Yearly Archives: 2019

Board Oversight of Corporate Compliance: Is it Time for a Refresh?

Robert Biskup is a managing director at Deloitte Risk & Financial Advisory, Krista Parsons is a managing director at Deloitte & Touche LLP, and Robert Lamm is Independent Senior Advisor at the Center for Board Effectiveness at Deloitte LLP. This post is based on their Deloitte memorandum.

Introduction—Compliance oversight as a board responsibility

Nearly 25 years have passed since a landmark decision of the Delaware Chancery Court involving the board’s role in compliance oversight. The case was based upon claims that the board in question had breached its fiduciary duty regarding compliance with legal requirements applicable to health care providers, leading to an extensive federal investigation, an indictment charging multiple federal felonies, and fines, penalties, and damages approximating $250 million. Among its other findings, the Chancery Court concluded that:

“a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and . . . failure to do so under some circumstances may . . . render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.” [1]

As a result of this decision and its progeny, it is now settled doctrine that a board of director’s fiduciary duties include establishing that management has an effective corporate compliance program in place, exercising oversight of that program, and taking regular steps to stay informed of the program’s content and operation. Aside from the many adverse consequences of an inadequate compliance program, a breach of these duties can result in shareholder derivative litigation, and may even subject board members to personal liability under some circumstances (though that did not happen in the case cited above). Of equal or greater importance, a compliance failure can lead to critical operational, reputational, and other business challenges that can haunt a company for years—or even destroy it.

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Observations on Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation

Peter J. Walsh, Jr. is a partner, and Nicholas D. Mozal is counsel, at Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP. This post is based on their Potter Anderson memorandum and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On October 1, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss a Caremark claim in In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation. Under In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), directors have a duty to exercise oversight and monitor a corporation’s operational viability, legal compliance, and financial performance. Clovis is the first decision to allow a Caremark claim to proceed beyond the pleadings since the Delaware Supreme Court’s June 2019 decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, which reversed a Court of Chancery decision dismissing a Caremark claim. The Clovis decision highlights (i) the importance of board level efforts to oversee compliance with governing law and regulatory mandates, particularly in situations where compliance issues are critical to a “monoline” company, and (ii) how stockholders are using books and records demands under 8 Del. C. § 220 to pursue fiduciary claims focused on those same compliance issues.

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Delaware Choice-of-Law Provisions in Restrictive Covenant Agreements

Christopher B. Chuff is an associate at Pepper Hamilton LLP. This post is based on a Pepper memorandum by Mr. Chuff, Joanna J. Cline, Matthew M. Greenberg, and Taylor B. Bartholomew. This post is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

It is well-settled that California has a strong public policy against the enforcement of restrictive covenants against employees. Because of this, there has been a recent trend where employers have sought to circumvent California’s public policy by invoking Delaware law in restrictive covenant agreements with their employees. However, in a number of recent opinions, the Delaware Court of Chancery has resisted those efforts, instead choosing to invalidate the Delaware choice-of-law provisions and apply California law to void the restrictive covenants.

Indeed, despite the fact that Delaware is typically a contractarian state, the Court of Chancery has reasoned that, unless one or more conditions (summarized below) are met, California-based companies will not be permitted to effectuate an end run around California’s strict public policy by invoking Delaware law in contracts with their employees. Furthermore, although not directly addressed by the Court of Chancery’s recent decisions, it is likely, based on the Court’s reasoning in these decisions, that Delaware courts will apply California law to void noncompetition and nonsolicitation provisions within an agreement between employers with their principal places of business outside of California and their employees that live and work primarily in California, notwithstanding the existence of a Delaware choice-of-law provision.

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CEO Pay Growth and Total Shareholder Return

Joseph Bachelder is special counsel at McCarter & English LLP. This post is based on a memorandum by Mr. Bachelder. Andy Tsang, a senior financial analyst with the firm, assisted in the preparation of this post. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Growth of Executive Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein; The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here); and Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

One of the methodologies used to assess the reasonableness of CEO pay is a comparison of the growth rate in CEO pay with the company’s total shareholder return (TSR) over a period of time. TSR generally represents (a) the change in stock price of the company over the period of time being measured plus dividends paid during such period divided by (b) the stock price at the beginning of the period. In 2015 the SEC proposed a new rule that would require each issuer to disclose in its proxy statements over a period of five years (initially, over three years) (a) the levels of CEO pay (as well as that of the other NEOs) and (b) the TSR of the issuer (as well as the TSR of a peer group of companies). See Pay Versus Performance, SEC Release No. 34-74835; File No. S7-07-15 (April 29, 2015), 80 Fed. Reg. 26329 (May 7, 2015).

Today’s column takes a look at the growth rate of CEO pay and TSR over the five-year period 2014-2018 for the following groups: (i) the S&P 500 companies and (ii) large companies in three industries: commercial banking, retail sales and computer software.

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Recent Trends in Shareholder Activism

Richard Grossman is partner and Alexander J. Berg is an associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on their Skadden memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); and Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Shareholder activism remains pervasive in the corporate landscape, as many companies continue to face new, and sometimes more sophisticated, activist situations. Recent activism-related trends indicate that the landscape is continually shifting, and companies’ strategies for dealing with activism should therefore also evolve and adapt.

Increase in M&A Activism

Mergers and acquisitions activity has increasingly become a focus for activists. Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group (Lazard) reported that approximately 46% of all activist campaigns in the first half of 2019 had an M&A angle, as activists continue to see these transactions as opportunities to increase returns for shareholders. Comparatively, from 2014 to 2018, M&A-related objectives arose in only one-third of all activist campaigns.

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Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies

John Armour is Professor of Law and Finance at the University of Oxford; Colin Mayer is Peter Moores Professor of Management Studies at University of Oxford Saïd Business School; and Andrea Polo is Assistant Professor of Finance at LUISS Guido Carli University. This post is based on their article, forthcoming in Cambridge Handbook of Compliance (Cambridge University Press).

A firm’s “reputation” reflects the expectations of its partners of the benefits of trading with it in the future. An announcement by a regulator that a firm has engaged in misconduct may be expected to impact negatively on trading parties’ (i.e. consumers or investors) expectations for a firm’s future performance, and hence on its market value. How can we identify reputational losses from share price reactions? How large are these losses for different types of misconducts? In the article Naming and Shaming: Evidence from Event Studies, forthcoming in the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance (Cambridge University Press), we describe the results of previous studies, discuss the event study methodology and underline the empirical challenges. We then present the evidence from one unique study that meet all necessary conditions for identification of reputational sanctions from event studies (Armour et al. 2017) and draw implications for regulatory enforcement policy.

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Weekly Roundup: October 4–10, 2019


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of October 4–10, 2019.

SEC Expansion of “Testing-the-Waters” Communications to All Issuers


Response to CII Proposal to Amend DGCL



Women Board Seats in Russell 3000 Pass the 20% Mark



Implied Private Right of Action Under the Investment Company Act


The Reverse Agency Problem in the Age of Compliance



Shareholder Activism and Governance in France


Self-Driving Corporations?


A Stakeholder Approach and Executive Compensation




Clear and Unambiguous Terms of Merger Agreement


Virtual Shareholder Meetings in the U.S


Corporate Control Across the World


Predicting Long Term Success for Corporations and Investors Worldwide

Predicting Long Term Success for Corporations and Investors Worldwide

Bhakti Mirchandani is Managing Director, Allen He is a senior research associate, and Victoria Tellez is a research associate at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on a FCLTGlobal memorandum by Ms. Mirchandani, Mr. He, Ms. Tellez, Steve Boxer, and Evan Horowitz. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here); and The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here).

Through our research, FCLTGlobal aims to identify the key determinants of long-term success for companies and investors around the world. We then use this knowledge to encourage long-term behaviors across capital markets. This post focuses on predictors of long-term health that are grounded in rich global data going back over time. Looking across the value chain—at companies, asset managers, and asset owners—we find the following:

  • Global companies are falling short on long-term behaviors. Companies are scoring lower than they did in 2014, and well below the level reached before the financial crisis, on our overall measure of long-term behavior.
  • Overdistribution of capital can be a drain on corporate performance. Although distributing capital via buybacks and dividends makes sense in some circumstances, our analysis finds that companies taking this approach tend to generate lower five-year returns on invested capital (ROIC, our preferred measure of performance).
  • Corporate research and development (R&D) can boost returns. By looking at the marginal value of additional research spending, we show that R&D investments are linked to higher ROIC.
  • Employee ownership is linked to higher returns among global asset managers. Employee ownership is the strongest predictor of success for asset managers, particularly those in equity investing.
  • Net returns for asset owners are linked to both governance and investment strategy. Relevant factors include board diversity, active ownership, lower costs, a higher funded ratio, and higher exposure to both public and private equity. Of course, not all drivers of long-term success are easily measured or detected, and if more data were available, we could deepen our understanding of vital factors such as talent retention and customer loyalty. But even with existing data limitations, we are able to confirm some well-known predictors of long-term success and also unearth some novel ones. What follows is a fuller account of our findings, our methodology, and our thoughts on how best to extend these results in the future.

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Corporate Control Across the World

Gur Aminadav is a Finance & Research Advisor at the London Business School; and Elias Papaioannou is Professor of Economics at the London Business School and the Hal Varian Visiting Professor at MIT Department of Economics. The post is based on their recent article, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.

Understanding the driving forces and consequences of the various types of corporate control are core inquiries of corporate finance. While most economics and legal theory distinguishes between widely-held corporations with dispersed ownership and controlled firms where a dominant shareholder exerts control, corporate structures are complex. Pyramids that allow shareholders to influence decisions over their cash-flow rights and cross-holdings of equity in business groups are pervasive. Moreover, ownership and control are often hidden behind shell companies incorporated in off-shore centers. Equity blocks—that entail some controlling rights—are commonplace, even in companies that most would coin as widely-held.

In a series of influential works Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999) tried to bridge economics and law research, compiling data on ownership concentration, corporate control, and legal protection of investors for a large number of countries. The subsequent voluminous literature on law and finance explores the role of the legal tradition, imposed by colonial powers, as well as corporate law, shareholder and creditor protection, securities legislation, and regulatory features on corporate control and finance (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sheifer (2006) for an overview).

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Virtual Shareholder Meetings in the U.S

This post is based on an ISS Analytics publication by Marie Clara Buellingen, ISS Custom Research.

Key Findings

  • While overall the share of virtual annual meetings among Russell 3000 firms has increased to 7.7 percent, the number of new adopters has decreased in each of the last two years.
  • There does not seem to be a link between governance structure and company meeting format. Companies with virtual meetings appear no more likely to have poor governance provisions.
  • Similarly, the dissent levels on key voting items such as say-on-pay and director election appear to not vary materially for both physical and virtual meeting holders.
  • When adopting a new meeting format, companies and shareholders should evaluate key considerations to protect shareholder rights and address both concrete and perceived risks associated with a virtual meeting format.

Meeting format proliferation

Supporters of virtual shareholder meetings hail the benefits of giving more shareholders the opportunity to attend and actively participate in annual meetings, while reducing the cost to shareholders. Critics emphasize that the intangible benefits of in-person interaction could be lost, and that virtual meetings could also present problems with standard meeting procedures (such as presenting shareholder proposals). They argue that the virtual meeting format could give boards too much sway over the discussion and allow boards to avoid uncomfortable questions more easily.

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