Yearly Archives: 2019

Statement on Volcker Rule Amendments

Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioners Jackson, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Regulating Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here); and The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here).

[On September 18, 2019], the Commission finalized the rollback of the Volcker Rule—the risktaking limits that keep banks from gambling with taxpayer money. These limits are designed to help regulators address a basic problem of incentives: bankers, anticipating taxpayer-funded bailouts, prefer to take excessive risks to maximize their bonuses. [1] That’s why I’ve called upon my colleagues to finalize the rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act to prohibit pay practices that reward excessive risktaking. Instead, having done nothing about banker bonuses, we are weakening structural limits on risk.

As always, I am grateful to my colleagues on the Staff in the Division of Trading and Markets for their hard work. But, as I said at the proposal stage, “[r]olling back the Volcker Rule while failing to address pay practices that allow bankers to profit from proprietary trading puts American investors, taxpayers, and markets at risk.” [2] That’s no less true today than it was a year ago, so I respectfully dissent.

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Are Early Stage Investors Biased Against Women?

Michael Ewens is Associate Professor of Finance and Entrepreneurship at the California Institute of Technology and Richard Townsend is Assistant Professor of Finance at the UCSD Rady School of Management. This post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.

It is well known that there is a significant gender gap in high-growth entrepreneurship. The persistence of this gap over time runs counter to more general labor market trends. Several potential explanations have been proposed, including gender differences in technical training or risk preferences. However, many have also speculated that part of the gender gap may, in fact, be due to a lower propensity for investors to fund female entrepreneurs seeking capital. This view largely stems from the fact that over 90% of venture capitalists (VCs) are men. In this article, we directly examine whether female entrepreneurs are at a disadvantage in raising capital due to their gender and if so, why.

To examine these questions, in our article we use a proprietary data set obtained from AngelList, a popular online platform that connects investors with seed-stage startups. Companies create profiles on AngelList describing their businesses and founding teams. They can then start a fundraising campaign wherein they specify the amount of capital they are trying to raise along with other desired deal terms. Accredited investors—both angels and VCs—can register on the platform and subsequently connect with companies seeking funds,

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Stakeholder Governance—Some Legal Points

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, William Savitt, Karessa L. Cain, and Sabastian V. Niles.

Recently, a number of questions have been raised about the legal responsibilities of directors in pursuing long-term sustainable business strategies and taking into account ESG (environmental, social, governance) factors and the interests of all the stakeholders in the corporation. The following are key parts of the answers we have been giving.

  1. The purpose of a corporation is long-term business success and long-term increase in the corporation’s value.
  2. Shareholders elect the directors of a corporation and thereby have the power to determine the composition of the board of directors.
  3. The directors of a corporation have a fiduciary duty to the corporation to use their business judgment to promote its long-term business success and increase in value.

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Weekly Roundup: September 13-19, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of September 13-19, 2019.

Financial Contracting with the Crowd


Audit Committee Reports to Shareholders


Market Based Factors as Best Indicators of Fair Value



PE Sale of Portfolio Company to a SPAC



Is Your Board Accountable?


Reforming Pensions While Retaining Shareholder Voice




Modernizing Bank Merger Review


Trends in Executive Compensation


Setting Directors’ Pay Under Delaware Law


Words Speak Louder Without Actions



New Policy for Shareholder Proposal Rule



Directors’ Duties in an Evolving Risk and Governance Landscape

Directors’ Duties in an Evolving Risk and Governance Landscape

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, and William Savitt is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Socially Responsible Firms by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum here).

The stakes for responsible corporate stewardship have never been higher.

Corporations today account for a greater proportion of our collective productivity than ever before. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 71 are corporations, and only 29 are countries. U.S. corporations alone generated profits of $2.3 trillion in 2018—the highest in history. Reflecting their unprecedented scale, U.S. corporations have been blamed for accelerating environmental degradation and aggravating disparities in income and wealth. Calls for the exercise of corporate social responsibility have become increasingly urgent. Recognizing this urgency, the Business Roundtable last month embraced broad stakeholder governance and urged corporate leaders to focus on sustainable value creation. Yet, as directors of U.S. corporations seek to answer these calls, they remain subject to countervailing market pressure to deliver outsized stockholder returns in compressed time horizons.

To allow directors to mediate this challenge, and to facilitate responsible long-term corporate decision making, we have long supported a stakeholder-centered model of corporate governance and cautioned against rote application of the entrenched shareholder-primacy model. Recognizing that investors, and the asset managers who represent them, share with the rest of society an interest in sustainable prosperity, we have sponsored The New Paradigm—a reconception of corporate governance as a collaboration among shareholders, managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and the communities in which corporations operate.

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The Limits of Delaware Corporate Law: Internal Affairs, Federal Forum Provisions, and Sciabacucchi

Joseph A. Grundfest is William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law School. This post is based on his recent paper, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Market for Corporate Law by Michal Barzuza, Lucian A. Bebchuk, and Oren Bar-Gill and Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History by Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani.

The Securities Act of 1933 provides for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. Securities Act claims were historically litigated in federal court, but in 2015 plaintiffs began filing far more frequently in state court where dismissals are less common and weaker claims more likely to survive. D&O insurance costs for IPOs have since increased significantly. Today, approximately 75% of defendants in Section 11 claims face state court actions. Federal Forum Provisions [FFPs] respond by providing that, for Delaware-chartered entities, Securities Act claims must be litigated in federal court or in Delaware state court.

In Sciabacucchi, Chancery applies “first principles” to invalidate FFPs primarily on grounds that charter provisions may only regulate internal affairs, and that Securities Act claims are always external. In so concluding, Sciabacucchi adopts a novel definition of internal affairs that is narrower than precedent, and asserts that plaintiffs have a federal right to bring state court Securities Act claims. It describes all Securities Act plaintiffs as purchasers who are not owed fiduciary duties at the time of purchase. The opinion constrains all actions of the Delaware legislature relating to the DGCL to comply with its novel definition of “internal affairs.”

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New Policy for Shareholder Proposal Rule

Joseph A. Hall is a partner, and Betty M. Huber and Ning Chiu are counsel at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. This post is based on their Davis Polk memorandum.

Staff may not take a position or may respond orally to some no-action requests

On September 6, the SEC staff announced a new policy regarding its administration of the shareholder-proposal rule, Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As before, the staff will monitor and provide informal guidance regarding shareholder proposals submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Where a company seeks to exclude a proposal by submitting a no-action letter request, the staff will continue to review the request.

Under the new policy, instead of responding in writing that it concurs or disagrees, in some cases the staff may respond only orally. It may also, orally or in writing, decline to state a view with respect to the company’s reasons for excluding the proposal. Where the staff declines to take a view on a no-action letter request, the interested parties should not interpret that position as indicating that the proposal should or should not be included in the proxy statement for shareholder vote. The announcement made clear that under those circumstances, the staff is not weighing in on the merits of the argument and the company may have a valid legal basis on which to exclude the proposal. The parties may choose to seek adjudication of the issue in court.

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Accounting Firms, Private Funds, and Auditor Independence Rules

David Wohl is a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. This post is based on his recent Weil memorandum.

The SEC recently charged a large public accounting firm (Accounting Firm) with violations of its auditor independence rules (Independence Rules) in connection with more than 100 audit reports involving at least 15 audit clients, including several private funds. [1] According to the SEC’s order, the Accounting Firm represented that it was “independent” in audit reports issued on the clients’ financial statements. However, the SEC found that the Accounting Firm or its affiliates provided prohibited non-audit services to affiliates of those audit clients (including to portfolio companies of the private funds), which violated the Independence Rules. The prohibited non-audit services included corporate secretarial services, payment facilitation, payroll outsourcing, loaned staff, financial information system design or implementation, bookkeeping, internal audit outsourcing and investment adviser services. The SEC also found that certain of the Accounting Firm’s independence controls were inadequate, resulting in its failure to identify and avoid these prohibited non-audit services.

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Words Speak Louder Without Actions

Doron Levit is Assistant Professor of Finance at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. This post is based on a recent article by Professor Levit, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Letting Shareholders Set the Rules and The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, both by Lucian Bebchuk.

Information and control rights are central aspects of leadership, management, and corporate governance. In practice, communication of private information and intervention in the decision-making process are common remedies for information asymmetries and conflicts of interest in a wide range of situations. The interplay between communication and intervention, however, is little understood.

In my article, Words Speak Louder Without Actions, which is forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, I show that the power of a principal to intervene in an agent’s decision exacerbates the underlying agency problem and as a result limits the ability of the principal to use her private information to influence the agent’s decision. The power to intervene can therefore be detrimental to the principal. This novel result has implications for the effectiveness of visionary management, the tension between the supervisory and advisory roles of corporate boards, and the value that sophisticated investors offer their portfolio companies.

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Setting Directors’ Pay Under Delaware Law

Steve Seelig is Senior Director, Executive Compensation and Stephen Douglas is Senior Legislative and Regulatory Advisor, Technical Services at Willis Towers Watson. This post is based on their Willis Towers Watson memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Delaware Chancery’s refusal to dismiss a derivative allegation in a suit claiming that Goldman Sachs directors were paid excessively may soon provide a decision that offers companies guidance on setting board of director pay (Stein v. Blankfein, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, C.A. No. 2017-0354-SG (Del. Ch. May. 31, 2019). This guidance may come despite the court’s initial doubts that the facts, when more fully developed, would yield a holding against Goldman.

If the case is not settled before the next phase of the case, the Chancery’s application of the “entire fairness” standard may provide greater clarity on how directors are paid and whether pay levels are excessive. The “entire fairness” standard, as applied to director pay setting, was articulated in the 2017 Investor’s Bancorp case, and has a standard that is less differential than the “business judgment rule”. (See “Delaware Supreme Court ruling moves the goalposts on director compensation,” Executive Pay Matters, February 16, 2018).

The initial court decision raises several notable issues.

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