Yearly Archives: 2018

2017 Financial Stability Report

This post is based on the executive summary of the 2017 Financial Stability Report prepared by the Office of Financial Research.

The OFR’s Financial Stability Report presents our annual assessment of U.S. financial stability. The financial system is now far more resilient than it was at the dawn of the financial crisis 10 years ago. But new vulnerabilities have emerged.

Chapter 1 of the complete publication (available here) highlights three potential threats to financial stability: vulnerability to cybersecurity incidents, resolution risks at systemically important financial institutions, and evolving market structure. Chapter 2 concludes that overall financial stability risks remain in a medium range, although market risks are elevated.

In developing our financial stability assessment this year, we kept in mind that the United States has begun a two-year period of 10-year anniversaries of key events from the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Anniversaries encourage reflection on the events of the past, the reactions to those events, and the lessons learned. Anniversaries of massively disruptive events such as the crisis lead to hard questions: How does today differ? Are we better positioned to withstand the next crisis?

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Compensation in the 2018 Proxy Season

Holly M. Bauer and Adam L. Kestenbaum are partners in, and Bradd L. Williamson is global Co-chair of, the Benefits, Compensation & Employment Practice at Latham & Watkins. This post is based on a Latham & Watkins publication by Ms. Bauer, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Kestenbaum, David T. Della Rocca, and James D.C. Barrall. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes: Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here); and The Growth of Executive Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein.

2018 brings significant changes to the executive and director compensation landscape due to the passage of H.R. 1—informally known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act [1] (the TCJA)—the implementation of the CEO pay ratio disclosure rules, and a surprising court decision in Delaware regarding director compensation. These developments, along with the perennial proxy season compensation considerations, warrant new or renewed attention and may affect proxy disclosure or annual meeting agenda items.

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Stock Market Evaluation, Moon Shots, and Corporate Innovation

Ming Dong is an associate professor of finance at York University Schulich School of Business; David Hirshleifer is Paul Merage Chair in Business Growth and professor of finance at University of California at Irvine Paul Merage School of Business, and a Research Associate at NBER; Siew Hong Teoh is Dean’s Professor of Accounting at University of California at Irvine Paul Merage School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper.

We test how stock market overvaluation affects corporate innovative activities and success. Under what we call the misvaluation hypothesis of innovation, firms respond to market overvaluation by engaging more heavily in innovative activities, resulting in higher future innovative output. We further argue that overvaluation encourages the most risky and creative forms of innovation (“moon shots”). We empirically test this hypothesis by relating measures of stock misvaluation to corporate innovative investment in the form of research and development (R&D), innovative output (measured by the number of patents and patent citations), and innovative inventiveness (measured by novelty, originality, and scope of patents and citations).

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Weekly Roundup: January 26–February 1, 2018


More from:

This roundup contains a collection of the posts published on the Forum during the week of January 26–February 1, 2018.

Corporate Governance Update: Boards, Sexual Harassment, and Gender Diversity




Points to Remember When Preparing Your Form 10-K



The Effects of Investment Bank Rankings: Evidence from M&A League Tables


Activism in 2018



Preparing a Successful IPO in 2018



A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory Firms





The Highest-Paid Boards



The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism

The Changing Face of Shareholder Activism

Paula Loop is Leader, Catherine Bromilow is Partner, and Leah Malone is Director of the Governance Insight Center at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Ms. Loop, Ms. Bromilow, and Ms. Malone. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Dancing with Activists by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum here); Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here).

Activism is about driving change. Shareholders turn to it when they think management isn’t maximizing a company’s potential. Activism can include anything from a full-blown proxy contest that seeks to replace the entire board, to shareholder proposals asking for policy changes or disclosure on some issue. In other cases, shareholders want to meet with a company’s executives or directors to discuss their concerns and urge action. The form activism takes often depends on the type of investor and what they want.

Institutional investors and hedge funds typically have the most impact. Individual investors may submit lots of shareholder proposals, but they usually lack the backing to drive real change.

To prepare for—and possibly to even avoid—shareholder activism, companies and their directors need to understand today’s landscape. Who are the activists? What are they are trying to achieve? When are activists more likely to approach a company? What tactics do they use? We break down the answers by the two main types of investors. Read on.

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Disasters and Disclosures

Donald Langevoort is Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. This post is based on his recent paper.

Corporate disasters happen with unnerving frequency. These can be visibly dramatic events like the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig catastrophe, with loss of life, environmental damage, and great consequential economic loss. Many are (or are also) legal compliance disasters: a massive fine or penalty imposed on the company after government authorities determine that the corporation surreptitiously had violated the law. Others may be on a smaller scale yet still painful, as with a defective product on which the company had pinned its hopes or the departure of a key leader under questionable circumstances. In a working paper entitled Disasters and Disclosures, I explore the legal risks associated with corporate disclosures before, during and after these kinds of events, focusing mainly on Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market litigation.

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The Highest-Paid Boards

Courtney Yu is Director of Research at Equilar, Inc. This post is based on an Equilar publication by Mr. Yu, available here.

Since the enactment of Say on Pay following the passage of Dodd-Frank, executive compensation has been closely watched and scrutinized by corporate shareholders. However, the compensation of those who represent shareholders—the board of directors—often flies under the radar. While no mandated check or balance like Say on Pay currently exists for director compensation, recent events may change the current governance landscape.

As covered in a recent Equilar post, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) published annual updates to its proxy voting guidelines. With respect to director pay, the new guidelines state:

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Activists and Socially Responsible Investing

Charles Nathan is a senior advisor at Finsbury LLC, and an adjunct professor of law at Yale Law School and Columbia Law School. This post is based on a commentary by Mr. Nathan. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? By Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum here), and Social Responsibility Resolutions by Scott Hirst (discussed on the Forum here).

At first blush, activists embracing socially responsible investing sounds like an oxymoron. After all, a common perception is that activist investors are solely financial engineers who seek short-term stock market gains by leveraging balance sheets, selling off valuable corporate assets and imprudent cost-cutting of R&D and other long-term value creators. What could be farther from short-term financial engineering than socially responsible investing, which typically looks to a much longer-term impact on the company’s financial and commercial performance?

However, like so much in life, the real world is far more complicated and harder to categorize. First, many activist campaigns are not about financial engineering in any sense. While activists sometimes do campaign on platforms that include (or perhaps consist principally of) cost-cutting, far from all of these are imprudent cost reductions at the expense of long-term growth. More important, many activist campaigns focus on building the business through better organizational structures and/or more effective focus on improving the quality of goods and services. Indeed, the latter type of activist investor policy has been in the ascendant among leading activist investors for several years now.

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2017 Year in Review: Corporate Governance Litigation & Regulation

Jason Halper and Nathan Bull are partners and Jared Stanisci is special counsel at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. This post is based on a Cadwalader publication by Mr. Halper, Mr. Bull, Mr. Stanisci, Jaclyn Hall, Christina Martin and William Simpson, and is part of the Delaware law series; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Delaware courts have recently issued decisions that have fundamentally altered corporate governance litigation. In 2016, the Court of Chancery changed the landscape for resolution of class actions on the basis of “disclosure-only” settlements, i.e., settlements without any monetary payment to the class. In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., the Court of Chancery refused to approve such a settlement to the extent it provided a class-wide release unless the supplemental disclosure was “plainly material.” In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC that a transaction otherwise subject to Revlon review instead would be analyzed under the deferential business judgment rule if the transaction was approved by a majority of fully informed, uncoerced, disinterested stockholders. Confirming the far-reaching implications of Corwin, in Singh v. Attenborough, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “dismissal is typically the result” following Corwin‘s standard shifting, suggesting that the presumption is virtually irrefutable in that it can only be overcome by a showing of waste. The cumulative effect of these decisions has been to discourage pre-closing deal litigation (by making disclosure-based settlement much more difficult) and post-closing deal litigation (by making dismissal a near certainty where the procedural protections articulated in Corwin are in place).

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Destructive Collectivism: Dodd-Frank Coordination and Clearinghouses

Yuliya Guseva is Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School. This post is based on her recent article, published in the Cardozo Law Review.

Research on financial regulation consistently focuses on several critical paradigms, including, inter alia, the calls for better economic justification of regulations and the role of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Prominent commentators, including Robert Bartlett, John Coates, Jeffrey Gordon, Robert Jackson, Eric Posner, Cass Sunstein, and others, have dissected the pros and cons, as well as the feasibility, of economic and cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation. One of the recent articles in this debate, by Prof. Revesz, proposes expanding the FSOC’s role in the economic analysis of individual regulations or, in the alternative, adding an additional layer of administrative review to be provided by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The underlying presumption is that the independent regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), often do not have the required expertise to run proper economic analysis. The FSOC, by contrast, is an entity focused on the gestalt of the financial landscape and systemic risk identification. In this task, it is aided by the well-respected Office of Financial Research.

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