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HLS Faculty & Senior Fellows
Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board
- Peter Atkins
- David Bell
- Kerry E. Berchem
- Richard Brand
- Daniel Burch
- Paul Choi
- Jesse Cohn
- Arthur B. Crozier
- Renata J. Ferrari
- Andrew Freedman
- Ray Garcia
- Joseph Hall
- Jason M. Halper William P. Mills
- David Millstone
- Theodore Mirvis
- Philip Richter
- Elina Tetelbaum
- Sebastian Tiller
- Marc Trevino
- Steven J. Williams
Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation
Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top
In my article, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, forthcoming in the Boston College Law Review, I offer a new theory to explain why corporations are so bad at privacy. We have all heard numerous stories of corporations neglecting to protect, failing to consider, or in some cases even intentionally violating the privacy of […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Securities Regulation
Tagged Behavioral finance, Consumer protection, Cybersecurity, Disclosure, Information environment, Investor protection, Management, Managerial style, Misconduct, Privacy, Securities regulation
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An Empirical Analysis of Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties in Australia
There is significant international interest in enforcement of directors’ duties. Our paper presents the findings of an empirical study of judicial proceedings brought by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) for breaches of the directors’ duties provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in the ten […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Securities Regulation
Tagged Australia, Boards of Directors, Conflicts of interest, Director liability, Duty of care, Duty of good faith, Fiduciary duties, International governance, Liability standards, Misconduct, Securities enforcement
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Women Directors and Participation on Key Committees
Women corporate directors globally are showing greater proportional gains on occupying key board committees than on boards overall, according to a new analysis by leading governance and ESG data and analytics provider Institutional Shareholder Services. Between Jan. 1, 2014, and Jan. 1, 2016, the proportion of women directorships at companies across major markets and indices […]
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, International Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Audit committee, Australia, Board composition, Board dynamics, Boards of Directors, Canada, Compensation committees, Director qualifications, Diversity, EU, Europe, International governance, Japan, Nominating committees, UK
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How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?
The idea that stock market pressure leads to “managerial myopia” has been a recurring concern and has evolved into a heated debate in recent years as activist hedge funds have come to epitomize shareholder empowerment. Our study, How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?, aims to inform the debate by analyzing how hedge fund […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Empirical Research
Tagged Bebchuk-Brav-Jiang study, Capital allocation, Firm performance, Hedge funds, Innovation, Long-Term value, Patents, R&D, Shareholder activism, Short-termism
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Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation
Prominent scholars have descried a pattern of boom and bust in securities laws: after financial crisis comes “bubble law,” “quack” regulation that is a misguided populist reaction with little empirical support. [1] In other words, crisis leads to reactionary legislation. But what about when Congress legislates in the absence of a precipitating crisis—most recently, in […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Banking & Financial Institutions, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Empirical Research, Financial Crisis, Financial Regulation, Securities Regulation
Tagged Asset bubbles, Dodd-Frank Act, Enron, Financial crisis, Financial institutions, Financial reform, Financial regulation, Governance reform, JOBS Act, SEC, SEC rulemaking, Securities regulation, SOX
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The Value-Decreasing Effect of Staggered Boards
In an article published in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2013, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, we provided evidence that market participants perceive staggered boards to be, on average, value-decreasing. In an April 2016 paper, summarized in a recent post on the Forum (available here), Amihud and […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Boards of Directors, Empirical Research, HLS Research
Tagged Antitakeover, Classified boards, Entrenchment, Shareholder value, Shareholder voting, Staggered boards, Takeover defenses
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The “Gimlet Eye” and Shareholder Voting
On May 19, 2016, the Delaware Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined the directors of Cogentix Medical from reducing the size of the company’s board because, under the facts presented, there was a reasonable probability that the board reduction plan was implemented to defeat insurgent candidates in a contested director election. Pell v. Kill, C.A. No. 12251-VCL […]
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Corporate Elections & Voting, Court Cases, Mergers & Acquisitions, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Board dynamics, Boards of Directors, Classified boards, Delaware cases, Delaware law, Management, Merger litigation, Mergers & acquisitions, Proxy contests, Proxy fights, Shareholder elections, Shareholder rights, Shareholder suits, Shareholder voting
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Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk During Economic Expansions and Recessions
In our article, Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk during Economic Expansions and Recessions, which is forthcoming in the Review of Finance, we show that the relationship between managerial pay-for-performance incentives and risk taking is pro-cyclical. A significant portion of executive pay packages are in the form of equity-based compensation, which create pay-for-performance sensitivity and […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Executive Compensation, Financial Crisis
Tagged Agency costs, Equity-based compensation, Executive Compensation, Financial crisis, Firm performance, Incentives, Management, Managerial style, Pay for performance, Risk, Risk management, Risk-taking, Stock returns
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Getting the Most from the Evaluation Process
More than ten years have passed since the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) began requiring annual evaluations for boards of directors and “key” committees (audit, compensation, nominating/governance), and many NASDAQ companies also conduct these evaluations annually as a matter of good governance. [1] With boards now firmly in the routine of doing annual evaluations, one challenge […]
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Posted in Boards of Directors, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Practitioner Publications
Tagged Board communication, Board evaluation, Board performance, Boards of Directors, Council of Institutional Investors, Disclosure, ISS, Proxy disclosure, Surveys
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Shareholder Proposal Settlements, the SEC, and Campaign Finance Disclosure
Reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to influence federal, state, and local elections—and particularly what is known about corporate “dark money”—comes […]
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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation, Corporate Elections & Voting, Securities Regulation
Tagged Agency costs, Campaign finance, Disclosure, ESG, Political spending, Private ordering, Reputation, Rule 14a-8, SEC, Shareholder proposals, Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, Transparency, Voluntary Disclosure
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