Monthly Archives: March 2022

Scales Tipped Toward More Women Joining Boards in California in 2021

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here); and Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? by Jesse M. Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

With the passage of SB 826 in 2018, California became the first state to mandate board gender diversity (see this PubCo post). To measure the impact of that legislation, in 2020, California’s current First Lady co-founded the California Partners Project. In 2020, the CPP released a progress report on women’s representation on boards of public companies headquartered in California, tracking the changes in gender diversity on California boards since enactment of the law. (See this PubCo post.) Now, the CPP has released another report, Mapping Inclusion: Women’s Representation on California’s Public Company Boards by Region and Industry. The new report, the CPP’s third, found “much to celebrate in the progress California has made. All-male boards are a thing of the past—from nearly a third of public company boards in 2018 to less than two percent now—and women hold a record number of California public company board seats.” The report asserts that the “California experiment proves that where there’s a will, there’s a way. Concern that there were not enough qualified women to serve on boards is unfounded.” Most revealing perhaps, the report tells us that, in 2021more women have joined California’s public company boards than men, likely for the first time.” But just barely—469 of the 930 directors that started in 2021, or 50.4%, were women. Whether this new statistic is attributable to SB 826 is anyone’s guess—correlation is not necessarily causation and investors and others have also pressured companies on diversity issues—but it certainly helped to dial up the heat.

SideBar

SB 826 requires that, by December 31, 2021, all listed public companies headquartered in California, no matter where they are incorporated, include at least two women on their boards if the corporation has five directors and three women directors if the corporation has six or more directors. A minimum of one woman director is required if the board has four or fewer directors.

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Delaware Confirms Importance of Up-to-Date and Unambiguous Advance Notice Bylaws

Daniel E. Wolf is partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. This post is based on a Kirkland & Ellis memorandum by Mr. Wolf, Sarkis Jebejian, Shaun Mathew, Stefan Atkinson, and Byron Pacheco, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

  • In a recent decision, Delaware continued its longstanding practice of enforcing unambiguous bylaws, affirming a company’s rejection of an activist nomination notice for failure to comply with requirements of its advance notice bylaws, including that nominations may be made only by a shareholder of record and that a company’s required form of nominee questionnaire may be requested only by a shareholder of record
  • Advance notice bylaws will have increased importance with the coming implementation of the SEC’s new universal proxy rules in September 2022, and companies may want to consider reviewing their bylaws to ensure the benefits of state-of-the-art provisions, including certain modifications tied to the new universal proxy rules

As we have noted before, advance notice bylaws are a near-universal feature of the organizational documents of public companies. These provisions establish informational, timing and procedural requirements that shareholders must satisfy as a condition to nominating directors or making a business proposal at a shareholder meeting. In a string of cases over the last three years, Delaware courts have repeatedly upheld enforcement of these provisions by boards, finding that they are useful in permitting “orderly meeting and election contests,” giving companies “sufficient time to respond to shareholder nominations” and “preventing last-minute surprise attacks by third parties for control or board representation.”

In a recent decision involving a hostile takeover bid and associated proxy contest targeting one of our clients, the Delaware Chancery Court once again followed this path, affirming our client’s rejection of the bidder’s nomination notice for failure to comply with the unambiguous requirements of its advance notice bylaws.

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The Ongoing Debate at the SEC on Climate Disclosure Rules

Cydney S. Posner is special counsel at Cooley LLP. This post is based on her Cooley memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance (discussed on the Forum here) and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

Who doesn’t love the latest gossip—I mean reporting—about internal squabbles—I mean debate—at the SEC? This news from Bloomberg sheds some fascinating light on reasons for the ongoing delay in the release of the SEC’s climate disclosure proposal: internal conflicts about the proposal. But, surprisingly, the conflicts are not between the Dems and the one Republican remaining on the SEC; rather, they’re reportedly between SEC Chair Gary Gensler and the two other Democratic commissioners, Allison Herren Lee and Caroline Crenshaw, about how far to push the proposed new disclosure requirements, especially in light of the near certainty of litigation, and whether to require that the disclosures be audited. Just how tough should the proposal be? The article paints the SEC’s dilemma about the rulemaking this way: “If its rule lacks teeth, progressives will be outraged. On the flip side, an aggressive stance makes it more likely the regulation will be shot down by the courts, leaving the Biden administration with nothing. Either way, someone is going to be disappointed.”

According to the article, the issues center around “how much information the agency can force companies to divulge without losing an almost certain legal challenge brought by Washington’s business lobby or a Republican-led state. Another flashpoint involves whether auditors should sign off on the disclosures, ensuring they would be vetted by the same independent watchdogs who review corporations’ financial statements.”

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Remarks by Chair Gensler Before the Investor Advisory Committee

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public remarks before the Investor Advisory Committee. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Thank you. It’s good to be back with the Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) again. As is customary, I’d like to note that my views are my own, and I’m not speaking on behalf of the Commission or SEC staff.

I’d like to acknowledge the departure of Committee members J.W. Verret and Paul Mahoney. J.W. has served as the Assistant Secretary and Chair of the Market Structure Subcommittee. Paul has served in a number of roles, including IAC Chair during a transitionary period. Both have been active, engaged members of the Committee. Thank you for volunteering your time to make important contributions to our work.

The topics you’re discussing today address a number of items on the Regulatory Flexibility Act Agenda.

Your opening panel tackles the ethical issues and fiduciary responsibilities related to the use of artificial intelligence in robo-advising. More broadly, I’d like to address what we call digital engagement practices, and how they intersect with a variety of finance platforms.

Technological developments can increase access and choice. They also, however, raise important public policy considerations — with respect to conflicts of interest and bias, as you’ll discuss today, and systemic risk, a topic I’ll leave for another day.

First, conflicts of interest. Predictive data analytics, differential marketing, and behavioral prompts — what we’ve collectively called digital engagement practices — are integrated into robo-advising, wealth management platforms, brokerage platforms, and other financial technologies.

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Women and M&A

Afra Afsharipour is Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law at the UC Davis School of Law. This post is based on her recent paper, forthcoming in the UC Irvine Law Review. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Politics and Gender in the Executive Suite by Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, and David Weiss (discussed on the Forum here); and Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? by Jesse M. Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Undertaking a large merger and acquisition (M&A) deal involves many different actors—a corporation’s board of directors, its senior management, and legal and financial advisors. Each of these actors plays a significant role in the decision to move forward on an M&A deal and is deeply involved in planning, negotiating, and executing a deal. This paper provides a holistic analysis of the lead actors involved in M&A transactions, revealing gender disparities in leadership among each of these actors. After decades of pronouncements about the commitment to diversity, there remains a significant underrepresentation of women in leadership among all the institutions involved in M&A.

For purposes of corporate law, boards are at the center of corporate governance in M&A. The central role that boards play in corporate governance has made the board as an institution a target for gender diversity efforts. Thus, while women continue to be underrepresented on boards, board diversity has accelerated over the last decade. For instance, in 2008, only sixteen percent of S&P 500 board seats were held by women, by 2021 that number had increased to thirty percent. Nevertheless, women remain underrepresented in board leadership roles, an important element of what some scholars call substantive gender diversity. For M&A transactions, substantive gender diversity is particularly important because the board chair plays a critical role in setting a board’s agenda, and board members often view the chair as influential in board decision-making.

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Weekly Roundup: March 4-10, 2022


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of March 4-10, 2022.

SEC Proposes Additional Private Fund Disclosures


The Further Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers, and Direct Listings


Women in the Boardroom: 2022 Update


Remarks by Commissioner Lee at PLI’s Corporate Governance


Biotech’s ESG Crossroads


SEC Proposes Amendments to Schedules 13D and 13G


Four Takeaways from the SEC’s Proposed Cybersecurity Rules


The Effect of Media-Linked Directors on Financing and External Governance


Gender Pay Gap


How Sarah Bloom Raskin’s Confirmation May Affect Climate-Related Banking Regulation


Board Diversity Matters: An Empirical Assessment of Community Lending at Federal Reserve-Regulated Banks


DOJ Delivers Stark Message About Corporate Cooperation



Workforce Diversity Data Disclosure


The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation


Proposed Rule Changes to SEC Beneficial Ownership Reporting


Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Proposal for Mandatory Cybersecurity Disclosures


Statement by Chair Gensler on Proposal for Mandatory Cybersecurity Disclosures

Statement by Chair Gensler on Proposal for Mandatory Cybersecurity Disclosures

Gary Gensler is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on his recent public statement. The views expressed in the post are those of Chair Gensler, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Staff.

Today [March 9, 2022], the Commission is considering a proposal to mandate cybersecurity disclosures by public companies. I am pleased to support this proposal because, if adopted, it would strengthen investors’ ability to evaluate public companies’ cybersecurity practices and incident reporting.

We’ve been requiring disclosure of important information from companies since the Great Depression. The basic bargain is this: Investors get to decide what risks they wish to take. Companies that are raising money from the public have an obligation to share information with investors on a regular basis.

Over the years, our disclosure regime has evolved to reflect evolving risks and investor needs.

Today, cybersecurity is an emerging risk with which public issuers increasingly must contend. The interconnectedness of our networks, the use of predictive data analytics, and the insatiable desire for data are only accelerating, putting our financial accounts, investments, and private information at risk. Investors want to know more about how issuers are managing those growing risks.

Cybersecurity incidents, unfortunately, happen a lot. They can have significant financial, operational, legal, and reputational impacts on public issuers. Thus, investors increasingly seek information about cybersecurity risks, which can affect their investment decisions and returns.

A lot of issuers already provide cybersecurity disclosure to investors. I think companies and investors alike would benefit if this information were required in a consistent, comparable, and decision-useful manner.

Today’s release would enhance issuers’ cybersecurity disclosures in two key ways:

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Statement by Commissioner Peirce on Proposal for Mandatory Cybersecurity Disclosures

Hester M. Peirce is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on her recent public statement. The views expressed in this post are those of Ms. Peirce and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff.

Thank you, Renee, Ian, and Jessica. Cybersecurity risk is top of mind for everyone. The Commission’s consideration of this topic—whether for investment advisers, as we did a month ago, [1] or public companies, as we are doing today—is, therefore, reasonable. We must approach this topic, of course, through the prism of our mission. We have an important role to play in ensuring that investors get the information they need to understand issuers’ cybersecurity risks if they are material. This proposal, however, flirts with casting us as the nation’s cybersecurity command center, a role Congress did not give us. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Our role with respect to public companies’ activities, cybersecurity or otherwise, is limited. The Commission regulates public companies’ disclosures; it does not regulate public companies’ activities. Companies register the offer and sale, and classes of securities with the Commission; they themselves are not registered with us, and we do not have the same authority over public companies as we do over investment advisers, broker-dealers, or other registered entities.

The proposal, although couched in standard disclosure language, guides companies in substantive, if somewhat subtle, ways. First, the governance disclosure requirements embody an unprecedented micromanagement by the Commission of the composition and functioning of both the boards of directors and management of public companies. First, the proposal requires issuers to disclose the name of any board member who has cybersecurity expertise and as much detail as necessary to fully describe the nature of the expertise. Second, the proposal requires issuers to disclose whether they have a chief information security officer, her relevant expertise, and where she fits in the organizational chart. Third, the proposal requires granular disclosures about the interactions of management and the board of directors on cybersecurity, including the frequency with which the board considers the topic and the frequency with which the relevant experts from the board and management discuss the topic.

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Proposed Rule Changes to SEC Beneficial Ownership Reporting

Eleazer Klein and Adriana Schwartz are partners and Clara Zylberg is special counsel at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. This post is based on their SRZ memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here) and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

On Feb. 10, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proposed amendments to the rules governing beneficial ownership reporting (“Proposal”). [1] The Proposal seeks to:

  • Tighten filing deadlines for Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G;
  • Require inclusion of certain cash-settled derivative securities (other than cash settled swaps) in determining beneficial ownership for Schedule 13D filers and require disclosure of all cash settled derivative securities in Item 6 of Schedule 13D;
  • Clarify when persons form a “group”; and
  • Require that Schedules 13D and 13G be filed using a structured, machine-readable data language.

The following is an overview of the Proposal.

Initial Filing Deadlines

  • Schedule 13D. The Proposal shortens the Schedule 13D filing deadline from 10 days to 5 days following the acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than 5% or losing eligibility to file a Schedule 13G.
  • Institutional/Exempt Schedule 13G. The Proposal requires an initial Schedule 13G filing for institutional investors and exempt investors by the 5th business day after month-end in which their beneficial ownership exceeds 5% (in place of the current 45 days after the calendar-year-end in most circumstances).
  • Passive Schedule 13G. The Proposal shortens the initial Schedule 13G filing deadline for passive investors from 10 days to 5 days after acquiring beneficial ownership of more than 5%.

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The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation

Lucian Bebchuk is the James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School; and Roberto Tallarita is a Lecturer on Law and Associate Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School. This post is based on their recent paper.

Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum here); and Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita.

With the rising support for stakeholder capitalism and at the urging of its advocates, companies have been increasingly using ESG metrics for CEO compensation. In a recently released study, The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation, we provide a conceptual and empirical analysis of this practice, and we expose its fundamental flaws and limitations. The use of ESG-based compensation, we show, has questionable promise and poses significant perils.

Based partly on an empirical analysis of the use of ESG compensation metrics in S&P 100 companies, we identify two structural problems. First, ESG metrics commonly attempt to tie CEO pay to limited dimensions of the welfare of a limited subset of stakeholders. Therefore, even if these pay arrangements were to provide a meaningful incentive to improve the given dimensions, the economics of multitasking indicates that the use of these metrics could well ultimately hurt, not serve, aggregate stakeholder welfare.

Second, the push for ESG metrics overlooks and exacerbates the agency problem of executive pay, which have received closed attention from both scholars and policymakers. In particular, we warn that the use of ESG metrics threatens to reverse the progress achieved in the past few decades in making executive pay more transparent, more sensitive to actual performance, and more open to outside oversight and scrutiny.

To ensure that they are designed to provide effective incentives rather than serve the interests of executives, pay arrangements need to be subject to effective scrutiny by outsiders. However, our empirical analysis shows that in almost all cases in which S&P 100 companies use ESG metrics, it is difficult if not impossible for outside observers to assess whether this use provides valuable incentives or rather merely lines CEOs’ pockets through performance-insensitive pay. Encouraging and expanding the use of ESG-based compensation, we explain, gives self-interested executives a powerful tool to increase their payoffs without creating any significant incentives to deliver value to either stakeholders or shareholders.

The current use of ESG metrics, we conclude, likely serves the interests of executives, not of stakeholders. Expansion of ESG metrics should not be supported even by those who care deeply about stakeholder welfare.

Below is a more detailed account of our analysis:

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