 ISS Global Policy Survey Results





Bank Governance, Bank Risk, and Optimal Executive Compensation


Q2 2019 Gender Diversity Index

Q2 2019 Gender Diversity Index

Amit Batish is Content Manager and Ryan Lau is an Associate Editor at Equilar Inc. This post is based on an Equilar memorandum by Mr. Batish, Mr. Lau, Kofi Boadu, Jacob Doty, Louisa Lan, and Paul Richardson.

The Equilar Gender Diversity Index (GDI) has now increased for a seventh consecutive quarter. The percentage of women on Russell 3000 boards increased from 19.3% to 20.2% in Q2 2019. This acceleration once again moved the needle, pushing the GDI to 0.40, where 1.0 represents parity among men and women on corporate boards across the Russell 3000.

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Bank Governance, Bank Risk, and Optimal Executive Compensation

Sanjai Bhagat is Provost Professor of Finance at the University of Colorado Boulder Leeds School of Business and Brian J. Bolton is Associate Director at the Global Board Centre at IMD Business School. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in Journal of Corporate Finance. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Paying for Long-Term Performance (discussed on the Forum here) and Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried; Regulating Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here); and The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here).

Corporate governance continues to be a focus of not just the financial media but the popular media, as well. The scandals at Wells Fargo and Equifax are just the most recent in the long line of scandals involving large well-known public U.S. corporations. Going back in time—the financial crisis of 2008 was triggered by the implosion of the big banks. Further back in time, at the turn of the new millennium, the scandals in Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Qwest led to their demise.

After each set of these scandals, policymakers raised questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in these companies. This led to the inevitable call for more regulation and laws to constrain and regulate corporate behavior, to wit, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Have these two rather extensive set of laws addressed the governance concerns of corporate America? The recent Wells Fargo and Equifax episodes would suggest otherwise; these are particularly noteworthy because they are both in finance industries, which Dodd-Frank 2010 was explicitly designed to address. We think a more fruitful approach to addressing the corporate governance concerns is to focus on possible common themes underpinning the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Qwest, the big banks circa 2008, Wells Fargo, and Equifax scandals. We propose, on the basis of our more recent research, that misaligned CEO incentive compensation is a common theme underpinning the above corporate scandals.

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Analysis of the Business Roundtable Statement

Morton Pierce is a partner at White & Case LLP. This is based on his White & Case memorandum, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Business Roundtable recently issued a much commented upon Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (the “Statement”). The Statement purports to redefine the purpose of a corporation as a commitment to all of its stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers, communities and, finally, shareholders. Much has already been written speculating on the timing and motivation for the Statement. A more fundamental question is whether it is legally correct or necessary.

In Delaware, where many US public companies are incorporated, the law provides that the business and affairs of a company are entrusted to the oversight of its board of directors. Those directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the shareholders. That reflects the basic fact that shareholders own a company, and the directors, and the CEOs those directors choose, are acting on behalf of the shareholder owners.

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SEC Testimony: Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Wall Street’s Cop on the Beat

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on SEC testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services by Chairman Clayton and Commissioners Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Hester M. Peirce, Elad L. Roisman, and Allison Herren Lee, available here.

Chairwoman Waters, Ranking Member McHenry and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about the work of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission or agency). [1]

Overview—The SEC’s Mission, People and Governance

The SEC and its tripartite mission—to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital formation—are critical to the functioning of our economy and the well-being of millions of Americans. With a workforce of almost 4,400 staff in Washington and across our 11 regional offices, the SEC oversees, among other things: (1) approximately $96 trillion in securities trading annually on U.S. equity markets; (2) the disclosures of approximately 4,300 exchange-listed public companies with an approximate aggregate market capitalization of $33 trillion; and (3) the activities of over 26,000 registered entities and registrants including, among others, investment advisers, broker-dealers, transfer agents, securities exchanges, clearing agencies, mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), who employ over one million people in the United States. The agency also has oversight of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

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Taking Corporate Social Responsibility Seriously

Howell E. Jackson is the James S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Chair of the Harvard Corporation’s Advisory Committee on Shareholder Responsibility. This post is based on an article originally published in the Harvard Gazette.

Over the past few decades, Harvard like many other major universities has established a variety of mechanisms to get community input on how the university’s endowment should vote its proxies on issues related to the environment and social responsibility. In recent years, many endowments, like Harvard’s, have increasingly come to rely on external managers to invest their assets and no longer retain direct shareholdings of public corporations or the right to vote proxies. To address this change, the Harvard Corporation recently turned to its Advisory Committee on Shareholder Responsibility (ACSR) to assist in drafting new proxy voting guidelines to be shared with external managers. At the same time, the Harvard Management Company also reaffirmed the University’s commitment to engagement initiatives on these issues. As outgoing faculty chair of the ACSR, I recently discussed these changes in an interview with the staff of the Harvard Gazette. That interview appears below along with links to the new Harvard proxy voting guidelines and related documents.

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2019 ISS Global Policy Survey Results

Subodh Mishra is Executive Director at Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. This post is based on his Institutional Shareholder Services publication.

Key Findings

  • Board Gender Diversity: Majorities of both investors (61 percent) and non-investors (55 percent) agreed with the view that board gender diversity is an essential attribute of effective board governance regardless of the company or its market. Approximately 27 percent of investors tended to favor a market-by-market approach to reviewing board gender diversity, while 24 percent of non-investors tended to favor an analysis conducted at the company level.
  • Director Overboarding: Investors and non-investors diverged on the question of measurement of director overboarding. A plurality of investor respondents (42 percent) indicated four public-company boards as the appropriate maximum limit for non-executive directors. A plurality of investor respondents (45 percent) also responded that two total board seats is an appropriate maximum limit for CEOs (i.e., the CEO’s “home” board plus one other board). A plurality of non-investors responded that a general board seat limit should not be applied to either non-executives (39 percent) or CEOs (36 percent), and that each board should consider what is appropriate and act accordingly.
  • Board Chair Independence: Concerning the U.S. market, survey participants were asked to identify factors that suggest the need for an independent chair in the context of a shareholder proposal. Investor respondents cited poor responsiveness to shareholder concerns as the most commonly chosen factor that strongly suggested the need for an independent board chair. Additional factors included governance practices that weaken or reduce board accountability to shareholders (such as a classified board, plurality vote standard, lack of ability to call special meetings and lack of a proxy access right). Concerning European markets, 62 percent of investors supported the policy position of a potential vote against the election of a non-independent chair solely based on the principle that the board chair should be independent. Most investor and non-investor respondents, 89 percent and 70 percent, respectively, indicated that they would apply the same approach in European markets where companies are more likely to combine the roles of CEO and Chair as in markets where separating the roles is the norm.
  • Climate Change Risk Oversight: Sixty percent of investor respondents supported the idea that all companies should be assessing and disclosing climate-related risks and taking actions to mitigate such risks where possible, while 35 percent of investor respondents indicated that climate disclosure and action may depend on company-specific factors, including the business model, industry, and location of operations. Only 5 percent of investors indicated that the possible risks related to climate change are too uncertain to incorporate into a company-specific risk assessment model.

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