Yearly Archives: 2019

Weekly Roundup: August 16–22, 2019


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This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of August 16–22, 2019.

Recent Application of Caremark: Oversight Liability


Audit Committee Disclosure in Proxy Statements—2019 Proxy Review


What the Capital One Hack Means for Boards of Directors




Technology and Life Sciences IPOs


Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation



SEC Proposal to Modernize Reg S-K


How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions?


Securities Class Action Filings—2019 Midyear Assessment



The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations






Institutional Investors’ Proxy Voting Responsibilities and Use of Proxy Advisory Firms


Statement on Proxy-Advisor Guidance


Statement Regarding Proxy Voting and Proxy Voting Advice

Statement Regarding Proxy Voting and Proxy Voting Advice

Elad L. Roisman is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Commissioner Roisman’s recent statement at the Open Meeting on Commission Guidance and Interpretation Regarding Proxy Voting and Proxy Voting Advice, available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Mr. Roisman and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Thank you, Chairman Clayton. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome Commissioner Lee to her first open meeting. I look forward to working with you and am happy that we will all benefit from your insight and passion for this agency and its mission.

As with most of our meetings, there are many “Thank Yous” to go around because so many people worked hard to get us to where we are today. Before discussing the substance of the releases the Commission will vote on this morning, I would like to make sure that I recognize each of you individually.

I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Jay Clayton. Since his earliest days leading the SEC, he has prioritized the interests of Main Street investors and improving our capital markets for all Americans. [1] I am honored that he has entrusted me with leading the Commission’s wholesale evaluation [2] of the proxy process, [3] a topic that I have been passionate about for many years.

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Statement on Proxy-Advisor Guidance

Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Jackson and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

I want to begin by expressing my appreciation to Division Directors Dalia Blass and Bill Hinman, and the terrific Staff in the Divisions of Investment Management and Corporation Finance, for their hard work in advance of today’s meeting. I’m also deeply grateful to my colleague Elad Roisman, whose work in this area is an exceptional example of effective, thoughtful leadership.

The guidance before us today addresses advice investors use in corporate voting. By informing and empowering investors ahead of corporate elections, that advice can help hold insiders accountable for how they run America’s public companies. I’m concerned that today’s guidance may alter the competitive landscape for the production and use of that advice—without addressing whether doing so might make it harder for investors to oversee management. I therefore respectfully dissent.

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Institutional Investors’ Proxy Voting Responsibilities and Use of Proxy Advisory Firms

David A. Katz, Sabastian V. Niles, and Elina Tetelbaum are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz, Mr. Niles, Ms. Tetelbaum, Trevor S. Norwitz, Andrew R. Brownstein, and Adam O. Emmerich.

Yesterday [August 21, 2019], the Securities and Exchange Commission approved new guidance in two releases from the Division of Corporation Finance and the Division of Investment Management concerning the fiduciary responsibilities of investment advisers (like fund managers) with respect to proxy voting, the use of proxy advisory firms (like ISS and Glass Lewis), assessing such advisory firms’ “care and competency” with respect to potential factual errors, incompleteness, or methodological weaknesses that may materially affect voting recommendations, and addressing the applicability of proxy solicitation and anti-fraud rules to proxy advisory firms and their vote recommendations.

Consistent with past statements by SEC Chair Jay Clayton and Commissioner Elad Roisman, today’s guidance goes beyond the 2014 staff-level interpretations regarding proxy voting and, importantly, reflects Commission-level approval. As noted by the Commission, the guidance and articulated policies (provided in question and answer formats) do not create new obligations or require rulemaking. These pronouncements increase pressure on investment advisers and proxy advisory firms in terms of what is expected of them, and should alter the behavior of those that are not already following this guidance. The SEC is encouraging investment advisers and proxy advisory firms to review their policies and practices in light of the new guidance in advance of next year’s proxy season.

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So Long to Shareholder Primacy

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on a Cooley memorandum by Ms. Posner.

In a press release issued [August 19, 2019], the Business Roundtable announced the adoption of a new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, signed by 181 well-known, high-powered CEOs. What’s newsworthy here is that the Statement “moves away from shareholder primacy” as a guiding principle and outlines in its place a “modern standard for corporate responsibility” that makes a commitment to all stakeholders. Yup, that Business Roundtable. According to the press release, the Business Roundtable has had a long-standing practice of issuing Principles of Corporate Governance. Since 1997, those Principles have advocated the theory of “shareholder primacy—that corporations exist principally to serve shareholders”—and relegated the interests of any other stakeholders to positions that were strictly “derivative of the duty to stockholders.” The new Statement supersedes previous statements and “more accurately reflects [the Business Roundtable’s] commitment to a free market economy that serves all Americans. This statement represents only one element of Business Roundtable’s work to ensure more inclusive prosperity, and we are continuing to challenge ourselves to do more.” Fasten your seatbelts, disciples of Milton Friedman; it’s going to be a bumpy night.

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Legal Implications of The Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose

Betty M. Huber is counsel, and Joseph A. Hall and Louis Goldberg are partners at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk memorandum by Ms. Huber, Mr. Hall, Mr. Goldberg, William H. Aaronson, Neil Barr, and Margaret E. Tahyar.

The Business Roundtable has endorsed stakeholder capitalism in its highly publicized Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation. The Statement of Purpose breaks from what has long been the dominant model in the United States, which conceptualizes a corporation’s sole or primary purpose to be that of maximizing shareholder value. A handful of BRT members declined to sign the Statement of Purpose. Under the Statement of Purpose, each signatory commits to (1) delivering value to its customers, (2) investing in its employees, (3) dealing fairly and ethically with its suppliers, (4) supporting the communities in which it works, and (5) generating long-term shareholder value.

The Statement of Purpose, available here, at just under a page in length, incorporates some of the environmental, social and governance, or ESG, concepts that have taken root, first in Europe and more recently in the United States. It includes the concept of a “social license to operate,” or the need for acceptance of a corporation’s business practices and operations by customers, employees, suppliers and the general public, in addition to shareholders. The Statement of Purpose is for the moment mainly symbolic since legislatures and courts, not trade associations, define the scope of a director’s fiduciary duties.

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Statement at Open Meeting on Commission Guidance and Interpretation Regarding Proxy Voting and Proxy Voting Advice

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent statement at an Open Meeting on Commission Guidance and Interpretation Regarding Proxy Voting and Proxy Voting Advice, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Congress assigned to the Commission the responsibility to regulate the proxy solicitation process in 1934. Voting proxies is important. When we meet with market participants, we consistently hear about the importance of engagement, and the voting process is a key component of that engagement. This is made clear in many ways, including that our proxy rules regulate how proxies can be solicited and what information must be disclosed. Those rules impose significant anti-fraud liability on statements which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, are false or misleading with respect to any material fact. No other country comes close in terms of providing and enforcing this level of investor protection around the proxy voting process. Further, in the context of a share-for-share merger subject to a shareholder vote, we impose additional liability under the Securities Act of 1933 on registrants and officers and directors for the information in the associated registration statement.

In the past two decades, the proxy process has become one of increasing complexity, and also importance, to investors, issuers, and investment advisers. Commission rule changes, state law changes, corporate governance practices, technology and other factors have all increased the significance of shareholder voting in our public capital markets. This is one reason why the Commission and its staff have prioritized our work in this area. During this time, investment advisers have assumed a much greater role in our marketplace and, consequently, a greater role in the area of shareholder-company engagement. For example, there are now over 13,000 SEC-registered investment advisers with over $84 trillion in assets under management, and over 8,000 of these investment advisers provide services to retail investors. [1]

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Remarks at SECs Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee Meeting

Jay Clayton is Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Chairman Clayton’s recent remarks at the SEC’s Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee Meeting, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Mr. Clayton and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you Carla [Garrett], members of the Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee, Martha [Miller], and the staff in the Office of the Advocate for Small Business Capital Formation for holding the second meeting of the Committee outside of Washington, DC. [1] It demonstrates a clear commitment to capital formation across the country. I thank you for your thoughtful and pragmatic exploration of how our rules, regulations, and policies impact small businesses and their investors, including smaller public companies. In that vein, a very big thank you to our host, Creighton University, for the warm welcome to Omaha, NE.

Your agenda today is packed with substantive topics that I believe can have a very positive impact on smaller companies and their investors. This morning you already heard from the staff in the Division of Corporation Finance about the SEC’s Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions. [2] The concept release is the first step in what I hope will be a much needed reform of our exemptive offering framework, which I have referred to before as an elaborate patchwork. [3] I understand that this morning was also the first step for the work of the Committee in this area and that you will continue to consider how we can harmonize and make more effective our exemptions from registration at a future meeting of the Committee. The opportunity for improvement is stark. Private capital raising is now outpacing capital raising in our public markets, yet our Main Street investors have no effective access to investments in private capital offerings. Further, the availability of private capital is geographically skewed and, as we discussed at your first meeting, significantly favors companies with valuations in excess of $50 million. I look forward to your work in this area. In the meantime, I encourage everyone, including small businesses and their investors, to send us their comments and share their suggestions for how we can improve the exemptive offering framework.

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The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations

Michael Dorff is the Michael & Jessica Downer Endowed Chair, Southwestern Law School; James Hicks is an Academic Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; and Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper.

The public benefit corporation (“PBC”) is one of the hottest developments in corporate law. The sine qua non of this new form is that directors are permitted under their fiduciary duties to consider purposes other than profit in decision-making. The PBC has thus been described as different from the traditional corporation, which in some measure must be devoted solely to a for-profit motive. The PBC has been hailed as the “new corporate form”: one that permits a corporation to both earn money and serve a social purpose.

While there has been significant hype and theoretical consideration of this new form, to date there has been little empirical study. Critics of the PBC argue that it will be used for “purpose washing,” merely advocating a public purpose for public relations purposes while still maintaining a purely for-profit motive. Critics also argue that the current corporate form has enough latitude to serve multiple purposes. Advocates counter that the PBC will do nothing less than transform the U.S. capital markets, arguing that the profit maximization norm has contributed to a litany of preventable social ills, from global warming to income inequality, and from declining job stability to political corruption. By incorporating values other than profit-seeking into a company’s “DNA,” proponents assert, the law can tame capitalism’s worst excesses while retaining its many virtues.

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Stakeholder Corporate Governance Business Roundtable and Council of Institutional Investors

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton.

The failure of the Council of Institutional Investors to join the Business Roundtable in rejecting shareholder primacy and embracing stakeholder corporate governance is misguided. The argument that protection of stakeholders other than shareholders should be left to government regulation is an even more serious mistake. It would lead to state corporatism or socialism.

The failure to recognize the existential threats of inequality and climate change, not only to business corporations but also to asset managers, institutional investors and all shareholders, will invariably lead to legislation that will regulate not only corporations but also investors and take from them the ability to use their voting power to influence the corporations in which they invest. Inequality and climate change will not be mitigated without adherence to the BRT governance principles not just by members of the BRT, but by all business corporations.

The BRT did not dismiss shareholders as “simply” providers of capital. To the contrary, the BRT principles recognize the fundamental importance of shareholders to the company, and commit the company to transparency and engagement with its shareholders to obtain their views of the company’s strategy, operations, and prospects.

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