Author Archives: Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation

SEC Request for Comments on Quarterly Reporting and Earning Releases

In a release issued December 18, 2019, the SEC requested comments on the hotly debated subject of quarterly reporting. The Release summarizes the request as follows: The Commission is requesting public comment on how we can enhance, or at a minimum maintain, the investor protection attributes of periodic disclosures while reducing administrative and other burdens […]

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SEC Enforcement Activity: Public Companies and Subsidiaries—Fiscal Year 2018 Update

After a decline in new enforcement actions that began in the second half of FY 2017 and continued into the first half of FY 2018, SEC activity rebounded in 2H FY 2018. The SEC filed a record-setting 55 new actions against public companies and subsidiaries in 2H FY 2018, resulting in a total of 71 […]

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Soft Shareholder Activism

The modus operandi of a typical activist investor is to target a public company and propose major changes to its strategy, financial policy, operations, and personal. To defend themselves against these proposals, companies use poison pills, staggered boards, dual-class structures, and other measures. Securities regulation and disclosure requirements also limit the power of activists. In […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Boards of Directors, Corporate Elections & Voting, Empirical Research, Institutional Investors, Mergers & Acquisitions | Tagged , , , , , , | Comments Off on Soft Shareholder Activism

Roundup of Key Federal Securities Litigation Developments

The Scope of “Scheme Liability”: Supreme Court Grants Cert to Determine the Extent of Rule 10b-5 On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission (Docket No. 17-1077), a case that considers the potential liability for a false statement that is not “made” by a person under the […]

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Audit: Radical Change on the Horizon?

Audit committee chairs may find resonance in the phrase “tragedy of the horizon”, an expression coined in 2015 by Bank of England governor Mark Carney, which refers to the paradox that arises when market actors must take urgent action to address a long-term risk—but have no observable short-term incentive to do so. Carney was talking […]

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Posted in Academic Research, Accounting & Disclosure, Boards of Directors, HLS Research, International Corporate Governance & Regulation | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Mutual Fund Board Connections and Proxy Voting

Mutual funds own 24 percent of the U.S equity market and are dominant players in proxy voting. If mutual funds were to vote their proxies to maximize firm value, they would play an important role in corporate governance. However, many funds may not find it optimal to invest resources to get informed about specific votes. […]

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ISS and Glass Lewis Policy Updates for the 2019 Proxy Season

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) have updated their proxy voting policies for shareholder meetings held on or after February 1, 2019 (ISS) or January 1, 2019 (Glass Lewis). This post (i) summarizes the changes in proxy voting policies that apply to U.S. companies, (ii) discusses the practical implications of […]

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The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures

We have recently placed on SSRN an academic presentation, The Lifecycle Theory of Dual-Class Structures, that we prepared for delivery as Lucian Bebchuk’s keynote address at the December 2018 ECGI-BIU conference on differential voting structures. The presentation focuses on the structure and influence of the lifecycle theory of dual-class structure introduced in Bebchuk and Kastiel, […]

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Investment Returns and Distribution Policies of Non-Profit Endowment Funds

Endowment funds are repositories for gifts and operating surpluses generated by non-profit organizations. Often described by their parent organizations as “nest eggs” or “rainy day funds,” endowments invest in stocks, bonds, and alternative asset classes such as hedge funds and private equity, and they pay income to their parents to subsidize operating costs and capital […]

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The Prescience of 5% of Investors: A Monsanto Case Study

Even though a proposal receives only a fraction of shareholder support, it may still be the best available opportunity to bring more foresight to investors, board, and management on an issue that may eventually prove costly to a company. Only a small portion of investors may be exercising prescience on risk management or governance issues […]

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